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CHAPTER	1	INTRODUCTION	
	
“I	speak	as	a	woman	and	a	mother	.	.	.	who	was	told	she	had	one	chance	in	a	
million	of	having	a	child.	 I	had	a	therapeutic	abortion	20	years	ago	 in	a	Catholic	
hospital.”1	In	1969,	Republican	N.	Lorraine	Beebe,	a	first-term	state	senator	from	
Dearborn,	 stood	 before	 the	 Michigan	 Senate,	 which	 was	 considering	 a	 bill	 to	
liberalize	 Michigan’s	 ban	 on	 abortion,	 and	 stunned	 her	 colleagues	 with	 that	
admission.	 Her	 medically	 necessary	 abortion,	 while	 traumatic,	 was	 safely	
performed	in	a	hospital.	She	recognized,	however,	that	many	women	who	could	
not	 legally	 terminate	 their	 pregnancies	 suffered	 long-term	 medical	 and	
psychological	difficulties,	or	even	died,	as	a	result	of	illegal,	back-street	abortions.	
Beebe	believed	that	her	male	colleagues	could	not	understand	the	gravity	and	the	
impact	of	the	decision	that	they	were	about	to	make	on	behalf	of	women.	By	adding	
a	female	perspective	to	the	debate,	she	represented	all	those	women	who	were	
unable	 to	 obtain	 a	 legal	 abortion.	 She	 later	 emphasized	 that	 “only	 in	 dire	
circumstances	will	a	woman	ask	for	an	abortion,	and	that	only	she,	not	her	husband	
or	doctor,	only	she	.	.	.	is	the	one	who	must	live	with	this	decision.	Abortion	is	no	
																																																						
1	Barbara	Holliday,	“The	Lady	Said	‘Abortion,’	If	You	Want	to	Awaken	Our	State	Senate,	
Try	Lorraine	Beebe’s	Method,”	Detroit	Free	Press	Magazine,	August	3,	1969.	
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joke,	especially	to	a	woman.”2	Thus,	Beebe,	as	the	only	woman	in	the	Senate,	felt	
compelled	 to	 share	 her	 personal	 story	 with	 them.3	The	 legislature,	 sensing	 the	
gravity	of	the	moment,	gave	her	a	standing	ovation,	but	she	did	not	convince	them	
to	decriminalize	abortion	in	Michigan.4	The	proposed	legislation	was	defeated.	
Beebe	paid	a	political	and	personal	price	for	publicizing	her	pro-choice	stand	
on	abortion.	In	1970,	she	was	not	reelected	to	the	Michigan	Senate.	She	attributed	
her	loss	to	her	gender	and	her	public	support	for	abortion.5	The	morning	after	the	
election,	she	said,	“I	stood	up	and	spoke	for	women	.	.	.	and	I	see	my	defeat	as	a	
slap	against	all	women.”6	Her	story,	however,	was	a	preview	of	events	 to	come.	
Over	 the	 next	 fifteen	 years,	 as	 the	 women’s	 movement	 developed	 and	 the	
Republican	 Party	 took	 a	 conservative	 turn	 to	 the	 right,	women	who	were	 both	
																																																						
2	Judy	Jacob,	“Dearborn’s	Lady	Senator	Speaks	Up	on	Abortion,	Grapes	and	Problem	
Kids,”	Detroit	News,	July	14,	1969.	
	
3	Ibid.	
	
4	Jim	Neubacher,	“Abortion:	Up	from	the	Underground,”	Detroit	News,	n.d.,	Lorraine	
Beebe	Scrapbook,	N.	Lorraine	Beebe	Papers,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	
(hereafter	cited	as	Beebe	Papers).	
	
5	Stephen	Dobyms,	“Newcomer	Defeats	Mrs.	Beebe:	Dearborn	Senator	Blames	Abortion	
Stand,”	Detroit	News,	[November	4,	1970?],	box	1,	folder:	Beebe-State	Senate	Election	
Campaigns	1966	and	1970,	Beebe	Papers;	Willa	Weddon,	“Is	Bias	a	Bar	to	Women	Candidates?”	
Detroit	Free	Press,	November	22,	1970.	
	
6	Dobyms,	“Newcomer	Defeats	Mrs.	Beebe,”	Detroit	News.	
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Republicans	and	feminists	found	it	increasingly	difficult	to	reconcile	these	two	parts	
of	their	lives.	Ultimately	they	were	forced	to	choose	between	two	elements	at	the	
core	of	their	identities:	Am	I	a	Republican?	Or	am	I	a	feminist?	
Although	 it	 is	sometimes	overlooked	and	may	be	difficult	 to	comprehend,	
the	 conflict	 between	 the	 Republican	 Party	 and	 feminism	 was	 not	 inevitable.	
Historically,	women’s	rights	activists	found	that	the	Republican	Party	offered	them	
more	support	in	their	fight	for	equality.	In	1920,	in	response	to	the	not-yet-ratified	
Nineteenth	 Amendment	 that	 provided	 women	 with	 the	 right	 to	 vote,	 the	
Republican	National	Party	platform	provided	that	“we	welcome	women	 into	full	
participation	in	the	affairs	of	government	and	the	activities	of	the	Republican	Party.	
We	earnestly	hope	that	Republican	legislatures	in	states	which	have	not	yet	acted	
on	the	suffrage	amendment	will	ratify	the	amendment,	to	the	end	that	all	of	the	
women	of	the	nation	of	voting	age	may	participate	in	the	election	of	1920,	which	
is	 so	 important	 to	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 country.” 7 	Pragmatically,	 Republicans	
recognized	the	potential	power	of	women,	who	would	ultimately	constitute	half	of	
the	expanded	voting	population.		
																																																						
7	“The	Republican	Party	and	Women:	A	Brief	History,”	Republican	Women	for	I.W.Y.,	
n.d.,	box	2,	folder:	International	Women’s	Year	Houston	Conference,	1977,	Patricia	Hill	Burnett	
Papers,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	Burnett	Papers).	
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Despite	these	gestures,	however,	after	1920	the	Republican	Party,	much	like	
the	Democratic	Party,	did	 little	 to	promote	 the	 interests	of	women.	 In	 fact,	 the	
political	 parties	 became	 largely	 indifferent	 to	 women	 once	 they	 realized	 that	
female	voters	would	not	change	the	outcomes	of	elections	because	they	did	not	
vote	in	a	bloc.	While	some	women	chose	to	become	involved	in	party	politics,	the	
men	in	charge	accepted	women	only	on	their	terms,	and	assigned	them	the	menial	
tasks	that	men	refused	to	perform.	These	early	political	women	did	not	gain	any	
real	 power	 in	 the	 parties,	 although,	 according	 to	 political	 scientist	 Jo	 Freemen,	
women	fared	a	little	better	in	the	Republican	Party	than	the	Democratic	Party.8		
With	 the	advent	of	 second	wave	 feminism	 in	 the	 late	1960s,	many	of	 the	
women	who	worked	with	or	in	the	Republican	Party	became	Republican	feminists.	
Because	they	sought	gender	equality,	they	believed	that	feminism	and	the	party,	
with	its	longstanding	commitment	to	individual	rights	and	opportunities,	could	be	
easily	integrated.	By	the	late	1970s,	however,	conservatives	had	coalesced	within	
the	Republican	Party	in	opposition	to	both	moderate	Republicans,	who	were	their	
intra-party	 rivals,	 and	 feminists,	 who	 sought	 government	 solutions	 to	 their	
inequality.	Conservatives	argued	that	the	American	way	of	life	was	threatened	by	
																																																						
8	Jo	Freeman,	A	Room	at	a	Time:	How	Women	Entered	Political	Parties	(Lanham	MD:	
Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2000),	228-29.	
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the	continuous	expansion	and	intrusion	of	the	liberal	federal	government	into	the	
lives	of	individuals;	families;	private	institutions,	such	as	the	church;	and	local	public	
institutions,	like	schools.	Feminist	Republicans	appeared	to	be	on	a	collision	course	
with	the	conservatives	in	their	own	party.	Despite	this	intra-party	conflict,	however,	
historian	 Catherine	 Rymph	 found	 that	 “during	 the	 mid-1970s,	 there	 was	 an	
ideological	space	in	the	party	for	Republican	feminists,	and	it	appeared	briefly	that	
Republican	feminism	might	be	a	real	political	force.”9	Michigan	offered	Republican	
feminists	similar	opportunities	because,	from	1962	to	1982,	under	the	leadership	
of	two	consecutive	moderate	Republican	governors,	“Michigan	was	considered	a	
model	in	the	nation	for	the	possibilities	of	moderate	Republicanism.”10	
This	dissertation	examines	the	evolution	of	Republican	feminism	from	the	
late	1960s	until	 the	early	1980s	 through	the	experiences	of	 seven	of	Michigan’s	
most	 prominent	 Republican	 feminists.	 These	 women	 mediated	 the	 conflicts	
between	feminism	and	conservatism	in	order	“‘to	maintain	a	feminist	presence	in	
the	 Republican	 Party	 and	 to	 maintain	 a	 Republican	 presence	 in	 the	 feminist	
																																																						
9	Catherine	Rymph,	Republican	Women:	Feminism	and	Conservatism	from	Suffrage	
through	the	Rise	of	the	New	Right	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2006),	189.	
	
10	Francis	X.	Blouin,	Jr.,	review	of	William	G.	Milliken:	Michigan’s	Passionate	Moderate,	
by	Dave	Dempsey,	Michigan	Historical	Review	33,	no.	1	(Spring	2007):	141,	
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/stable/20174206.	
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movement.’” 11 	Republican	 feminists	 partnered	 with	 moderate	 party	 leaders	 to	
stave	off	 this	 conservative	 challenge	by	 staking	out	 “the	 sensible”	 center	of	 the	
women’s	 movement. 12 	From	 this	 middle	 ground,	 they	 were	 able	 to	 engage	 in	
feminist	activism	and	simultaneously	repudiate	the	radical	feminism	that	many	of	
their	moderate	Republican	colleagues	found	offensive.	In	exchange,	they	expected	
the	 party	 to	 embrace	 their	 moderate	 feminist	 goals.	 As	 they	 battled	 with	
conservatives	 to	 determine	 who	 would	 become	 the	 true	 representatives	 of	
Republican	 women,	 they	 became	 a	 part	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 control	 of	 the	
Republican	 Party.	 As	 they	 feared,	 however,	when	moderate	 Republicanism	was	
displaced	by	conservatism,	they	were	 left	without	a	political	home.	At	the	same	
time,	 the	 “conservative	 ascendance”13	undermined	 the	 attempts	 of	 Republican	
feminists	 to	 incorporate	 a	 Republican	 voice	 into	 the	 feminist	 movement.	 They	
																																																						
11	Ken	Fireman,	“Angry	GOP	Women	Disown	Task	Force,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	June	26,	
1983;	Position	Statement,	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force,	n.d.,	box	7,	folder:	Topical	
files	1969-1982	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force,	Helen	Milliken	Papers,	Bentley	
Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	Helen	Milliken	Papers).	
	
12	Elly	Peterson,	Elly!:	Memoirs	of	a	Republican	Lady!,	s.l.,	s.n.,	[1990?],	121-22,	Elly	
Peterson	Papers,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	Peterson	
Papers).	
	
13	Donald	Critchlow	uses	a	variant	of	this	phrase	in	the	title	of	his	monograph,	The	
Conservative	Ascendancy:	How	the	GOP	Right	Made	Political	History,	which	chronicles	the	rise	
of	the	conservative	movement	in	the	United	States.	Donald	Critchlow,	The	Conservative	
Ascendency:	How	the	GOP	Right	Made	Political	History	(Boston:	Harvard	University	Press,	
2007).	
		
7	
found	 that	 feminists	 were	 not	 interested	 in	 associating	 with	 a	 conservative	
Republican	Party	that	repudiated	their	feminist	agenda.	As	the	1970s	ended,	so	too	
did	their	hopes	of	 integrating	their	gendered	 interests	with	their	Republicanism.	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	were	each	forced	to	choose	between	these	two	
different	core	identities.	
These	seven	women	came	to	the	Republican	Party	from	various	backgrounds	
and	with	different	interests.	However,	because	of	their	activism,	their	paths	often	
crossed.	Over	time,	some	of	them	became	good	friends.	Beebe,	the	oldest	of	these	
women,	 was	 born	 in	 Kalamazoo,	 Michigan,	 in	 1910.	 She	 was	 elected	 to	 the	
Michigan	 Senate	 as	 a	 Republican	 representative	 from	 blue-collar	 Dearborn,	
Michigan,	in	1966.	Although	she	lost	her	reelection	bid	in	1970,	she	continued	her	
activism	with	an	emphasis	on	abortion	rights	for	all	women.14	Only	slightly	younger	
than	Beebe,	Elly	Peterson	was	born	 in	1914	in	New	Berlin,	 Illinois	and	moved	to	
Charlotte,	Michigan,	in	1948.	She	spent	much	of	her	life	working	for	the	Republican	
Party,	but	in	her	later	years	she	led	the	nonpartisan	fight	to	ratify	the	Equal	Rights	
																																																						
14	Judy	Jacob,	“Dearborn’s	Lady	Senator	Speaks	Up;”	N.	Lorraine	Beebe,	Inductee,	
Michigan	Women’s	Hall	of	Fame,	http://www.michiganwomenshalloffame.org/home.aspx.		
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Amendment	(ERA).15	Patricia	Hill	Burnett,	born	in	Ohio	in	1920,	was	a	wealthy	wife,	
mother	and	famous	portrait	artist.	She	never	held	a	political	office	but	was	a	co-
founder	of	the	Michigan	chapter	of	the	National	Organization	for	Women	(NOW).	
She	remained	active	in	Republican	politics	and	in	the	feminist	movement	for	her	
entire	life.16		
Ruth	 McNamee,	 born	 in	 1921,	 was	 married	 and	 had	 two	 college-aged	
children	when	she	became	mayor	of	Birmingham,	Michigan,	a	wealthy	suburb	of	
Detroit,	 in	 1970.	 As	 a	 ten-year	 representative	 from	 Birmingham	 in	 the	 state	
legislature,	she	fought	for	both	the	ERA	and	abortion	rights.17	Born	in	1922,	Helen	
Milliken	was	married	to	Michigan’s	Governor	William	Milliken	and	the	mother	of	
two	children.	She	never	held	elective	office,	but	used	her	position	as	Michigan’s	
first	 lady	 to	 promote	 feminist	 causes,	 especially	 the	 ERA.18 	Helen	 Milliken	 and	
																																																						
15	Sara	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	“Mother	of	the	Moderates”	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	
Michigan	Press,	2011).	Fitzgerald	wrote	this	biography	of	Peterson	with	the	cooperation	of	
Peterson.	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	20-22.	
	
16	Patricia	Hill	Burnett,	True	Colors:	An	Artist’s	Journey	from	Beauty	Queen	to	Feminist	
(Troy,	MI:	Momentum	Books,	1995).	
	
17	Ruth	McNamee,	Vita,	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Ruth	Braden	McNamee	Biographical	Vita	and	
Overview	Articles,	Ruth	Braden	McNamee	Papers,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	University	of	
Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	McNamee	Papers).	
	
18	Dave	Dempsey,	William	G.	Milliken:	Michigan’s	Passionate	Moderate	(Ann	Arbor:	
University	of	Michigan	Press,	2006),	130-45;	Helen	Milliken,	Inductee,	Michigan	Women’s	Hall	
of	Fame,	http://www.michiganwomenshalloffame.org/home.aspx.		
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Peterson	 became	 life-long	 friends	 through	 their	 shared	 activism	 on	 behalf	 of	
women’s	 rights.	 Similarly,	Helen	Milliken	 and	McNamee	became	 very	 close	 and	
continued	to	correspond	long	after	they	left	public	service.		
Born	in	northern	Michigan	in	1924,	Connie	Binsfeld	had	five	grown	children	
when	she	became	involved	in	politics.	She	“was	the	first	women	to	hold	leadership	
posts	in	Michigan’s	House,	Senate,	and	executive	branch.”	19	She	served	as	assistant	
minority	leader	in	the	House,	assistant	majority	leader	in	the	Senate	and	lieutenant	
governor	 to	 conservative	 governor	 John	 Engler. 20 	As	 a	 feminist	 who	 opposed	
abortion,	 she	was	 uniquely	 positioned	 to	 try	 to	 bridge	 the	 differences	 between	
feminists	 and	 the	 conservatives	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 The	 youngest	 of	 these	
women,	 Lee	 Kefauver,	 was	 born	 in	 1934.	 Her	 cousin	 was	 Estes	 Kefauver,	 the	
prominent	Democratic	United	States	 senator	 from	Tennessee.	Divorced	and	 the	
mother	of	two,	she	never	held	elective	public	office	but	was	a	lobbyist	and	activist	
																																																						
19	“Former	Michigan	Lt.	Gov.	Connie	Binsfeld	Dies,”	Associated	Press,	January	13,	2014,	
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/former_michigan_lt_gov_connie.html.	
	
20	John	Flesher	and	John	Kennett,	“Former	Lt.	Gov.	Connie	Binsfeld	Remembered	by	
Local	Officials,	Others,”	Midland	Daily	News,	January	15,	2014,	
http://www.ourmidland.com/news/article/Former-Lt-Gov-Connie-Binsfeld-remembered-by-
6927214.php.	
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for	women’s	rights	for	most	of	her	adult	life,	with	a	special	interest	in	abortion.21	
While	fighting	for	access	to	abortion	for	all	women,	she	often	worked	with	Beebe.		
Beebe,	 Peterson,	 Burnett,	 McNamee,	 Milliken,	 Binsfeld,	 and	 Kefauver	 all	
believed	 that	 they	 were	 both	 Republicans	 and	 feminists.	 This	 study	 does	 not	
purport	to	determine	or	even	try	to	examine	whether	they	were	genuine	feminists	
or	 real	 Republicans.	While	 some	may	 disagree	with	 one	 or	more	 of	 these	 self-
assessments,	the	veracity	of	how	they	identified	themselves	is	not	important	for	or	
relevant	to	this	analysis.	Rather,	what	 is	critical,	and	what	this	research	 is	based	
upon,	is	that	these	women	believed	that	they	were	Republicans	and	feminists.		
This	analysis	 is	both	chronologically	and	geographically	bounded.	 It	begins	
with	the	emergence	of	second	wave	feminism	in	the	late	1960s	and	ends	with	the	
ascendance	 of	 conservatism	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party	 in	 the	 early	 1980s.	 At	 that	
point,	each	woman	had	to	decide	how	to	prioritize	and	reconcile	her	potentially	
conflicting	 interests.	 It	 is	 a	 grassroots	 analysis	 predicated	 on	 observations	 and	
experiences	 gleaned	 from	 their	 correspondence,	 memoirs,	 notes,	 and	 other	
																																																						
21	David	Holtz,	“Lansing	Lobbyists	Strike	from	Dearborn,”	Dearborn	Press	&	Guide,	
September	6,	1979,	box	1,	folder:	Lee	Kefauver,	Organizations,	WEAL,	Michigan	Division,	1973-
1980,	Lee	Kefauver	Papers,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	
Kefauver	Papers).	This	article	incorrectly	identified	Estes	Kefauver	as	a	Republican.	Lee	
Kefauver,	“Personal	History	with	Pro-Choice	Activities,”	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Lee	Kefauver,	
Biographical	Information,	Kefauver	Papers.	
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records,	as	well	as	the	documents	of	both	the	partisan	and	feminist	organizations	
to	which	they	belonged,	and	newspaper	articles	that	contemporaneously	described	
their	activities.	Although	this	story	is	situated	within	a	larger	national	context,	the	
focus	 is	 primarily	 on	 feminists	 who	 participated	 in	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party	
politics.	
As	 a	 study	 of	 Republican	 feminists	 during	 the	 1970s,	 this	 dissertation	 is	
situated	at	the	point	where	the	historiographies	of	feminism,	the	rise	of	Republican	
conservatism,	and	women	in	the	Republican	Party	intersect.	The	women	who	are	
the	subject	of	this	study	were	all	Republicans	before	they	became	feminists.	They	
shared	 with	 their	 male	 counterparts	 a	 conviction	 that	 party	 politics	 effectively	
facilitated	change	and	a	commitment	 to	 the	beliefs	and	goals	of	 the	Republican	
Party.	At	least	some	of	them	were	what	historians	have	called	“party	women”	who	
sought	to	participate	in	party	politics	on	the	same	terms	as	men.22	They	immersed	
themselves	 in	 the	 party	 bureaucracy	 and	 willingly	 performed	 the	 mundane	
housekeeping	duties	of	the	party	in	order	to	convince	the	party’s	leaders	that	they	
could	be	loyal	and	competent	partisans.23	However,	the	Republican	Party	did	not	
																																																						
22	Rymph,	Republican	Women,	2-7.	
	
23	Ibid.	
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reward	them	for	their	loyalty	and	hard	work.	With	the	emergence	of	second	wave	
feminism,	these	female	political	activists	finally	had	a	frame	of	reference	through	
which	to	understand	their	dissatisfaction	and	redirect	their	activism.	
Second	wave	feminists	participated	in	the	broader	social	movement	activism	
that	swept	the	United	States	in	the	1960s.	Historians	often	divide	the	women	who	
participated	 in	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 feminism	 into	 two	 groups.24 	“Equal	 rights”	
feminists	worked	within	 the	existing	 legal,	 economic	and	political	 framework	 to	
eliminate	discrimination	and	produce	a	society	 that	 treated	men	and	women	as	
equals.	They	tended	to	be	older,	professional	women	who	became	conscious	of	
gender	 inequality	 and	 the	 efficacy	 of	 legal	 remedies	 for	 discrimination.25	Myra	
Marx	Ferree	and	Beth	B.	Hess	noted	that	these	feminists	were	likely	to	promote	
feminism	through	their	participation	 in	 feminist	organizations	such	as	NOW,	the	
Women’s	Equity	Action	League	(WEAL),	and	the	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus	
(NWPC).26	
																																																						
24	Jo	Freeman,	“The	Origins	of	the	Women’s	Liberation	Movement,”	American	Journal	of	
Sociology	78,	no.	4	(January	1973):	795-98;	Myra	Marx	Ferree	&	Beth	B.	Hess,	Controversy	and	
Coalition:	The	New	Feminist	Movement	Across	Four	Decades	of	Change	(New	York:	Routledge,	
2000),	56-75;	Sara	M.	Evans,	Tidal	Wave:	How	Women	Changed	America	at	Century’s	End	(New	
York:	Free	Press,	2003),	21-24.	
	
25	Evans,	Tidal	Wave,	21-26;	Ferree	and	Hess,	Controversy	and	Coalition,	59-65.	
	
26	Ferree	and	Hess,	Controversy	and	Coalition,	65-68.	
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Women’s	liberation	feminists	were	often	younger	women	who	participated	
in,	but	felt	 increasingly	marginalized	by	the	masculinity	and	militancy	of	the	civil	
rights,	anti-war	and	New	Left	movements	of	the	1960s.	They	were	more	likely	to	
reject	 the	 political	 and	 legalistic	 solutions	 to	 inequality	 sought	 by	 their	 older	
counterparts	 and,	 influenced	 by	 their	 membership	 in	 the	 protest	 and	
counterculture	 movements	 of	 the	 1960s,	 they	 emphasized	 self	 awareness,	
nonhierarchical	organizations,	and	collective,	egalitarian	strategies	to	achieve	their	
goals.	 These	 more	 unconventional	 feminists	 tended	 to	 divide	 into	 socialist	
feminists,	who	believed	that	discrimination	against	women	was	due	to	the	class	
oppression	that	resulted	from	capitalism,	and	radical	feminists,	who	argued	that	
the	problem	was	patriarchy,	which	could	only	be	resolved	by	revolutionizing	the	
system	to	make	gender	irrelevant.	Some	of	these	feminists	believed	that	women	
would	be	liberated,	and	men	and	women	would	be	truly	equal,	only	when	the	social	
constructs	that	created	the	artificial	differences	between	men	and	women	were	
eliminated	by	 significant	 structural	 changes	 to	 society.27	Cultural	 feminism	grew	
																																																						
27	Evans,	Tidal	Wave,	21-24,	26-38;	Ferree	and	Hess,	Controversy	and	Coalition,	68-75.	
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out	 of	 radical	 feminism.	 These	 women	 believed	 in	 female	 superiority	 and	
advocated	gendered	separatism.28	
Although	they	were	not	a	monolithic	group,	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	
can	best	be	characterized	as	equal	rights	feminists.	As	a	demographic	group,	they	
were	very	homogenous–white,	middle	class,	married	or	divorced	and,	for	the	most	
part,	mothers.	Middle-aged	when	they	became	feminists	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	
1970s,	 none	 of	 them	 were	 products	 of	 or	 participants	 in	 any	 of	 the	 protest	
movements	of	the	1960s.	Republicans	before	they	became	feminists,	they	believed	
that	political	power	was	the	key	to	feminist	success	and	that	feminist	success	was	
the	 key	 to	 political	 power.	 They	promoted	 their	 feminism	not	 only	 through	 the	
Republican	Party,	but	also	by	participating	in	feminist	organizations,	such	as	NOW,	
WEAL,	 and	 the	 NWPC. 29 	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 eschewed	 radical,	 or	
women’s	 liberation	 feminism,	 with	 its	 ties	 to	 the	 anti-establishment	 social	
movements	of	the	1960s.	They	disputed	(or	failed	to	recognize)	the	ties	between	
gender	discrimination	and	class	or	racial	oppression	and,	therefore,	dismissed	the	
need	 to	 revolutionize	 the	system	to	eliminate	 the	social	 constructs	 that	created	
																																																						
28	Alice	Echols,	Daring	to	be	Bad:	Radical	Feminism	in	America	1967-1975	(Minneapolis:	
University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1989),	1-11.	
	
29	Ferree	and	Hess,	Controversy	and	Coalition,	65-68.	
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artificial	 differences	 between	 men	 and	 women.	 Instead,	 they	 believed	 that	
incremental	change	within	the	system	would	remedy	the	disadvantages	of	women.	
As	 feminists,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 sought	 “to	 maintain	 .	 .	 .	 a	
Republican	presence	 in	 the	 feminist	movement.”30	They	 joined	with	 like-minded	
political	feminists	in	a	multipartisan	network	of	coalitions	through	which	they	tried	
to	politicize	and	empower	women.	Political	participation	was	a	feminist	goal	in	and	
of	itself.	At	the	same	time,	however,	coalition	members	understood	that	if	women	
participated	 in	 political	 parties	 and	 were	 elected	 and	 appointed	 to	 influential	
leadership	 positions	 in	 the	 government,	 they	 would	 be	 able	 to	 enact	 laws	 and	
policies	that	advanced	both	their	feminist	and	partisan	interests.31		
This	network	of	 coalitions,	however,	experienced	 the	same	problems	 that	
plagued	most	feminist	coalitions.	While	members	all	shared	the	disadvantages	they	
experienced	 as	 women,	 they	 had	 other,	 competing	 identities	 that	 they	 had	 to	
reconcile,	integrate,	or	prioritize	to	be	able	to	come	together,	at	least	temporarily,	
to	pursue	their	feminist	goals.	Stephanie	Gilmore	called	these	multiple	identities	
																																																						
30	Position	Statement,	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force.	
	
31	Catherine	E.	Rymph,	“Political	Feminism	and	the	Problem	of	Sarah	Palin,”	in	Obama,	
Clinton,	Palin:	Making	History	in	Election	2008,	ed.	Liette	Gidlow	(Champagne:	University	of	
Illinois	Press,	2011),	137.	
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the	“intersecting	hierarchies	in	their	lives”	that,	for	the	most	part,	challenged	the	
coalitions	that	they	built.32	Sara	Evans	described	the	resultant	instability	of	these	
coalitions	as	follows:	“If	human	identities	are	both	multiple	and	fluid,	the	human	
communities	 generated	 by	 grassroots	 organizing	 are	 similarly	 never	 fixed	 and	
always	 filled	with	 competing	perspectives	and	 interests.”33	For	a	 short	 time,	 the	
political	and	gendered	interests	of	these	women	aligned	in	this	network	of	affiliated	
political	coalitions.	Their	differences	soon	emerged,	however,	and	they	struggled	
to	find	common	ground.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 Republican	 feminists	 realized	 that	 they	 could	 not	
accomplish	all	of	their	gendered	and	partisan	objectives	through	a	feminist	political	
organization.	Therefore,	they	needed	“to	maintain	.	.	.	a	feminist	presence	in	the	
Republican	Party.”34	They	tried	to	convince	party	men	and	women	that	feminism	
and	Republicanism	were	synergetic.	The	Republican	Party	needed	female	voters	
and	participants,	and	feminism	was	the	best	way	to	politicize	women.35	But	as	the	
																																																						
32	Stephanie	Gilmore,	ed.,	Feminist	Coalitions:	Historical	Perspectives	on	Second-Wave	
Feminism	in	the	United	States	(Chicago:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2008),	2-3,	6-7;	Ferree	and	
Hess,	Controversy	and	Coalition,	vii,	211.	
	
33	Sara	M.	Evans,	forward	to	Feminist	Coalitions,	by	Gilmore,	x.	
	
34	Position	Statement,	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force.	
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Republican	 Party	 turned	 to	 the	 right,	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	met	with	
increased	resistance,	especially	from	conservative	women.		
The	 Republican	 Party	 had	 long	 encompassed	moderate	 and	 conservative	
wings	that	had	managed	to	coexist	as	their	fortunes	waxed	and	waned	in	relation	
to	the	Democratic	Party	and	each	other.36	However,	by	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	
century,	 the	 conservative	 movement,	 while	 rife	 with	 internal	 conflicts,	 was	
beginning	 to	 unite.	 Members	 opposed	 communism	 and	 big	 government,	 and	
supported	a	 laissez-faire,	capitalist	economy,	 low	taxes,	 individual	 responsibility,	
the	traditional	family,	and,	perhaps	most	importantly,	a	shared	desire	for	power.	
Yet	 conservatives	did	not	 follow	a	 linear	path	as	 they	 took	over	 the	Republican	
Party.		
The	 nomination	 of	 conservative	 Barry	 Goldwater	 as	 the	 Republican	
candidate	 for	 president	 in	 1964	 persuaded	 conservatives	 that	 they	 had	 finally	
																																																						
Establishment	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	1998);	Mary	Fainsod	Katzenstein,	Faithful	
and	Fearless:	Moving	Feminist	Protest	inside	the	Church	and	Military	(Princeton:	Princeton	
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36	Geoffrey	Kabaservice,	Rule	and	Ruin:	The	Downfall	of	Moderation	and	the	Destruction	
of	the	Republican	Party,	From	Eisenhower	to	the	Tea	Party	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2012),	xvii-xix;	Geoffrey	Kabaservice,	“How	Democrats	are	Complicit	in	the	War	Against	
Women,”	New	Republic,	April	8,	2012,	https://newrepublic.com/article/102441/war-women-
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gained	control	of	the	party.	His	overwhelming	defeat	by	Democrat	Lyndon	Johnson,	
however,	 quickly	 dashed	 their	 hopes.	 Instead	 of	 giving	 up,	 they	 regrouped.	
Moderate	 party	 leadership	 largely	 underestimated	 and	 overlooked	 the	 growing	
grassroots	 support	 they	were	building	 for	 conservatism.	The	Watergate	debacle	
that	 resulted	 in	 President	 Richard	 Nixon’s	 resignation	 severely	 damaged	 the	
Republican	Party	with	voters,	and	further	divided	moderates	and	conservatives	as	
they	blamed	each	other	for	the	scandal.	In	1976,	after	a	valiant	effort,	conservative	
candidate	 Ronald	 Reagan	 lost	 the	 Republican	 nomination	 for	 president	 to	
moderate	Gerald	Ford.	While	Reagan	lost	the	nomination,	Ford	lost	the	presidential	
election	to	Democrat	Jimmy	Carter,	which,	according	to	Kabaservice,	“removed	the	
moderates’	 last	defense	against	a	 conservative	 takeover	of	 the	GOP.”37	In	1980,	
Reagan	 came	 back	 to	 win	 the	 nomination	 and	 defeated	 Carter	 for	 president.	
Reagan’s	 victory	 marked	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 conservative	 takeover	 of	 the	
party.38		
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The	Michigan	Republican	Party	faced	similar	conservative	challenges,	but	for	
many	 years	 the	 party’s	moderate	 leaders	minimized	 their	 influence.	 From	1962	
until	1969,	Michigan	was	led	by	Governor	George	Romney,	a	prominent	member	
of	the	moderate	wing	of	the	national	Republican	Party.	He	believed	that	a	political	
party	 needed	 to	 encompass	 a	 wide-ranging	 diversity	 of	 ideas	 to	 facilitate	
compromise,	 political	 stability,	 and	 cohesion.	 As	 a	 pragmatist,	 he	 promoted	 an	
inclusive	political	party	and	tried	to	appeal	to	a	broad	swath	of	Michigan	voters,	
including	 a	 large	 number	 of	 independents	 and	 traditionally	 Democratic	 union	
members.	 Romney	 rejected	 conservatism	 because	 he	 opposed	 identity	 or	
ideological	 politics	 that	 pitted	 one	 group	 against	 another.	 He	 feared	 that	
conservatives	espoused	a	single-minded	political	extremism	that	 threatened	the	
future	of	the	party.39	According	to	Kabaservice,	Romney	was	one	of	the	last	chances	
to	save	moderate	Republicanism.40	
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In	 1969,	 moderate	 Republican	 William	 Milliken	 succeeded	 Romney	 as	
Michigan’s	 governor	 when	 Romney	 accepted	 a	 position	 in	 President	 Richard	
Nixon’s	 cabinet.	 Milliken	 was	 elected	 governor	 in	 1970,	 1974,	 and	 1978.	 Like	
Romney,	he	believed	in	an	open	and	inclusive	Republican	Party.	He	understood	that	
the	party	needed	to	attract	independent	voters	in	order	to	win	elections	and	thus	
eschewed	conservative	extremism.	While	Romney’s	very	public	opposition	to	the	
ERA	made	it	difficult	to	characterize	him	as	a	feminist,	Milliken	actively	supported	
feminist	causes.	In	fact,	two	female	friends,	his	assistant	for	political	appointments	
Joyce	Braithwaite	and	attorney	Harriet	Rotter,	characterized	Milliken	as	a	long-time	
feminist.	His	commitment	to	gender	equality	provided	a	political	space	within	the	
Michigan	 Republican	 Party	 and	 the	 state	 of	Michigan	 that	 allowed	 feminists	 to	
pursue	 their	 feminist	 goals.41	However,	 conservatives	 completed	 their	 efforts	 to	
take	 control	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party	 in	 1982	 when	 Republican	 primary	
voters	elected	conservative	Richard	Headlee	as	the	party’s	candidate	for	governor.	
By	 the	 early	 1970s,	 conservatives	 openly	 opposed	 feminism.	 Many	
conservatives	were	 angered	 and	 frightened	 by	 the	 breakdown	 in	 the	 American	
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family	caused,	they	believed,	by	the	women’s	movement.	 In	 fact,	 the	two	belief	
systems	 were	 understandably	 at	 odds	 because	 the	 rights	 sought	 by	 feminists	
contradicted	 the	 longstanding	 definition	 of	 the	 family	 embraced	 by	
conservatives.42	Pamela	 Johnston	 Conover	 and	 Virginia	 Gray	 put	 it	 very	 simply:	
“When	the	role	of	a	woman	is	defined	by	her	reproductive,	sexual,	and	childrearing	
functions	within	the	family,	then	there	is	a	‘natural’	division	of	activities	into	the	
public	 extrafamilial	 jobs	 done	 by	 the	 male	 and	 the	 private	 intrafamilial	 ones	
performed	 by	 the	 female.	 If	 women	 act	 outside	 their	 ‘natural’	 roles,	 that	 is	 as	
individuals,	that	action	is	ipso	facto	anti-family.”43		
Conservatives	clung	to	the	traditional	definition	of	the	family	and	argued	that	
feminists	denied	its	fundamental	foundation–the	immutable	biological	differences	
between	men	and	women.	By	declaring	that	men	and	women	were	identical,	the	
ERA	threatened	to	eliminate	longstanding	protections	for	women	and	force	them	
to	work	outside	the	home.	As	a	result,	conservatives	worried,	children	would	be	
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raised	by	the	state	in	day	care	centers	and	families	would	be	destroyed.44	Pro-life	
advocates	believed	 that	women	were	biologically	destined	 to	be	mothers.	 They	
argued	 that	 abortion,	 which	 was	 the	 murder	 of	 an	 unborn	 child,	 undermined	
motherhood	 and	 disrupted	 the	 traditional	 roles	 of	men	 and	women	within	 the	
nuclear	family.45	Conservatives	were	convinced	that	 feminists	promoted	divorce,	
dismissed	the	traditional	roles	of	women	as	wives	and	mothers,	and,	 in	general,	
legitimized	immoral	behavior.46	
Feminists,	on	the	other	hand,	challenged	the	notion	of	the	traditional	family.	
They	believed	that	society	defined	what	it	meant	to	be	a	man	or	woman.	Without	
these	artificial	constructs,	they	argued,	women	would	have	the	same	opportunities	
as	 men	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 of	 politics,	 economics,	 and	 culture. 47	
Feminists	contended	that	an	unwanted	pregnancy	was	a	barrier	to	gender	equality.	
Women	needed	to	control	their	reproductive	decisions	so	that	they	could	prioritize	
the	relative	importance	of	pregnancy	and	motherhood	in	their	lives.	According	to	
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feminists,	 the	 issues	 that	 had	 long	 been	 considered	 personal,	 including	 gender	
relations,	 sexual	preferences,	 reproductive	 rights,	 and	 family	 structure,	 involved	
the	distribution	of	power,	which	made	them	political.48	The	ERA	and	abortion	rights	
would	help	to	equalize	men	and	women.		
While	feminists	believed	that	the	ERA	and	abortion	rights	would	empower	
women,	conservatives	argued	that	feminists,	who	sought	to	impose	on	them	their	
interpretations	of	sexual	difference	and	gender	neutrality,	limited	women.49	Thus,	
in	the	context	of	the	ERA,	Donald	G.	Mathews	and	Jane	Sherron	DeHart	concluded	
that	“the	appeal	to	individual	rights	that	elicited	from	ratificationists	a	 liberating	
vision	evoked	from	their	opponents	different	images–women	forced	to	be	men	and	
thus	bereft	of	 the	 female	 relationships	 that	had	defined	and	sustained	 them.”50	
Conservative	 activists	 offered	 apocalyptic	messages	 because	 they	 believed	 that	
society	 would	 be	 irreversibly	 altered	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 all	 Americans	 by	 the	
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ratification	of	the	ERA	and	the	legalization	of	abortion.	With	such	high	stakes,	the	
debates	were	rancorous	and	compromise	became	impossible.		
Historians	believe	that	the	anti-feminist	activism	of	conservative	women	was	
more	than	just	a	backlash	to	feminism	and	differing	worldviews.51	Kim	Phillips-Fein	
argued	 that	 the	 conservatism	 of	 these	 women	was	 tied	 “to	 a	 broader	 political	
framework	 .	 .	 .	 [through	which]	 ideas	about	gender	shaped	visions	of	 the	 state,	
economic	 regulation,	 anticommunism,	 and	 the	 proper	 role	 of	 government.” 52	
Rosalind	Pollack	Petchesky	cynically	asserted	that	conservatives	did	not	politicize	
their	opposition	to	abortion	because	they	were	concerned	about	pregnant	women	
and	their	fetuses.	Instead,	they	used	it	to	enhance	their	political	power	so	that	they	
could	 impose	 their	 larger	 ideological	 agenda,	 including	 the	 privatization	 of	 the	
traditional	patriarchal	family,	business,	religion,	and	education,	upon	the	American	
people.53		
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In	 fact,	 both	 liberals,	 including	 feminists,	 and	 conservatives	 invoked	 the	
notion	of	the	family	to	justify	their	own	political	agendas.	Matthew	Lassiter	found	
that,	during	the	1970s,	each	group	offered	their	own	economic,	political,	and	social	
programs	 to	 address	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 traditional	 nuclear	 family.	 Liberals	
attributed	the	breakdown	to	the	flailing	economy	and	proposed	as	solutions	the	
very	 types	 of	 programs,	 such	 as	 equal	 rights	 for	 women	 in	 the	 workplace	 and	
government	funded	childcare,	that	conservatives	disdained.	Conservatives	argued	
that	American	families	were	under	siege	by	feminism.	Equal	rights	and	 legalized	
abortion	 led	 to	 promiscuity	 and	 immorality.	Moreover,	 the	 economic	 solutions	
promoted	by	 feminists	encouraged	women	to	work	outside	of	 the	home,	which	
further	undermined	 the	 family	 and	expanded	 the	 government.	 The	only	way	 to	
save	the	traditional	family,	according	to	conservatives,	was	to	stop	the	women’s	
movement.54		
Robert	 O.	 Self	 argued	 that	 feminists	 battled	 with	 conservatives	 over	 the	
appropriate	definition	of	the	American	family.	Both	attacked	the	traditional	liberal	
construct	of	family–characterized	by	a	white	male	breadwinner	and	a	stay-at-home	
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mother,	propped	up	and	supported	by	various	social	welfare	programs–because	it	
did	not	reflect	reality.	Feminists	believed	that	the	notion	of	family	had	to	be	flexible	
enough	 to	 incorporate	 alternative	 lifestyles,	 such	 as	 single	 parent	 families	 and	
families	with	same-gender	parents.	Conservatives,	on	the	other	hand,	constructed	
their	own	idealized	image	of	an	economically	independent	family	with	a	white	male	
breadwinner	and	a	stay-at-home	mother,	which	did	not	rely	on	government	social	
welfare	programs.	Instead,	the	conservative	family	needed	government	protection	
from	the	moral	 threats	posed	by	 feminism,	such	as	 legalized	abortion.	 Ironically	
government	 interference	 became	 a	 moral	 threat	 to	 families,	 which	 required	 a	
different	 type	 of	 government	 interference	 to	 protect	 families.	 Although	 they	
argued	about	the	appropriate	definition	of	the	family,	each	side	was	really	debating	
the	economic,	political,	social,	and	ideological	direction	of	the	country.55		
When	Self’s	contest	between	liberals,	feminists	and	conservatives	over	the	
family	is	superimposed	on	the	two-party	political	system	in	Michigan,	it	becomes	
apparent	that	 this	debate	was	situated	 largely	within,	and	became	a	part	of	 the	
struggle	over,	who	would	dictate	 the	 future	of	 the	Republican	Party.	As	Rymph	
noted,	“Conflicts	between	feminists	and	antifeminists	were	an	important	part	of	
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the	process	by	which	the	Republican	Party	remade	itself	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.”56	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	were	significant	participants	 in	this	controversy.	
They	claimed	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	movement	as	they	emphasized	
moderate	political	 and	 legalistic,	 rather	 than	 radical,	 structural,	 solutions	 to	 the	
problems	that	faced	women.	From	this	middle	ground,	they	aligned	with	moderate	
Republicans	to	refute	conservative	allegations	about	the	dangerous	extremism	of	
feminism	 and	 to	 stop	 conservatives	 from	 implementing	 their	 political	 agenda	
through	the	Republican	Party.		
Ironically,	 the	 conservative	movement	 embraced	 female	 activists,	 such	 as	
Phyllis	Schlafly,	who	used	their	political	and	organizational	skills	to	politicize	this	
new	 constituency	 of	 anti-feminist	 conservative	 voters. 57 	Schlafly	 and	 her	
conservative	Michigan	cohorts,	Elaine	Donnelly	and	Patt	Barbour,	spent	the	1970s	
battling	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists.	As	they	fought	over	who	would	represent	
women	and	define	the	family	within	the	Republican	Party,	the	stakes	were	high.	
These	women	identified,	framed,	constructed,	and	articulated	their	positions	and	
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arguments	in	response	to	and	anticipation	of	each	other.	58	They	became	a	part	of	
the	 ongoing	 struggle	 over	 the	 control	 of	 the	 future	 of	 the	Michigan	Republican	
Party.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 abortion,	 where	 compromise	 between	 feminists	 and	
conservatives	 appeared	 impossible,	 one	 group	 of	 women	 seemed	 to	 have	 the	
potential	to	at	least	partially	bridge	the	gap.	Mary	Ziegler	identified	a	group	of	“pro-
life	feminists”	within	the	feminist	movement.59	They	promoted	gender	equality	but	
did	 not	 believe	 that	 it	 was	 dependent	 on	 access	 to	 abortion.	 These	 women	
struggled	to	find	an	ideological	home.	Conservative	leaders	did	not	agree	with	their	
commitment	to	gender	equality	and	liberal	feminists	linked	opposition	to	abortion	
with	 anti-feminism.	 Ziegler	 noted	 that	 “ERA	 opponents	 [like	 Schlafly]	 helped	 to	
convince	anti-abortion	activists	that	it	was	politically	impossible	to	oppose	abortion	
while	supporting	the	women’s	movement.”60	In	1976,	NOW	leader	Karen	DeGrow	
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delegitimized	 pro-life	 feminists	 when	 she	 stated,	 “I	 don’t	 think	 you	 can	 be	 a	
feminist	 and	 be	 against	 the	 right	 of	 a	 woman	 to	 choose	 abortion.” 61 	Ziegler	
suggested	that	activists	 like	these	women,	“who	sought	middle-ground	positions	
on	gender	 issues,”	created	opportunities	 for	compromise	on	 issues	about	which	
pro-life	 and	 pro-choice	 women	 might	 otherwise	 be	 able	 to	 agree. 62 	Binsfeld	
represented	these	pro-life	feminists	in	Michigan.	
Despite	their	optimism	and	the	opportunities	available	to	them,	Michigan’s	
Republican	 feminists,	 aligned	with	party	moderates,	were	 losing	 their	battle	 “to	
maintain	a	feminist	presence	in	the	Republican	Party	and	to	maintain	a	Republican	
presence	in	the	feminist	movement.”63	By	1980,	the	brief	window	of	opportunity	
to	align	feminism	with	the	Republican	Party	had	passed	and,	as	Rymph	asserted,	
conservatives	had	marginalized	and	forced	feminists	out	of	the	Republican	Party.	
Rymph	concluded	with	a	suggestion	that,	by	the	end	of	the	1980s,	a	new	type	of	
woman	had	 replaced	 feminists	 in	 the	Republican	Party.	This	woman	 focused	on	
individualism	 rather	 than	 sexual	 difference	 or	 identity	 politics.	 Rymph’s	 new	
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Republican	woman	did	not	expect	the	government	to	solve	gender	inequality	and	
did	not	believe	that	she	would	be	empowered	by	joining	with	other	women.64		
These	women	were	Rebecca	Klatch’s	laissez-faire	conservative	women.	They	
believed	 that	 a	 limited	 federal	 government	 should	 not	 become	 involved	 in	 the	
economy	 or	 the	 lives	 of	 American	 citizens.65	According	 to	 Klatch,	 these	women	
were	genderless	economic	actors	who,	like	men,	benefited	from	a	robust	capitalist	
economy	to	the	extent	of	their	 individual	initiative	and	effort.	While	laissez-faire	
conservatives	 recognized	 that	 women	 were	 subject	 to	 discrimination,	 they	
opposed	the	ERA	because	it	allowed	the	federal	governmental	to	become	involved	
in	individual	lives.	Instead,	they	argued,	problems	of	gender	discrimination	should	
be	resolved	at	the	state	and	local	level.	Abortion	was	a	private	issue	in	which	the	
government	should	never	be	involved,	even	to	subsidize	poor	women	who	would	
otherwise	be	denied	access	to	the	procedure.	Klatch	argued	that	unlike	feminists,	
who	advocated	changing	and	expanding	roles	for	women,	and	social	conservatives,	
who	 promoted	 traditional	 familial	 roles	 for	 women,	 laissez-faire	 conservative	
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women	did	not	identify	with	other	women	based	on	gender	and	never	supported	
positions	that	promoted	the	interests	of	women	as	women.66	
As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 increasingly	 contentious	 intra-party	 conflict,	 and	 the	
ultimate	ascendance	of	conservatism	within	the	Republican	Party,	the	interests	and	
priorities	 of	 many	 Republican	 feminists	 changed,	 their	 identities	 and	
commonalities	 diverged,	 and	 the	 women,	 who	 had	 often	 worked	 together	 but	
never	 self-identified	 as	 a	 single	 cohesive	 group,	 fragmented.	 Each	 Republican	
feminist	had	to	choose	whether	to	prioritize	her	feminist	interests	or	her	loyalty	to	
a	Republican	Party	that	no	longer	supported	feminism.	Some	left	the	Republican	
Party	 or	 supported	 candidates	 from	 other	 parties.	 A	 small	 number	 of	 them	
continued	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 Republican	 Party	 provided	 them	 with	 the	 best	
opportunities	 to	 meet	 their	 goals	 and,	 therefore,	 they	 remained	 loyal	 party	
members.	 Those	 feminists	who	 stayed,	 however,	were	 not	 Klatch’s	 laissez-faire	
conservatives.	They	did	not	abandon	 their	 identification	with	or	 support	 for	 the	
women’s	movement.	Instead,	they	adapted	their	feminist	rhetoric	to	the	changes	
in	the	party	as	they	tried	to	make	it	more	receptive	to	women’s	rights.	
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This	 dissertation	 begins	 in	 Chapter	 One	 with	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
development	 of	 feminism	 in	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party	 through	 the	
experiences	of	 three	Republican	 feminists,	Peterson,	Beebe,	and	Burnett.	When	
the	second	wave	of	 feminism	emerged	 in	the	 late	1960s,	 the	moderation	of	the	
leaders	of	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	provided	space	for	the	development	of	a	
feminist	 consciousness	 and	 the	 active	 pursuit	 of	 feminist	 goals	 by	many	 of	 the	
women	within	 the	 party.	 These	women	were	 all	 Republicans	 before	 they	were	
feminists.	 They	adopted	an	 interpretation	of	 feminism	 that	 repudiated	 its	more	
radical	elements,	thereby	facilitating	its	convergence	with	moderate	Republicanism.	
From	 this	 sensible	 center	 of	 the	 women’s	 movement,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	
feminists	 positioned	 themselves	 to	 both	 promote	 feminism	 and	 oppose	
conservatism	within	the	Michigan	Republican	Party.		
Chapter	Two	continues	with	an	analysis	of	the	formation	and	operation	of	
the	NWPC	and	its	state	affiliate,	the	Michigan	Women’s	Political	Caucus	(MWPC).	
When	 members	 realized	 that	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 pursue	 their	 partisan	 interests	
within	 this	 multipartisan	 organization,	 they	 created,	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	
women’s	political	caucuses,	the	National	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force	(NRWTF)	
and	 its	 state	 affiliate,	 the	Michigan	 Republican	Women’s	 Task	 Force	 (MRWTF).	
Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 organized	 and	 participated	 in	 these	 coalitions	
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believing	 that	 their	 large	 numbers	 would	 provide	 them	with	 access	 to	 political	
power	to	promote	their	feminist	interests	in	the	male-dominated	Republican	Party	
and	 the	national,	 state,	and	 local	political	 systems	more	broadly.	Through	 these	
organizations,	 they	 tried	 “to	 maintain	 a	 Republican	 presence	 in	 the	 feminist	
movement.”67	As	 this	chapter	 illustrates,	however,	 this	network	of	organizations	
suffered	 from	 the	 problems	 that	 all	 feminist	 coalitions	 faced.	 The	 Republican	
feminists	who	participated	in	these	feminist	caucuses	were	partisan	political	actors	
who	struggled	 to	 reconcile	 their	partisanship	with	 the	coalition’s	 feminism.	As	a	
result,	 they	 were	 forced	 to	 regularly	 reprioritize	 and	 reconcile	 their	 multiple	
interests	in	order	to	make	the	coalition	work	and	to	remain	both	Republicans	and	
feminists.		
Chapter	 Three	 looks	 at	 how	 Republican	 feminists	 simultaneously	
participated	in	single	issue	coalitions	and	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	to	fight	for	
the	 ratification	 of	 the	 ERA.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 different	ways	 that	 these	 activists	
formulated	and	articulated	their	strategies	and	arguments	depending	on	whether	
they	were	working	with	other	feminists	to	achieve	these	specific	goals,	or	seeking	
the	support	of	the	moderate	wing	of	the	Republican	Party	on	this	issue.	When	they	
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worked	with	their	Republican	colleagues,	they	framed	the	issues	 in	ways	that	fit	
into	a	partisan	narrative,	emphasizing	moderation	and	family	values	in	response	to	
their	 conservative	 critics.	 They	 operated	 within	 a	 metaphoric	 middle	 ground,	
mediating	 between	 the	 radical	 component	 of	 the	 feminist	 movement	 and	 the	
conservative	 faction	 of	 the	 Republican	 Party,	 hoping	 to	 convince	 Republican	
leaders	to	support	this	feminist	goal.	As	the	party	became	more	conservative	and	
intensified	its	opposition	to	the	ERA,	however,	Republican	feminists	found	that	the	
middle	 ground	 became	 a	 very	 small	 space	 that	 was	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	
negotiate.		
Chapter	 Four	 continues	 to	 explore	 the	 activism	 of	Michigan’s	 Republican	
feminists	in	the	context	of	abortion	rights	and	other	reproductive	issues.	Because	
of	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 ERA	 and	 abortion,	 they	 had	 to	 adopt	 different	
procedural	and	substantive	strategies	to	promote	and	protect	this	right.	Milliken’s	
support	 for	 abortion	made	 the	work	 of	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 easier,	
especially	with	 respect	 to	women	who	 could	not	 otherwise	 afford	 to	 terminate	
their	 pregnancies.	 As	 a	 Ziegler	 pro-life	 feminist,	 Binsfeld	 had	 ties	 to	 both	 the	
moderate	and	conservative	wings	of	 the	party.	She	challenged	 the	alignment	of	
abortion	 opponents	 with	 the	 anti-feminist	 movement,	 and	 seemed	 uniquely	
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positioned	to	bridge	some	of	the	differences	between	women	on	abortion	rights.	
This	effort,	however,	proved	more	challenging	than	anticipated.		
Chapter	Five	explores	the	ways	that	some	of	Michigan’s	Republican	women	
participated	 in	 the	 1977	 International	 Women’s	 Year	 (IWY)	 Conference,	 which	
marked	 a	 high	 point	 in	 the	women’s	movement.	 Five	 of	Michigan’s	 Republican	
feminists,	and	the	daughter	of	a	sixth,	attended	this	conference.	They	joined	with	
women	 from	 around	 the	 United	 States	 to	 reiterate	 their	 commitment	 and	
reenergize	their	efforts	to	ratify	the	ERA	and	protect	abortion	rights	for	all	women.	
Many	 of	 the	 members	 of	 Michigan’s	 growing	 conservative	 movement	 also	
attended	this	convention.	Their	recollections	of	the	event,	read	together	with	those	
of	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	in	attendance,	provide	an	interesting	snapshot	
of	 the	 status	 of	 feminism	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party	 at	 that	 time.	 However,	 by	
endorsing	a	more	radical	feminist	agenda	that	included	support	for	homosexuality,	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	provided	conservative	women	with	evidence	that	
Republican	 feminists	 were	 no	 longer	 at	 the	 sensible	 center	 of	 the	 women’s	
movement	 and,	 therefore,	 not	 moderate	 enough	 to	 represent	 women	 in	 the	
Republican	Party.		
Chapter	 Six	 is	 a	 study	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 conservative	 ascendency	
within	the	Republican	Party,	culminating	in	the	presidential	election	of	1980	and	
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the	 gubernatorial	 election	 of	 1982,	 influenced	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists.	
They	 all	 felt	 excluded,	 to	 different	 degrees,	 by	 the	 party’s	 rightward	 shift	 that	
caused	it	to	change	its	positions	on	issues	of	concern	to	them.	At	the	same	time,	
they	 were	 losing	 their	 influence	 in	 the	 political	 caucuses,	 which	 struggled	 to	
support	 conservative	Republican	 candidates	who	did	 not	 endorse	 their	 feminist	
agenda.		
Realizing	that	feminism	would	not	survive	in	a	Republican	Party	controlled	
by	 conservatives,	 and	 that	 any	 connection	 to	 a	 conservative	 Republican	 Party	
would	jeopardize	their	political	 influence	within	the	feminist	movement,	they	all	
had	to	recognize	and	try	to	reconcile	the	conflicts	between	these	components	of	
their	 core	 identities.	 Many	 Republican	 feminists	 prioritized	 their	 interests	 as	
women	over	their	partisan	loyalties	and	either	left	the	party	or	publicly	supported	
candidates	 from	 other	 parties	 who	 were	more	 responsive	 to	 their	 concerns	 as	
feminists.	 These	 women	 walked	 away	 from	 their	 prior	 attempts	 to	 make	 the	
Republican	 Party	 a	 broad-based,	 inclusive	 political	 organization.	 However,	 this	
chapter	 complicates	 the	assertion	 that	 conservatism	 left	no	 room	 for	a	 feminist	
political	 presence	 in	 the	Michigan	 Republican	 Party.	While	 many	 left,	 a	 few	 of	
Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 chose	 to	 continue	 to	 work	 within	 the	 party,	
believing	 that	 its	 stance	on	economic	and	 foreign	policy	 issues	would	ultimately	
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benefit	women.	They	hoped	to	continue	a	feminist	influence	within	the	Republican	
Party	in	order	to	persuade	party	leaders	to	abandon	the	conservatism	that	quashed	
their	feminist	goals.68	They	remained	committed	to	both	their	Republicanism	and	
their	feminism.	Thus,	this	chapter	will	illustrate	how	feminists	within	the	Michigan	
Republican	 Party	 both	 changed	 and	 were	 changed	 by	 the	 ascendance	 of	
conservatism	within	the	party.		
Republicans	 who	 became	 feminists	 came	 together	 during	 the	 1970s	 to	
promote	and	reconcile	their	partisan	and	gendered	interests.	As	this	dissertation	
will	 illustrate,	for	a	short	time	they	were	successful.	They	formed	coalitions	with	
feminists	outside	of	the	Republican	Party,	and	created	a	coherent	feminist	voice	
within	 the	 Republican	 Party	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 partner	 with	 moderate	
Republicans	 to	 try	 to	 stymie	 the	 rise	 of	 conservatism.	 As	 the	 Republican	 Party	
became	more	 conservative	 and	 less	 receptive	 to	 their	 feminist	 goals,	 however,	
their	different	priorities	undermined	their	ability	to	operate	as	a	cohesive	group	
and	they	fragmented.	Feminists	who	were	Republicans,	those	who	prioritized	their	
feminism	 over	 their	 partisanship,	 ultimately	 either	 supported	 non-Republican	
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candidates	or	left	the	party	altogether.	Republicans	who	were	feminists	remained	
in	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 became	 increasingly	
hostile	 to	 many	 of	 their	 feminist	 goals.	 In	 order	 to	 remain	 Republicans,	 their	
feminism	 had	 to	 be	 moderated	 or	 to	 change	 in	 response	 to	 the	 conservative	
ideology	that	was	espoused	by	those	who	controlled	the	party.	Ultimately,	some	of	
the	 ideals	 of	 Republican	 feminism	 survived	 the	 rise	 of	 conservatism	within	 the	
Michigan	 Republican	 Party	 as	 its	 few	 remaining	 adherents	 continued	 to	 exert	
pressure	on	the	party	to	recognize	the	rights	of	women.
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CHAPTER	2	THE	PATH	TO	THE	SENSIBLE	CENTER:	1960	TO	1970	
	
Women,	you	must	take	the	lead	in	building	this	party	if	it	is	to	survive.	
–Elly	M.	Peterson	
	
It	has	been	said	that	the	home	is	the	cradle	of	all,	a	grave	if	you	stay	there.		
–N.	Lorraine	Beebe	
	
We	must	turn	men	around	to	recognize	that	we	are	persons	before	we	are	women.	
–Patricia	Hill	Burnett	
	
In	 1970,	 Peterson,	 assistant	 chairman	 of	 the	 Republican	 National		
Committee	(RNC),	resigned	in	frustration	after	working	on	behalf	of	the	Republican	
Party	 in	different	 capacities	 for	over	 twelve	years.	 She	 spent	much	of	 that	 time	
trying	 to	 persuade	 the	 party	 to	 welcome	 women	 and	 minorities	 as	 equal	
participants,	but	she	could	never	get	past	the	discriminatory	attitudes	of	the	men	
who	led	the	party.	Faced	with	their	intransigence,	she	realized	that	she	would	have	
to	change	her	approach.	While	“she	ha[d]	always	thought	that	the	best	way	to	deal	
with	discrimination	against	women	was	not	to	complain,	but	to	endure	it	and	work	
around	 it	 [she	was	 no	 longer]	 sure.”1	She	 added,	 “I’m	 getting	 awfully	weary	 of	
maintaining	that	attitude.	I’m	getting	weary	at	the	discrimination	against	women	
in	all	kinds	of	political	life.	.	.	.	I	say,	if	men	keep	working	at	it,	we’ll	be	wiped	out	in	
																																																						
1	Richard	Dudman,	“Woman	GOP	Leader	Shows	Disenchantment,”	St.	Louis	Post-
Dispatch,	November	5,	1970,	box	23,	folder:	Scrapbook	July	1970-Dec	1970,	Peterson	Papers.		
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10	years.”2	Peterson’s	recognition	that	she	was	going	to	have	to	become	more	of	
an	activist	for	women’s	rights	led	her	to	the	sensible	center	of	feminism.		
Peterson’s	story	is	but	one	example	of	the	road	traveled	by	many	Republican	
women	during	the	1960s.	Beebe	and	Burnett	were	as	frustrated	as	Peterson–Beebe	
by	a	discriminatory	political	system	and	Burnett	by	a	patriarchal	society	that	limited	
her	 personal	 life	 and	 career.	 All	 three	 women	 believed	 that	 they	 could	 best	
effectuate	 change	 by	 working	 within	 the	 political	 system,	 specifically	 the	
Republican	Party.	But	they	had	little	success	breaking	through	the	gender	barriers	
erected	by	the	men	in	charge.	Second	wave	feminism	provided	these	women	with	
the	language	that	they	needed	to	understand	and	articulate	their	frustration	and	a	
framework	through	which	they	could	promote	their	common	interests	as	women.		
Although	 their	 paths	 to	 feminism	 were	 different,	 Republicans	 Peterson,	
Beebe,	 and	 Burnett	 developed	 similar	 understandings	 of	 and	 commitments	 to	
feminism.3	They	agreed	that	the	women’s	movement	was	polarized.	On	one	end	of	
the	spectrum,	apathetic	women	dismissed	feminism	because	they	were	satisfied	
																																																						
2	Ibid.	
	
3	Rymph	emphasized	the	developmental	diversity	of	Republican	feminists	on	the	
national	level.	They	traveled	many	roads	to	become	Republicans	and	feminists,	which,	she	
argued,	complicated	the	integration	of	feminism	into	the	Republican	Party.	Rymph,	Republican	
Women,	218-19.		
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with	their	lives	as	wives	and	mothers	and	saw	no	need	to	change	the	status	quo.	
On	the	opposite	end,	radical	feminists	believed	that	true	gender	equity	could	only	
be	 achieved	 by	 restructuring	 the	 system	 through	 revolutionary	 change.	 As	
Republican	 feminists,	Peterson,	Beebe,	 and	Burnett	 searched	 for	what	Peterson	
characterized	as	“the	sensible”	center	between	these	two	extremes4	because,	from	
this	position,	they	could	best	reconcile	their	 feminism	with	their	partisanship.	 In	
order	 to	 understand	 the	 complexities	 and	 richness	 of	 the	 feminist	 movement	
within	Michigan	Republican	Party	politics,	it	is	important	to	examine	how	and	why	
these	three	very	different	Republican	women	became	feminists.		
Peterson,	one	of	the	Michigan	Republican	Party’s	most	prominent	feminists,	
was	 neither	 a	 Republican	 nor	 a	 feminist	 when	 she	 became	 a	 member	 of	 the	
Republican	Party.	She	admitted	that	she	joined	a	political	party	because	that	was	
what	young	girls	did.	She	chose	the	Republican	Party	because	it	was	“more	fun”	
and	“had	by	far	the	nicest	parties.”5	Peterson	later	wrote	that	“we	wouldn’t	have	
known	an	issue	if	we	met	one	face	to	face	and	we	were	never	asked	to	meet	the	
																																																						
4	Peterson,	Memoirs,	121-22.	
	
5	Elly	Peterson, Elly!:	Confessions	of	a	Woman	Who	Walked	the	Streets,	s.l.,	s.n.,	1997,	
69,	Peterson	Papers.	
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candidates,	 or	 hear	what	 they	had	 to	 say.”6	Exhibiting	her	wry	 sense	of	 humor,	
Peterson	quipped	that	“like	prostitutes,	women	politicians	are	often	asked,	‘What’s	
a	nice	girl	like	you	doing	in	this	business?’	And,	like	prostitutes,	the	answer	is	often,	
‘MEN.’”7	
Peterson,	however,	met	her	husband	on	a	blind	date	set	up	by	her	 friend	
(although	he	was	not	the	date),	not	through	the	Republican	Party.	Married	in	1935,	
she	and	her	husband	divorced	eight	years	later	after	he	enlisted	in	the	Air	Force	
during	World	War	II.	Never	one	to	be	constrained	by	society’s	gender	norms,	the	
bored	divorcee	volunteered	 for	 the	Red	Cross	and	was	 sent	overseas	 to	Britain,	
France	and	Germany.8	She	and	her	ex-husband	 remarried	 in	1948	and	bought	a	
farm	in	Charlotte,	Michigan.9		
While	her	husband	traveled	with	the	National	Guard,	Peterson	returned	to	
Republican	 Party	 politics.10	In	 retrospect,	 she	 noted,	 “My	 political	 activism	 just	
																																																						
6	Ibid.	
	
7	Ibid.	
	
8	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	6-19.	
	
9	Ibid.,	8-19.	
	
10	Ibid.,	22-23.	
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happened,”11	but	 her	 success	was	 attributable	 to	 hard	work	 and	 dedication.	 By	
1957,	 despite	 her	 inauspicious	 beginnings	 and	 purported	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	
anything	 political,	 Peterson	 became	 a	 valuable	 employee	 of	 the	 Michigan	
Republican	Party,	organizing	voters	throughout	the	state.12	In	1961	the	state	party	
elected	Peterson	as	its	vice-chairman,	which	was,	as	a	practical	matter,	the	highest	
position	that	a	woman	could	attain	in	the	party	at	that	time.13	Romney’s	election	
in	 1962	 galvanized	 Peterson’s	 political	 career.	 She	 worked	 on	 his	 successful	
campaign	managing	his	wife,	Lenore	Romney	and,	in	the	process,	gained	a	mentor.	
After	 the	election,	 she	was	 reelected	 vice-chairman	of	 the	Michigan	Republican	
Party,	 but	 quickly	 left	 that	 position	 to	 become	 the	 Executive	 Director	 of	 the	
Women’s	 Division	 of	 the	 RNC.	 Shortly	 thereafter,	 she	 became	 the	 assistant	
chairman	 of	 the	 RNC,	 the	 highest	 position	 available	 to	 women	 in	 the	 national	
																																																						
11	Peterson,	Confessions,	69.	
	
12	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	24-29.	
	
13	GOPeterson	for	United	States	Senator,	Elly	Peterson,	1964,	box	20,	folder:	Clippings	
from	Scrapbook,	Peterson	Papers;	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	29-31.	The	positions	of	chairman	
and	vice-chairman	had	to	be	divided	between	a	man	and	a	woman,	and	since	a	man	was	always	
elected	chairman,	the	woman’	s	position	always	defaulted	to	the	vice-chairman.	Fitzgerald,	Elly	
Peterson,	30.	
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Republican	Party.	After	the	1964	Republican	national	convention,	Peterson	came	
home	to	Michigan	to	run	for	political	office.14	
As	the	 first	 female	candidate	 for	 the	United	States	Senate	 from	Michigan,	
Peterson	was	something	of	an	aberration,	which	meant	that	she	had	to	deal	with	
her	gender	on	the	campaign	trail.15	She	tried	to	use	the	fact	that	she	was	a	woman	
to	her	advantage.	Her	campaign	materials	characterized	her	as	a	“woman	of	action,”	
and	posed	her	traditionally	feminine	characteristics,	such	as	her	“interest	in	people,”	
as	 positive	 reasons	 to	 vote	 for	 her.	 Even	 though	 she	 had	 no	 children,	 political	
advertisements	 equated	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 lived	on	a	 farm	with	being	 a	mother.	
Invoking	this	false	equivalency,	her	interest	in	foreign	policy	was	attributed	to	“the	
hopes	 and	 aspirations	 farm	 women,	 like	 mothers	 everywhere,	 have	 for	 their	
children.”16	Campaign	brochures	made	a	crude	pitch	for	gender	equality,	noting,	
“Elly	Peterson	believes	‘it’s	a	man’s	world–and	a	woman’s	world,’	and	there	should	
be	equal	opportunities	for	both,	equal	chances	for	present	and	future	generations	
to	be	educated,	to	pursue	happiness,	to	exercise	talent,	without	prejudice	because	
																																																						
14	Peterson,	Confessions,	88.	
	
15	“Michigan	Woman	in	Senate	Race,”	New	York	Times,	March	27,	1964.	
	
16	“Peterson	for	U.S.	Senate,”	Campaign	Materials,	box	20,	folder:	Later	Correspondence	
and	Memorabilia,	Peterson	Papers.	
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of	sex,	race,	creed	or	color.”17	At	the	same	time,	it	was	made	clear	that	she	was	“a	
working	member	of	 the	Republican	team”18	so	 that	voters	connected	her	 to	 the	
group	of	Republican	men	running	for	state	office.	They	did	not	want	her	to	appear	
too	 independent.	 Peterson’s	 gender	 also	 became	 an	 issue	 among	 some	 of	 the	
voters.	 She	 noted	 that	 on	 one	 campaign	 stop,	 “an	 old,	 filth-covered	 man	
approached.	I	was	dreading	touching	his	hand	but	was	prepared	to	do	so.	I	put	out	
my	hand	and	introduced	myself,	whereupon	he	glowered	and	brushed	it	aside	and	
said,	 ‘I	 ain’t	 votin’	 for	 no	 woman–or	 niggers.’” 19 	Although	 she	 defeated	 her	
conservative	and	other	primary	opponents,	Peterson	lost	the	general	election.		
In	 1965,	 Peterson	 became	 the	 first	 female	 chairman	 of	 the	 Michigan	
Republican	 Party.	 She	 held	 that	 position	 for	 two	 consecutive	 two-year	 terms.20	
Although	she	considered	joining	the	Nixon	administration	to	work	for	Secretary	of	
Housing	and	Urban	Development	Romney,	in	April	1969	she	chose	instead	to	once	
																																																						
17	Ibid.	
	
18	Ibid.	
	
19	Speech,	Elly	Peterson,	n.d.,	3,	box	20,	folder:	Biographical-A	Tribute	to	Elly	Peterson-
1984,	Peterson	Papers.	In	her	autobiography,	she	attributed	an	almost	identical	quote	to	a	man	
who	made	the	comment	to	Lenore	Romney	in	her	campaign	for	the	Senate.	Peterson,	
Confessions,	145.	
	
20	Pat	Hunter,	“A	Ten-Year	History:	Women	in	Politics	Losing	Ground,”	Honolulu	
Advertiser,	November	5,	1969,	box	20,	folder:	Loose	Items	from	Scrapbook,	Peterson	Papers.		
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again	become	assistant	chairman	of	the	RNC.	In	1970,	she	agreed	to	serve	as	the	
campaign	manager	for	Lenore	Romney,	who	ran	for	the	United	States	Senate	from	
Michigan.	Romney	won	the	Republican	primary,	but	lost	the	general	election.		
As	 a	 Republican	 Party	 leader,	 Peterson	 believed	 that	 women	 and	 other	
underrepresented	 groups	 would	 benefit	 from	 participating	 in	 Republican	 Party	
politics.	 Thus,	 she	 established	 party	 organizations	 through	 which	 women	 could	
volunteer	 to	 help	 people,	 such	 as	 African	 Americans,	 Jewish,	 and	 other	 ethnic	
women,	 who	 did	 not	 traditionally	 feel	 welcomed	 by	 the	 party.21	However,	 her	
recruitment	program	had	another	purpose.	She	never	lost	sight	of	her	commitment	
to	the	party	which,	she	believed,	would	remain	viable	only	if	it	welcomed	all	people	
as	participants	and	provided	all	volunteers,	employees,	and	candidates	with	equal	
opportunities.		
As	both	an	elected	and	appointed	official	within	the	party’s	bureaucracy,	and	
also	a	Republican	candidate	for	public	office,	Peterson	experienced	first-hand	how	
badly	the	party	treated	women.	Despite	her	leadership	positions,	Peterson	found	
																																																						
21	Edith	K.	Roosevelt,	“GOP	Urged	to	Use	Woman	Power:	By	Offering	Meaningful	Roles	
in	Politics,”	Manchester	Union	(N.H.)	Leader,	July	28,	1970,	box	23,	Scrapbook,	July	1970-
December	1970,	Peterson	Papers;	“Remarks	by	Elly	M.	Peterson,	Assistant	Chairman,	
Republican	National	Committee	Before	the	Illinois	Federation	of	Republican	Women,	Chicago,	
Illinois,	November	19,	1970,”	2-4,	box	23,	folder:	Scrapbook	July	1970-Dec.	1970,	Peterson	
Papers.	
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that	 the	men	who	 ran	 the	party	did	not	 treat	her	 like	 they	would	have	 treated	
another	man.	The	same	Republican	 leaders	who	convinced	her	 to	 run	 for	office	
minimized	 and	 ultimately	 refused	 to	 recognize	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 her	 candidacy.	
They	asked	her	to	run	for	the	United	States	Senate	as	a	“gimmick	candidate	.	 .	 .	
someone	who	would	be	different,	yet	credible.”22	When	party	leaders	urged	her	to	
enter	the	campaign,	Max	Fisher,	one	of	the	party’s	chief	financiers	and	fundraisers,	
assured	her	that	money	would	not	become	an	issue.	Despite	these	promises,	the	
party	 was	 reluctant	 to	 provide	 her	 with	 the	 funding	 she	 needed	 to	 run	 her	
campaign,	requiring	her	to	plead	for	every	dollar.23		
Peterson	 experienced	 discrimination	 even	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 Michigan	
Republican	Party.	She	later	recognized	that	her	responsibilities	were	defined	and	
her	abilities	were	measured	by	her	gender.24	For	example,	she	was	paid	less	than	
her	male	predecessor	because	she	was	a	woman.25	When	Peterson	became	party	
chairman,	 she	 insisted	 on	 attending	 financial	 meetings,	 even	 though	 her	 male	
colleagues	controlled	party	finances	and	convened	their	meetings	at	a	club	that	did	
																																																						
22	Peterson,	Confessions,	95.	
	
23	Ibid.,	96.		
	
24	Ibid.,	106-107.	
	
25	Speech,	n.d.,	Peterson,	4.	
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not	admit	women.	Fisher	offered	to	send	her	“to	lunch	in	the	basement	with	his	
secretary.”26	Peterson	refused.	“I	quietly	replied	that	I	would	walk	out	and	go	home	
if	I	wasn’t	to	be	a	full	and	equal	participant.”27	Although	the	party	elected	her	as	
chairman,	 the	men	who	 led	 the	party	expected	her	 to	serve	on	 their	 terms	and	
conditions.	To	the	extent	she	could,	she	refused	to	yield	to	their	discrimination.		
While	Peterson	believed	that	the	Republican	Party	would	not	survive	if	it	did	
not	 become	 more	 inclusive,	 she	 was	 also	 convinced	 that	 the	 conservative	
movement	threatened	the	future	of	the	party.	As	a	long-time	moderate	Republican,	
she	worked	to	stop	the	infiltration	of	conservatives	into	her	party.	In	1964,	Romney	
was	running	for	reelection	for	governor,	and	Goldwater	led	the	Republican	ticket	
for	president.	One	of	the	reasons	that	Peterson	agreed	to	run	for	the	Senate	was	
because	of	the	threat	posed	by	the	schism	between	moderates	and	conservatives	
in	 that	year’s	elections.	Although	Michigan	was	not	 strongly	 conservative,	 there	
were	pockets	of	conservatism	within	the	state.	Romney	was	not	going	to	win	the	
governorship	 on	Goldwater’s	 coattails	 and	Goldwater	was	 not	 going	 to	win	 the	
state	 of	 Michigan	 by	 virtue	 of	 Romney’s	 voters.	 Democrats	 hoped	 to	 take	
																																																						
26	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	92.	
	
27	Peterson,	Confessions,	107;	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	92.	
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advantage	of	the	split	in	the	party	to	defeat	Romney.	28	Peterson	later	admitted	that	
she	knew	she	would	not	win	the	senatorial	race,29	but	nevertheless	agreed	to	run	
so	that	she	could	mediate	the	disputes	between	the	conservative	and	moderate	
wings	of	the	party	to	insure	that	Romney	was	reelected	as	governor.30	
It	was	almost	impossible	to	split	the	campaigns	away	from	each	other.	
If	I	would	say	I	was	campaigning	just	for	Peterson,	that	I	knew	my	own	
road	was	rough	and	rocky	and	I	would	do	my	thing	and	let	Goldwater	
and	 Romney	 do	 theirs,	 I	 satisfied	 no	 one.	 As	 the	 national	 election	
picked	up,	more	and	more	hate	was	generated.	I	grew	so	discouraged	
at	times.	I	had	been	a	working	Republican	too	long	to	leave	the	party	
in	such	a	hassle	as	that	election	grew	to	be.	I	was	a	Republican,	and	I	
wanted	to	remain	a	Republican.	I	believe	the	Romneys	felt	the	same	
way.	I	perceived	my	job	of	the	moment	not	being	elected	but	keeping	
the	 party	 together	 coming	 out	 of	 the	 election	 with	 a	 Republican	
Governor	and	the	troops	to	rebuild.31	
	
Romney	 won	 the	 election,	 but	 many	 downstream	 candidates	 were	 hurt	 by	
Goldwater’s	loss.		
																																																						
28	Peterson,	Confessions,	101.		
	
29	George	Weeks,	“Stabenow’s	Victory	Pleases	GOP	Political	Pioneer,”	Detroit	News,	
November	26,	2000.	
	
30	Peterson,	Confessions,	101;	Elly	Peterson,	interview	by	William	Ballenger,	Michigan	
Political	History	Society,	video,	May	1,	1995,	
http://www.jjblivinglibrary.com/Profile.php?Profile_ID=23.	Fitzgerald	came	to	the	same	
conclusion	as	Peterson.	Fitzgerald,	Elly	Peterson,	76.	
	
31	Peterson,	Confessions,	101.	
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In	1965,	as	chairman	of	the	Michigan	Republican	Party,	Peterson’s	support	
for	Romney	and	her	distaste	for	conservatives	aligned	when	she	masterminded	a	
moderate	takeover	of	Republican	Women’s	Federation	of	Michigan	(RWFM).	The	
RWFM	was	a	federation	of	Republican	women’s	clubs	throughout	the	state	created	
to	educate	voters	about	politics,	to	encourage	women	to	participate	in	politics,	and	
to	support	the	Republican	Party,	the	national	and	state	women’s	federations,	and	
Republican	candidates.32	In	March	1965,	months	before	the	next	election	of	RWFM	
leadership,	Peterson	 indicated	that	she	wanted	a	slate	of	Romney	moderates	to	
replace	Goldwater’s	conservative	women	who	operated	the	RWFM	independently	
of	Romney’s	moderate	Michigan	Republican	Party.33		
As	 expected,	 the	 nominating	 committee	 of	 the	 RWFM	 selected	 a	
conservative	 slate	 of	 candidates	 for	 the	 federation’s	 leadership.	 Under	 normal	
circumstances,	these	nominees	would	have	been	automatically	elected.	However,	
in	order	to	thwart	this	result,	Peterson	 inserted	herself	 into	the	nominating	and	
voting	 process.	 She	 selected	 a	 moderate	 slate	 of	 candidates	 and	 openly	
																																																						
32	By-Laws,	Republican	Women’s	Federation	of	Michigan,	box	14,	folder:	Republican	
Women’s	Federation	1965-67,	Peterson	Papers.	
	
33	Peterson	to	Mrs.	Neal	Tourtallotte,	March	17,	1965,	box	6,	folder:	Correspondence	
March	1965,	Peterson	Papers.		
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campaigned	for	them.	Through	her	machinations	and	over	the	strong	objections	of	
the	federation’s	conservative	leaders,	federation	members	elected	all	of	Peterson’s	
candidates. 34 	Peterson’s	 efforts	 insured	 that	 the	 RWFM	 and	 the	 Michigan	
Republican	Party	worked	together	to	advance	their	moderate	goals,	and	that	party	
conservatives	would	not	be	able	to	use	the	RWFM	to	promote	their	conservative	
agenda.35	According	to	at	least	one	political	observer,	the	RWFM	takeover	saved	
Romney,	who	intended	to	run	for	president	in	1968,	from	the	embarrassment	of	
having	a	rogue	conservative	women’s	federation	within	his	state,	and	reinvigorated	
																																																						
34	Glenn	Engle,	“Moderate	Jars	Harmony	of	Right-Wing	GOP	Club,”	Detroit	News,	n.d.,	
box	6,	folder:	Correspondence	8-1-to	8-15-65,	Peterson	Papers.	In	1967,	a	similar	power	
struggle	occurred	at	the	national	level	for	control	of	the	National	Federation	of	Republican	
Women.	Peterson	backed	moderate	Gladys	O’Donnell,	who	challenged	Schlafly,	a	conservative	
clubwoman	who	was	next-in-line	for	the	leadership	of	the	organization.	O’Donnell	predicted	
this	conflict	in	1965	when	she	wrote	to	Peterson	about	what	she	characterized	as	a	fight	for	the	
future	of	the	party.	“A	factional	showdown	.	.	.	is	coming,	whether	we	like	it	or	not.	It	is	simply	
facing	these	people	now,	or	else.	The	prospect	of	these	people	in	control	and	watching	many	
years	effort	going	down	the	drain,	along	with	the	Party	as	well	as	the	Federation,	is	appalling.	It	
is	this	specter	that	keeps	us	going.”	O’Donnell	to	Peterson,	August	13,	1965,	box	4,	folder:	
Correspondence	September	15,	1965,	Peterson	Papers.	O’Donnell	won	the	chairmanship,	but	
the	election	set	off	a	firestorm	between	conservative	and	moderate	Republican	women	in	the	
national	Republican	Party.	
	
35	Elly	Peterson,	memorandum,	September	30,	1965,	box	14,	folder:	Republican	
Women’s	Federation	1965-1967,	Peterson	Papers;	“Peterson	Supporters	Win	Control	of	State	
Women’s	GOP	Federation,”	Adrian	Daily	Telegram,	September	23,	1965,	box	14,	folder:	
Republican	Women’s	Federation	1965-1967,	Peterson	Papers.		
	
		
52	
the	state	Republican	Party	with	an	 infusion	of	enthusiastic	moderate	women	as	
both	volunteers	and	candidates.36		
Peterson’s	 description	of	 the	 actual	 RWFM	vote	provided	 insight	 into	 the	
animosity	and	festering	ideological	divisions	between	moderate	and	conservative	
members	of	the	RWFM	and	the	Michigan	Republican	Party.	She	wrote	that	“the	
battle	was	 vicious	with	 the	 opposition	 slate	 [the	 conservatives]	 standing	 in	 the	
lobby	of	the	hotel	with	two	cries—‘All	liberal	Republicans	are	Communists	so	all	on	
the	Hobbs	[referring	to	Ruth	Hobbs,	the	woman	who	Peterson	had	selected	to	run	
for	chairwoman	of	the	RWFM]	slate	are	Communists’	and	‘this	is	your	opportunity	
to	beat	George	Romney.’”37	She	added	that	“the	part	that	struck	terror	in	my	heart	
was	 the	 obvious	 hatred	 on	 the	 faces	 of	 about	 twenty	 women.” 38 	She	 later	
analogized	the	conflict	between	the	two	wings	of	the	party	to	a	war.	Moderates	
engaged	in	short	term	political	battles,	but	then	returned	to	their	everyday	lives.	
Peterson	wrote	that	“the	moderates	just	don’t	care	enough	to	fight	constantly	to	
win.	.	.	.	When	the	battle	is	over	they	want	to	go	on	to	other	things.	It	doesn’t	seem	
																																																						
36	Roger	Lane,	“Pro-Romney	Women	Could	Tip	Balance,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	September	
26,	1965.		
	
37	Peterson,	memorandum,	September	30,	1965.		
	
38	Ibid.	
	
		
53	
to	matter	that	much	to	them.	Life	goes	on.”39	Conservatives,	on	the	other	hand,	
never	 stopped	 fighting	 and	 refused	 to	 compromise	 their	 principles.	 They	 were	
dangerous	 because	 of	 the	 intensity	 of	 their	 commitment	 to	 their	 conservative	
ideals	and	goals.	She	noted	that	“they	will	make	NO	concessions	to	moderates,	or	
liberals,	but	they	expect	to	have	concessions	made	to	them.”40	While	in	the	1960s	
moderates	 and	 conservatives	disagreed	about	 the	 future	direction	of	 the	party,	
their	debates	also	foreshadowed	the	fault	line	that	erupted	between	conservative	
and	moderate	Republican	women	during	the	1970s	over	ideologically	based	issues	
that	directly	impacted	them,	such	as	the	ERA	and	abortion.	
In	1970,	a	discouraged	Peterson	left	the	RNC.	Although	she	believed	that	she	
had	introduced	some	women	to	politics,	her	efforts	to	persuade	party	leadership	
to	 treat	 women	 as	 equals	 had	 largely	 failed. 41 	The	 party	 still	 assigned	 them	
secondary	roles	and	supportive	tasks,	which	precluded	them	from	developing	the	
skills	necessary	to	assume	the	party’s	leadership	positions	and	to	run	for	elective	
office. 42 	Despite	 her	 best	 efforts,	 the	 party	 continued	 to	 discriminate	 against	
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women.43	She	had	been	a	party	woman	for	almost	twenty	years,	and	had	hoped	
that	in	exchange	for	her	loyal	partisanship	and	hard	work,	the	party’s	leaders	would	
ultimately	accept	her	and	other	Republican	women	as	equals.44	By	the	end	of	the	
1960s,	however,	she	recognized	the	fallacy	of	the	grand	bargain	that	framed	the	
rules	under	which	she	and	other	women	chose	to	participate	in	the	party.	Women	
helped	 men	 get	 elected	 and	 then	 men	 refused	 to	 provide	 them	 with	 equal	
opportunities	in	the	party	or	access	to	the	government	offices	that	they	controlled.	
Moreover,	 officeholders	 did	 not	 reward	 women	 with	 meaningful	 political	
appointments	and	the	number	of	women	in	elective	national	and	state	offices	had	
dropped.45		
In	 1970,	 Peterson	 noted	 with	 frustration	 that	 “women	 are	 regressing	 in	
politics.”46	In	 retrospect,	 she	attributed	 the	beginnings	of	 the	gender	gap	 in	 the	
Republican	Party	to	this	period.	She	wrote,	“How	blind	these	men	were.	At	a	time	
																																																						
43	Richard	Ryan,	“Elly	Peterson	is	Retiring,	but	Don’t	Bet	on	It,”	Grand	Rapids	Press,	
December	28,	1970,	box	23,	folder:	Clippings	1970	Retirement	from	Republican	National	
Committee,	Peterson	Papers.		
	
44	In	this	way,	Peterson	resembled	many	other	female	Republican	activists	who	chose	to	
become	“party	women.”	Rymph,	Republican	Women,	6.	
	
45	Dudman,	“Woman	GOP	Leader	Shows	Disenchantment,”	November	5,	1970.		
	
46	Eleanor	Morehead,	“GOP	Official	Wants	Top	Jobs	for	Women,”	Columbus	Citizens	
Journal,	August	27,	1970,	box	23,	folder:	Scrapbook	July	1970-Dec	1970,	Peterson	Papers.	
	
		
55	
when	women	were	becoming	more	and	more	disenchanted	with	government,	at	a	
time	 when	 almost	 all	 of	 the	 well	 known	 women’s	 national	 organizations	 were	
beginning	 their	 fight	 for	 equality,	 there	was	a	blindness	 in	 the	 resistance	 in	 the	
White	House.	I	believe	they	felt	the	women	would	continue	to	do	their	volunteer	
work	regardless.	They	felt	women	would	continue	to	take	orders	and	perform,	but	
it	ain’t	necessarily	so!”47	She	later	noted,	“Surely,	 it	 is	reasonable	to	say	that	the	
events	that	took	place	in	my	life	in	the	sixties	and	early	seventies	prepared	me	for	
my	strong	feelings	about	being	IN	and	a	PART	of	the	women’s	movement.”48	It	was	
this	disillusionment	that	caused	her	to	become	a	feminist.	
While	close	in	age,	Beebe	and	Peterson	followed	different	paths	to	feminism.	
Beebe	was	only	the	third	woman	elected	to	the	Michigan	Senate,	and,	during	her	
tenure,	 was	 the	 only	 women	 to	 serve	 in	 that	 legislative	 body.49	A	 graduate	 of	
Western	Michigan	University,	she	eventually	moved	to	Dearborn,	Michigan,	where	
she	met	her	husband,	a	Ford	Motor	Company	executive.	By	the	time	she	took	the	
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oath	of	office	in	1967	as	a	Republican	representative	from	Dearborn,	she	was	in	her	
fifties,	divorced	and	her	children	were	nearly	grown.50	Her	campaign	emphasized	
that	she	was	“not	just	another	‘professional	politician.’	She	is	first	and	foremost	a	
homemaker	who	has	raised	two	children.”51	Politics,	she	noted,	fit	naturally	with	
her	 long-term	 interest	 in	 children. 52 	As	 an	 educator	 and	 parent,	 she	 brought	
strengths	and	skills	to	the	table	that	differentiated	her	from	other	candidates.	She	
cared	about	how	the	issues	addressed	in	Lansing,	including	taxes,	the	cost	of	food,	
raising	a	 family,	education,	and	mental	health,	 impacted	families	and	 influenced	
communities.53	A	self-identified	“Romney	Republican,”	Beebe	acknowledged	that	
voters	were	aware	of	her	gender,	but	argued	that	it	did	not	make	a	difference	in	
her	first	campaign.54		
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She	attributed	her	feminism	to	the	experiences	of	her	youth,	although	she	
never	thought	of	herself	as	a	feminist	until	she	became	a	state	senator.	As	a	child,	
her	grandmother	advised	her	that	girls	should	always	“be	passive,	nonaggressive	
and	supportive	of	the	male.”55	After	she	graduated	from	high	school,	she	heard,	
like	most	girls	her	age,	that	married	women	did	not	need	to	be	college	educated.	
She	 believed	 that	 “‘we’ve	 been	 conditioned	 to	 be	 passive	 and	 submissive	
throughout	 the	 entire	 framework	 of	 society.’”56	Yet	 her	 experiences	 belied	 the	
messages	she	received.	As	a	child,	she	played	with	the	boys	without	regard	to	her	
gender.	An	engaged,	successful	college	student	who	wanted	to	get	married,	but	
also	have	a	career,	she	refused	to	accept	subordination	as	a	second	class	citizen.57	
In	the	Michigan	Senate,	her	male	colleagues	disparaged	the	intelligence	of	women	
who,	they	argued,	could	not	make	sound	decisions	because	they	were	incapable	of	
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separating	 logic	 from	emotion.	While	her	 life	experiences	paved	 the	way,	 these	
comments	finally	inspired	her	to	become	a	feminist.58		
Beebe	recognized	the	special	challenges	that	she	faced	as	the	only	woman	in	
the	Michigan	Senate	and	accepted	that	she	needed	“to	work	twice	as	hard	and	try	
to	be	twice	as	alert”	to	gain	the	respect	of	her	male	colleagues.59	One	told	her	“that	
he	expected	I’d	take	my	hat	and	purse	and	go	shopping	the	day	after	I	took	the	oath	
of	office.”60	She	quickly	defied	these	expectations.	Because	of	her	singular	status,	
she	believed	that	she	had	assumed	“a	great	responsibility	for	women	and	feel	I	am	
their	 special	 advocate.”61 	Her	 male	 colleagues	 were	 not	 motivated	 to	 fight	 for	
equality	for	women.	Moreover,	they	did	not	understand	and,	therefore,	could	not	
adequately	address	and	resolve	the	peculiar	and	pressing	issues	that	women	faced.	
Beebe	became	chairman	of	the	Health	and	Welfare	Committee	and	vice-chairman	
of	the	Labor	Committee	of	the	Senate	(later	the	Senate	Health,	Social	Services	and	
Retirement	Committee)	so	that	she	could	focus	primarily	on	issues	that	involved	
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women	 and	 children.	 She	 sought	 to	 create	 an	 administrative	 agency	within	 the	
state	to	address	the	problems	of	children.	After	she	left	the	Senate,	Beebe	fought	
to	 establish	 screening	 for	 mental	 retardation	 for	 young	 children,	 because	 she	
believed	that	the	high	crime	rate	among	teenagers	was	partially	attributable	to	a	
failure	 to	 identify	 these	 health	 issues	 earlier.	 Male-dominated	 legislatures,	 she	
noted,	 were	 not	 interested	 in	 and	 would	 not	 tackle	 problems	 related	 to	 the	
family.62		
Beebe,	like	many	of	her	Republican	feminist	colleagues,	worked	in	a	public	
sphere	 dominated	 by	 men	 who	 were	 not	 quite	 sure	 how	 to	 judge	 or	 react	 to	
political	 women.	 Journalists	 seemed	 particularly	 confused	 and	 frequently	
emphasized	her	physical	appearance	over	the	substance	of	her	work.	For	example,	
one	 writer	 observed	 that	 she	 “does	 not	 look	 like	 the	 popular	 conception	 of	 a	
woman	politician.”63	Another	described	her	as	“neat,	soft	spoken,	not	perceptibly	
aggressive.	Her	hair	 is	 light	 red	and	occasionally	her	blue	eyes	crinkle	 in	sudden	
warm	 humor.” 64 	In	 a	 grudging	 acknowledgement	 of	 her	 career,	 the	 author	
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conceded,	 “nevertheless	 there	 is	 a	 professional	 façade	 which	 suggests	 careful	
discipline.”65	Even	female	journalists	emphasized	her	femininity.	One	Detroit	Free	
Press	reporter	wrote	the	following,	ridiculously	irrelevant,	description:	“Sen	Beebe	
folded	her	coral	tipped	fingers	in	her	lap.	Her	lips	matched	her	nail	polish.	And	her	
dress	matched	her	house,	green,	a	soft	green	shade	darker	than	the	walls,	a	shade	
lighter	than	the	upholstery.”66	It	is	unclear	how	a	“woman	politician”	should	look	
or	why	any	observations	about	her	makeup,	dress	or	decor	were	relevant	to	her	
work	in	the	Michigan	Senate.	Certainly,	newspapers	did	not	provide	these	types	of	
superficial	 descriptions	 for	her	male	 colleagues.	 Yet	 journalists	 regularly	offered	
these	 highly	 feminized	 assessments	 of	 Beebe	 to	 their	 readers.	 Perhaps	 their	
characterizations,	which	seemed	to	delegitimize	her	credibility	as	a	politician	and	
legislator,	fueled	her	commitment	to	the	feminist	cause.		
Beebe’s	greatest	passion	was	the	liberalization	of	Michigan’s	abortion	laws,	
which	 was	 why,	 after	 twenty	 years,	 she	 publicly	 revisited	 with	 her	 Senate	
colleagues	the	circumstances	surrounding	her	therapeutic	abortion.	She	recalled	
that	her	testimony	brought	back	all	the	trauma	of	that	time.	Although	her	doctor	
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advised	 her	 that	 she	 probably	 could	 not	 have	 children,	 she	 sought	 a	 medical	
resolution	 for	her	problem.	After	one	miscarriage,	 she	had	a	baby	boy,	and	 five	
miscarriages	later,	she	was	pregnant	again.	Doctors	told	her	the	baby	was	stillborn	
and	that	she	needed	a	therapeutic	abortion.	She	went	through	a	period	of	denial,	
hoping	that	the	doctors	were	wrong	about	the	baby.	She	admitted,	“I	realize	now	
that	the	fetus	was	dead,	but	I	was	clinging	to	that	one	hope–one	positive	test.	Some	
might	say	I	was	emotionally	disturbed	but	I	think	any	woman	would	be	under	the	
same	circumstances,	and	having	to	make	that	decision.”67	She	tried	to	explain	to	
her	 colleagues	 the	 anguish	 surrounding	 the	 decision	 about	whether	 to	 have	 an	
abortion,	 but	 also	 “that	 it	 can	 happen	 under	 the	 best	 of	 circumstances.”68	She	
hoped	to	impress	on	them	that	“you	are	trying	to	impose	your	will	on	a	woman’s	
decision.	 You	 cannot	 do	 this.”69	Abortion	 was	 a	 difficult	 choice,	 but	 it	 was	 the	
pregnant	woman’s	decision	to	make.	
She	received	a	tremendous	amount	of	both	positive	and	negative	feedback	
about	 her	 testimony.	 Many	 people	 praised	 her	 courage	 and	 shared	 their	 own	
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experiences.	Others	sent	hate	mail	that	“accused	[her]	of	being	without	a	God–of	
being	a	murderer.”70	While	her	controversial	confession	jeopardized	her	position	
in	 the	Michigan	Senate,	Beebe	was	not	willing	“to	sell	out	my	 ideas	 for	political	
office.”71	Her	 disclosure	made	 a	 difference	 because	 it	 forced	 her	 colleagues	 to	
confront	 the	 notion	 that	 it	 was	 time	 for	 the	 legislature	 to	 address	 issues	 that	
heretofore	had	been	considered	off	limits	because	they	belonged	within	the	private	
sphere	of	 the	home.	She	exemplified	what	would	soon	become	a	basic	 tenet	of	
second	wave	feminism.	By	virtue	of	her	public	admission,	she	made	the	personal	
political.72		
Two	years	later,	Beebe	narrowly	lost	her	bid	for	reelection	to	David	Plawecki,	
a	relatively	unknown	twenty-two-year-old	Democrat	who	was	supported	by	both	
the	United	Auto	Workers	and	the	Catholic	Church.	In	an	example	of	how	all	politics	
are	local,	Catholics	turned	out	to	vote	in	large	numbers	because	they	opposed	a	
proposed	constitutional	amendment	on	the	state	ballot	prohibiting	the	transfer	of	
state	money	to	private	schools.	A	large	Catholic	turnout	did	not	bode	well	for	Beebe	
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because	the	Catholic	Church	had	mobilized	against	her	due	to	her	stand	on	abortion.	
Her	opponents	argued	 that	 she	wanted	 to	 “legaliz[e]	murder”	and	 that	 she	had	
“‘denounced	the	Catholic	Church.’”73		Since	it	was	unclear	when	a	fetus	became	a	
human	being,	Plawecki	argued,	all	abortion	was	potentially	murder.	He	noted	that	
“if	 this	 is	 true,	 I	 don’t	 see	how	hardship	on	parents	 could	 justify	 it.”74	After	her	
defeat,	Beebe	characterized	her	loss	as	“a	slap	against	all	women,”	and	she	vowed	
to	 continue	 her	 efforts	 to	 liberalize	 Michigan’s	 abortion	 laws	 after	 her	 Senate	
tenure	ended.75	She	later	noted	that	she	made	a	mistake	because	she	“was	trying	
to	 be	 a	 ‘lady’”	 and	 urged	 female	 politicians	 “not	 to	 ‘fight	 like	 ladies’”	 in	 their	
campaigns.76	While	 in	1966	 she	 said	 she	did	not	believe	 that	 the	 fact	 she	was	a	
woman	made	a	difference	in	her	election,	by	1970	she	had	changed	her	mind.	
Burnett’s	perspective	on	women’s	rights	differed	from	that	of	both	Peterson	
and	Beebe.	Burnett	spent	most	of	the	1960s	focusing	on	her	family	and	career,	not	
politics.	She	came	from	a	middle	class	background,	although	her	fortunes	changed	
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in	her	teen	years	when	her	wealthy	grandfather	decided	to	forgive	Hill’s	mother	
(his	daughter)	for	divorcing	her	husband	and	shared	his	wealth	with	them.	With	his	
money	and	connections,	she	attended	finishing	school,	came	out	as	a	debutante,	
and	became	what	her	mother	wanted:	an	“American	geisha.”77	A	successful	model	
and	beauty	queen,	she	won	the	Miss	Michigan	pageant	 in	1942	and	served	as	a	
runner	 up	 to	 Miss	 America.	 She	 studied	 art	 at	 different	 universities,	 including	
Wayne	State	University,	and	became	a	famous	portrait	painter.	From	an	early	age,	
Burnett	realized	that	money	was	the	key	to	independence	and	throughout	her	life	
remained	 unapologetic	 about	 her	 wealth	 and	 the	 cars,	 furs,	 and	 trips	 that	 her	
money	provided.78	
In	her	autobiography,	entitled	True	Colors:	An	Artist’s	Journey	from	Beauty	
Queen	to	Feminism,	Burnett	explored	the	personal	and	professional	experiences	
that	led	her	to	the	women’s	movement.	For	many	years,	she	was	dissatisfied	with	
her	personal	life.	In	retrospect,	it	is	apparent	she	that	suffered	from	Betty	Friedan’s	
“problem	 that	 has	 no	 name.”79	After	 a	 short	 failed	 marriage	 to	 a	 domineering	
																																																						
77	Burnett,	True	Colors,	5,	18-20.		
	
78	Ibid.,	25-31,	12-14,	1,	15-17.	
	
79	Betty	Friedan,	The	Feminine	Mystique	(New	York:	Dell	Publishing,	1964).		
	
		
65	
doctor,	she	married	a	bully	who	also	dominated	and	demeaned	her.80	An	unfulfilled	
wife	and	mother,	she	recognized	that	those	roles	were	not	necessarily	sufficient	to	
make	her	happy	and	wanted	more	 in	 life	 than	 to	 live	 through	her	husband	and	
children.	A	therapist	advised	her	that	she	would	be	happy	if	she	“concentrate[d]	on	
giving.	That	should	be	a	woman’s	satisfaction.”81	While	she	wanted	the	freedom	to	
forge	her	own	path	in	life,	she	realized	that	her	“career	was	piece-mealed	around	
[her]	hard	and	fast	duties	as	a	housewife–cemented	by	custom,	family	expectation	
and	guilt.”82	Ironically,	the	familial	role	that	society	had	deemed	appropriate	and	
satisfying	 for	women	had	become	a	 trap	 from	which	 she	 could	not	escape.	 She	
argued	that	“we	must	turn	men	around	to	recognize	that	we	are	persons	before	
we	are	women.”83		
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Burnett	described	feminism	as	“true	equality	between	the	sexes”84	“in	the	
economic	 world,	 the	 social	 world,	 and	 the	 private	 home	 world.” 85 	Gender	
discrimination,	in	her	opinion,	started	at	a	young	age.	She	noted	that	when	asked	
hypothetical	questions	about	careers,	boys	and	girls	reacted	differently.	Boys	who	
were	told	to	assume	they	were	girls	did	not	know	how	to	answer	a	question	about	
what	 career	 they	 would	 choose,	 although	 one	 responded	 that	 he	 would	 “be	
nothing.”86	The	answers	of	girls	varied	depending	on	whether	they	assumed	they	
were	girls	or	boys.	As	girls,	they	said	they	would	be	nurses,	secretaries	and	mothers.	
As	 boys,	 these	 girls	 said	 they	 would	 choose	 to	 be	 doctors	 and	 lawyers.	 Such	
attitudes	continued	into	adulthood	when	husbands	routinely	made	decisions	for	
their	 wives.	 Personal	 relationships	 between	 men	 and	 women	 were	 political	
because	 they	 involved	power.	 Like	 Beebe,	 Burnett	 saw	 the	 personal	 as	 political	
when	it	came	to	the	women’s	movement.87		
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Burnett	 argued	 that	 feminism	 could	 take	many	 forms	 “and	 any	 so-called	
feminists	who	try	to	impose	a	particular	political	or	cultural	straitjacket	on	others	
can	only	hurt	our	cause.”88	Thus,	it	was	counterproductive	for	women	to	argue	with	
each	 other	 over	 the	ways	 in	which	 they,	 as	 individuals,	 chose	 to	 exercise	 their	
feminism.	 Perhaps	 she	was	 particularly	 conscious	 of	 this	 because,	 as	 a	wealthy	
former	beauty	queen	who	loved	to	dress	extravagantly	and	flaunt	her	femininity,	
other	 feminists	 often	 judged	 her	 for	 her	 lifestyle	 choices	 and	 questioned	 her	
commitment	to	feminism.	
Burnett	claimed	that	one	particular	professional	experience	contributed	to	
her	development	as	a	feminist.	A	prominent	Detroit	doctor	commissioned	her	to	
paint	a	portrait	of	his	wife.	When	she	finished,	he	asked	her	to	sign	the	painting	
using	only	her	last	name.	He	told	her	that	a	female	artist	would	reduce	the	value	of	
the	portrait.	She	signed	it	with	her	full	name.89		
In	1969,	however,	she	finally	assigned	a	 label	 to	her	dissatisfaction.	While	
driving	to	a	funeral,	Burnett	and	her	friend,	Marjorie	Levin,	a	Democrat,	complained	
to	each	other	about	how	badly	men	treated	them.	Their	husbands	expected	them	
																																																						
88	Burnett,	True	Colors,	71.	
	
89	Ibid.,	4.	
	
		
68	
to	care	for	their	homes	and	assume	primary	responsibility	for	raising	their	children	
even	though	they	had	full	time	jobs.	Burnett	suggested	to	Levin	that	they	form	a	
chapter	of	NOW.	When	they	called	Betty	Friedan,	she	encouraged	them	to	create	
a	Michigan	chapter.90		
Burnett	 gathered	 forty	 professional	 women,	 both	 Democrats	 and	
Republicans,	 for	 a	 NOW	 organizational	 luncheon.	 All	 success	 stories	 in	 a	male-
dominated	world,	 the	women	she	contacted	shared	a	belief	 that	 they	had	been	
discriminated	against,	and	achieved	 their	goals	 in	 spite	of	men.	At	 the	meeting,	
they	 identified	 three	 objectives.	 They	 wanted	 “to	 recruit	 at	 least	 a	 thousand	
members	 across	 the	 state,	 who	 would	 then	 work	 for	 the	 repeal	 of	 Michigan’s	
abortion	laws	.	.	.	and	to	establish	day	care	centers	for	those	mothers	who	wanted	
to	put	their	talents	to	work	.	.	.	(ellipses	in	original)	or	needed	to	work	to	support	
their	children.”91	They	targeted	as	potential	members	“‘the	untouched	woman–the	
silent	majority–the	middle	class	woman	who	[was]	afraid	to	speak	out	because	it	
[wasn’t]	feminine.’”92	In	retrospect,	it	was	a	very	successful	meeting.93	
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Through	NOW,	Burnett	hoped	to	destroy	a	number	of	myths	about	women.	
In	particular,	the	Michigan	chapter	sought	to	refute	the	outdated	and	inaccurate	
notion	 that	 women	 could	 only	 be	 wives	 and	 mothers.	 Members	 believed	 that	
women	could	be	productive	long	after	their	children	left	home.	Anatomy	should	
not	 dictate	 opportunity	 and	 was	 never	 determinative	 of	 accomplishment.	 The	
media	and	advertising	industries,	they	argued,	contributed	to	the	subordination	of	
women	 by	 treating	 them	 as	 “‘sex	 objects	 or	mothers,	 NEVER	 as	 individuals.’”94	
Burnett	analogized	the	plight	of	women	to	that	of	slaves,	stating	that	“‘home	is	our	
cotton	field,’”	and	characterized	women’s	“current	home-bound	status	as	that	of	
‘house	servants.’”95	
Burnett	quickly	realized,	however,	that	although	NOW	was	created	largely	
by,	it	was	not	an	organization	created	solely	for,	middle	class	women.96	After	this	
initial	meeting,	she	visited	Friedan’s	New	York	apartment,	where	NOW	members	
were	preparing	for	a	meeting	with	the	press.	Burnett	described	these	supporters	
as	 “a	 huge	 black	 woman	 named	 Beulah	 Sanders,	 leader	 of	 a	 welfare	 rights	
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organization,	 and	 a	 nineteen-year-old	 from	 a	 socialist	 group	 called	 the	 Red	
Stockings,	who	was	there	 in	a	ragged	T-shirt	and	 jeans,	nursing	her	baby.”97	The	
woman	who	answered	the	door	introduced	Burnett	as	a	“woman	in	a	chinchilla	hat	
down	 here	 who	 says	 she	 is	 a	 lifelong	 Republican	 and	 claims	 to	 be	 a	 chapter	
president	of	NOW.”98	Friedan	happily	characterized	her	at	the	press	conference	as	
“the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum.”99	Yet	 despite	 their	 differences,	 Burnett	 felt	 a	
kinship	with	 these	different	women	who	 all	 suffered	because	of	 discrimination.	
When	it	became	obvious	that	many	women	could	not	afford	the	dues	that	NOW	
charged,	Burnett’s	chapter	organized	free	“rap	sessions”	that	allowed	women	from	
all	backgrounds	to	share	their	experiences.	She	was	shocked	by	the	stories	women	
told	at	these	meetings	about	physical	abuse.	She	believed,	however	that	when	she	
told	of	her	experiences	with	her	mentally	abusive	husband,	these	women	learned	
that	even	wealthy	women	were	subject	to	mistreatment	by	men.100	
As	Peterson,	Beebe,	and	Burnett	each	developed	a	feminist	consciousness,	
they	 all	 arrived	 at	 what	 Peterson	 called	 “the	 sensible”	 center	 of	 the	 women’s	
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movement,	 the	 mid-point	 between	 the	 “polarized”	 extremes	 of	 compliant	
femininity	and	angry	radicalism.	Peterson	described	the	continuum	as	follows:		
On	the	one	hand,	we	had	the	ultra-feminist,	a	complacent	house-frau,	
content	to	be	beckoned	by	the	will	of	man,	who,	when	she	had	free	
time	would	use	it	to	follow	the	TV	traumas	of	‘As	the	World	Turns.’	On	
the	other	hand,	you	have	the	militant,	who	seems	not	to	be	so	much	
FOR	 women	 as	 AGAINST	 men	 and,	 with	 her	 rudeness,	 her	 absurd	
demands,	and	 talk	of	 ‘take	over,’	antagonizes	 the	very	women	who	
she	seeks	to	help.	Somewhere,	between	the	saccharine	[“1001	ways	
to	 camouflage	 hamburger	 way”]	 and	 the	 strident,	 [“bra	 burning,	
radical	Liberation”]	lies	the	sensible.101		
	
Peterson,	Beebe,	and	Burnett	urged	women	to	reject	both	extremes	and	to	look	
for	the	middle	ground,	a	place	where	each	woman	could	assume	her	responsibility	
to	live	up	to	her	full	potential.102		
Peterson,	Beebe,	and	Burnett	believed	that	women	chose	not	to	participate	
in	politics	 for	 two	primary	reasons.	Society	constructed	expectations	 for	women	
that	 kept	 them	 “passive	 and	 submissive”	within	 their	 homes.103	Only	wives	 and	
mothers	could	be	considered	successful	women	and	a	working	mother	could	never	
be	a	good	mother.	Thus,	a	successful	woman	had	to	devote	herself	to	her	husband	
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and	children	and	forgo	a	career.104	The	natural	life	cycle	reinforced	these	attitudes.	
Women	felt	meaningful	and	productive	only	when	they	were	raising	children.	After	
their	 children	 left	 home,	 when	 they	 should	 have	 had	 more	 time	 to	 engage	 in	
activities	that	were	important	to	them,	they	withdrew	even	further	because	they	
felt	irrelevant.	Beebe	described	this	phenomenon	as	follows:	“Once	a	mother	no	
longer	acts	as	a	mother,	as	such,	she	loses	her	incentive	to	be	important	in	life.	She	
renders	herself	helpless	in	a	lot	of	cases	where	her	personal	efforts	would	bring	a	
mountain	of	personal	satisfaction.”105	Society	dictated	that	women	should	be	wives	
and	mothers,	and	thus	created	pressures	that	precluded	them	from	trying	to	do	
anything	else	to	reach	their	full	potential.106		
Peterson	and	Beebe	believed	that	women	were	their	own	worst	enemies.	
Beebe	noted	that	while	“there	 is	discrimination	 in	 jobs,	pay	and	promotions	 .	 .	 .	
women	sit	back	and	take	 it.	But	 I	say	 it’s	as	much	our	fault	as	anyone	else’s.”107	
Peterson	argued	that	many	women	chose	to	remain	“passive	and	submissive”108	
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because	 of	 their	 “pure	 apathy.”109	They	 happily	 assumed	 the	 roles	 that	 society	
assigned	to	them	as	wives	and	mothers,	and	were	unwilling	to	leave	the	comfort	of	
their	own	homes.	To	make	matters	worse,	career	women	and	full	time	wives	and	
mothers	sniped	at	each	other,	unable	or	unwilling	or	organize	around	a	common	
cause.110	Peterson	stated	that	“we’ll	have	to	stop	the	jealousies	and	ill	feelings	that	
seem	to	turn	women	against	women	when	a	competitive	situation	arises.	We	have	
to	be	together	in	this.”111	Equal	rights	were	within	reach	and	worth	the	fight,	but	
men	were	not	interested	and	many	women	were	not	willing	to	become	activists.112	
External	pressures	created	guilt	which,	when	combined	with	the	internal	pull	
of	the	comforts	of	home,	made	it	difficult	for	women	to	break	out	of	their	apathy.	
Feminist	Betty	Friedan,	who	was	familiar	with	this	phenomenon,	struggled	to	deal	
with	it.	Feminist	politician	and	scholar	Harriet	Woods,	and	Friedan,	described	the	
latter’s	plight	as	follows:		
When	Friedan	was	fired	from	her	writing	job	in	the	1950s	because	she	
was	pregnant	again	she	says	she	almost	felt	relief	in	seeking	security	
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within	four	walls	in	suburbia:	[Friedan	wrote]	“I	had	begun	to	feel	so	
guilty	working,	and	I	really	wasn’t	getting	anywhere	in	that	job.	I	was	
more	than	ready	to	embrace	the	feminine	mystique	[centering	one’s	
life	on	husband,	children,	and	home.]	(brackets	in	original)	.	.	.	There	
was	a	comfortable	small	world	you	could	really	do	something	about,	
politically:	the	children’s	homework,	even	the	new	math,	compared	to	
the	atomic	bomb.113		
	
Peterson,	Beebe,	and	Burnett	all	realized	that	they	had	to	discredit	longstanding,	
deeply	 ingrained,	 and	 powerful	 cultural	 norms	 in	 order	 to	 convince	 women	 to	
become	activists.		
Radical	feminism,	on	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	was	just	as	threatening	
to	 women.	 Beebe	 asserted,	 “I’m	 not	 militant,	 nor	 belligerent,	 but	 let’s	 be	
determined.”114	Burnett	believed	that	radical	feminism	would	alienate	women.	She	
made	it	clear	at	NOW’s	initial	meeting	that	it	was	not	a	militant	group,	and	that	it	
would	engage	in	traditional	tactics,	such	as	lobbying,	to	change	the	existing	social	
system.	In	fact,	Beebe	promised	to	endorse	the	organization	only	if	it	was	not	too	
militant.115	To	convey	the	organization’s	moderation,	Burnett	instructed	attendees	
to	 wear	 dresses	 to	 the	 meeting	 so	 that	 they	 would	 appear	 professional,	 yet	
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feminine.	Burnett	 told	 the	women	that	“if	 you	want	 to	picket	or	burn	your	bra,	
you’d	better	join	a	more	radical	women’s	organization,	like	the	Women’s	Liberation	
Movement.	We	love	men	and	by	gaining	equal	rights	within	the	existing	structure,	
we	think	we’ll	make	men	happier.”116	Although	she	later	recognized	the	naivety	of	
these	 initial	 assertions,	 she	 envisioned	 NOW	 as	 an	 organization	 that	 would	
promote	equal	 rights	 feminism,	and	she	was	never	 totally	 comfortable	with	 the	
more	radical	elements	of	the	women’s	movement.117	
Radical	 feminism	 created	 artificial	 choices,	 pitting	 careers	 against	 families	
and	women	against	men.118	Peterson	asserted	that	extreme	feminism	“opens	the	
doors	 to	 certain	 male	 critics	 who	 blanketly	 brand	 all	 feminists	 as	 lesbians,	
frustrated	old	maids,	or	living	examples	of	Freudian	philosophy.	Too	many	feminists	
seem	not	so	much	for	women	as	against	men.”119	Burnett	made	it	clear	that	at	the	
sensible	center	of	feminism,	women	did	not	reject	men.	In	fact,	she	believed	that	
feminism	 would	 be	 good	 for	 men	 and	 families	 because	 fulfilled	 women	 were	
																																																						
116	Barbara	Hitsky,	“Detroit	Feminists	Map	Strategy–NOW,”	Detroit	News,	January	9,	
1970.		
117	Burnett,	True	Colors,	57,	77;	“All	This	and	Liberation,	Too!”	Ecorse	Enterprise,	March	
17,	1971.	
	
118	Roscoe	Drummond,	“Rescuing	Women’s	Lib,”	n.p.,	October	9,	1971,	box	23,	folder:	
Clippings	ERAmerica	&	Other	Women’s	Rights	Involvement	(1964,	1969-79),	Peterson	Papers.	
	
119	Ibid.	
	
		
76	
happier	 and	 more	 satisfied	 with	 their	 lives. 120 	Men	 would	 not	 be	 trapped	 in	
marriages	 with	 women	 who	 remained	 with	 them	 only	 for	 financial	 benefits.	
Moreover,	 working	 women	 who	 contributed	 to	 the	 family	 income	 would	 help	
alleviate	 the	economic	burdens	on	men.121	Finally,	according	 to	Burnett,	women	
who	pursued	their	own	goals	would	have	more	independent	children.122		
Radical	feminism	also	undermined	the	goal	of	politicizing	women	because	it	
scared	them	and	convinced	the	men	who	led	the	Republican	Party	that	feminists	
could	not	be	loyal	and	effective	partisans.	Peterson	did	not	believe	that	average	
women	could	relate	to	radical	feminism	or	that	it	would	help	them.	She	was	careful	
about	the	 language	she	used	to	describe	her	activism,	“sh[ying]	away	from	such	
terms	as	‘woman’s	liberation’	because	.	.	.	people	like	Betty	Friedan,	president	of	
the	National	Organization	of	Women	(NOW)	‘come	on	too	strong	and	do	more	to	
hurt	 the	 movement	 than	 help	 it.’”123 	Beebe	 noted	 that	 “our	 tactics	 should	 be	
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politics,	 not	 protests.”124	Extremism,	 they	 believed,	 was	 abrasive,	 assertive	 and	
alienating	to	both	men	and	women.		
Peterson,	Beebe	and	Burnett	occupied	this	middle	ground	of	the	women’s	
movement	as	equal	rights	feminists.	They	were	committed	to	feminist	activism	and	
believed	that	women	became	self-aware,	conscious	of	the	women	around	them,	
and	pragmatically	optimistic	about	what	they	could	collectively	accomplish	through	
their	involvement	in	the	women’s	movement,	with	its	emphasis	on	inclusiveness	
and	 equality. 125 	Yet	 they	 were	 not	 radical.	 They	 merely	 sought	 the	 same	
opportunities	 as	 men. 126 	As	 Burnett	 noted,	 “We	 advocate	 staying	 within	 the	
present	marriage	laws	and	the	present	government	but	we	want	free	access	to	the	
good	jobs	and	better	pay	for	the	bad	ones.	We	want	to	get	off	the	plantation,	out	
of	the	cotton	fields,	and	live	freely	and	equally	in	the	world.”127	Burnett	argued	that	
women	could	achieve	equality	“by	infiltrating	the	‘system’	.	.	.	by	becoming	active	
in	a	viable	Party,	searching	out	men	sympathetic	to	the	women’s	movement,	and	
																																																						
124	Konesko,	“Women	Will	Win	Rights	by	Vote,”	Saginaw	News,	October	21,	1971.	
	
125	Remarks	by	Elly	Peterson,	Illinois	Federation	of	Republican	Women.	
	
126	Burnett,	Hand	Written	Notes,	box	4,	n.d.,	folder:	NOW-Womansurge,	Burnett	Papers.	
	
127	Hitsky,	“Detroit	Feminists	Map	Strategy,”	January	9,	1970.	
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passing	and	enforcing	legislation	that	will	equalize	society.”128	Republican	feminists	
were	committed	to	working	within	the	Republican	Party	to	achieve	their	feminist	
goals.	 They	 realized	 that	 they	 would	 be	 able	 to	 find	 a	 middle	 ground	 where	
feminists	 and	 Republicans	 could	 coexist	 and	 effectuate	 change	 only	 if	 they	
operated	from	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	movement.129		
In	1970,	Peterson,	Beebe,	and	Burnett	came	together	when	Peterson	and	
Burnett	 served	 on	 the	 committee	 to	 reelect	 Beebe	 as	 state	 senator. 130 	These	
women	had	all	reached	transition	points	in	their	political	and	personal	lives.	Beebe	
lost	her	bid	 for	 reelection	and,	at	 the	age	of	 sixty,	 it	appeared	 that	her	political	
career	had	ended.	She	asserted,	however,	that	despite	her	loss	she	would	continue	
to	fight	for	women’s	rights	even	if	she	could	not	do	so	from	elective	office.	At	fifty,	
Burnett,	who	 developed	 a	 feminist	 consciousness	 after	 she	 became	 dissatisfied	
with	the	life	society	expected	of	her	as	a	wife	and	mother,	appeared	to	be	launching	
into	a	new	phase	of	activism.	
																																																						
128	Speech,	Patricia	Hill	Burnett,	1977,	5,	box	2,	folder:	Speeches,	Articles,	Interviews	
Spans	1973-1987	and	undated,	Burnett	Papers.	
	
129	Drummond,	“Rescuing	Women’s	Lib,”	October	9,	1971.		
	
130	Press	Release,	“Senator	N.	Lorraine	Beebe-12th	Senatorial	District,”	October	15,	1970,	
box	1,	folder:	Beebe-State	Senate	Legislative	Reports	and	Press	Releases	1966-1970,	Beebe	
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At	 the	 end	 of	 1970,	 after	 leading	 the	 unsuccessful	 campaign	 of	 Lenore	
Romney,	 which	 the	 fifty-six-year-old	 Peterson	 called	 “one	 of	 the	 saddest	
experiences	 in	 my	 career	 in	 politics,” 131 	Peterson	 announced	 her	 retirement.	
Despite	her	years	of	hard	work	and	loyalty,	her	influence	within	the	party	remained	
limited.	Party	leaders	refused	to	recognize	women	as	equal	participants	with	the	
same	opportunities	as	men.	Moreover,	they	rejected	her	argument	that	the	base	
of	 the	Republican	Party	would	expand,	and	the	party	would	benefit,	by	 treating	
women	 as	 valued	 colleagues	 rather	 than	 secondary	 helpmates.	 Her	 retirement,	
however,	was	temporary.	Like	Beebe	and	Burnett,	during	the	1970s	she	devoted	
her	 energies	 to	 the	 women’s	 movement	 and	 to	 empowering	 women	 through	
political	participation.		
Over	 the	next	decade,	 these	 three	women	became	 involved	 in	 a	 feminist	
movement	that	they	would	try	to	integrate	with	their	long-standing	Republicanism	
from	the	sensible	center.	Their	activism	would	bring	them	together	with	each	other	
and	 other	 Republican	 feminists	 in	 Michigan	 to	 promote	 the	 causes	 that	 were	
important	to	them–political	participation	for	women,	the	Equal	Rights	Amendment,	
and	abortion	rights.	At	the	same	time,	their	feminism	would	ultimately	put	them	at	
odds	with	an	increasingly	conservative	Republican	Party.
																																																						
131	Peterson,	Confessions,	138.	
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CHAPTER	3	GENDER	AND	PARTISANSHIP	IN	POLITICAL	COALITIONS:	1970	TO	1980	
	
As	women,	we	have	more	that	unites	us	on	feminist	grounds	than	divides	us	on	
partisan	ones.	
–Audrey	Rowe	Colom,	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force	Newsletter	
	
As	 the	1960s	 transitioned	 into	 the	1970s,	Republican	women	agreed	 that	
women	needed	to	become	more	involved	in	politics	to	fight	for	laws	and	policies	
that	would	establish	and	protect	their	equality.	But	the	politicization	of	women	was	
not	 merely	 a	 Republican	 concern. 1 	In	 1971,	 cognizant	 that	 female	 political	
participation	was	a	multipartisan	problem,	Republican	and	Democratic	 feminists	
decided	 to	 form	 a	 coalition,	 the	National	Woman’s	 Political	 Caucus	 (NWPC),	 to	
address	 their	 concerns.	 Realizing	 that	 their	 success	 depended	 on	 grassroots	
participation,	they	created	affiliated	state	and	local	political	caucuses,	including	the	
Michigan	 Woman’s	 Political	 Caucus	 (MWPC).	 NOW	 and	 other	 feminist	
organizations	used	the	NWPC,	which	was	characterized	“as	the	‘political	arm’	of	the	
women’s	movement,”2	to	introduce	issues	into	the	political	arena	for	resolution.3	
																																																						
1	“Statement	of	Elly	Peterson,	Assistant	Chairman	Republican	National	Committee	and	
Geri	Joseph,	Vice	Chairman	Democratic	National	Committee,”	press	release,	May	4,	1970,	box	
23,	folder:	Scrapbook,	April	1970	to	June	1970,	Peterson	Papers;	Vera	Glaser,	“Lady	Politicians	
Losing	Ground,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	November	17,	1969.	
	
2	Maryann	Barakso,	Governing	NOW:	Grassroots	Activism	in	the	National	Organization	
for	Women	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2004),	45.		
	
3	Rona	F.	Feit,	“Organizing	for	Political	Power:	The	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus,”	
in	Women	Organizing:	An	Anthology,	eds.	Bernice	Cummings	and	Victoria	Schuck,	(Metuchen,	
N.J.:	Scarecrow	Press,	1979),	202-3.	
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This	 network	 of	 political	 caucuses	 brought	 together	 feminists	 from	 all	 political	
parties	in	an	arrangement	that	Republican	feminists	believed	would	be	positive	for	
both	the	women’s	movement	and	the	Republican	Party.		
Republican	feminists,	however,	soon	recognized	the	difficulties	inherent	in	
promoting	 their	 interests	 through	 this	multitiered	 organization	 of	multipartisan	
coalitions.	The	founding	members	of	the	NWPC	were	motivated	by	their	collective	
sense	of	empowerment	as	women.	But	its	members	were	so	diverse	and	its	goals	
so	 radical	 that	 they	 sometimes	 struggled	 to	 come	 together	 in	 common	 cause.	
Republican	and	Democratic	 feminist	women	disagreed	about	 feminist	 goals	and	
strategies.	 These	 differences,	 along	with	 their	 divergent	 political	 constituencies,	
underlying	 partisan	 objectives,	 and	 the	 NWPC’s	 multitiered	 organization,	
oftentimes	undermined	their	ability	to	act	with	one	voice.		
To	better	address	their	partisan	concerns,	Republican	feminists	followed	the	
lead	 of	 the	 feminists	 within	 the	 Democratic	 Party	 and	 formed	 the	 Republican	
Women’s	Task	Force	(RWTF),	followed	by	the	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	
Force	 (MRWTF).	 Through	 these	 task	 forces,	 Republican	 feminists	 attempted	 “to	
maintain	.	.	.	a	feminist	presence	in	the	Republican	Party	and	a	Republican	Presence	
in	 the	 feminist	 movement.” 4 	Partisan	 task	 forces	 were	 a	 concession	 to	 the	
																																																						
4	Position	Statement,	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force,	n.d.		
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difficulties	 faced	 by	 the	 multipartisan	 caucuses	 when	 they	 unsuccessfully	
attempted	to	paper	over	their	political	differences.	They	indicated	that	Republican	
feminists	 were	 not	 necessarily	 willing	 to	 set	 aside	 their	 partisanship	 for	 the	
women’s	movement.	Partisan	coalitions	allowed	Republican	feminists	to	position	
themselves	 at	 the	 sensible	 center	 of	 the	women’s	movement,	 from	which	 they	
could,	at	least	temporarily,	reconcile	their	Republicanism	and	their	feminism.	
On	July	10	and	11,	1971,	approximately	three	hundred	political	women	from	
twenty-seven	 different	 states	 met	 in	 Washington	 D.C.	 to	 organize	 a	 national	
coalition	intended	to	increase	the	number	of	women	who	participated	in	politics.	
They	decided	to	act	because	women	were	largely	absent	from	the	1968	Democratic	
and	 Republican	 national	 conventions	 and	 elective	 and	 appointed	 government	
offices,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	made	 up	 at	 least	 half	 of	 the	 nation’s	 voting	
population.	The	women	who	assembled	in	Washington	D.C.	that	weekend	agreed	
that	they	sought	“power,	political	power,”5	by	building	a	broad	based	organization	
of	women	from	all	backgrounds,	political	parties,	and	ages.	The	group	characterized	
itself	 as	 a	 multipartisan,	 rather	 than	 a	 bipartisan,	 organization.	 Most	 of	 the	
																																																						
5	NWPC	Organizing	Information,	box	4,	folder:	NWPC	4,	Virginia	R.	Allan	Papers,	Bentley	
Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	Allan	Papers);	“Women	Fight	for	
Political	Power	in	‘72”	Detroit	News,	November	8,	1971;	Drummond,	“Rescuing	Women’s	Lib,”	
October	9,	1971.		
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attendees	 at	 this	 organizational	meeting	 identified	 themselves	 as	Democrats	 or	
politically	 unaffiliated.	 Republicans	 made	 up	 only	 about	 6	 percent	 of	 the	
participants.6		
At	this	initial	meeting	of	the	NWPC,	the	participants	created	a	Statement	of	
Purpose	that	delineated	its	mission,	identified	its	intended	audience,	and	listed	the	
issues	of	 critical	 importance	 to	women.	NWPC	organizers	adopted	a	broad,	and	
what	 some	 have	 called	 radical, 7 	mission	 to	 fight	 “sexism,	 racism,	 institutional	
violence	and	poverty.”8	The	organization	sought	to	empower	all	women,	including	
those	who	were	traditionally	 ignored	because	they	were	on	welfare,	and	“every	
minority	woman	who	has	endured	 the	 stigma	of	being	 twice-different	 from	 the	
white	male	ruling	class.”9	Based	on	their	shared	interests,	women	hoped	that	they	
could	become	a	powerful	voting	constituency	that	would	hold	political	parties	and	
elected	and	appointed	government	officials	accountable.	Specifically,	they	sought	
																																																						
6	“Report	of	the	Organizing	Conference,”	July	10	and	11,	1971,	box	4,	folder:	NWPC	4,	
Allan	Papers;	Eileen	Foley,	“Caucus	Convenes	Saturday,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	November	4,	1971.	
	
7	Susan	Smith	Richardson	(chair),	“The	Radical	Roots	of	the	National	Women’s	Political	
Caucus,”	WLM	Conference	Video,	August	12,	2014,	http://www.bu.edu/wgs/2014/08/12/the-
radical-roots-of-the-national-womens-political-caucus/.		
	
8	Statement	of	Purpose,	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus,	July	11,	1971,	2,	box	3,	
folder:	NWPC	4,	Allan	Papers.	
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political	 parity	 by	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 women	 in	 elective	 and	 appointed	
national,	 state,	 and	 local	 political	 offices.	 They	 also	wanted	 to	 place	women	 in	
positions	of	authority	in	political	parties	and	throughout	the	political	process,	and	
to	 educate	 them	 about	 how	 to	 lobby	 on	 behalf	 of	 important	 issues,	 laws,	 and	
regulations. 10 	They	 agreed	 that	 they	 would	 encourage	 female	 candidates,	 but	
support	 any	 candidate,	 regardless	 of	 gender,	 who	 advocated	 on	 behalf	 of	
“women’s	issues.”11		
The	NWPC	identified	a	broad	range	of	domestic	and	foreign	policy	issues	that	
were	important	to	women.	Participants	sought	to	ratify	the	ERA	and	to	guarantee	
reproductive	 rights	 for	 all	 women.	 They	 believed	 that	 guaranteed	 income	 and	
universal	health	care	programs	would	alleviate	poverty.	To	address	discrimination	
in	 the	 workplace	 and	 in	 education,	 they	 advocated	 free	 child	 care	 programs,	
maternity	leave	and	changes	in	the	tax	and	social	security	laws.	The	women	who	
joined	the	NWPC	also	wanted	the	United	States	to	protect	the	environment,	end	
war,	stop	“the	use	of	physical	violence	as	a	traditional	‘masculine’	way	of	resolving	
conflict,”	and	respect	the	rights	of	other	sovereign	countries.12		
																																																						
10	NWPC	Organizing	Information,	box	4,	folder:	NWPC	4,	Allan	Papers.	
	
11	Statement	of	Purpose,	NWPC,	3.	
	
12	Ibid.,	3-6.	
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Conference	attendees	elected	twenty-two	women	to	the	Policy	Council,	the	
governing	body	of	the	NWPC.	Their	interests	reflected	the	broadly	humanistic	goals	
of	the	organization.	Policy	Council	members	included	union	leaders,	such	as	United	
Auto	Workers’	 officials	Mildred	 Jeffrey	 and	Olga	Madar;	 civil	 rights	 and	welfare	
activists,	like	Fannie	Lou	Hamer,	Myrlie	Evers	(widow	of	civil	rights	activist	Medgar	
Evers),	Beulah	Sanders,	and	Shirley	Chisholm;	liberation	feminists,	including	Gloria	
Steinem	and	Bella	Abzug;	and	at	least	one	peace	activist,	Mary	Clarke.13	The	Policy	
Council	also	included	political	office	holders	and	activists,	including	Midge	Miller,	a	
Democratic	legislator	from	Wisconsin,	and	Joan	Cashin,	a	member	of	the	Alabama	
Democratic	 Party;	 and	 Betty	 Friedan,	 Virginia	 Allan,	 and	 Shana	 Alexander,	 who	
were	 all	 women’s	 rights	 activists.	 Seven	members	 identified	 as	 Democrats	 and	
three	claimed	to	be	Republicans.	The	remainder	did	not	acknowledge	any	partisan	
affiliation. 14 	Between	 them,	 they	 represented	 all	 of	 the	 diverse	 constituencies	
whose	interests	were	reflected	in	the	Statement	of	Purpose.		
																																																						
13	“Elected	Members	of	the	Policy	Council,”	Report	of	the	Organizing	Conference,	July	10	
and	11,	1971,	box	4,	folder:	NWPC	4,	Allan	Papers.	
	
14	“‘Women’s	Political	Caucus’-What	It	Is,	What	It	Wants,”	U.S.	News	&	World	Report,	
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The	NWPC	 realized	 that	 it	 could	only	achieve	 its	 goals	 through	grassroots	
political	activism,	so	it	immediately	called	for	the	creation	of	state	caucuses,	and	
local	caucuses	based	on	congressional	districts.	The	organization	defined	a	state	
caucus	as	“a	coalition	of	women	from	various	backgrounds,	economic	levels	and	
political	 affiliations	who	have	 joined	 together	 for	 political	 action.	 These	women	
from	a	variety	of	political	parties—and	also	no	political	party—unite,	crossing	party	
lines,	in	the	interest	of	all	women.”15	In	order	to	pursue	their	interests	in	the	ways	
that	best	met	their	specific	needs,	the	national	organization	provided	these	state	
and	local	caucuses	with	tremendous	organizational	and	operational	latitude.	The	
only	real	restriction	placed	on	them	was	that	their	objectives	and	strategies	had	to	
be	 broadly	 consistent	 with	 and	 ultimately	 serve	 the	 general	 purposes	 of	 the	
national	 organization.16	Although	 not	 binding,	 the	NWPC	 recommended	 that	 its	
members	avoid	candidate	endorsements	and	issues,	such	as	abortion,	that	might	
prove	divisive.17	National	leaders	also	stressed	the	importance	of	compromise,	and	
																																																						
15	“What	is	a	Women’s	Caucus?”,	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus,	n.d.,	box	7,	folder:	
Topical	Files	1969-1982	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus	ca.	1974-1975,	Helen	Milliken	
Papers.	
	
16	Ibid.	
	
17	State	Caucus	Organizing	Guidelines,	March	1972,	box	9,	folder	13:	NWPC,	delegate	
selection	organizing	guidelines,	1972,	Mildred	Jeffrey	Papers,	Walter	P.	Reuther	Library,	
Archives	of	Labor	and	Urban	Affairs,	Wayne	State	University	(hereafter	cited	as	Jeffrey	Papers);	
“What	is	a	Women’s	Caucus?”,	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus.	
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they	advised	state	and	local	leaders	to	eschew	“purists,”	who	were	“women	who	
seem[ed]	to	be	unwilling	to	compromise	on	issues	and	methods.”18	Women	had	to	
learn	how	to	use	the	political	system	for	their	benefit	and	purists	undermined	these	
efforts.19		
Approximately	 two	 hundred	 and	 fifty	 people	 attended	 the	 organizational	
meeting	of	the	MWPC	on	November	6,	1971	in	East	Lansing,	Michigan.	Organizers,	
disappointed	about	what	they	considered	a	low	turnout,	nevertheless	celebrated	
the	diversity	of	attendees.	While	the	women	came	from	different	socioeconomic	
classes,	 races,	 age	 groups,	 and	 political	 parties,	 they	 emphasized	 their	 shared	
concerns	as	women	and	the	theme	of	female	solidarity	predominated.	Jeffrey	and	
Peterson	served	as	the	chairperson	and	secretary	of	the	new	MWPC,	respectively.	
Beebe,	who	 chaired	 the	meeting,	 announced	 that	 local	 organizations	would	 be	
formed	 on	 the	 congressional	 district	 level. 20 	Thus,	 leaders	 emphasized	 the	
importance	of	grassroots	participation.	They	urged	attendees	to	vote	as	women,	
																																																						
18	State	Caucus	Organizing	Guidelines,	March	1972,	7.		
	
19	State	Caucus	Organizing	Guidelines,	March	1972,	7;	“What	is	a	Women’s	Caucus?”,	
National	Women’s	Political	Caucus.	
	
20	Lucille	DeView,	“Women	Fight	for	Political	Power	in	‘72,”	Detroit	News,	November	8,	
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regardless	of	party	affiliation,	because	partisanship	undermined	the	cohesiveness	
women	needed	to	create	a	politically	powerful	voting	bloc.	Despite	the	enthusiasm	
with	 which	 they	 left	 this	 first	 meeting,	 however,	 it	 took	 almost	 two	 years	 of	
organizing	 for	 the	MWPC	 to	come	 together	 for	 its	 first	 state	convention	 in	May	
1973.21		
The	 exhilaration	 that	 the	 national	 leaders	 experienced	when	 they	met	 in	
Washington	D.C.	 soon	gave	way	 to	 the	pragmatics	of	 trying	 to	accomplish	 their	
objectives.	One	organizer,	Rona	Feit,	noted	that	“the	Caucus	quickly	became	heir	
to	 the	major	 problem	 of	 all	 coalitions,	 how	 to	 satisfy	 diverse	 interests	 without	
compromising	 conviction,	 coherence	 and	 force.”22	NWPC	 guidelines	 established	
loose	connections	between	the	national,	state	and	local	organizations,	mandated	
membership	diversity,	and	defined	feminist	issues	and	strategies	in	ways	that	were	
both	vague	and	inclusive.	However,	it	became	apparent	that	these	attributes	made	
it	 difficult	 to	 exert	 any	 discipline	 or	 create	 any	 coherence	 among	 either	 the	
																																																						
21	Members	issued	a	number	of	resolutions	at	this	convention.	For	example,	they	
demanded	that	the	State	Department	of	Education	enforce	federal	law,	especially	Title	IX,	to	
fight	discrimination	in	Michigan	schools.	They	sought	to	eliminate	discrimination	in	education	
through	oversight	by	a	state	official,	specific	training	and	affirmative	action	in	hiring.	They	also	
required	that	all	books,	curriculum,	sports,	and	classes	be	gender	neutral.	“Women’s	Caucus,	
May	5	Convention	Resolutions,”	box	11,	folder	25:	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus,	Michigan	
Women’s	Political	Caucus,	1972-1973,	Olga	Madar	Papers,	Walter	P.	Reuther	Library,	Archives	
of	Labor	and	Urban	Affairs,	Wayne	State	University	(hereafter	cited	as	Madar	Papers).		
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members	or	their	organizations.	Since	members	had	the	discretion	to	define	their	
objectives,	 identify	 their	 priorities,	 and	 resolve	 the	 problems	 created	 by	 these	
intentional	 ambiguities,	 the	 different	 organizations	 within	 the	 political	 caucus	
network	adopted	strategies	that	sometimes	worked	at	cross-purposes.	Moreover,	
the	diversity	of	individual	members	made	it	difficult	for	them	to	work	together.		
As	 intended,	 the	decentralized	nature	of	 the	caucus	 structure	allowed	 for	
maximum	flexibility.	Local	organizations	were	more	responsive	and	accountable	to	
their	 constituents	because	 they	were	able	 to	 identify	 the	concerns	 that	were	of	
particular	importance	to	them.	But	the	focus	on	local	issues	meant	that	individual	
organizations	established	different	priorities	and	tactics,	which	made	it	difficult	to	
coordinate	their	efforts,	particularly	on	state-wide	issues	and	candidates.	A	1972	
report	by	the	Planning	Committee	of	the	MWPC	proved	this	point.	It	described	the	
different	 priorities	 and	 strategies	 of	Michigan’s	 local	 organizations.	 Ann	Arbor’s	
caucus	focused	on	abortion	reform.	Caucus	members	in	Grand	Rapids	emphasized	
grassroots	 organization	 and	 identified	 women	 to	 run	 for	 precinct	 delegates.	
Detroit’s	caucus	dealt	with	diversity	issues,	making	sure	that	its	leadership	included	
both	white	and	minority	members.	It	struggled	to	attract	Republicans	to	the	caucus.	
A	 downriver	 group	 could	 not	 attract	 politically	 active	 women	 because	 it	 was	
considered	 a	 women’s	 “lib”	 organization.	 Members	 of	 local	 political	 caucuses	
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discouraged	 the	 state	 organization	 from	 developing	 a	 position	 statement	 on	
women’s	issues	because	“if	they	tried	to	come	up	with	an	issue	statement	on	some	
of	the	current	topics	of	the	day,	the	organization	would	be	split	and	many	members	
would	be	lost.”23	The	different	groups	disagreed	on	strategies	as	well	as	priorities	
and	 issues.	The	MWPC’s	 leadership	criticized	 the	 tactics	adopted	by	 the	Lansing	
area	organization	because	it	focused	on	big	issues	and	was	not	willing	to	address	
tangible	grassroots	problems,	such	as	elections	and	candidates.24	How	could	such	
different	organizations	identify	and	work	towards	common	goals?		
Disputes	also	developed	between	the	national,	state	and	local	organizations	
as	they	worked	at	cross-purposes.	For	example,	the	NWPC	became	involved	in	a	
local	issue	that	undermined	a	collaborative	effort	between	the	MWPC	and	NOW.	
In	June	1973,	the	MWPC	and	NOW	tried	to	change	the	negative	characterizations	
of	women	by	local	television	and	radio	stations.	They	wrote	letters	to	local	media	
leaders	 and	 the	 Federal	 Communications	 Commission	 to	 object	 to	 the	 stations’	
																																																						
23	Michigan	Women’s	Political	Caucus	Planning	Committee	Meeting,	minutes,	April	17,	
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“programming	and	hiring	practices	concerning	women.”25	The	campaign	was	timed	
to	influence	the	pending	federal	relicensing	of	these	television	stations.26		
However,	 two	months	 later,	 Lavon	Bliesener,	 a	Michigan	Republican	who	
was	a	member	of	the	NWPC	Board,	sent	a	letter	to	the	manager	of	Detroit’s	WJBK,	
Channel	2,	on	NWPC	letterhead.	She	responded	to	the	questions	raised	about	the	
station’s	application	to	renew	its	broadcasting	license	by	endorsing	and	supporting	
the	work	of	the	channel’s	chief	political	reporter.	In	seeming	contradiction	to	the	
MWPC,	 she	 wrote	 that	 “he	 has	 an	 appreciation	 for	 the	 causes	 women	 and	
minorities	are	involved	in	and	has	been	responsive	in	bringing	these	vital	topics	to	
the	attention	of	the	general	public	via	the	media.”27	The	MWPC,	embarrassed	by	
the	inconsistent	message	of	the	NWPC,	contacted	NOW	to	make	it	clear	that	the	
MWPC	disagreed	with	and	did	not	endorse	Bliesener’s	 letter.28	Thus,	 the	MWPC	
prioritized	its	temporary	alliance	with	NOW	over	its	affiliation	with	the	NWPC.	
																																																						
25	“Resolution	Regarding	Role	Models	in	the	Media,	6/23/73,”	box	2,	folder	14:	Subject	
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Likewise,	 abortion	 emerged	 as	 a	 divisive	 issue	within	 the	 political	 caucus	
network,	despite	instructions	from	the	national	organization	to	avoid	it.	In	1974,	a	
disagreement	occurred	between	the	national	and	state	political	caucuses	over	their	
inconsistent	 positions	 on	 a	 proposed	 Michigan	 abortion	 law.	 The	 NWPC	
recommended	that	Senate	Bill	345	be	moved	out	of	legislative	committee	for	full	
consideration	 by	 the	 state	 Senate.	 The	 proposed	 legislation,	 which	 legalized	
abortion	 in	 the	 first	 and	 second	 trimesters,	 but	 required	 that	 the	procedure	be	
performed	 in	 a	 hospital	 by	doctors	 in	 the	 second	 trimester,	 clarified	Michigan’s	
abortion	laws.29		
Contrary	to	the	NWPC,	the	MWPC	did	not	support	Senate	Bill	345	because	
of	changes	sought	by	the	Democrats,	who	were	trying	to	amend	it	to	“protect	the	
‘unborn	child	 in	 the	womb	of	 its	mother,’”30	and	 to	 criminalize	violations	of	 the	
statute.	 These	 modifications	 would	 have	 effectively	 recharacterized	 certain	
abortions	 as	 crimes	 and	 undermined	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	MWPC	 to	 create	 a	 new	
legislative	framework	for	abortion	in	Michigan.	The	MWPC	supported	Senate	Bill	
																																																						
29	“State	Abortion	Law	Needed,”	Michigan	Daily,	October	11,	1973;	Hammond	to	
McMichael,	January	16,	1974,	box	1,	folder	1:	Subject	Files	Abortion	1973-1974,	n.d.,	accession	
no.	MS	80-72,	MacIntosh	Papers.	
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888,	which	prioritized	the	health	of	pregnant	women	by	characterizing	“abortion	
[as]	a	medical	procedure,	 the	provision	of	which	 should	be	 subject	 to	 the	 same	
standards	 that	govern	all	 such	care.”31	The	MWPC	was	angry	about	 the	NWPC’s	
interference	in	the	state’s	legislative	proceedings,	especially	because	the	NWPC’s	
recommendation	was	based	on	inaccurate	and	incomplete	information	about	the	
intricacies	and	nuances	of	Michigan	state	politics	and	a	misunderstanding	of	the	
statutory	 objectives	 of	 the	 MWPC. 32 	The	 NWPC	 ultimately	 retreated	 from	 its	
endorsement	of	Senate	Bill	345.33		
The	organizers	of	these	political	caucuses	wanted	women	to	become	political	
activists	because	political	participation	facilitated	change.	Women	could	advance	
feminist	interests	by	working	through	their	respective	political	parties	to	promote	
the	interests	that	they,	as	women,	presumably	shared.	It	was	difficult,	however,	for	
these	 activists	 to	 prioritize	 their	 feminism	 over	 their	 partisan	 loyalties	 because	
partisanship	 was	 such	 an	 important	 part	 of	 their	 identities.	 For	 example,	 the	
																																																						
31	“W74,	Win	with	Women,	A	Project	of	the	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus,”	
Newsletter	I,	January-February,	1974,	vol.	III,	no.	I,	box	1,	folder:	NWPC	Convention	in	Kansas	
1974,	Jean	King	Papers,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	
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founding	 members	 of	 the	 MWPC	 included	 Democrats	 Madar	 and	 Jeffrey,	 and	
Republican	Peterson.	Madar	and	Jeffrey	were	both	leaders	of	and	employed	by	the	
United	Auto	Workers,	which	was	essentially	an	arm	of	the	state	Democratic	Party	
in	Michigan.	Similarly,	Peterson	worked	for	many	years	as	a	paid	employee	of	the	
Republican	 Party.	 It	 could	 not	 have	 been	 easy	 for	 any	 of	 these	 women	 to	
deemphasize	their	partisanship	when	it	was	so	inextricably	tied	to	their	careers.	In	
another	context,	Peterson	made	it	clear	that	“I	am	a	partisan	Republican.	I	do	not	
put	my	sex	above	my	party.”34	These	were	the	challenges	that	the	political	caucuses	
faced	when	they	asked	women	to	prioritize	their	gender	over	their	partisanship.	
Founders	structured	the	caucuses	to	provide	women	with	spaces	where	they	
could	move	beyond	their	political	differences	and	interact	with	their	colleagues	as	
women	who	faced	common	gender-based	problems.	On	a	very	personal	level,	this	
happened.	 Peterson,	 for	 example,	 wrote	 to	 her	 fellow	 Michigan	 Republican	
feminists	about	national	Democratic	 leaders	Abzug	and	Liz	Carpenter.	She	noted	
“Bella	Abzug	is	funny	as	a	crutch	but	so	is	Liz	Carpenter	so	I	hope	sometime	you	
two	 get	 to	 see	 them	 in	 action.	 I	 didn’t	 find	 any	 died	 in	 the	 wool–hope	 to	 die	
Democrats–they	are	pretty	much	disgusted	with	the	picture	of	their	leadership	and	
																																																						
34	Eleanor	Morehead,	“GOP	Official	Wants	Top	Jobs	for	Women,”	Columbus	Citizens	
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I	 think	 we	 can	 help	 adding	 to	 that	 by	 attending–and	 keeping	 on	 top	 of	
everything.”35	Peterson	later	became	good	friends	with	Carpenter	when	they	put	
aside	their	partisan	differences	to	jointly	lead	ERAmerica,	an	organization	created	
to	 persuade	 hold-out	 states	 to	 ratify	 the	 ERA.	 Nevertheless,	 her	 comments	
indicated	that	she	could	not	totally	relinquish	her	partisanship.	Instead,	she	hoped	
to	 exacerbate	 her	 Democratic	 colleagues’	 problems	 with	 Democratic	 Party	
leadership	by	actively	participating	in	the	NWPC.		
Because	 partisanship	was	 so	 important	 to	 these	 activists,	 they	 constantly	
looked	for	ways	to	protect	their	partisan	interests	within	the	multipartisanship	of	
the	political	caucuses.	From	its	inception,	Democrats	outnumbered	Republicans	in	
the	NWPC.36	Thus,	Peterson	faced	an	uphill	battle	as	she	tried	to	make	sure	that	
caucus	 leadership	 would	 not	 favor	 the	 Democrats	 over	 the	 Republicans.	 She	
warned	attendees	at	 the	second	Policy	Council	meeting	 in	September	1971	that	
many	state	activists	viewed	the	NWPC	as	a	Democratic	organization.	To	avoid	the	
taint	of	partisanship,	she	asked	that	Council	membership	be	structured	to	include	
																																																						
35	Peterson	to	Armstrong,	memorandum,	October	25,	1971,	attached	note	to	Ranny-
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similar	 numbers	 of	 Democrats	 and	 Republicans.	 A	 Council	 subcommittee	
recommended	that	Peterson,	Beebe,	and	moderate	Republican	Bobbie	Kilberg	be	
appointed	to	the	Council	immediately,	and	that	the	Republican	Party	be	given	the	
opportunity	to	nominate	four	additional	women	at	a	later	date.	The	Council	made	
it	clear	that	one	of	its	functions	was	to	select	new	members.	Therefore,	it	refused	
to	assign	this	responsibility	to	special	interest	groups,	such	as	the	Republican	Party.	
It	appointed	the	three	Republican	women	nominated	at	the	meeting,	but	left	four	
openings	(not	necessarily	Republican)	to	be	filled	at	a	later	date.	However,	at	the	
same	time	that	they	declined	to	retain	specific	openings	on	the	Policy	Council	for	
Republicans,	 Council	 leaders	 appointed	 one	 Chicana	woman	 and	 left	 a	 position	
open	 for	 a	 second. 37 	Their	 unwillingness	 to	 do	 the	 same	 for	 the	 Republicans	
suggests	that	they	intended	to	populate	their	organization	with	particular	types	of	
people.		
In	a	subsequent	report	to	Anne	Armstrong,	cochairperson	of	the	RNC,	and	
Gladys	O’Donnell,	president	of	the	NFRW,	Peterson	indicated	that	the	organization	
was	“disorganized,”	and	“not	so	much	Democratic	per	se	as	heading	towards	their	
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own	goals	whether	it	be	day	care	centers	or	helping	Chicanos.”38	Peterson	wanted	
Republican	women	to	become	involved	in	the	organization	because	it	was	gaining	
legitimacy	through	the	participation	of	credible	Democratic	politicians	like	Martha	
Griffiths,	who	sponsored	the	ERA	in	the	United	States	Congress	in	1971.	Without	
Republican	participants,	Democrats	would	 fill	 the	void	and	 the	Republican	Party	
would	lose	an	opportunity	to	appeal	to	nontraditional	women	voters.39	Peterson	
wanted	to	prevent	the	NWPC	from	giving	the	Democrats	a	political	edge	over	the	
Republicans	with	women.	
In	October	1971,	when	Policy	Council	members	gathered	in	Detroit	for	their	
third	meeting,	Peterson	was	 finally	 convinced	 that	Republicans,	Democrats,	 and	
independents	 were	 evenly	 represented.	 However,	 she	 saw	 intra-party	 conflicts	
between	 both	 the	 Republicans	 and	 Democrats	 on	 the	 Policy	 Council.	 She	 told	
Armstrong	that	“the	most	unified	group	you	might	say	were	the	New	York	Jewish	
crusaders	except	even	here	Bella	Abzug	and	Betty	Friedan	do	not	see	eye	to	eye.”40	
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Peterson’s	efforts	insured	that	the	Policy	Council	would	protect	the	interests	of	the	
Republican	Party,	or	at	least	not	provide	an	advantage	to	the	Democratic	Party.		
Peterson	 and	 Madar	 also	 struggled	 to	 make	 sure	 the	 MWPC	 was	
multipartisan.	Madar’s	attempt	to	convene	the	planning	meeting	in	Michigan	on	
an	inconvenient	date	caused	Republican	women	to	worry	that	“this	direct	action	
by	Olga	would	end	the	chance	of	the	Women’s	Caucus	in	Michigan.	It	would	turn	
into	 a	 Democratic	 Caucus.” 41 	Before	 the	 meeting,	 the	 Planning	 Committee	
concluded	that	the	“prime	objective	[of	the	new	organization]	is	to	involve	women	
in	politics	and	help	women	to	organize	politically	where	their	interests	lies	[sic].”42	
Organizers	recognized,	but	downplayed,	partisanship.	By	the	time	of	the	founding	
meeting	 of	 the	MWPC	 on	 November	 6,	 1971,	 Peterson	was	 satisfied	 that	 both	
parties	would	be	adequately	represented.	
The	partisan	loyalties	of	NWPC	and	MWPC	members	became	relevant	during	
every	election	when	they	had	to	cast	votes	for	candidates	who	were	affiliated	with	
a	political	party.	In	an	effort	to	persuade	women	to	place	their	interests	as	women	
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above	their	partisanship,	participants	at	the	NWPC’s	organizational	meeting	agreed	
to	 try	 to	 reform	 their	 political	 parties,	 but	 also	 to	 “confront	 our	 own	 party	
structures,	and,	when	necessary,	cross	party	lines	or	work	outside	formal	political	
parties	 in	 support	 of	 such	 women	 candidates	 [who	 fight	 for	 women	 and	
minorities].”43	At	the	state	organizational	meeting,	Madar	reiterated	the	Statement	
of	Purpose	when	she	announced	 that	 “we	have	 to	compromise	on	some	of	our	
individual	 beliefs,	 but	 we	 won’t	 compromise	 our	 dedication	 to	 peace,	 ending	
racism,	sexism	and	poverty,	and	to	greater	democratization	of	our	society.”44		
However,	as	Republican	Carol	MacIntosh,	Michigan’s	representative	on	the	
National	 Steering	 Committee	 of	 the	 NWPC,	 recognized,	 not	 all	 women	 could	
relinquish	their	partisanship	on	specific	 issues	or	 in	 the	voting	booth.	She	noted	
that	 “there	 are	 some	 women	 involved	 who	 are	 very	 partisan,	 and	 are	 loyal	
Republicans	or	Democrats.	They	are,	as	a	rule,	older,	and	they	can	not	[sic]	vote	for	
anyone	of	 the	opposite	party,	even	 if	 the	candidate	 is	a	woman	that	they	agree	
with	in	everything	except	her	party	identity.”45	One	activist	succinctly	summed	up	
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the	difficulties	 involved	when	a	caucus	from	Michigan’s	upper	peninsula	tried	to	
engage	in	local	activism.	She	stated	that	“no	more	has	been	done	on	nonpartisan	
activities–most	of	us	are	too	partisan!”46	MacIntosh	believed	that	each	woman	had	
to	 personally	 decide	 who	 and	 what	 she	 could	 support	 within	 the	 organization.	
When	 gender	 and	 partisanship	 became	 potentially	 inconsistent,	 each	 woman	
would	have	to	individually	identify,	prioritize	and	reconcile	her	interests.	MacIntosh	
worried	that	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	retain	members	 if	 the	organization	failed	to	
recognize	and	address	their	personal	concerns.47	Women	questioned	whether	they	
should	 support	 all	 women	 who	 were	 running	 for	 office,	 or	 only	 those	 who	
supported	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	MWPC.48	The	MWPC	 ultimately	 decided	 that	 it	
would	 not	 support	 all	 female	 candidates	 indiscriminately,	 but	 only	 those	 who	
endorsed	the	goals	of	the	MWPC.49	However,	this	did	little	to	address	the	concerns	
of	women	who	did	not	want	to	vote	across	party	lines.	
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Despite	 their	 avowed	 multipartisanship,	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 MWPC	 never	
really	 forgot	 their	 political	 affiliations	 and	 continuously	worked	 to	 populate	 the	
organization	with	their	own	constituents.	From	the	start,	Madar	encouraged	union	
members	to	 join	the	MWPC	and	 its	 local	affiliates.50	Within	two	years,	however,	
Madar	concluded	that	MWPC	members	did	not	adequately	reflect	the	interests	of	
working	 class	 women.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 Jeffrey,	 she	 called	 the	 MWPC	 “a	 paper	
organization	with	little	constituency	in	the	districts.	At	the	Convention	[the	state	
convention	 of	 the	MWPC],	 the	 participation	 will	 be	 from	middle	 income	white	
professional	females,	most	of	whom	have	not	been	involved	at	the	district	level.	I	
don’t	know	how	we	can	get	enough	women	to	vote	out	the	Republican	group	and	
the	Jean	King	[an	attorney	who	was	a	leader	in	the	Democratic	Women’s	Caucus]	
types.” 51 	She	 specifically	 stated	 that	 she	 did	 not	 share	 these	 concerns	 with	
MacIntosh,	who	was	a	Republican.52		
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MacIntosh,	however,	had	similar	concerns.	On	January	18,	1973,	she	gave	a	
speech	to	the	Livingston	County	Republican	Women’s	Club	in	which	she	quoted	Lee	
Kefauver,	who	lamented	the	lack	of	Republican	women	activists.		
The	Republican	Party	began	as	a	civil	rights	group.	Why	is	it	taken	for	
granted	 that	 because	 I	 am	 working	 for	 a	 cause	 that	 I	 must	 be	 a	
Democrat?	 I	 feel	 very	 strange	 at	meetings	when	 a	 speaker	 says,	 “I	
assume	 that	 everyone	 here	 is	 a	 Democrat,”	 and	 I	 and	 a	 few	 other	
members	raise	our	hands	with	a	gulp	to	say,	“No,	we	are	Republicans!”	
The	 looks	 of	 astonishment	 annoy	 me	 considerably:	 But	 what	 has	
happened	in	the	public	mind	to	change	this	view	of	our	party?53	
	
Leaders	of	the	political	caucuses	never	lost	sight	of	political	affiliations	and	tried	to	
manipulate	 the	 membership	 of	 their	 organizations	 to	 protect	 their	 political	
interests.	
At	 times,	 the	 caucuses	 worked	 together	 on	 projects	 where	 their	
multipartisanship	gave	them	credibility	and	legitimacy.	For	example,	the	Michigan	
coalition	 effectively	 developed	 bipartisan	 legislative	 analyses	 that	 would	 have	
lacked	 credibility	 if	 authored	or	 issued	by	either	party	 separately.54	In	1972	and	
1973,	 the	 MWPC	 issued	 detailed	 reports	 on	 the	 voting	 records	 of	 Michigan	
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representatives	and	senators,	respectively,	on	women’s	issues.	Beebe	emphasized	
that	 this	 type	 of	 information	 was	 crucial	 to	 women	 when	 they	 made	 voting	
decisions	 because	 it	 allowed	 them	 to	 intelligently	 participate	 in	 the	 campaign	
process	 and	 to	 hold	 their	 representatives	 accountable	 for	 their	 decisions.55	Yet	
even	these	types	of	allegedly	nonpartisan	projects	gave	rise	to	partisan	responses.	
Based	on	its	study,	the	MWPC	concluded	that	Republicans	in	both	the	House	and	
Senate	 had	 a	 better	 voting	 record	 than	 the	 Democrats.	 Republican	 leaders	 in	
Michigan	immediately	used	the	results	for	partisan	purposes,	encouraging	people	
to	 vote	 for	 Republican	 candidates	 because	 they	 were	 more	 responsive	 to	 the	
interests	of	women.56	
As	members	of	an	organization	created	to	promote	the	political	priorities	of	
women,	 caucus	 participants	 should	 have	 been	 able	 to	 find	 common	 ground	 as	
feminists.	Republican	Audrey	Rowe	Colom,	chairwoman	of	the	NWPC	from	1975	to	
1977,	wrote	that	“as	women,	we	have	more	that	unites	us	on	feminist	grounds	than	
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divides	 us	 on	 partisan	 ones.” 57 	However,	 Colom’s	 optimism	 was	 misplaced.	
Members	of	the	political	caucuses	oftentimes	struggled	to	find	common	ground,	
even	as	feminists.		
One	 reason	 for	 this	 was	 because	 their	 feminism	 was	 linked	 to	 their	
partisanship.	While	at	least	one	scholar	concluded	that	the	NWPC	brought	together	
equal	rights	and	liberation	feminists,58	the	organizational	framework	of	the	NWPC	
clearly	reflected	the	latter.	With	its	emphasis	on	rectifying	social	ills	ranging	from	
racial	inequality	to	poverty	to	war,	its	agenda	far	exceeded	the	legalistic	rhetoric	of	
rights-based	 political	 and	 social	 equality	 that	 was	 the	 core	 of	 the	 equal	 rights	
feminist	 agenda. 59 	In	 fact,	 at	 its	 first	 national	 organizational	 meeting,	 radical	
feminists	 established	 and	 attendees	 endorsed	 a	 special	 interest	 caucus	 and	
adopted	a	resolution	that	“women’s	liberation	is	at	least	as	important	as	women’s	
election.”60		
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Rymph	 argued	 that	 the	 Democratic	 and	 Republican	 women	 sought	 to	
incorporate	 feminist	 ideology	 into	 their	 respective	parties	 for	 different	 reasons.		
Democrats	believed	that	feminism	was	integral	to	their	party’s	larger,	social	justice	
and	 empowerment	 agenda.	 Republican	women,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 engaged	 in	
feminist	outreach	to	expand	their	base	of	support.	Republicans	feared	that	they	
were	playing	a	zero-sum	game	in	which	the	women	that	they	failed	to	attract	or	
welcome	 to	 their	 party	 would	 become	 Democrats.	 61 	In	 fact,	 at	 its	 inception	
Peterson	was	motivated	to	participate	in	the	NWPC	for	this	very	reason.62	In	reality,	
however,	women	 from	 the	 two	 parties	 embraced	 a	 different	 type	 of	 feminism,	
which	ultimately	undermined	their	ability	to	act	with	one	voice.	Because	the	NWPC	
adopted	 the	 more	 expansive	 (and	 some	 would	 say	 radical)	 type	 of	 feminism	
promoted	 by	 Democrats,	 Republican	 women,	 in	 particular,	 found	 it	 especially	
difficult	to	prioritize	their	gender	over	their	partisanship	within	the	coalition.		
In	fact,	many	Republican	feminists	found	the	liberation	feminism	espoused	
by	their	Democratic	cohorts	in	the	NWPC	too	radical	for	party	leadership	and	off-
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putting	 to	 those	 women	 they	 wanted	 to	 attract	 to	 Republican	 Party	 politics.63	
Republican	Mary	Coleman,	a	Michigan	Supreme	Court	justice	from	1973	to	1982,	
was	 disturbed	 by	 the	 radicalism	 of	 many	 of	 the	 women	 at	 the	 first	 NWPC	
conference	 in	 1973,	 particularly	 those	 represented	 by	 “the	 Radical	 Women’s	
Caucus,	 the	 Lesbian	Caucus,	 etc.	 etc.”64	The	 attacks	 on	Republicans,	 particularly	
President	Nixon,	caused	her	 to	question	 the	motives	of	 the	organization	and	 its	
leaders.		
When	 Helen	 Bentley	 read	 a	 very	 fine	 message	 of	 greeting	 from	
President	 Nixon,	 it	 was	 met	 with	 some	 boo’s	 and	 hisses	 and	 very	
discourteous	behavior.	I	begin	to	think	it	was	only	a	platform	for	the	
women’s	 militant	 demonstrators,	 especially	 after	 Bella	 Abzug	 very	
heatedly	attacked	the	President	for	just	about	everything	imaginable.	
Frankly,	I	felt	that	the	Republicans	were	mere	window	dressing.	There	
were	only	about	100	out	of	the	1500	women	present.	 It	 is	possible,	
however,	the	Republicans	may	be	more	active.	.	.	.	Only	time	will	tell	
what	effectiveness	the	Republican	women	can	have	 in	directing	the	
attention	of	the	Caucus	to	women	rather	than	to	partisan	politics.65		
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Even	those	women	who	embraced	 liberation	feminism	did	not	necessarily	
agree	on	the	appropriate	strategy	to	politicize	women.	Friedan	wanted	to	bring	all	
women,	regardless	of	their	partisanship	or	views	on	the	women’s	movement,	into	
the	 political	 process	 because	 she	 believed	 that	 together	 they	 would	 form	 a	
powerful	and	influential	constituency	that	could	achieve	political	equality.	Abzug	
and	Steinem	believed	that	Friedan’s	strategy	was	not	radical	enough.	Incorporating	
women	 into	 the	existing	political	 system	would	only	perpetuate	 the	very	power	
structure	that	Abzug	and	Steinem	hoped	to	eliminate.	Instead,	they	wanted	to	build	
a	larger	constituency	of	all	of	the	groups,	including	minorities	and	the	poor,	who	
were	systemically	excluded	from	the	current	system	dominated	by	rich,	white	men.	
Collectively	this	new	coalition	would	have	the	legitimacy	and	the	power	to	destroy	
the	 current	 system.	 66 	One	 founder	 later	 observed	 that	 the	 organizers	 “left	
important	 concepts	 ambiguous	 but	 succeeded	 in	 setting	 a	 direction	 without	
creating	 a	 line	 item	 orthodoxy.”67 	As	 a	 compromise	 between	 Friedan’s	 goal	 to	
organize	 women	 for	 political	 power	 and	 Abzug	 and	 Steinem’s	 strategy	 to	
incorporate	 women	 into	 a	 larger	 constituency	 focused	 on	 progressive	 social	
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change,68	this	ambiguity,	they	hoped,	would	attract	the	largest	number	of	women	
to	the	organization.		
Another	reason	why	it	was	so	difficult	for	political	caucus	members	to	agree	
on	 what	 they	meant	 by	 women’s	 issues	 was	 because	 the	 organization	 tried	 to	
appeal	 to	 the	 full	 range	of	 its	members’	 interests.	The	MWPC	defined	women’s	
issues	broadly	to	encompass	all	“laws	that	restrict	or	deny	opportunities	for	women	
to	make	decisions	about	their	own	lives.”69	This	more	expansive	definition	included	
legislation	on	issues	such	as	abortion	and	maternal	medical	care,	birth	control	for	
minors,	 discrimination	 in	 education	 and	 school	 sports,	 child	 care	 facilities	 for	
working	women	and	the	ERA.70	As	the	NWPC	guidelines	suggested,	however,	some	
of	 theses	 issues	were	 divisive	 and	made	 consensus	 unlikely.	 Differences	 among	
members	 became	 apparent	 at	 the	 MWPC	 convention.	 A	 Catholic	 woman	 who	
belonged	 to	 the	 John	 Birch	 Society	 believed	 that	 sex	 education	 was	 the	
responsibility	 of	 the	 family	 and	 the	 church,	 not	 the	 schools.	 She	 attended	 the	
meeting	alongside	a	woman	who	argued	that	a	parental	permission	requirement	
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for	sex	education	in	the	schools	undermined	efforts	to	provide	this	information	to	
students.	Similarly,	while	one	woman	wanted	to	have	the	father	of	her	children	in	
the	 delivery	 room,	 another	 worried	 that	 a	 rule	 providing	 such	 access	 could	 be	
extrapolated	 to	 require	 a	 biological	 father’s	 permission	 for	 an	 abortion.71	While	
caucus	 members	 agreed	 that	 they	 wanted	 to	 politicize	 women,	 they	 did	 not	
necessarily	agree	on	how	to	do	so	or	what	positions	they	should	promote	once	they	
were	politicized.		
In	light	of	the	competing	and	sometimes	conflicting	interests	of	the	members	
of	 the	 political	 caucuses,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 they	 initially	 formed	women’s	
organizations	that	were	affiliated	with	their	own	parties,	rather	than	the	NWPC	and	
the	MWPC.	The	Michigan	Democratic	Women’s	Caucus	was	established	in	1970,	
but	Republican	women	did	not	create	their	own	Republican	Women’s	Caucus	until	
1975.72	Peterson	attributed	the	delay	to	a	longstanding,	but	familiar,	problem.	The	
party	was	not	receptive	to	female	political	participation.	It	did	not	select	inspiring	
candidates	or	causes	that	appealed	to	women	and	did	not	make	volunteers	feel	like	
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they	 were	 a	 part	 of	 a	 team.	 Women	 were	 apathetic	 and	 not	 interested	 in	
participating	in	party	politics.	In	a	1973	speech	that	is	believed	to	have	been	given	
by	Peterson,	she	observed	that	the	average	woman	“views	the	National	Women’s	
Political	Caucus	with	disdain.	.	.	.	She	is	happy	in	her	socio-economic	superiority	and	
she	is	not	especially	interested	in	change.”73	In	a	somewhat	pessimistic	assertion,	
she	added	 that	 “the	possibilities	of	a	dramatic	advance	 in	 the	 ‘70’s	are	 just	not	
there–unless	 they	 overcome	 their	 lack	 of	 interest,	 indicate	 a	 willingness	 to	
participate	beyond	the	brief	encounter–and	have	a	 fighting	desire	to	go	beyond	
their	 present	 role.”74	She	 concluded	 “that	 the	 appointment	 of	 women	 is	 good	
personally	for	them–and	for	the	general	story–but	doesn’t	particularly	attract	other	
women.	This	is	probably	due	to	the	feeling	now	it	is	every	man	for	himself.”75	
Another	Republican	feminist	shared	Peterson’s	concerns	that	the	Michigan	
Republican	Party	did	not	welcome	women.	Kefauver,	 a	 transplanted	east	 coast,	
liberal	 Republican,	 always	 seemed	a	 little	 uncomfortable	 trying	 to	 reconcile	 her	
feminism	with	Michigan	Republicanism.	While	she	never	held	elective	office,	she	
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believed	that	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	was	not	liberal	enough.	She	set	out	to	
convince	 its	 leaders	 to	 refashion	 it	 after	 the	more	 “progressive”	Massachusetts	
state	party	 that	 focused	on	“human	rights	and	 issues	 that	affect	people	 in	 their	
daily	lives.”76	She	stated,	“I	was	raised	on	that	old	Puritan	ethic	that	your	life	isn’t	
worth	living	unless	you	try	and	make	the	world	a	little	better.”77	Highly	critical	of	
the	Michigan	Republican	Party,	she	said	“its	the	pits!	 .	 .	 .	Here	I	see	a	party	that	
wishes	(for	the	most	part)	to	return	to	the	1890’s.	There	is	little	realization	of	where	
the	American	people	are	today,	what	they	want,	and	how	a	political	party	can	meet	
that	need.”78	She	did	not	believe	that	it	had	the	grassroots	organization	needed	to	
support	political	candidates.	Romney’s	much	touted	strategy	of	encouraging	voters	
to	split	their	ticket	to	get	Republicans	elected	to	the	highest	state	offices	resulted	
in	a	lack	of	organization	at	the	local	levels	and	a	total	disregard	for	local	positions.	
Thus,	the	party	ignored	average	voters	and	special	interest	groups,	such	as	women,	
and	 their	 concerns.	 Because	 the	 party	 was	 not	 receptive	 to	 women,	 Kefauver	
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contended,	they	increasingly	turned	to	the	Democratic	Party,	which	they	believed	
would	better	serve	their	interests.79		
Perhaps	it	was	difficult	to	convince	feminists	to	create	a	women’s	caucus	in	
the	Michigan	Republican	Party	because	it	did	not	endorse	feminist	goals.	In	fact,	
the	 political	 parties	 in	 Michigan	 had	 very	 different	 views	 of	 feminism.	 The	
Democratic	Women’s	 Caucus	 of	Michigan	 embraced	 feminism	 and	 the	 broader	
humanistic	goals	of	 liberation	feminists,	such	as	livable	wages,	access	to	medical	
care,	a	pollution-free	environment,	and	legislative	limits	on	the	president	to	declare	
war.	At	the	same	time,	it	realized	that	it	needed	to	look	out	for	women	through	
“the	 enactment	 of	 legislation	 essential	 to	women’s	 needs	 and	 the	 election	 and	
appointment	of	feminists	[emphasis	added]	to	policy	making	positions	both	within	
the	Democratic	Party	and	at	all	levels	of	government.	A	feminist	is	here	defined	as	
any	person	who	pursues	the	goal	of	full	equality	for	women.”80	Thus,	Democrats	
were	not	afraid	to	use	the	word	“feminism,”	which	encompassed	not	only	equality	
for	women,	but	also	an	end	to	racism,	limitations	on	war	and,	in	general,	“a	more	
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humanistic	society.”81	Apparently,	Democratic	feminists	were	not	concerned	that	
feminist	extremism	would	undermine	their	efforts	to	bring	more	women	into	the	
political	process.	
Some	of	the	founders	of	the	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Caucus	(MRWC),	
including	 Burnett	 and	 Kefauver,	 believed	 that	 the	 organization	 should	 be	
“committed	 to	 encourage	 women	 to	 become	 active	 feminist	 Republicans.” 82	
Ultimately,	the	organization’s	statement	of	purpose	did	not	emphasize	feminism	
because	it	was	too	controversial.	 Instead,	the	MRWC	was	structured	to	focus	on	
legislation	 that	 supported	 all	 women	 and	 to	 “unite	 Republican	 women	 with	 a	
variety	of	views	and	talents,”	including	those	who	were	not	feminists.	83	The	party	
worried	 that	 any	 connection	 with	 feminism	 might	 be	 deemed	 too	 radical	 and	
discourage	women	from	becoming	involved	in	Republican	Party	politics.		
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The	NWPC	and	MWPC	tended	to	break	down	into	partisan	women’s	groups	
because	the	organizations	were	not	sure	how	to	best	pursue	their	political	goals.	
These	tensions	surfaced	as	early	as	1972	when	members	of	the	Policy	Council	of	
the	NWPC,	faced	with	a	presidential	election,	could	not	decide	on	the	best	way	to	
proceed.	Some	of	them	wanted	to	split	the	organization	into	two	partisan	groups	
so	that	women	from	each	group	would	return	to	and	work	within	their	respective	
parties	for	the	election	in	order	to	accomplish	their	partisan	goals.	Others	believed	
that	 the	 organization	 would	 be	 more	 powerful	 if	 it	 acted	 in	 a	 multipartisan	
fashion.84	While	 they	 decided	 on	 the	 latter	 approach,	 it	 became	 apparent	 that	
every	four	years	they	would	have	to	serve	as	the	feminist	representatives	to	each	
party’s	national	convention.	This	meant	that	they	would	have	to	address	questions	
about	the	number	of	female	representatives	at	the	convention	and	the	inclusion	of	
planks	supporting	women’s	rights	in	party	platforms.		
Women	from	the	NWPC	first	participated	in	the	Democratic	and	Republican	
national	conventions	in	1972.	Jill	Ruckelshaus	spoke	at	the	Republican	Convention,	
where	she	asked	that	the	goals	of	the	NWPC	be	included	in	the	Republican	Party	
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platform. 85 	Similarly,	 Burnett	 testified	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 MWPC,	 the	 Michigan	
Women’s	 Commission,	 and	 NOW	 at	 the	 same	 convention. 86 	Republican	
representatives	 from	 the	political	 caucuses	 had	 some	 success	 because,	 after	 an	
eight-year	 hiatus,	 Republicans	 once	 again	 agreed	 to	 endorse	 the	 ERA	 with	 a	
platform	plank,	and	the	number	of	women	delegates	at	the	convention	increased	
to	30	percent	from	17	percent	in	1968.87	Republican	feminists	also	convinced	party	
leaders	 to	 amend	Rule	 32,	 through	which	 the	party	had	agreed	 to	broaden	 the	
diversity	 of	 convention	 delegates	 by	 prohibiting	 discrimination	 based	 on	 race,	
ethnicity,	 and	 religion.	 Through	 1972,	 states	 were	 not	 prohibited	 from	
discriminating	against	potential	delegates	based	on	sex.88	Because	of	the	work	of	
Republican	feminists	in	1972,	however,	the	Republican	Party	expanded	Rule	32	for	
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the	1976	convention	to	prohibit	sex	discrimination	in	the	selection	of	delegates	and	
issued	 a	 new	 directive	 providing	 that	 “each	 state	 shall	 endeavor	 to	 have	 equal	
representation	 of	men	 and	women	 in	 its	 delegation	 to	 the	Republican	National	
Convention.”89	The	Michigan	 Republican	 Party	 incorporated	 these	 changes	 into	
their	 delegate	 selection	process	 for	 the	1976	national	 convention.90	These	 rules	
continued	 to	 be	 suggestions	 rather	 than	 mandates,	 however,	 and	 included	 no	
enforcement	mechanism.91		
In	1975,	a	group	of	Republican	women	who	believed	that	the	creation	of	a	
partisan	feminist	organization	would	help	them	to	convince	the	Republican	Party	
to	be	more	inclusive	of	women	and	cognizant	of	feminist	issues	created	the	RWTF.	
They	also	hoped	it	would	enable	them	to	politicize	more	women,	thereby	serving	
the	purposes	of	the	NWPC,	and	bring	them	into	the	Republican	Party.92	Ironically,	
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the	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force	of	the	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus,	April	18,	1975,	
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they	 intended	 to	 use	 the	 self-described	 multipartisan	 organization	 to	 increase	
female	political	participation,	in	the	process	making	them	partisan.	Retrospectively,	
the	establishment	of	partisan	task	forces	has	been	called	a	“chance	development”	
that	“brilliantly	answered	the	need	for	the	Caucus	to	be	effective	within	both	major	
party	structures	without	sacrificing	the	leverage	party	women	gain	by	their	unity	
across	party	lines.”93	It	can	also	be	characterized,	however,	as	a	concession	to	the	
ongoing	importance	of	partisanship	within	this	feminist	coalition	and	a	safety	valve	
that	permitted	the	NWPC	and	its	state	affiliates	to	continue	their	work	while	taking	
into	account	the	political	differences	among	their	members	and	the	political	parties	
to	which	they	belonged.	By	1976,	“the	NWPC	was	‘overwhelmingly	Democratic.’”94	
Partisan	task	forces,	such	as	the	RWTF,	enabled	Republican	feminists	to	continue	
to	 be	 both	 Republicans	 and	 feminists	within	 a	 largely	 Democratic	 organization.	
They	did	not	have	 to	chose	between	the	more	radical	and	primarily	Democratic	
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feminists	who	drove	the	agenda	of	the	NWPC	and	the	men	who	ran	their	political	
party.		
The	RWTF	quickly	 focused	on	the	number	of	 female	delegates	selected	to	
attend	 the	 1976	 Republican	 National	 Convention	 in	 Kansas	 City.	 Despite	 the	
changes	to	the	delegate	selection	rules	that	became	effective	in	1976,	the	number	
of	female	delegates	was	projected	to	drop	below	the	1972	level	of	30	percent.95	
Apparently,	the	nonbinding	nature	of	the	new	rule	rendered	it	ineffectual.	However,	
it	 must	 have	 provided	 some	 leverage	 because	 when	 Republican	 leaders	 of	 the	
NWPC	and	the	RWTF	complained,	convention	organizers	managed	to	increase	the	
numbers	 of	 women	 selected	 as	 delegates	 to	 31.5	 percent	 through	 at	 large	
nominations	by	state	party	officials.96		
Before	 the	 fact,	 RWTF	 leaders	 also	 complained	 that	 women	 at	 the	 1976	
Republican	 convention	 had	 been	 relegated	 to	 token	 appearances,	 whereas	 the	
Democratic	 Party	 had	 assigned	 women	 prominent	 roles	 at	 its	 convention.	 In	
response,	 RNC	 Chairwomen	 Mary	 Louise	 Smith	 agreed	 to	 make	 women	 more	
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119	
visible,	 but	 only	 after	 she	 castigated	 Pat	 Goldman,	 chairwoman	 of	 the	 RWTF.	
Goldman	wrote	that	“the	public	perception	of	the	role	of	women	in	the	Republican	
Party	will	not	only	be	 important	 in	 terms	of	convention	delegates,	but	 it	will	be	
important	as	 the	 image	 that	 sticks	 in	 the	mind	of	 the	general	voting	public	 that	
watches	the	convention	proceedings.”97	In	her	surprising	response,	Smith	seemed	
to	reprimand	Goldman	for	the	failure	of	women	to	participate	in	Republican	Party	
politics,	indicating	that	such	involvement	would	put	them	“in	positions	of	influence	
and	leadership	at	crucial	times.	Women	must	come	to	recognize	that	these	goals	
and	objectives	are	not	most	readily	and	effectively	accomplished	in	the	emotionally	
charged	atmosphere	of	an	election	year.	Perhaps	we	have	all	failed	to	make	this	
point	 emphatically	 enough.” 98 	The	 RWTF	 later	 touted	 that	 its	 letter	 to	 Smith	
resulted	in	greater	female	exposure	at	the	convention.99	
While	members	of	MRWC	first	inquired	about	the	RWTF	in	1975,	it	took	four	
years	 for	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 to	 establish	 the	MRWTF.100	This	 new	
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organization	was	“committed	to	maintaining	a	feminist	presence	in	the	Republican	
Party	 and	 a	 Republican	 presence	 in	 the	 feminist	 movement.”101 	It	 focused	 on	
placing	Republican	women	into	elective	and	appointive	political	and	government	
positions,	and	supporting	male	and	female	candidates	and	issues	that	benefitted	
women.102	
The	NWPC	 and	MWPC	exemplified	 the	 role	 that	 one	 network	 of	 feminist	
organizations	played	 in	 trying	 to	 connect	 the	burgeoning	 feminist	movement	 to	
politics.	 They	 also	 illustrated	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 multiple	 interest	
coalitions.	The	founders	of	the	NWPC	recognized	that	these	competing	 interests	
would	eventually	make	 it	difficult	 for	 this	 large	group	of	women	to	 identify	and	
work	together	towards	common	goals.	Their	intentional	ambiguity	in	the	founding	
documents	and	the	establishment	of	partisan	caucuses	 in	1975	served	as	safety	
valves	that	gave	the	women	room	to	pursue	their	different	interests	as	feminists	
and	partisans	without	undermining	the	integrity	of	the	organization.103	Moreover,	
the	flexibility	that	they	built	into	both	the	substantive	focus	and	structure	of	the	
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organization,	 the	space	 they	created	 in	 terms	of	defining	what	 they	meant	by	a	
“woman’s	 issue,”	and	the	ability	of	state	and	 local	organizations	 to	pursue	their	
own	 interests	 so	 long	 as	 they	 did	 not	 conflict	 with	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 national	
organization,	were	positive	developments	that	allowed	the	members	to	act	as	a	
group	without	being	in	total	agreement	with	each	other.104		
However,	 the	 multiple	 layers	 of	 loosely	 connected	 organizations	 created	
difficulties	 as	 participating	 groups	 struggled	 to	 coordinate	 with	 each	 other.	
Moreover,	 women	 had	 a	 difficult	 time	 even	 temporarily	 relinquishing	 their	
partisanship	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 feminism.	 They	 shared	 the	 feminist	 goal	 of	
politicizing	 women,	 but	 then	 tried	 to	 recruit	 these	 newly	 politicized	 women	 to	
participate	 in	 their	 own	 respective	 political	 parties.	 Ultimately,	 Republican	
feminists	 found	 it	 challenging	 to	 integrate	 their	 feminism	 with	 Democratic	
feminists	 who	 operated	 within	 a	 different	 political	 structure.	 Even	 when	
confronted	by	male-dominated	political	parties,	the	purportedly	shared	feminism	
of	 the	 women	 who	 participated	 in	 these	 organizations	 did	 not	 allow	 them	 to	
overcome	 their	partisanship.	 For	 some	women,	 it	was	difficult	 to	 separate	 their	
feminism	from	their	partisanship	because	their	feminism	was	integrated	with	their	
partisanship.		
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The	Republican	task	forces	addressed	this	by	provided	Republican	feminists	
with	 a	 space	 where	 they	 could	 combine	 their	 moderate	 Republicanism	 with	
moderate	feminism	while	they	worked	on	behalf	of	the	Republican	Party.	Over	time	
however,	Republican	feminists	found	that	while	they	might	have	been	at	odds	with	
Democratic	feminists,	they	were	being	squeezed	within	their	own	political	party	by	
its	conservative	wing.	The	next	three	chapters	illustrate	how	Republican	feminists	
dealt	with	these	divisive	issues	within	their	own	party.	They	did	not	yet	realize	that	
conservatism	would	 ultimately	 threaten	 the	multipartisanship	 of	 these	 political	
caucuses	as	well.	
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CHAPTER	4	REPUBLICAN	FEMINISTS	FIGHT	FOR	THE	ERA:	1972	TO	1979	
Equality	of	rights	under	the	law	shall	not	be	denied	or	abridged	by	the	United	States	or	
by	any	state	on	account	of	sex.	
–Equal	Rights	Amendment	
	
Inequality	hurts.	ERA	ends	inequality.	
–Laura	Callow,	WJR	Point	of	View,	July	25,	1977	
	
The	time	is	here	for	women	to	enter	directly	into	the	world	as	both	architects	of	the	
society	in	which	we	wish	to	live	and	as	direct	beneficiaries	of	the	rewards.	
–Ruth	McNamee,	Speech,	“The	Women’s	Movement:	Change	and	Future	Challenges”	
	
On	March	22,	1972,	almost	fifty	years	after	it	was	first	proposed	in	1923,	the	
United	States	Congress	passed	 the	ERA.	Once	adopted	by	Congress,	 thirty-eight	
states	had	to	ratify	it	by	March	22,	1979	in	order	for	it	to	become	a	constitutional	
amendment.	Twenty-two	states	ratified	it	that	same	year.	Thereafter,	the	pace	of	
ratification	slowed	considerably.	By	1975,	only	twelve	more	states	had	ratified	the	
amendment,	and	one	final	state	approved	it	in	1977.	Once	proponents	realized	that	
they	would	not	have	the	requisite	number	of	approvals	within	the	allotted	time	
period,	they	asked	Congress	for	an	extension	of	the	deadline.	At	the	same	time,	
they	worried	 that	 they	were	 going	 to	 lose	 some	 the	 ratifications	 that	 they	 had	
already	obtained.	Some	ratification	states	considered	rescinding	their	ratifications	
and	 others	 argued	 that	 their	 ratifications	 expired	when	 the	 original	 ratification	
period	ended.	The	deadline	for	ratification	was	extended	until	June	22,	1982,	but	
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ERA	 advocates	 never	 obtained	 another	 state	 approval.	 The	 effort	 died	 in	 1982,	
three	states	short	of	the	number	needed	to	enact	the	amendment.1	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	actively	participated	in	the	battle	over	the	
ERA.	As	feminists,	they	supported	a	constitutional	amendment	that	they	believed	
would	 guarantee	 them	 social,	 political,	 and	 economic	 equality.	 As	 Republicans,	
they	 were	 convinced	 that	 the	 ERA	 was	 consistent	 with	 the	 basic	 tenets	 of	 the	
Republican	Party	and	could	only	be	enacted	with	Republican	support.	In	the	space	
where	their	gendered	and	political	interests	overlapped,	Republican	feminists	tried	
to	carefully	craft	their	arguments	on	behalf	of	the	ERA	in	ways	that	were	consistent	
with	the	broad	principles	of	the	Republican	Party.	In	doing	so,	they	were	forced	to	
distinguish	themselves	from	radical	feminists	who	argued	that	the	ERA	did	not	go	
far	 enough	 to	 secure	 gender	 equality,	 and	 to	 discredit	 the	 extremism	 of	
conservative	Republicans	who	feared	that	the	ERA	would	destroy	the	traditional	
family	 and	 fundamentally	 change	 American	 society.	 As	 the	 Republican	 Party	
became	 more	 conservative	 and	 its	 opposition	 to	 the	 ERA	 more	 pronounced,	
Republican	 feminists	deliberately	aligned	with	 the	party’s	moderate	 leaders	and	
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distinguished	 themselves	 from	 conservative	 women	 so	 that	 they	 could	 be	
identified	 as	 the	 legitimate	 representatives	 of	 the	 party’s	women.	 This	 enabled	
them,	at	least	temporarily,	to	remain	both	Republicans	and	feminists.		
Less	than	three	months	after	it	was	enacted	by	the	United	States	Congress,	
the	Michigan	Legislature	adopted	the	ERA	on	May	22,	1972.2	The	Michigan	Senate,	
which	was	equally	divided	between	Republicans	and	Democrats,	adopted	the	ERA	
by	 voice	 vote.	Democrats	 held	 a	 six	 seat	majority	 in	 the	 110	member	Michigan	
House.	In	a	bipartisan	vote,	forty-six	of	the	fifty-eight	Democrats	and	forty-four	of	
the	 fifty-two	Republicans	 voted	 for	 the	 ERA.	 Similarly,	 ten	Democrats	 and	eight	
Republicans	opposed	it.3		
Despite	its	quick	ratification,	however,	the	fight	over	the	ERA	in	Michigan	and	
throughout	 the	 country	 was	 just	 beginning.	 Two	 organizations,	 STOP	 ERA	 and	
Happiness	of	Womanhood	(HOW),	led	the	national	opposition	to	the	ERA.	Drawing	
on	 her	 grassroots	 conservative	 network,	 Schlafly	 founded	 STOP	 ERA	 in	 1972. 4	
																																																						
2	Senate	Joint	Resolution	GG	and	House	Joint	Resolution	LLL,	May	22,	1972,	Legislative	
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Livonia,	Michigan	native,	Elaine	Donnelly,	was	only	in	her	mid-twenties	when	she	
founded	Michigan	STOP	ERA,	the	state	affiliate	of	STOP	ERA.	Ironically,	she	was	a	
Democrat	 when	 she	was	 young,	 but	 became	 disenchanted	with	 the	 party	 as	 it	
became	 more	 liberal	 and	 she	 started	 working	 with	 Schlafly.	 Like	 Schlafly,	 she	
initially	supported	the	ERA	but	changed	her	mind	once	she	realized	that	women	
would	be	disadvantaged	by	its	breadth.5	“As	a	mother	of	two	daughters,”	Donnelly	
said,	“it	was	my	responsibility	to	see	to	it	that	ERA	did	not	pass.”6	
While	STOP	ERA	and	Michigan	STOP	ERA	 focused	exclusively	on	defeating	
the	 ERA,	 HOW	 adopted	 a	 broader	 perspective.	 In	 1971	 Jacquie	 Davison,	 an	
Arizonian	 initially	 concerned	 about	 how	 the	 ERA	would	 affect	women,	 founded	
HOW.	The	organization	adopted	a	patriotic,	religious,	pro-life	agenda	to	defeat	the	
ERA,	but	also	worked	to	preserve	the	rights	of	parents	and	the	traditional	family.	
Davison	 stated	 that	 “like	many	 good	 American	women,	 I	 ignored	 the	women’s	
liberationists	while	they	were	growing	hair	on	their	legs	and	burning	their	bras.	But	
now	America	 is	under	attack.	The	 family	 is	being	attacked	and	 the	 family	 is	 the	
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backbone	 of	 America.” 7 	Conservative	 Republican	 Patt	 Barbour,	 from	 Dearborn	
Heights,	led	the	Michigan	chapter	of	HOW	before	she	became	its	national	leader	in	
1975.	She	argued	“that	the	ERA	amendment	‘will	do	nothing	for	women	but	put	a	
federal	noose	around	their	neck.’”8	In	1975	she	gave	voice	to	the	opinion	of	many	
conservative	 Republican	women	when	 she	wrote	 to	Governor	Milliken,	 “I	 am	 a	
Republican,	but	the	Republican	Party	has	left	me.”9	While	they	did	not	specifically	
characterize	themselves	as	Republican	or	partisan	organizations,	women	who	were	
connected	to	the	conservative	movement	in	the	Republican	Party	led	both	STOP	
ERA	and	HOW.		
NOW	was	one	of	the	first	organizations	to	support	the	ERA.	It	was	a	melting	
pot	of	women	with	different	priorities,	strategies	and	political	loyalties.	Its	leaders	
recognized	 that	 they	 needed	 to	 carefully	 balance	 the	 conflicting	 interests	 and	
objectives	of	all	of	its	members	to	maintain	its	focus	on	feminism.	Therefore,	NOW	
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was	structured	as	a	nonpartisan	organization	to	avoid	 the	difficulties	 that	might	
develop	 from	 partisan	 alliances. 10 	At	 the	 same	 time,	 NOW	 recognized	 the	
importance	 of	 convincing	 women	 to	 become	 involved	 in	 politics,	 and	 worked	
closely	with	the	NWPC	and	its	local	affiliates.	Many	women	who	participated	in	the	
women’s	movement	were	members	of	both	organizations.11	In	1967,	one	of	NOW’s	
primary	goals	became	the	ratification	of	the	ERA.12	
In	 1976,	 proponents	 of	 the	 ERA	 finally	 created	 an	 umbrella	 organization,	
ERAmerica,	to	bring	together	the	various	groups	that	were	specifically	focused	on	
ratification	of	the	ERA.	A	Michigan	affiliate	of	ERAmerica,	Michigan	ERAmerica,	was	
created	on	June	10,	1976	to	coordinate	different	groups	of	people	in	the	pursuit	of	
their	common	goals	of	“preserving	Michigan’s	ratification	of	the	ERA	‘educating	the	
public	 about	 the	 need	 to	 guarantee	 equal	 protection	 under	 the	 law’	 [and]	
promoting	the	ratification	of	the	ERA	nationally.”13	The	leaders	of	ERAmerica	and	
its	Michigan	affiliate	seemed	surprised	that	they	needed	to	organize	to	promote	
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the	 ERA	 because	 congressional	 approval	 was	 so	 easy	 that	 supporters	 did	 not	
believe	they	needed	to	do	anything	“to	insure	people	understanding	it.”14	But	over	
time,	as	Peterson	witnessed	extremists	from	both	 ideological	extremes	hijacking	
the	ratification	process,	it	became	clear	to	her	that	ERAmerica	and	its	local	affiliates	
should	serve	as	the	educational	ambassadors	for	the	ERA.15	
Like	NOW,	ERAmerica	and	its	Michigan	affiliate	understood	that	partisanship	
could	 undermine	 the	 fragile	 coalition	 that	 they	 had	 created	 to	 engage	 in	
collaborative	work	on	behalf	of	the	ERA.	Thus,	Michigan	ERAmerica	instructed	its	
members	 to	 avoid	 connections	 to	 any	 other	 issues	 that	 might	 link	 the	 ERA	 to	
partisan	politics.	These	organizations	were	careful	to	maintain	the	delicate	balance	
that	 Republican	 and	 Democratic	 women	 had	 achieved	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 gain	
ratification.	 Organizational	materials	 instructed	members	 that	 “both	 Democrats	
and	 Republicans	 are	 very	 sensitive.	 Sometimes	 it’s	 necessary	 to	 criticize	
representatives	from	one	party	or	the	other.	Try	to	follow	with	articles	of	praise	for	
someone	else	in	same	party.”16	In	order	to	work	effectively	together	to	promote	
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the	 ERA,	 women	 from	 both	 political	 parties	 needed	 to	 overcome	 the	 political	
differences	 that	might	have	otherwise	undermined	their	efforts	 to	achieve	 their	
common	goal.		
Ironically,	 in	order	to	solidify	 its	nonpartisanship,	 two	partisan	women	 led	
ERAmerica.	From	its	inception	until	1979,	Republican	Peterson	and	Democrat	Liz	
Carpenter	chaired	the	organization.	They	were	both	moderate	feminists	who	were	
political	 veterans,	 and	 brought	 their	 political	 experience	 to	 the	 fight	 over	 ERA,	
indicating	that	“their	major	strategy	.	.	.	is	a	nationwide	campaign,	run	along	the	
lines	of	a	political	campaign,	only	this	time	the	candidate	isn’t	a	human	being	but	
24	words.”17	They	 intended	to	utilize	 their	partisanship	 to	 lobby	their	 respective	
party	 leaders,	promote	 candidates	 in	 targeted	 states	and	 influence	 their	party’s	
platforms.	 The	 two	women	 “denied	 .	 .	 .	 that	 this	 emphasis	 on	 partisan	 politics	
meant	that	 they	would,	 in	effect,	be	snubbing	 feminist	organizations	that	 in	 the	
past	had	led	the	fragmented	fight	for	the	equal	rights	amendment.	‘Oh,	we’ll	work	
with	women’s	organizations,	because	that’s	what	gave	us	birth.’	 .	 .	 .	 ‘We’ll	work	
with	 anybody	 who	 gives	 us	 assistance.	 We	 both	 consider	 ourselves	 strong	
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feminists.’”18	They	were	critical	of	Schlafly,	who	used	typically	female	tactics,	such	
as	providing	legislatures	with	baked	goods,	to	influence	their	votes.	Carpenter	said	
“man	does	not	live	by	bread	alone.	.	.	.	I’ll	give	legislators	the	dignity	of	voting	with	
their	brains.”19	In	1976,	Helen	Milliken,	along	with	Democrat	Martha	Griffiths,	were	
named	the	honorary	chairpersons	of	Michigan	ERAmerica.	In	1979,	the	leadership	
roles	 in	 the	 national	 organization	 were	 passed	 on	 to	 two	 wives	 of	 prominent	
governors,	 Helen	 Milliken	 and	 Sharon	 Percy	 Rockefeller,	 wife	 of	 Democrat	
Governor	Jay	Rockefeller	of	West	Virginia.	
Milliken	was	a	relative	latecomer	to	the	women’s	movement.20	While	she	did	
not	become	a	feminist	until	the	mid-1970s,	once	converted,	she	became	one	of	the	
state’s	leading	feminists	from	either	party.	Milliken	was	from	a	very	conservative	
Republican	 family.	 Later	 noting,	 “I	 was	 raised	 in	 an	 era	 when	 women	 were	
supposed	 to	 be	 educated,	 literate,	 find	 a	 good	 husband,	 and	 provide	 a	 good	
home,”21 	she	 followed	 that	 dictate.	 A	 graduate	 of	 Smith	 College,	 she	 married	
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Milliken	in	1945	at	the	end	of	World	War	II.	When	her	husband	finished	college	at	
Yale,	they	moved	back	to	his	hometown	of	Traverse	City,	Michigan.	They	had	two	
nearly	grown	children	by	the	time	her	husband	was	elected	first	to	the	Michigan	
Senate	in	1960,	and	then	as	lieutenant	governor	under	George	Romney	in	1964.	
During	this	time,	she	balanced	her	duties	as	the	wife	of	the	 lieutenant	governor	
with	her	life	as	a	student	of	landscape	architecture	at	Michigan	State	University.22	
Milliken	became	governor	of	Michigan	when	Romney	accepted	a	position	 in	the	
Nixon	cabinet	in	1969.	
In	her	early	years	as	first	lady,	she	recognized	the	importance	of	women	in	
the	political	process	and	credited	the	MWPC	for	educating	women	about	politics,	
but	 she	 only	 reluctantly	 offered	 any	 support	 for	 the	 burgeoning	 women’s	
movement.	She	supported	the	ERA	and	when	asked,	she	noted,	“‘I’m	for	equal	pay	
for	 equal	work,’	 .	 .	 .	 ‘but	 I’m	not	 really	 sure	 about	women’s	 liberation,	when	 it	
comes	to	disrupting	the	family.’”23	She	defended	women	who	were	not	interested	
in	the	women’s	movement	because	“equality	.	.	.	should	be	an	individual	right	.	.	.	
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to	have	 full	equality	or	not	 to	claim	 it	 if	you	really	do	not	 feel	 the	need	of	 it.”24	
Despite	 her	 somewhat	 traditional	 ideas	 about	 women,	 she	 and	 her	 husband	
provided	each	other	with	the	space	to	be	independent.	She	did	not	feel	that	she	
always	had	to	agree	with	him	and	he	let	her	be	her	own	person.	At	this	point	in	her	
career	as	Michigan’s	first	lady,	her	real	interests	were	conservation	and	making	art	
accessible	to	the	people	of	Michigan.25		
According	to	the	Oakland	Press,	“it	wasn’t	until	1975	that	she	assumed	an	
active	part	 in	the	struggle	for	equal	rights	for	women.”26		She	acknowledged	she	
was	a	latecomer	to	the	women’s	movement	because	“‘I’d	never	had	to	work.	I’d	
worked	for	a	couple	of	years	(at	J.W.	Milliken,	Inc.).	It	was	an	enjoyable	outlet,	a	
pin	money	 job	 and	 I	was	working	 part	 time	 .	 .	 .	 a	 very	 different	 situation	 from	
women	 today.’”27	She	 attributed	 her	 feminist	 consciousness	 to	 her	 daughter,	 a	
lawyer,	who	chastised	her	for	not	having	an	opinion	on	the	ERA.	Her	daughter	told	
her,	 “‘Mother,	 you	must	 become	 informed	 about	women’s	 issues.	 You	 are	 in	 a	
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wonderful	position	now	to	help	women.’	And	the	lights	went	on	and	I	embarked	
on	 learning.” 28 	Milliken	 asserted	 that	 “once	 the	 window	 gets	 open,	 it’s	 never	
closed.”29 	Braithwaite	 later	 stated	 that	 Helen	 Milliken	 is	 “the	 purest	 feminist	 I	
know,	.	 .	 .	so	many	of	us	are	divorced	and	widowed	so	we,	out	of	necessity,	are	
feminists.	She’s	not	in	that	position,	yet	her	concerns	and	efforts	have	been	100	
percent.”30	For	the	next	eight	years,	Milliken	devoted	most	of	her	energy	to	the	the	
ratification	 of	 the	 ERA,	 not	 as	 a	 figurehead	 for	 ERAmerica,	 but	 as	 a	 passionate	
activist.		
Republican	feminist	Ruth	McNamee	emerged	in	Michigan	during	the	1970s	
to	 work	 closely	 with	 Helen	Milliken	 on	 the	 ERA.31	McNamee	 graduated	 with	 a	
bachelor’s	degree	in	political	science	and	English	from	Bucknell	University.	Married	
with	 two	 children,	 she	 began	 her	 political	 career	 locally,	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	
Birmingham	City	Commission	from	1965	to	1974,	and	as	mayor	of	Birmingham	in	
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1970	and	1971.	In	1974,	she	was	elected	to	the	Michigan	House	of	Representatives,	
where	she	remained	until	1984,	when	she	decided	to	retire.		
McNamee	started	to	develop	her	feminist	consciousness	when	she	became	
aware	of	the	disadvantages	she	faced	as	a	female	volunteer	in	her	Episcopal	Church.	
Much	like	women	in	the	Republican	Party,	she	and	other	women	did	most	of	the	
work	but	had	no	power	or	authority.	Frustrated	but	energized,	her	church	activism	
led	her	to	become	involved	in	the	community	and	local	politics.32	She	was	initially	
ambivalent	about	the	women’s	movement,	arguing	that	some	of	its	goals,	such	as	
gender	neutral	clubs,	were	not	important	to	her.	But	she	eventually	came	to	credit	
it	with	effectuating	important	societal	changes,	“such	as	recognition	at	last	that	a	
woman	has	her	own	right	to	enter	directly	into	the	world,	be	both	an	architect	of	
it	and	a	direct	beneficiary	of	its	rewards.”33	Thus,	she	argued	that	“women	should	
have	equal	opportunities	in	education	and	jobs,	and	that	their	work	performance	
[should]	be	recognized	in	the	same	manner	as	a	man’s.”34	Women	and	men	were	
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different	from	each	other,	but	such	differences	were	enriching,	not	limiting.35	She	
laughingly	complained	that	while	she	was	the	only	woman	on	the	Birmingham	City	
Commission,	 the	 men	 frequently	 questioned	 the	 intellectual	 abilities	 of	 the	
“confused	housewife”	or	“confused	woman	driver.”	She	noted	“before	 I	 retire,	 I	
hope	the	‘confused	driver’	is	the	male–just	once.”36	
Despite	 her	 commitment	 to	 gender	 equality,	 McNamee	 had	 some	 very	
traditional	 ideas	 about	 the	 family.	 She	 was	 a	 stay-at-home	 mother	 while	 her	
children	were	young,	and	did	not	resent	or	regret	that	time	with	her	children.	She	
believed	that	as	a	wife	and	mother,	a	woman	was	responsible	for	the	family	home	
and	if	that	was	in	order,	a	woman	could	work	outside	the	home.37	Even	after	her	
children	were	grown,	she	said	that	she	preferred	“Saturday	morning	meetings.	‘I	
refuse	to	have	my	husband	eat	TV	dinners.	Even	though	I	am	mayor	now,	he	is	still	
my	husband	and	deserves	to	have	the	best	I	can	give	him.’”38	While	her	husband,	
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she	believed,	was	not	responsible	for	cooking	or	cleaning,	he	was	still	obliged	to	
participate	in	raising	the	children.	“I	don’t	expect	my	husband	to	help	at	home,	but	
it	is	important	that	he	be	a	good	father	to	the	kids.”39	
Like	Beebe,	McNamee’s	femininity	was	often	stressed	in	the	press.	She	was	
once	described	as	“probably	the	prettiest	of	the	mayors	of	metropolitan	Detroit.”40	
One	author	noted	that	“her	favorite	household	appliance	is	her	dishwasher.	.	.	.The	
mayor	is	an	avid	antique	collector	and	favors	glass	and	china.	Her	glass	collection	
pattern	is	the	old	‘buzz-saw’	design.”41	Another	female	journalist	commented	“that	
her	dimpled	smile	makes	her	no	less	formidable	than	her	six	male	associates	when	
it	comes	to	handling	city	affairs.”42	Certainly	journalists	would	never	compare	the	
looks	of	male	officeholders	or	comment	on	their	dimples.	Moreover,	no	one	cared	
about	a	male	politician’s	“favorite	household	appliance.”	This	 journalistic	double	
standard	made	it	difficult	for	female	politicians	to	be	taken	seriously.		
Despite	 the	 challenges	 she	 faced	as	 a	politician	 and	member	of	 the	 state	
legislature,	McNamee	became	a	 representative	 for	women	within	 the	Michigan	
																																																						
39	Hay,	“Birmingham’s	Mayor	Speaks	Out,”	August	20,	1970.	
	
40	Ladd	Neuman,	“Detroit’s	Exchange	Mayor	Tells	It	Like	She	Sees	It,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	
May	19,	1970.	
	
41	Smith,	“On	Being	a	Woman,”	May	7,	1970.		
	
42	Luise	Leismer,	“She’s	a	City	Father,”	Detroit	News,	September	20,	1968.		
		
138	
Republican	Party.	She	consistently	identified	herself	as	a	moderate	Republican	and	
a	fiscal	conservative.	When	asked	why	she	did	not	become	a	Democrat	instead	of	
remaining	in	an	increasingly	conservative	Republican	Party,	she	noted	that	she	was	
a	 Republican	 because	 she	 believed	 in	 the	 party’s	 commitment	 to	 limited	
government	and	its	tenet	that	people’s	problems	were	best	solved	by	the	private	
sector.43		
Once	the	Michigan	legislature	ratified	the	ERA,	the	battle	over	the	proposed	
constitutional	 amendment	 entered	 a	 new	 phase.	 Michigan’s	 ERA	 opponents,	
especially	Donnelly	 and	Michigan	 STOP	 ERA,	 began	 to	 try	 to	 rescind	Michigan’s	
ratification	of	the	amendment.	While	Donnelly	saw	rescission	as	a	potentially	viable	
strategy,	 she	 recognized	 that	Governor	Milliken	 created	 a	 political	 environment	
that	made	rescission	difficult.	Thus,	to	undermine	his	 influence,	her	organization	
pushed	back	on	his	involvement.	Michigan	STOP	ERA	objected	to	his	“use	[of]	the	
funds,	power,	and	prestige	of	his	office	to	interfere	in	the	Amendment	process,	or	
to	 financially	 subsidize	 one	 side	 in	 the	 national	 debate	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	
other.” 44 	Donnelly	 reminded	 the	 governor	 that	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	
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Michigan	 state	 government	 did	 not	 have	 a	 role	 in	 amending	 the	 United	 States	
Constitution.	Unlike	legislation,	which	only	becomes	law	when	the	governor	signs	
it,	state	legislatures	ratify	federal	constitutional	amendments	without	a	governor’s	
participation.	 As	 a	 result,	 she	 asserted,	 he	 could	 not	 legally	 participate	 in	 the	
ratification/rescission	process.	Donnelly	wrote,	“To	put	it	bluntly,	the	ratification	of	
the	 ERA,	 or	 a	 rescission	 of	 that	 ratification,	 is	 none	 of	 your	 official	 business.”45	
Donnelly	made	it	clear	to	the	governor	that	he	should	not	use	his	office	to	take	any	
position	on	the	ERA	or	to	try	to	protect	the	legislature’s	earlier	ratification	vote.46	
Donnelly	 shared	 with	 her	 feminist	 opponents	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 power	 of	
politicized	women.	But	since	Michigan	STOP	ERA	members	were	not	politicized,	she	
had	 to	 teach	 them	 to	become	active	 voters	and	effective	 lobbyists	 so	 that	 they	
could	meaningfully	engage	in	the	rescission	process.	She	asked	them	to	send	hand	
written	“rescindograms”	and,	if	possible,	to	visit	legislators	to	convince	them	that	
their	 constituents	 favored	 rescission. 47 	She	 encouraged	 them	 to	 campaign	 for	
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legislators	 who	 supported	 rescission.	 While	 Donnelly	 suggested	 that	 they	
participate	through	bumper	stickers,	phone	calls	and	lawn	signs,	she	urged	them	to	
more	proactively	“invite	your	neighbors	and	friends	in	the	District	over	for	coffee	
or	an	evening	social	event.	Better	yet,	organize	a	whole	day	of	coffees	in	the	homes	
of	 friends	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 invite	 their	 friends	 into	 their	 homes	 to	 meet	 the	
Candidate.”48	In	order	 to	 raise	 the	money	 to	engage	 in	 these	grassroots	efforts,	
Michigan	 STOP	 ERA	 held	 bake	 sales,	 luncheons	 and	 boutiques	 throughout	 the	
state.49	Donnelly’s	efforts	 to	teach	other	women	to	engage	 in	grassroots	politics	
were	a	part	of	the	conservative	playbook	and	replicated	what	was	happening	all	
around	the	nation	as	conservative	 leaders	were	bringing	 formerly	nonpoliticized	
women	into	the	political	process	and	empowering	them	to	take	charge	of	their	lives.		
Michigan’s	attorney	general	made	Donnelly’s	task	a	little	more	difficult	when	
he	 ruled	 that	 rescission	of	 the	 ratification	by	 the	 state	 legislature	was	probably	
illegal.50	Despite	this	setback,	Donnelly	and	other	ERA	opponents	did	not	abandon	
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their	rescission	efforts.	They	argued	that	the	will	of	the	people	had	been	ignored	
when	the	state	legislature	originally	ratified	the	ERA,	and	that	politicians	continued	
to	ignore	their	constituents	as	the	ratification	was	being	reconsidered.	In	an	“Open	
Letter	to	all	Michigan	Legislators,”	Donnelly	and	Barbour	argued	that	“right	from	
the	start	of	the	Equal	Rights	Amendment	controversy,	the	opinions	of	the	wives	
and	mothers	who	do	not	choose	to	join	a	large	organization	have	been	screened	
out,	 ignored,	 or	 ridiculed.” 51 	Significantly,	 these	 ERA	 opponents	 publicly	
characterized	 themselves	 as	 “wives	 and	 mothers,”	 not	 women,	 indicating	 they	
believed	that	they	derived	their	 legitimacy	and	would	be	able	 to	exert	the	most	
influence	through	these	familial	roles.	
With	 Donnelly’s	 assistance,	 the	 Michigan	 House	 of	 Representatives	
proposed	joint	resolutions	to	rescind	the	ERA	in	March	1974	and	March	1976,	but	
both	languished	in	the	Committee	on	Constitutional	Revision	and	Women’s	Rights.	
In	1974	House	Joint	Resolution	FF,	which	had	five	Democratic	sponsors,	sought	“to	
rescind	and	nullify”	the	ratification	of	the	ERA	by	the	Michigan	 legislature.52	The	
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Committee’s	 vote	 on	 the	 resolution	was	 equally	 divided	 along	 party	 lines.	 Four	
Democrats	opposed	moving	the	resolution	out	of	committee	and	four	Republicans	
favored	allowing	the	resolution	to	be	voted	on	by	the	full	House.	As	a	result,	the	
Democrat	members	of	the	Committee	overruled	their	Republican	colleagues	and	
stopped	 the	 Democrat	 sponsored	 resolution,	 which	 died	 in	 Committee. 53 	The	
number	of	sponsors	for	House	Joint	Resolution	TT,	introduced	on	March	2,	1976,	
had	increased	to	twenty-two,	indicating	that	support	for	rescission	was	growing.	Of	
these	 sponsors,	 sixteen	were	 Democrats	 and	 six	were	 Republicans.	 Despite	 the	
additional	support,	the	resolution	met	the	same	fate	as	the	1974	resolution	and	
never	got	out	of	the	Committee.54	
While	the	move	to	rescind	Michigan’s	ratification	of	the	ERA	lost	much	of	its	
energy	 after	 the	 1976	 vote	 for	 rescission,	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 ERA	 continued,	
especially	 as	 efforts	 towards	 ratification	 in	 other	 states	 seemed	 to	 stall.	 For	
Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists,	 the	 1976	 Republican	 national	 convention	
intensified	 the	 debate.	 In	 1972,	 the	 Republican	 Party	 included	 a	 plank	 in	 its	
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platform	that	reiterated	the	party’s	 longstanding	support	 for	 the	ERA.55	In	1976,	
Republican	feminists,	led	by	the	NRWTF,	retained	a	pro-ERA	plank	in	the	platform,	
which	emphasized	“that	the	Republican	Party	‘fully	endorses	the	principle	of	equal	
rights,	equal	opportunities	and	equal	responsibilities	for	women.’	The	Equal	Rights	
Amendment	is	the	embodiment	of	this	principle	and	therefore	we	support	its	swift	
ratification.”56	However,	conservative	Republicans,	 led	by	Schlafly,	came	close	to	
convincing	the	party	to	abandon	its	endorsement.	
The	convention	served	as	a	wakeup	call	to	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists.	
They	had	already	defeated	bipartisan	attempts	to	rescind	Michigan’s	ratification	of	
the	 ERA	 and	 that	 effort	 seemed	 over.	 Republican	 feminists	 had	 persuaded	 the	
national	Republican	Party,	at	least	temporarily,	to	continue	its	support	for	the	ERA.	
Yet	all	of	their	hard	work	would	be	wasted	if	they	could	not	convince	other	states	
to	ratify	 the	ERA.	Moderate	Republicans	still	controlled	the	Republican	Party,	as	
evidenced	by	Milliken’s	reelection	as	governor	in	1974	and	Gerald	Ford’s	defeat	of	
conservative	Ronald	Reagan	for	the	presidential	nomination	in	1976.	Realizing	that	
they	needed	the	party’s	support	to	ratify	the	ERA,	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	
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aligned	with	party	moderates.	Their	strategy	had	a	dual	purpose,	however.	They	
understood	 that	 feminists	 would	 support	 a	 party	 that	 supported	 them,	 which	
would	strengthen	the	moderate	wing	of	the	party.	While	Republican	feminists	had	
a	temporary	advantage	in	the	Michigan	Republican	Party,	they	knew	that	the	fight	
for	control	of	the	party	was	far	from	over.	The	battle	between	Republican	feminists	
and	conservative	women	over	the	ERA	became	a	part	of	the	much	larger	war	for	
control	of	the	Republican	Party.		
The	 first	 task	 of	 Republican	 feminists	 was	 to	 counter	 the	 narrative	 that	
conservative	women	had	constructed	about	the	ERA.	Schlafly	and	STOP	ERAmerica,	
argued	 that	 the	 ERA	 endangered	 American	 society.	 Schlafly	 explained	 that	
conservative	 opposition	 to	 the	 ERA	was	 based	 on	 two	 interrelated	 notions:	 the	
primacy	of	the	traditional	family	and	the	biological	differences	between	men	and	
women.57	Because	of	the	importance	of	the	family,	women	enjoyed	a	unique	status,	
which	 justified	 their	 special	privileges	as	wives	and	mothers.	Schlafly	contended	
that	the	women’s	movement	arrogantly	presumed	to	speak	for	all	women	with	its	
assertion	that	women	were	treated	unfairly.	Instead,	she	argued,	“Women’s	lib	is	
a	total	assault	on	the	role	of	the	American	woman	as	wife	and	mother,	and	on	the	
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family	as	the	basic	unit	of	society.”58	She	queried,	“Why	should	we	lower	ourselves	
to	‘equal	rights’	when	we	already	have	the	status	of	special	privilege?”59	Donnelly	
agreed	“that	the	feminists	‘reject	the	values	that	the	majority	of	women	hold	.	.	.	
they	 have	 a	 very	 negative	 attitude	 toward	 the	 family	 and	 I	 don’t	 think	 they	
understand	the	nature	of	commitment	to	the	family.’”60		
For	Schlafly	and	her	supporters,	men	and	women	were	biologically	different,	
which	meant	that	they	had	different	functions	in	life.	Women	were	meant	to	be	
wives	and	mothers	and	could	fulfill	those	functions	only	in	a	traditional	family	with	
a	husband	and	children.	Schlafly	believed	that	abortion	would	eliminate	women’s	
primary	role	in	society.	She	tied	the	ERA	to	both	abortion	rights	and	homosexuality	
when	she	 stated	 that	 “the	ultimate	goal	of	women’s	 liberation	 is	 independence	
from	men	and	the	avoidance	of	pregnancy	and	its	consequences	.	.	.	[so]	lesbianism	
is	logically	the	highest	form	in	the	ritual	of	women’s	liberation.”61		
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ERA’s	 opponents	 claimed	 that	 they	 did	 not	 oppose	 equality,	 but	 worried	
about	what	women	would	lose	in	the	process	of	attaining	it.	STOP	ERA	emphasized	
that	 the	 “ERA	 forbids	 any	 legal	 distinction	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex,	 no	matter	 how	
reasonable	and	beneficial	those	distinctions	may	be.”62	They	believed	that	the	ERA	
created	 the	 potential	 for	 dangerous	 overreaching	 by	 the	 government,	 which	
threatened	 the	 special	 privileges	 enjoyed	 by	 women,	 including	 protective	
legislation.63	Barbour	emphasized	that	“to	treat	women	exactly	like	men	is	to	treat	
women	unfairly.”64	A	constitutional	amendment	could	not	abrogate	the	differences	
between	 men	 and	 women,	 but	 would	 invalidate	 the	 protective	 laws	 that	
ameliorated	some	of	the	disadvantages	that	women	suffered	as	a	result	of	those	
differences.	It	did	not	add	any	value	for	women,	but	it	did	“take	away	rights	and	
privileges	that	American	women	have	achieved	that	make	our	life	here	the	best	in	
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the	world.”65	The	ERA	“would	sacrifice	a	 large	measure	of	personal	and	political	
freedom,	 plus	 justice	 for	women,	 on	 the	 altar	 of	 inflexible	 equality.”66	Donnelly	
clearly	 intended	to	scare	wives	and	mothers	when	she	argued	that	 the	 financial	
impact	of	the	ERA	on	families	would	eliminate	a	husband’s	obligation	to	provide	
financial	support	for	his	wife.	She	noted	that	the	laws	requiring	such	support	“were	
not	written	to	penalize	men,	or	to	give	women	something	they	don’t	deserve.	They	
were	written	 to	protect	 the	 rights	of	women	who	make	a	good	 faith,	 long-term	
commitment	 to	marriage	 and	motherhood.	 All	 of	 society	 has	 an	 interest	 in	 the	
stability	of	 families,	because	 families	are	 responsible	 for	 the	care	of	 children.”67	
Donnelly	asserted	that	“if	ERA	is	ratified	.	.	.	‘motherhood	would	become	a	high	risk	
occupation.’”68	Thus,	 according	 to	Michigan	 STOP	 ERA,	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 ERA	
would	eliminate	government	protections	that	enabled	women	to	act	as	wives	and	
mothers	and,	in	the	process,	destroy	families.	
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Building	on	Schlafly’s	opposition	to	the	ERA,	HOW	and	Michigan	STOP	ERA	
conservatives	emphasized	the	radicalism	of	the	groups	that	supported	the	ERA	to	
make	 them	 more	 threatening	 to	 women.	 In	 1975,	 Donnelly	 referenced	 the	
campaign	slogan	of	the	president	of	NOW,	Karen	DeCrow,	“Out	of	the	Mainstream,	
Into	 the	 Revolution,”	 to	 argue	 that	 “all	 attempts	 to	 paper	 over	 the	 simmering	
radicalism	of	N.O.W.	are	sure	to	fail.”69	They	warned	that	radical	feminists	would	
take	advantage	of	the	law’s	ambiguity	to	undermine	the	integrity	of	the	traditional	
family	in	a	variety	of	unanticipated	ways.	Donnelly	called	proponents	of	the	ERA	
“militant	 feminists”	 who	 wanted	 to	 create	 a	 “‘gender-free’	 society”70 	in	 which	
abortion,	homosexual	marriage	and	unisex	bathrooms	would	be	 legal.	 If	women	
were	no	different	than	men,	young	girls	would	have	to	be	drafted	and	sent	 into	
combat	alongside	young	men.	The	education	system	would	have	to	be	modified	to	
eliminate	 sexism	 in	 teaching	 by	 downplaying	 concepts	 of	 masculinity	 and	
femininity	for	children.	Donnelly	objected	to	this	because	“there	is	no	set	standard	
to	determine	what	is	sexist.	‘The	definition	of	sexism	is	as	wide	as	the	feminist	mind	
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is	narrow.’”71	According	to	Donnelly,	feminists	were	trying	to	“have	the	boys	put	
on	make-up	and	discuss	how	it	affects	their	self-perception,”	and	to	persuade	boys	
“to	 suppress	 their	 aggressive	 tendencies	 and	 masculinity	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 a	
disease.”72	HOW	also	argued	that	ERA’s	proponents	wanted	to	use	schools	to	teach	
children	about	a	broad	array	of	sexual	preferences	and	that	heterosexual	sex	was	
not	the	only	acceptable	option.73		
	One	major	objection	 to	 the	ERA	was	 that	 it	would	change	 the	 traditional	
configuration	of	government	power.	The	provision	that	granted	the	federal	courts	
the	right	to	enforce	the	constitutional	amendment	effectively	shifted	power	from	
state	and	local	governments	to	the	federal	government.74	The	ERA	would	also	alter	
power	 allocations	within	 the	 federal	 government.	 For	 example,	 Schlafly	 cited	 a	
statement	made	by	ERA	proponent,	Democrat	Congresswoman	Patricia	Schroeder,	
in	which	she	addressed	federal	funding	for	medical	research	in	the	context	of	the	
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ERA.	Schroeder	asserted	that	women	have	“as	much	right	to	claim	an	equal	portion	
for	diseases	that	women	are	concerned	about	as	men	do.”75	Schlafly	interpreted	
that	“to	mean	that	ERA	would	compel	the	United	States	Congress	to	spend	50%	of	
health	 care	 money	 on	 ‘women’s	 diseases’	 (whatever	 that	 means)	 and	 50%	 on	
‘men’s	 diseases’	 (whatever	 they	 are).” 76 	Thus,	 the	 ERA	 would	 eliminate	
Congressional	discretion	for	medical	spending.		
In	response	to	the	arguments	of	conservative	women,	Republican	feminists	
focused	on	what	the	ERA	would	provide	for	women,	rather	than	what	it	would	take	
away	from	them.	Peterson	called	it	“a	simple	statement	of	principle—a	principle	of	
equal	justice	under	the	law—a	guarantee	of	legal	rights,	free	of	sex	bias.”77	Helen	
Milliken	emphasized	that	the	ERA	“will	remove	sex	as	a	factor	in	determining	the	
legal	 rights	of	men	and	women.”78	Unlike	 their	opponents,	however,	Republican	
feminists	also	seemed	to	spend	much	of	their	time	on	the	defensive,	responding	to	
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the	arguments	made	by	HOW	and	STOP	ERA	about	the	ERA’s	dire	and	unanticipated	
consequences.	As	Peterson	later	noted,	“In	retrospect,	I	can	see	we	spent	too	much	
time	 trying	 to	 defend	 our	 stand	 from	 the	 Schlafly	 Eagles	 and	 other	 right-wing	
organizations	or	fundamentalist	churches	and	too	little	time	on	the	attack.”79	They	
allowed	their	conservative	opponents	to	create	the	narrative,	which	put	them	at	a	
disadvantage.		
Proponents	tried	to	narrow	the	scope	of	the	ERA	by	separating	it	from	other	
controversial	issues,	such	as	homosexual	marriage	and	abortion,	in	order	to	make	
it	more	 palatable	 to	 voters	 and	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 Laura	 Callow,	 a	Michigan	
feminist	who	Helen	Milliken	called	“our	Susan	B.	Anthony”	because	of	her	more	
than	thirty	years	of	activism	on	behalf	of	the	ERA,	was	a	regular	pro-ERA	contributor	
to	 the	 WJR	 Radio	 Show	 “Point	 of	 View.” 80 	She	 argued	 that	 “the	 Equal	 Rights	
Amendment	was	concerned	with	discrimination	on	account	of	gender,	being	male	
or	 female,	 not	 sexual	 preference.”81	NOW	and	Michigan	ERAmerica	emphasized	
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that	 the	 ERA	 did	 not	 impact	 abortion	 because	 it	 applied	 only	 to	 rights	 and	
obligations	that	applied	to	both	men	and	women.	Since	men	could	not	give	birth	
to	children,	they	argued,	the	ERA	was	not	relevant	to	abortion	rights.82	Peterson	
noted	that	she	did	not	understand	“how	you	can	equate	abortion	with	equality	of	
rights	 and	 privileges	 [unless	 those	 who	 converged	 the	 fights	 over	 the	 ERA	 and	
abortion]	 found	 a	 way	 for	 men	 to	 conceive.”83 	To	 bolster	 her	 position	 on	 the	
divisibility	of	the	ERA	and	abortion,	Callow	noted	that	in	1976	the	Republican	Party	
supported	 the	ERA	but	opposed	abortion.	Opponents,	 they	argued,	 inaccurately	
conflated	the	two	issues	to	radicalize	the	ERA	and	confuse	the	American	people.84		
The	efforts	of	ERA	 supporters	 to	 isolate	 the	ERA	 from	other	 controversial	
issues	sometimes	missed	the	mark,	indicating	that	they	did	not	always	understand	
the	concerns	of	ERA’s	opponents	and	undecided	voters.	One	of	Donnelly’s	primary	
arguments	against	the	ERA	was	that	it	would	require	women	to	serve	in	the	military	
under	 the	 same	 terms	 and	 conditions	 as	men.	 ERA	 proponents	 responded	 that	
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“excluding	women	from	the	draft	denies	 them	their	equal	 right	 to	 resist	war.”85	
Then,	instead	of	separating	the	ERA	from	the	draft,	they	affirmed	the	concerns	of	
the	ERA’s	opponents	with	their	legalistic	responses.	In	defense	of	the	ERA,	they	first	
emphasized	that	federal	law	already	authorized	the	government	to	draft	women	
into	 combat.	 Perhaps	 realizing	 that	 this	 concession	would	neither	persuade	nor	
reassure	women,	they	then	tried	to	minimize	the	likelihood	that	women	would	be	
sent	 into	combat	by	arguing	that	combat	readiness	was	 largely	dependent	upon	
physical	fitness	and	women	would	be	asked	to	do	only	that	which	they	could	do.	
Callow	also	tried	to	disassociate	the	ERA	from	combat	readiness	by	arguing	that	
“war	 is	wrong	not	 the	ERA.	War	arguments	should	not	be	used	 in	peacetime	to	
deter	women	 from	seeking	a	 constitutional	 guarantee	against	discrimination	on	
account	of	sex.”86	Moreover,	she	argued,	“It	is	manhating	to	oppose	the	drafting	of	
women	but	not	the	drafting	of	men.	Male	lives	are	not	less	valuable	than	female	
lives.”87	These	logical,	but	nonresponsive	rejoinders	and	fits	of	pacifism	did	little	to	
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reassure	Americans	who	did	not	want	their	female	relatives	to	be	sent	into	battle,	
or	to	refute	the	arguments	of	radical	feminists	that	men	and	women	were	identical.		
For	the	most	part,	ERA	supporters	responded	to	the	dire	predictions	of	ERA’s	
opponents	by	arguing	that	the	ERA	would	not	significantly	change	the	American	
way	of	life	or	radically	restructure	American	society.	They	likened	it	to	“‘insurance’	
to	guarantee	that	laws	applied	to	men	and	women	equally	without	interference	by	
state	and	local	governments.”88	However,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	the	opponents	of	
the	ERA	were	able	 to	 take	advantage	of	 the	amendment’s	ambiguity	or	at	 least	
emphasize	 its	uncertainty.	Even	its	proponents	did	not	understand	its	 impact	on	
current	law.	Helen	Milliken,	for	example,	suggested	that	laws	would	change	as	a	
result	 of	 the	 ERA,	 but	 it	was	not	 necessarily	 clear	 how	 they	would	 change.	 She	
noted	that	“if	a	law	restricts	rights,	it	will	no	longer	be	valid;	if	it	protects	rights,	it	
will	probably	[emphasis	added]	be	extended	to	men.”89	It	was	difficult	to	downplay	
the	impact	of	the	proposed	constitutional	amendment	when	its	leading	supporters	
could	not	even	explain	how	it	would	relate	to	the	laws	already	on	the	books.	
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When	 Republican	 feminists	 described	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 ERA,	 they	
frequently	 shifted	 the	 focus	 and	 discussion	 away	 from	more	 intangible	 notions	
about	 family	 and,	 instead,	 addressed	 the	 economic	 consequences	of	 the	 ERA–a	
topic	that	was	much	more	comfortable	for	moderate	members	of	the	Republican	
Party.	They	emphasized	the	fact	that	“marriage	is	an	economic	as	well	as	social	and	
emotional	 partnership”90 	in	 order	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 ERA	 protected	 women	 as	
economic	actors.	Peterson	described	the	ERA	as	follows:	“There	has	been	a	lot	of	
rhetoric	 about	 the	 partnership	 of	 marriage	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 role	 of	
homemaking	 and	 the	 rewards	 of	 mothering	 but	 there	 has	 been	 precious	 little	
action	to	make	it	an	economically	secure	and	dignified	role.	The	ERA	will	raise	the	
legal	 status	 of	 the	 homemaker	 and	 strengthen	 the	 family	 unit.	 In	 an	 age	 of	
instability,	uncertainty	and	deteriorating	 family	 life,	 it	 is	needed	now	more	than	
ever.”91		
The	ERA	would,	proponents	argued,	eliminate	many	of	the	laws	that	made	
women,	especially	 stay-at	home	mothers,	 economically	dependent	on	men.	 For	
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example,	insurance	companies	would	be	required	to	provide	health,	disability,	and	
life	 insurance	 to	women	 on	 the	 same	 terms	 that	 they	were	 offered	 to	men.	 A	
woman	could	then	purchase	insurance	on	the	life	of	her	husband,	the	proceeds	of	
which	could	be	used	to	support	their	children	in	the	event	of	his	death.	Women	
were	typically	charged	more	for	disability	or	health	insurance	because	they	were	
considered	 “‘clunkers	 and	 losers’”	 due	 to	 potential	 “problems	 with	 their	
reproductive	 systems.”92 	This	 practice,	 in	 effect,	 constituted	 “discrimination	 on	
account	 of	 motherhood,” 93 	an	 argument	 that	 enabled	 Republican	 feminists	 to	
usurp	 the	 oftentimes	 conservative	 position	 that	 they	 were	 protecting	 mothers	
through	the	ERA.		
The	debate	over	working	wives	and	mothers	became	particularly	intense	in	
the	 context	 of	 discussions	 about	 social	 security	 laws.	 Callow	 emphasized	 that	
society	security	benefits	were	based	on	employment,	which	left	unemployed	wives	
and	 mothers	 dependent	 on	 their	 spouses	 for	 derivative	 benefits.	 Divorce	 and	
premature	death	left	homemakers	who	had	not	participated	in	the	workplace	and	
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accrued	benefits	of	their	own	particularly	vulnerable.	Callow	argued	that	“there	is	
a	 lack	 of	 fairness	 in	 Social	 Security	 for	 homemakers	 because	 under	 the	
‘breadwinner/dependents’	assumption,	women	are	penalized	for	motherhood.”94	
The	ERA,	she	contended,	would	protect	the	family	as	an	economic	unit,	a	status	
that	 was	 not	 adequately	 accounted	 for	 under	 the	 derivative	 benefit	 scheme	
established	by	social	security	laws.95	Conversely,	Donnelly	responded,	changes	in	
the	 Social	 Security	 laws	 to	 bring	 about	 gender	 equality	 would	 eliminate	 the	
derivative	social	security	benefits	that	wives	and	mothers	were	able	to	claim	based	
on	their	husbands’	working	lives.	Instead,	women	would	be	treated	as	workers	in	
their	homes	and	the	family	would	be	required	to	pay	social	security	on	their	behalf,	
resulting	 in	a	tax	 increase	that	would	force	more	women	to	work	outside	of	the	
home.96	
Some	 feminists	 were	 critical	 of	 the	 ERA	 because	 it	 failed	 to	 address	 the	
double	burden	faced	by	working	women.	These	activists	contended	that	the	ERA	
should	 have	 provided	 relief	 for	women	who	had	 jobs	 and	 had	 to	 care	 for	 their	
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homes	 and	 families.	 Such	 assistance	 could	 have	 included	 government	 provided	
childcare,	paid	maternity	leave,	or	other	arrangements	which	divided	childcare	and	
homemaking	 responsibilities	 between	 men	 and	 women.	 One	 woman	 from	 the	
northern	peninsula	of	Michigan	explained	to	Milliken	that	she	hoped	that	the	ERA	
would	be	ratified	because	working	women	in	her	community	who	were	paid	the	
legal	minimum	wage	earned	eighty	dollars	each	week,	but	had	to	pay	forty	dollars	
for	 child	 care	 services.97	Until	 this	 issue	was	 resolved,	many	 believed,	men	 and	
women	would	not	be	truly	equal.	
Because	 these	 fixes	 for	 the	 double	 burden	 all	 increased	 government	
spending	 and	 required	 that	 the	 government	 interfere	 with	 the	 family,	 many	
Republican	 feminists	 were	 comfortable	 with	 this	 omission.	 The	 ERA	 was	 less	
controversial	 because	 it	 did	 not	 significantly	 alter	 the	 lives	 of	 working	 women.	
When	she	testified	before	the	Michigan	legislature	in	support	of	ratification	of	the	
ERA,	 Ranny	 Riecker,	 the	 Republican	National	 Committeewoman	 from	Michigan,	
argued	 that	 Republicans	 could	 support	 the	 ERA	 precisely	 because	 it	 benefitted	
families	by	leaving	the	double	burden	intact.	Facing	the	challenges	associated	with	
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employment	and	homemaking,	women	would	not	choose	to	work	outside	of	the	
home.	She	said	that	“it	[the	ERA]	will	not	affect	the	social	relationships	between	
men	 and	 women.	 It	 will	 not	 mean	 that	 women	 will	 automatically	 desert	 their	
homes	and	families	for	the	‘fun	and	excitement’	of	the	job	market,	but	rather	will	
confirm	that	they	are	legally	equal.	The	status	of	traditional	women’s	occupations	
will	 be	 enhanced	 and	 the	 role	 of	 women’s	 occupations	 will	 be	 broadened.” 98	
McNamee	also	disagreed	with	the	notion	that	families	should	be	restructured	so	
that	men	could	assume	some	of	the	double	burden.	Women,	she	believed,	should	
care	for	the	home.	Men	had	the	responsibility	to	be	good	fathers,	but	not	good	
homemakers.99	
Republican	feminists	emphasized	that	the	ERA	would	create	gender	equality	
by	 incrementally	 changing	 the	 law.	As	a	 result,	 they	 could	assert	 that	 it	did	not	
change	the	roles	of	men	and	women	in	society	or	undermine	the	sanctity	of	the	
traditional	 family.	 Peterson	made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 ERA	 had	 no	 impact	 on	 “the	
personal	 relationships	 between	man	 and	wife–whether	 he	 supports	 her	 or	 not,	
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whether	 she	works	or	not	 is	 a	personal	 relation–and	will	 not	be	 covered	 in	 the	
ERA.”100	McNamee	asserted	that	the	“ERA	will	not	alter	family	life.	Women	are	the	
heart	 of	 the	 family	 and	 the	 family	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 America.	 If	 you	 help	
American	women,	[you]	strengthen	the	family	and	[the]	total	social	fabric	of	this	
nation.” 101 	By	 emphasizing	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 ERA’s	 economic	 changes	
benefited	 the	 family,	 Republican	 feminists	 mediated	 between	 radical	 feminists	
who	wanted	the	government	to	address	the	structural	inequities	that	resulted	in	
the	double	burden	faced	by	working	class	women,	and	Republican	conservatives	
who	 argued	 that	 the	 ERA	 would	 destroy	 families.	 From	 the	 sensible	 center,	
Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 ERA	 did	 not	 systemically	
change	 American	 society.	 It	 did,	 however,	 provide	 economic	 support	 and	
protections	to	 families	and	mothers	 in	ways	that	did	not	undermine	the	familial	
structure.	Moreover,	stripped	of	any	connection	to	abortion	and	homosexual	rights,	
it	became	less	of	a	moral	threat	to	the	family.		
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Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	believed	that	moderate	Republicans	would	
be	more	 likely	 to	support	 the	ERA	 if	 they	could	connect	 it	 to	 longstanding	party	
ideology.	Thus,	they	framed	the	ERA	as	the	latest	attempt	of	Republicans	to	seek	
equality	 for	all	Americans,	consistent	with	the	party’s	 long-term	commitment	to	
“individual	freedoms	and	human	rights	for	the	common	man	and	woman.”102	The	
ERA	was	merely	an	extension	of	or	follow	up	to	the	emancipation	of	the	slaves	and	
the	 fight	 for	 women’s	 suffrage.	 This	 historical	 tie	 legitimized	 the	 connections	
between	the	Republican	Party,	as	the	party	of	equal	rights,	and	feminism,	as	the	
social	 movement	 established	 to	 promote	 equality	 for	 women.	 In	 fact,	 in	 1976,	
Jeanne	Holm,	the	first	woman	to	become	an	Air	Force	general,	and	an	advisor	to	
President	 Ford	 on	women’s	 issues,	 asserted	 that	 “it	 is	 imperative,	 I	 feel,	 that	 a	
Republican	 President	 deal	 with	 this	 phenomenon	 [the	 women’s	 movement]	
because	 the	major	 gains	women	 have	made	 throughout	 our	 history	 have	 been	
made	 under	 Republican	 leadership.”103	The	 Republican	 Party,	 as	 the	 party	 that	
freed	the	slaves,	was	the	natural	party	to	lead	the	fight	for	the	ERA.	
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In	order	to	 legitimize	themselves	as	the	representatives	 for	women	 in	the	
Republican	 Party,	 Republican	 feminists	 appropriated	 the	 sensible	 center	 of	 the	
women’s	movement.	 In	 this	middle	 ground	 they	 distinguished	 themselves	 from	
both	radical	feminists	and	anti-feminist	conservative	Republicans.	Ideologically,	it	
was	comfortable	place	for	them	to	reside.	Substantively,	most	Republican	feminists	
did	not	agree	with	the	radicalism	of	liberation	feminists.	In	an	April	1974	speech	in	
Lansing,	 Michigan,	 on	 behalf	 of	 a	 Democratic	 candidate	 for	 the	 state	 Senate,	
feminist	 Steinem	 indicated	 that	 she	 would	 support	 any	 woman	 for	 office,	
regardless	of	party	affiliation,	because	“‘there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	larger	struggle	
than	women.’”104	During	that	same	speech,	she	argued	“‘overthrowing	capitalism	
is	 too	 small	 for	 us.	 We	 want	 to	 overthrow	 the	 whole	 fucking	 patriarchy!’” 105	
Expressing	 her	 disapproval	 in	 a	 marginal	 notation	 to	 Steinem’s	 quote,	 Milliken	
wrote,	“what	a	shame.”106		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 realized	 that	 if	 they	 associated	 with	 feminist	
extremists,	 they	 would	 not	 have	 the	 legitimacy	 to	 promote	 the	 ERA	 within	 a	
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moderate	Republican	Party.	For	example,	in	1976	the	Detroit	Coalition	to	Defend	
ERA	 asked	 Callow	 for	 her	 support.	 She	 quickly	 realized,	 however,	 that	 the	
organization	was	an	affiliate	of	the	Young	Socialist	Workers	Party,	not	a	coalition	of	
Wayne	State	University	student	groups	who	supported	the	ERA,	as	she	was	led	to	
believe.	 She	 refused	 to	 affiliate	 with	 the	 group	 because	 she	 believed	 that	 it	
intended	 to	 connect	 the	 ERA	 to	 abortion	 and	 lesbian	 rights,	 and	 otherwise	
appropriate	the	ERA	for	its	own	purposes.	She	also	worried	that	such	associations	
might	undermine	her	personal	legitimacy	and	credibility	as	a	spokeswoman	for	the	
ERA,	and	her	reputation	with	respectable	organizations	like	the	League	of	Women	
Voters.107		
From	 this	 middle	 ground,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 also	 actively	
disengaged	from	the	conservative	women	in	their	party.	On	the	positive	side,	they	
hoped	 to	 maximize	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 own	 message	 by	 identifying	 one	
unimpeachable	 public	 representative	 to	 articulate	 their	 positions	with	 both	 the	
Michigan	 legislature	and	the	Republican	Party.	They	decided	that	Helen	Milliken	
was	the	perfect	women	“to	serve	as	the	spokesperson	for	Republican	women	in	
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Michigan.”108	Because	she	was	more	well	known	and	respected	than	Donnelly,	she	
was	best	positioned	to	fight	efforts	to	rescind	the	ratification	of	the	ERA	in	Michigan	
and	to	negate	the	influence	of	Donnelly	and	other	conservative	women	within	the	
Republican	Party.109	It	 is	not	apparent	how	these	women	felt	when	Milliken	was	
subsequently	 named	 co-chairperson	 of	 the	 nonpartisan	 ERAmerica,	 where	 she	
assumed	 responsibility	 for	 a	 nationally	 focused	 effort	 to	 ratify	 the	 ERA.	 In	
retrospect,	 however,	 not	 even	Milliken	 could	 have	 healed	 the	 intensifying	 rifts	
within	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	over	the	women’s	movement.		
At	the	same	time,	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	went	on	the	offensive	to	
delegitimize	their	conservative	opponents	and	attack	their	motives.	They	argued	
that	“Elaine	Donnelly	does	not	speak	for	us,	that	she	does	not	represent	us,	and	
that	she	is,	in	fact,	a	minority	of	a	minority,	who,	while	welcome	to	their	opinions,	
should	 not	 influence	 decisions	 in	 the	 Michigan	 Legislature.” 110 	Michigan’s	
Republican	 feminists	 characterized	 Donnelly	 and	 Barbour	 as	 bad	 Republicans.	
Because	 they	 worked	 with	 both	 Republican	 and	 Democratic	 members	 of	 the	
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Michigan	legislature	to	rescind	the	ERA,	Republican	feminists	argued	that	they	put	
“their	 own	 special	 concerns--whatever	 they	may	be,”	 above	 those	of	 the	party,	
“caus[ing]	strife,	confusion,	and	divisiveness.”111	Republican	feminists,	on	the	other	
hand,	argued	that	they	put	their	partisanship	above	their	feminism	and	were	loyal	
to	the	Republican	Party.112	
ERA	advocates	refused	to	engage	with	their	opponents,	hoping	to	send	the	
message	that	their	positions	were	not	even	worthy	of	consideration.	As	a	result,	
NOW	and	Michigan	ERAmerica	did	not	participate	in	ERA	debates.	The	League	of	
Women	Voters	noted	that	“all	too	often	debates	degenerate	into	‘sideshows’	for	
proponents	and	opponents,	with	the	press	picking	up	the	most	sensational	aspects	
of	 the	 debate	 with	 headlines	 like	 ‘ERA--Integrated	 bathrooms	 and	 homosexual	
marriages?’	regardless	of	the	truth.”113	Thus,	supporters	argued,	opponents	used	
debates	to	set	forth	their	unsubstantiated	emotional	objections	to	the	amendment,	
which	only	diverted	attention	from	the	real	issues	and	“create[d]	doubt.	We	must	
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overcome	any	remaining	doubt--let’s	not	help	them	create	it.”114	In	one	instance,	
Michigan	 ERAmerica	 refused	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 proposed	 debate	 over	 the	 ERA	
sponsored	 by	 the	Women’s	 Studies	 Department	 at	 the	 University	 of	Michigan.	
Callow	argued	that	it	made	no	sense	to	argue	about	whether	the	ERA	was	necessary.	
“The	very	existence	of	a	Women	and	the	Law	class	indicates	women	are	treated	
differently	 under	 the	 law.” 115 	A	 debate	 legitimized	 alternatives	 to	 gender	
equality.116		
Not	 only	 did	 proponents	 dismiss	 the	 need	 to	 debate	 the	 ERA,	 they	 also	
delegitimized	 their	 opponents	 by	 questioning	 their	 credentials	 to	 participate	 in	
such	debates.	While	 the	Women’s	 Studies	Department	 suggested	 that	Donnelly	
represent	 the	opposition	 to	 the	ERA,	Callow	argued	 that	her	prior	debates	with	
Donnelly	 “were	 ‘media	 events’	 that	 were	 neither	 legal	 nor	 scholarly.” 117 	She	
characterized	Donnelly	as	an	entertainer,	not	someone	with	real	knowledge	about	
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the	 ERA.118	The	 Director	 of	 the	Women’s	 Studies	 Program	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Michigan	responded	that	the	decision	to	present	information	about	the	ERA	in	a	
debate	 format	 which	 included	 arguments	 against	 the	 ERA	 was	 “a	 matter	 of	
pedagogic	discretion,”	and	that	the	university’s	professors	have	the	ability	to	sift	
through	and	prepare	their	students	for	information	which	might	be	inaccurate	or	
inappropriate.119	Thus,	they	did	not	agree	with	Callow	that	arguments	against	the	
ERA	should	be	dismissed.	Since	Donnelly	was	unavailable	on	the	suggested	date,	
the	 university	 instead	 brought	 in	 a	 lawyer	 to	 speak	 about	 the	 ERA,	 including	
arguments	on	both	sides	of	the	ratification	question.120	
When	 Peterson,	 at	 the	 request	 of	Michigan	 ERAmerica,	withdrew	 from	 a	
scheduled	debate	with	Schlafly,	Schlafly	argued	that	ERA’s	proponents	were	scared	
to	debate	the	issues	surrounding	the	ERA.121	While	this	might	have	been	a	popular	
position	for	Schlafly	to	take	to	generate	support	from	her	base	constituents,	it	was	
not	 truthful.	ERA	supporters	 in	Michigan	realized	they	had	nothing	 to	gain	 from	
																																																						
118	Ibid.	
	
119	Margot	Norris,	Director	of	the	Women’s	Studies	Program	at	the	University	of	
Michigan	to	Callow,	November	26,	1979,	box	1,	folder:	ERAmerica	Conferences	and	Speaking	
Engagements	1976-1980,	Callow	Papers.		
	
120	Ibid.	
	
121	Eagle	Forum	Newsletter,	August	1976,	box	15,	folder:	Convention	and	Republican	
Women,	Peterson	Papers.	
		
168	
debates	because	ERA	ratification	was	a	fait	accompli	in	the	Michigan.122	Michigan	
ERAmerica’s	motives	were	not	based	on	 fear,	but	were	 strategic	and	consistent	
with	the	belief	of	ERA	proponents	that	there	were	no	legitimate	issues	that	needed	
to	be	discussed	relative	to	the	amendment.	This	strategy,	however,	did	not	help	
their	 cause.	 The	 refusal	 of	 ERA’s	 proponents	 to	 acknowledge	 or	 address	 the	
arguments	of	 their	opponents	meant	 that	 the	two	sides	 failed	to	engage,	which	
offered	no	reassurance	to	those	who	heard,	but	did	not	know	how	to	process,	the	
allegedly	outlandish	allegations	of	the	opponents	of	the	ERA.	
By	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 1970s,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 added	
personal	 attacks	 to	 their	 substantive	 arguments	 about	 the	 ERA.	 Peterson	 never	
made	a	secret	of	her	contempt	for	conservatives.	She	wrote	that	“it	 is	a	strange	
new	 life	 for	me--I	 never	 fought	 the	Democrats	 hating	 them--nor	 did	 I	 feel	 they	
hated	me.	Now	I	find	myself	with	the	right	wingers	filled	with	vicious	propaganda	
which	I	can’t	simply	say	‘HOW	can	people	believe	that?’”123	Republican	feminists	
invoked	gender,	 class	and	race	 to	attack	 the	character,	motives	and	message	of	
their	 opponents	who,	 they	 argued,	were	 the	 hapless,	 powerless	 pawns	 of	 rich,	
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white	men	 with	 a	 broadly	 nefarious	 political	 agenda.	 They	 contended	 that	 the	
movement	against	the	ERA	was	a	part	of	a	larger	conspiracy	led	by	anti-progressive,	
radical	right-wing	hypocrites	who	invoked	nationalism	and	religion	to	justify	their	
attempts	 to	 impose	 their	 ideological	 agenda	 on	 the	 country.124	In	 an	 atypically	
alarmist	 assertion,	 Peterson	 identified	 them	 as	 “bigger,	 more	 terrifying,	 more	
destructive	than	a	small	band	of	Southern	bigots	or	a	handful	of	vindictive	women	
using	 their	 powers	 against	 their	 own	 sex.”	 They	 were	 “wealthy	 white	 ‘super-
patriots	and	super-Christians,”	who	sought	“to	give	the	New	Right	control	of	the	
U.S.”	125	They	relied	on	religion	to	justify	their	opposition	to	the	ERA	but,	according	
to	Peterson,	their	piety	was	false.	They	merely	invoked	religion	to	raise	money,	and	
then	used	the	money	for	political	power,	not	to	further	their	religious	beliefs.126		
To	 accomplish	 their	 goals,	 Republican	 feminists	 argued,	 the	 New	 Right	
opposed	anyone	who	did	not	look,	think,	or	act	like	them.	Peterson	believed	that	
they	dismissed	the	concerns	of	“welfare	mothers,	.	.	.	the	poor,	the	blacks,	foreign-
																																																						
124	Cheryl	Arvidson,	“Feminists	See	Right-Wing	Coalition	at	Work	in	ERA	Opposition,”	
Ann	Arbor	News,	September	24,	1977.	
	
125	Remer	Tyson,	“Fight	New	Right,	Women	Told,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	October	30,	1979.	
	
126	“Elly	Peterson	Would	Like	Woman	in	White	House,”	Detroit	News,	September	2,	
1979.	
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borns,	Jews,	women.”127	According	to	Helen	Milliken,	“the	New	Right	appears	to	
wrap	itself	in	a	mantle	of	self-righteous	infallibility	.	.	.	to	pursue	.	.	.	[its]	politics	of	
intimidation”	against	minorities,	women,	and	 the	poor.128	Callow	wrote	 that	she	
“found	opponents	of	ERA	to	be	a	curious	lot;	the	Communist	Party,	Ku	Klux	Klan,	
John	Birch	Society,	some	anti-feminist	groups	with	names	like	HOTDOG,	HOW	and	
Stop-ERA.”129	Republican	feminists	agreed	that	conservative	women	provided	the	
cover	for	a	group	of	powerful,	wealthy,	white	men	who	worked	through	a	network	
of	 organizations	 and	 fundamentalist	 churches	 to	 promote	 an	 intolerant,	 broad-
based	agenda	that	was	intended	to	change	the	country.130	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	adopted	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	
movement	with	 respect	 to	 the	 ERA.	 They	 disagreed	with	 radical	 feminists	 who	
hoped	that	the	ERA	would	help	to	eliminate	patriarchy	and	create	gender	equality	
through	 a	 restructured	 society.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 opposed	 conservative	
women	who	believed	that	the	ERA	would	destroy	the	traditional	family,	expand	the	
																																																						
127	Tyson,	“Fight	New	Right,	Women	Told,”	Detroit	Free	Press.	
	
128	Helen	Milliken,	quoted	in	“Remarks	for	the	ERA	Get	Together,”	Elly	Peterson,	August	
19,	1979,	box	25,	folder:	Speeches,	1979,	Peterson	Papers.		
	
129	“Michigan	ERAmerica,”	Point	of	View	Transcript,	February	25,	1977.		
	
130	Speech,	Elly	Peterson,	n.d.,	box	25,	folder:	Speeches,	1979,	Peterson	Papers.		
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federal	government,	and	interfere	with	their	goal	of	unfettered	capitalism.	From	
this	 middle	 ground,	 they	 contended	 that	 the	 ERA	 helped	 women	 by	 creating	
economic	equality,	which	protected	and	promoted	families	because	these	women	
were	often	also	wives	and	mothers.	They	argued	that	the	ERA	was	not	as	radical	as	
the	more	extreme	feminists	wanted	or	conservative	Republicans	feared.	However,	
anti-ERA	 conservative	women	were	mostly	 Republicans,	which	made	 the	 battle	
over	the	ERA	a	part	of	the	larger,	ongoing	struggle	for	control	of	the	Republican	
Party.	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	offered	their	party’s	moderate	leadership	a	
compromised	interpretation	of	the	ERA.	As	Republicans	and	representatives	of	the	
“sensible	center”	of	the	women’s	movement,	they	linked	their	gendered	and	their	
partisan	 interests,	 which	 enabled	 them	 to	 argue	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 ERA,	 and	 to	
reconcile,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	 these	 two,	 potentially	 conflicting,	 identities.	
However,	as	the	following	chapters	indicate,	this	middle	road	was	slowly	narrowing.	
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CHAPTER	 FIVE	 REPUBLICAN	 FEMINISTS	 AND	 REPRODUCTIVE	 RIGHTS:	 1970	 TO	
1980	
	
The	right	to	control	one’s	own	body	is	a	basic	human	and	democratic	right.	
–Flier,	“Abortion-A	Woman’s	Right	to	Choose”	
	
Abortion	was	made	illegal	in	Michigan	in	1848,	except	to	protect	the	life	of	
the	mother.	Starting	 in	 the	 late	1960s,	pro-choice	activists,	 including	Republican	
feminists,	 NOW,	 and	 the	MWPC,	 unsuccessfully	 tried	 to	 convince	 the	Michigan	
legislature	 to	 liberalize	 the	 state’s	 abortion	 laws.	 It	 was	 only	 in	 1973,	 with	 the	
United	States	Supreme	Court	decision	in	Roe	v.	Wade,	that	Michigan’s	longstanding	
prohibition	against	abortion	was	finally	invalidated.1	Roe	made	it	unconstitutional	
for	a	state	to	interfere	with	a	woman’s	right	to	privacy,	including	her	right	to	have	
an	abortion,	although	the	court	concluded	that	a	state	could	place	limitations	on	
access	to	abortion	after	the	first	trimester.2	
Despite	the	Supreme	Court	decision,	abortion	remained	a	highly	contested	
political	issue	in	Michigan	as	activists	continued	to	fight	over	meaningful	access	to	
legal	 abortions	 and	 birth	 control,	 especially	 for	 poor	 women	 and	 minors.	
Proponents	and	opponents	of	reproductive	rights	in	Michigan	did	not	divide	neatly	
along	partisan	lines.	During	much	of	the	1970s,	the	Democratic	Party,	with	its	large	
																																																						
1	Roe	v.	Wade,	410	U.S.	113	(1973).	
	
2	Sheila	Taylor,	Abortion:	A	History	of	Abortion	Laws	in	Michigan,	Michigan	Legislative	
Service	Bureau,	Legislative	Research	Division,	Research	Report,	18,	no.	2,	February	1998,	1.	
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Catholic	 constituency,	 was	 often	 the	 most	 outspoken	 opponent	 of	 liberalized	
abortion	rights.	Although	opposition	to	abortion	steadily	increased	in	the	national	
Republican	 Party	 throughout	 the	 1970s,	 Governor	Milliken	 remained	 a	 staunch	
supporter	not	only	of	abortion,	but	also	government	funding	for	abortions	for	poor	
women.	Thus,	in	Michigan	he	temporarily	slowed	the	partisan	realignment	that	was	
occurring	elsewhere	in	the	country.	Milliken’s	position	became	an	issue	during	the	
the	1978	Michigan	gubernatorial	election	between	him	and	William	Fitzgerald,	a	
Catholic,	 pro-life	 Democrat	 who	 opposed	 abortion.	 Although	 Milliken	 won	 the	
election,	the	fight	over	taxpayer	funded	abortions	continued.		
Republican	feminists	actively	participated	in	the	politicization	of	abortion	in	
Michigan.	Two	of	them	led	the	state’s	pro-choice	movement	and	fought	to	protect	
the	 right	 to	 legal,	 safe,	 and	 affordable	 abortions	 for	 all	 women.	 Their	 activism	
developed	in	two	stages	and	on	multiple	fronts.	Until	Roe,	they	used	the	legislature,	
the	judiciary,	and	the	voters	to	try	to	legalize	abortion	in	Michigan.	Once	the	Roe	
Court	recognized	that	women	had	the	right	to	terminate	their	pregnancies,	pro-
choice	Republican	feminists	shifted	their	attention	to	the	legislature,	and	directed	
their	 efforts	 at	blocking	encroachments	on	abortion	 rights	 and	making	abortion	
accessible	to	all	women,	regardless	of	their	ability	to	pay.	
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By	the	end	of	the	1970s,	pro-choice	Republican	feminists,	with	the	support	
of	 Governor	 Milliken,	 had	 managed	 to	 protect	 a	 woman’s	 right	 to	 abortion	 in	
Michigan.	Contrary	to	most	states,	Michigan	even	paid	for	abortions	for	women	
who	could	not	otherwise	afford	them.	However,	they	faced	growing	opposition	to	
their	pro-choice	position	from	women	within	their	own	party	when,	in	1976,	the	
Republican	Party	officially	 dropped	 support	 for	 abortion	 rights	 from	 its	 national	
party	platform.	Surprisingly,	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	also	faced	opposition	
from	one	of	their	own.	In	1974,	Binsfeld,	who	was	a	pro-life	Republican	feminist,	
was	elected	to	the	Michigan	legislature.	As	pressures	mounted	on	them	from	all	
sides,	 it	became	more	difficult,	but	not	yet	 impossible,	 for	 them	to	sustain	their	
pro-choice	 position	 within	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party.	 Moreover,	 while	
Binsfeld	 opposed	 them	 on	 abortion,	 she	 also	 provided	 the	 possibility	 for	
compromise	on	some	of	the	less	controversial	reproductive	issues	that	faced	the	
state.		
Members	 of	 the	 Michigan	 legislature	 unsuccessfully	 tried	 to	 amend	 the	
state’s	 virtually	 blanket	 prohibition	of	 abortion	 from	1967	until	 1972.	 (The	only	
exception	 was	 to	 save	 the	 life	 of	 the	 mother.)	 While	 Michigan	 voters	 did	 not	
consistently	divide	along	partisan	lines	on	the	question	of	abortion,	opposition	to	
abortion	reform	in	these	early	years	was	more	likely	to	come	from	the	Democratic	
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Party,	due	primarily	to	its	large	constituency	of	union	members,	who	were	mostly	
Catholic	immigrants.3	Not	surprisingly,	then,	in	1970	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	
endorsed	the	notion	of	abortion	reform.4	That	same	year,	Governor	Milliken,	citing	
legislative	upheaval	and	the	fact	that	women	who	wanted	abortions	obtained	them	
illegally,	 stated,	“I	believe	that	women,	under	appropriate	conditions,	should	be	
permitted	 to	 make	 an	 individual	 judgment,	 [concerning	 abortion]	 and	 that	 the	
result	of	this	judgment	should	be	respected	and	protected	by	law.”5	He	argued	that	
because	the	people	of	Michigan	could	not	agree	on	the	abortion	issue,	and	neither	
side	was	necessarily	incorrect,	abortion	laws	needed	to	be	reformed	to	make	the	
procedure	 available	 to	 all	 women,	 which	 would	 then	 permit	 each	 woman	 to	
determine	whether	to	have	an	abortion	based	on	her	individual	value	system	and	
religious	beliefs.6		
																																																						
3	Robert	N.	Karrer,	“The	Formation	of	Michigan’s	Anti-Abortion	Movement	1967-1974,”	
Michigan	Historical	Review	22,	no.	1	(Spring	1996):	79.	
	
4	Resolution,	Michigan	Republican	Party,	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Michigan	Abortion	
Referendum	Committee	Position	Statements,	1970-1972,	of	various	organizations	on	abortion	
reform	[16],	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Records	1969-1972,	Bentley	Historical	
Library,	University	of	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	MARC	Papers).	
	
5	Statement,	Governor	William	Milliken,	March	17,	1970,	1,	box	1,	folder:	Michigan	
Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Position	Statements,	1970-1972,	of	various	organizations	on	
abortion	reform	[18],	MARC	Papers.	
	
6	Ibid.	
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At	the	same	time,	he	established	specific	parameters	for	an	abortion	reform	
law	that	would	be	acceptable	to	him.	He	endorsed	a	three-month,	first	trimester	
limitation	on	abortion,	along	with	a	requirement	that	the	procedure	take	place	in	
a	licensed	medical	facility.	He	believed	that	a	pregnant	woman	had	the	sole	right	
to	decide	whether	to	have	an	abortion	in	consultation	with	her	doctor	and,	if	the	
pregnant	girl	was	an	unmarried	minor,	with	the	consent	of	her	parents.	He	also	
required	a	conscience	clause	in	any	legislation	to	protect	medical	personnel	from	
being	 required	 to	 participate	 in	 an	 objectionable	 abortion	 medical	 procedure.	
Previewing	 the	 abortion	 debate	 that	 he	 engaged	 in	 for	 much	 of	 his	 tenure	 as	
governor,	he	argued	that	safe	abortions	should	be	made	available	to	poor	women	
who	 could	 not	 otherwise	 afford	 the	 procedure.	 Finally,	 Governor	 Milliken	
reiterated	that	he	“believe[d]	very	deeply	in	the	strength	of	the	family	as	the	basic	
unit	of	our	society.”7	He	concluded	that	a	family	was	most	likely	to	remain	intact	if,	
when	faced	with	an	unwanted	pregnancy,	a	woman	was	given	the	option	to	have	
an	abortion.8		
Supported	by	the	governor	and	the	endorsement	of	the	Michigan	Republican	
Party,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 worked	 for	 abortion	 reform,	 initially	
																																																						
7	Ibid.	
	
8	Ibid.,	1-3.	
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through	 legislative	 changes	 and,	when	 they	 realized	 the	 futility	 of	 their	 efforts,	
through	 other	means.	 As	 a	member	 of	 the	Michigan	 Senate	 in	 1969	 and	 1970,	
Beebe	led	the	effort	to	decriminalize	abortion.	She	hoped	to	redefine	it	as	a	legal	
medical	procedure	to	be	performed	in	a	licensed	facility	based	on	a	decision	made	
between	 a	woman	 and	 her	 doctor.9	Beebe	 exemplified	 the	 feminist	 strategy	 of	
making	the	personal	political	when	she	came	to	the	Senate	floor	during	the	1968	
debates	over	the	abortion	bill	and	admitted	to	her	colleagues	that	she	had	had	a	
therapeutic	abortion.	She	had	been	advised	that	it	was	virtually	impossible	for	her	
to	have	 children,	 but	 after	 numerous	medical	 procedures	 and	miscarriages,	 she	
ultimately	 had	 a	 son	 and	 a	 daughter.	 During	 the	 fourth	 month	 of	 one	 of	 her	
unsuccessful	 pregnancies,	 however,	 doctors	discovered	 that	 the	 fetus	was	dead	
and	had	to	be	medically	removed.	
Her	admission	was	heralded	as	heroic	by	many	of	her	male	colleagues,	but	
she	 was	 disappointed	 by	 the	 demeaning	 comments	 made	 by	 others	 on	 the	
legislative	floor.	These	men	could	not	understand	the	positions	of	the	women	on	
whose	behalf	they	were	making	vital	decisions.	Thus,	she	felt	compelled	to	tell	her	
																																																						
9	Jack	M.	Stack,	“Abortion	Law	Reform	Progress	in	Michigan,”	box	39,	folder:	Abortion,	
Republican	Party,	(Mich.),	State	Central	Committee	Records,	Bentley	Historical	Library,	
University	of	Michigan.	
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story.	In	that	chamber,	she	alone	was	able	to	convey	the	female	perspective	from	
someone	 who	 had	 agonized	 over	 the	 termination	 of	 a	 pregnancy. 10 	From	 the	
Senate	floor	she	asked	her	fellow	senators	whether	they	could	“say	‘I	am	pregnant:	
I	am	happy’	or	‘I	am	desperate?’”	and	then	reminded	them,	“No,	you	can’t	begin	to	
imagine	the	feeling	that	a	woman	has.”11	She	found	that	many	of	these	men	were	
also	judgmental,	suggesting	that	women	who	sought	abortions	were	immoral	both	
for	both	engaging	 in	 the	 sexual	 act	 through	which	 the	 fetus	was	 conceived	and	
killing	an	unborn	child.12	
Beebe’s	heartfelt	testimony	did	not	convince	a	majority	of	senators	to	vote	
to	liberalize	Michigan’s	restrictive	abortion	laws	in	1969,	1970,	or	1971,	when	bills	
to	reform	such	laws	were	all	defeated.	While	most	state	legislators	indicated	that	
they	supported	abortion	reform,	they	could	not	agree	among	themselves	in	either	
legislative	branch	or	between	the	House	and	the	Senate	on	the	nature	and	scope	
of	 that	 reform.13	According	 to	 Beebe,	 abortion	 reform	was	 undermined	 by	 the	
																																																						
10	Nancy	Costello,	“Beebe’s	Bombshell	Sparked	New	Era,”	Lansing	Star,	November	8,	
1979,	box	2,	folder:	Miscellaneous,	Beebe	Papers.		
	
11	Holliday,	“The	Lady	Said	‘Abortion,’”	August	3,	1969.	
	
12	Speech,	Lorraine	Beebe,	April	11,	1970,	box	2,	folder:	Speeches	State	Senator	1966-
1970,	Beebe	Papers.		
	
13	Jane	Briggs,	“House	Fight	Due	on	Abortion	Bill,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	March	28,	1971.	
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organized	efforts	of	the	Catholic	Church.14	In	fact,	Beebe	lost	her	reelection	bid	in	
1970	to	her	Catholic,	Democratic	opponent,	David	Plawecki,	who	made	abortion	a	
primary	 issue	 in	 the	 campaign.	One	 of	 his	 campaign	 brochures,	 featuring	 three	
pictures	of	cherubic	babies,	emphasized	the	ambiguity	over	when	life	begins,	and	
suggested	that	legalized	abortion	might	constitute	murder.15	Despite	her	electoral	
defeat,	Beebe	continued	her	efforts	to	legalize	abortion	after	she	left	the	Michigan	
legislature.		
Republican	feminist	Kefauver	joined	Beebe	in	her	1970	reelection	campaign	
for	 state	 senator	 and	 in	 her	 ongoing	 fight	 to	 legalize	 abortion	 in	 Michigan.	 A	
committed	 political	 activist,	 Kefauver	 was	 a	 legislative	 expert	 who	 lobbied	 on	
behalf	 of	 a	 number	 of	 organizations,	 including	 WEAL	 and	 NOW,	 in	 support	 of	
women’s	 issues,	 particularly	 abortion	 rights	 for	 women.16 	Like	 Beebe,	 she	 was	
angered	by	the	fact	that	a	mostly	male	legislature	made	laws	on	behalf	of	women.	
She	 argued	 “‘that	 collectively	 they	 [the	male	 legislature]	 hate	 you	 as	 a	woman	
																																																						
14	Robert	H.	Longstaff,	“Abortion	Law	Change	Is	Defeated	in	Senate,”	Flint	Journal,	May	
15,	1970,	Scrapbook,	Beebe	Papers.		
	
15	Campaign	Flier	for	David	A.	Plawecki,	box	2,	folder:	Correspondence	1970	after	
election	loss,	Beebe	Papers.		
	
16	Lee	Kefauver,	Personal	history	with	pro-choice	activities,	box	1,	folder:	Lee	Kefauver,	
Biographical	Information,	Kefauver	Papers.		
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because	they	are	insecure	as	men.’	.	.	.	‘If	you	are	black,	they	can	deal	with	you	and	
go	home	to	a	segregated	neighborhood.	But	most	of	these	white,	male	legislators	
go	 home	 to	 a	woman--a	wife,	 daughter	 or	whatever.	 And	 they’ll	 be	 damned	 if	
they’ll	 give	 up	 any	 power	 to	 a	woman.’”17	Like	 other	 Republican	 feminists,	 she	
recognized	 that	 the	 largely	 male	 legislature	 did	 not	 understand	 women,	 and	
actually	prevented	them	from	trying	to	promote	their	interests.	In	such	a	restrictive	
environment,	women	had	 to	 empower	 themselves	 through	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	
their	voting	power.18	
By	 1971	 Beebe	 and	 Kefauver	 recognized	 that	 although	 members	 of	 the	
Michigan	 legislature	 continued	 to	 try	 to	 liberalize	 abortion	 laws,	 they	were	 not	
likely	to	succeed.	Thus,	they	identified	different	strategies	to	accomplish	their	goal	
of	repealing	or	reforming	Michigan’s	prohibition	on	abortion–a	judicial	challenge	
and	a	grassroots	voter	referendum.	In	1971	Kefauver	and	Beebe	were	a	part	of	the	
Michigan	Women’s	Abortion	Suit,	an	organized	class	action	lawsuit	in	which	over	
one	 thousand	 plaintiffs	 argued	 that	 Michigan’s	 law	 criminalizing	 abortion	 was	
unconstitutional.	 Beebe	 was	 the	 named	 plaintiff	 in	 the	 lawsuit	 filed	 in	 Wayne	
																																																						
17	Holtz,	“Lansing	Lobbyists	Strike	from	Dearborn,”	September	6,	1979.	
	
18	Ibid.	
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County	Circuit	Court	on	August	31,	1971.	Plaintiffs	claimed	to	speak	on	behalf	of	all	
of	the	women	in	Michigan	who	believed	that	a	woman	who	wanted	an	abortion	
should	not	be	 forced	 to	chose	between	an	out-of-state	 legal	abortion,	an	 illegal	
abortion	 in	Michigan,	or	a	 self-induced	abortion.	The	goal	of	 the	 lawsuit	was	 to	
convince	 the	 judge	 to	 recognize	 a	 constitutional	 right	 to	 abortion,	which	would	
effectively	repeal	all	of	Michigan’s	laws	that	prohibited	abortion.19	
However,	 the	 lawsuit’s	 plaintiffs	 were	 much	 like	 the	 women	 who	 joined	
together	to	form	political	caucuses.	Although	they	all	agreed	that	abortion	should	
be	 made	 legal,	 their	 personal	 and	 ideological	 diversity	 led	 to	 significant	
disagreements.	By	1972	politics	divided	the	plaintiffs.	Leaders	of	the	lawsuit	were	
members	 of	 the	 Detroit	 Abortion	 Action	 Coalition,	 a	 local	 subsidiary	 of	 the	
Women’s	National	 Abortion	Action	Coalition.20	Some	plaintiffs,	 including	Beebe,	
																																																						
19	Flier,	“Abortion-A	Woman’s	Right	to	Choose,”	box	1,	folder:	Topical	Files,	Abortion:	
Michigan	Women’s	Abortion	Suit,	1971-1972,	Kefauver	Papers.	
	
20	The	Women’s	National	Abortion	Action	Coalition	was	founded	in	July	1971	as	a	broad-
based	coalition	of	women	who	shared	an	interest	in	repealing	all	limitations	and	restrictions	on	
abortions	and	contraception.	Some	of	its	members	were	particularly	concerned	about	the	
onerous	impact	of	laws	governing	reproduction,	including	illegal	abortions	and	forced	
sterilization,	on	poor	women.	They	argued	that	abortion	restrictions,	forced	sterilization,	and	
limitations	on	contraception	all	dovetailed,	because	they	all	influenced	a	woman’s	right	to	
choose	whether	to	have	a	child.	One	member,	a	candidate	for	the	City	Council	in	Seattle,	
Washington,	noted	that	“government-financed	family	planning	centers,	which	are	used	
primarily	by	poor	and	minority	women,	often	are	little	more	than	research	laboratories	using	us	
as	the	guinea	pigs.	We	have	the	right	to	know	whether	pills	and	devices	are	fully	tested	before	
we	take	them.”	Newsletter,	Women’s	National	Abortion	Action	Coalition,	September	16,	1971,	
box	3,	folder:	Miscellanea	[75],	MARC	Papers.	
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objected	 to	 the	 involvement	 of	 this	 organization	because	 it	was	 created	by	 the	
Socialist	Workers	Party.	They	were	concerned	that	the	organization’s	socialist	ties	
might	undermine	the	lawsuit’s	singular	focus	on	repealing	Michigan’s	abortion	laws	
by	introducing	politics	into	the	conflict.	21		
In	 addition	 to	 the	 lawsuit,	 another	 group	of	 abortion	 activists,	 led	 by	 the	
Michigan	 Abortion	 Referendum	 Committee	 (MARC),	 (initially	 the	 Michigan	
Coordinating	Committee	for	Abortion	Law	Reform),	obtained	over	three	hundred	
thousand	signatures	to	place	on	the	November	1972	statewide	ballot	a	referendum	
proposing	a	 statute	 that,	 if	 approved	by	 the	voters,	would	become	 law	without	
being	adopted	by	the	legislature.22	The	referendum	provided	that	“all	other	laws	to	
the	 contrary	 notwithstanding,	 a	 licensed	medical	 or	 osteopathic	 physician	may	
perform	an	abortion	at	the	request	of	a	patient	if	the	period	of	gestation	has	not	
exceeded	20	weeks.	The	procedure	 shall	be	performed	 in	a	 licensed	hospital	or	
other	 facility	 approved	 by	 the	 Department	 of	 Public	 Health.” 23 	Referendum	
																																																						
21	Attachment,	“Controversy	Within	the	Michigan	Women’s	Abortion	Suit,	Lee	Lavalli	
(Kefauver)	to	‘Sister,’”	February	20,	1972,	box	1,	folder:	Lee	Kefauver,	Topical	Files,	Abortion:	
Michigan	Women’s	Abortion	Suit	1971-1972,	Kefauver	Papers.	
	
22	Lucille	DeView,	“Abortion	Pro:	The	Right	of	a	Woman	to	Choose?,”	Detroit	News,	n.d.	
box	2,	folder:	Miscellaneous,	Beebe	Papers.		
	
23	Michigan	Coordinating	Committee	for	Abortion	Law	Reform,	press	release,	October	
14,	1971,	box	2,	folder:	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Referendum	Campaign,	
1972	Publicity	and	Press	Releases,	[38],	MARC	Papers;	Initiative	Petition,	Initiation	of	
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supporters	hoped	that	the	citizens	of	Michigan	would	be	willing	to	take	a	position	
that	the	legislature	refused	to	adopt.	While	both	Beebe	and	Kefauver	supported	
the	ballot	referendum,	relations	between	the	two	groups,	one	supporting	repeal	
and	 the	 other	 backing	 reform,	 were	 not	 necessarily	 harmonious.	 For	 example,	
proponents	of	the	ballot	referendum	criticized	participants	in	the	lawsuit	for	failing	
to	support	the	referendum	effort.24	
The	 public	 seemed	 to	 support	 the	 referendum	 and	 preelection	 polling	
indicated	that	it	would	easily	pass.	Noting	that	the	Michigan	legislature	was	unlikely	
to	meaningfully	address	abortion	reform,	and	that	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	
supported	 such	 reform,	 the	Michigan	 Republican	 State	 Central	 Committee,	 the	
governing	 body	 of	 the	 state	 party,	 unanimously	 endorsed	 this	 referendum.	
Moreover,	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	directed	its	representatives	to	promote	
a	platform	plank	 at	 the	1972	national	 convention	advocating	 the	 legalization	of	
abortion	 during	 the	 first	 twenty	 weeks	 of	 pregnancy.	 Helen	 Milliken	 publicly	
																																																						
Legislation,	box	2,	folder:	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Referendum	Campaign,	
1972	Publicity	and	Press	Releases	[39],	MARC	Papers;	Newsletter,	Oakland	County	B-Abortion	
Reform-November	7,	box	2,	folder:	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Referendum	
Campaign,	1972	Publicity	and	Press	Releases	[40],	MARC	Papers.	
	
24	Untitled	Article,	Attachment	to	Note	from	Jack	M.	Stack,	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Michigan	
Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Referendum	Campaign,	1972	Publicity	and	Press	Releases	
[34],	MARC	Papers.		
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supported	 the	 referendum,	but	 the	governor,	despite	his	 support	 for	 liberalized	
abortion	laws,	refused	to	specifically	endorse	the	ballot	proposal.25		
On	 October	 5,	 1972,	 the	 Wayne	 County	 Circuit	 Court	 issued	 a	 ruling	
invalidating	 Michigan’s	 laws	 criminalizing	 abortion.	 Judge	 Charles	 Kaufman	
concluded	that	the	law	“violated	a	woman’s	right	to	privacy	and	‘control	over	her	
own	 body.’”26 	He	 added	 that	 at	 whatever	 stage	 of	 her	 pregnancy,	 a	 woman’s	
abortion	 decision	 was	 to	 be	 made	 solely	 by	 her	 and	 her	 doctor.	 The	 order	
prohibited	both	the	Wayne	County	Prosecutor	and	the	Michigan	Attorney	General	
from	 enforcing	 the	 state’s	 abortion	 laws.27 	The	 decision	 was	 stayed,	 however,	
pending	appeal,	and	on	October	20,	1972,	the	Michigan	Supreme	Court	agreed	to	
bypass	the	Court	of	Appeals	and	hear	the	case.28	Once	they	received	this	favorable	
ruling,	Kefauver	encouraged	plaintiffs	to	support	the	referendum	because	it	filled	
																																																						
25	Resolution	on	the	Abortion	Reform	Petition	Drive,	December,	1971,	box	1,	folder:	
Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Position	Statements,	1970-1972,	of	Various	
Organizations	on	Abortion	Reform	[19],	MARC	Papers;	Resolution	of	the	Michigan	Republican	
Party,	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Position	Statements,	
1970-1972,	of	Various	Organizations	on	Abortion	Reform	[16],	MARC	Papers;	John	Gill,	“Brickley	
Opposes	Abortion,”	Detroit	News,	October	20,	1972.	
	
26	Judy	Diebolt,	“Ban	on	Prosecution	Lifted:	State	Supreme	Court	to	Rule	on	Abortion,”	
Detroit	Free	Press,	October	21,	1972.		
	
27	Judy	Diebolt	and	Paul	Branzburg,	“State’s	Abortion	Laws	Struck	Down,”	Detroit	Free	
Press,	October	6,	1972.	
	
28	Diebolt,	“Ban	on	Prosecution	Lifted,”	October	21,	1972.	
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the	 void	 in	 state	 abortion	 laws	 with	 a	 law	 that	 governed	 licensing	 of	 abortion	
facilities,	 thus	 preventing	 abuse	 by	 prohibiting	 unsavory	 abortionists	 from	
practicing	in	Michigan.29		
One	month	 after	 Judge	 Kaufman’s	 decision,	 despite	 polling	 results	 to	 the	
contrary,	 the	 abortion	 ballot	 initiative	 was	 overwhelmingly	 defeated,	 “because	
[according	 to	 one	 scholar]	 anti-abortionists	 were	 more	 organized,	 used	 more	
sophisticated	advertising,	and	ably	articulated	the	moral	issue.”30	He	argued	that	
voters’	early	 support	 for	abortion	reform	 in	Michigan	was	based	on	a	 theoretic,	
sanitized	notion	of	abortion.	When	the	procedure	was	humanized	through	graphic	
pictures	 of	 twenty-week	 aborted	 fetuses,	 support	 evaporated. 31 	The	
characterization	of	access	to	abortion	as	an	equal	rights	issue	was	more	appealing	
to	 a	 judge	 than	 to	Michigan’s	 voters	who	were	 persuaded	 by	 the	 anti-abortion	
movement	that	liberalized	abortion	rights	destroyed	human	life.		
																																																						
29	Letter	to	Friends	[Michigan	Women’s	Abortion	Suit],	author	unknown,	[between	
October	5,	1972	and	November	7,	1972?],	box	1,	folder:	Lee	Kefauver,	Topical	Files,	Abortion:	
Michigan’s	Women’s	Abortion	Suit,	1971-1972,	Kefauver	Papers.		
	
30	Karrer,	“Formation	of	Michigan’s	Anti-Abortion	Movement,”	95.	
	
31	Ibid.,	94-97.	Karrer	examined	in	great	detail	the	development	of	the	anti-abortion	
movement	in	Michigan	during	this	period.		
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Before	 the	 appeal	 of	 Judge	 Kaufman’s	 decision	 could	 be	 considered,	 the	
United	States	Supreme	Court	issued	its	decision	in	Roe	and	the	Michigan	Supreme	
Court	shifted	its	consideration	to	a	review	of	the	circuit	court	ruling	in	light	of	the	
United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	 decision.	 The	Michigan	 Supreme	 Court	 concluded	
that	 Judge	 Kaufman	 correctly	 invalidated	 Michigan’s	 abortion	 prohibition,	 but	
under	 Roe,	 decriminalization	 was	 limited	 to	 the	 first	 trimester	 of	 pregnancy.	
Thereafter,	 once	 the	 fetus	 became	 viable,	 the	 issue	 of	whether	 abortion	was	 a	
crime	depended	on	the	facts	of	the	case.32	
Beebe,	Kefauver,	Burnett,	and	Helen	Milliken	all	believed	that	“the	right	to	
control	 one’s	 own	 body	 is	 a	 basic	 human	 and	 democratic	 right,”	 and	 that	 true	
equality	would	be	achieved	only	when	women	had	the	ability	to	control	their	own	
reproductive	 lives.33	They	 tried	 to	 debunk	 the	 notion	 that	most	women	 sought	
																																																						
32	Larkin	v.	Wayne	County	Prosecutor,	Beebe	v.	Wayne	County	Prosecutor,	389	Mich.	533	
(1973),	https://casetext.com/case/larkin-v-wayne-prosecutor.		
	
33	Flier,	“Abortion-A	Woman’s	Right	to	Choose.”	Milliken	also	believed	that	abortion	was	
a	valuable	tool	in	the	fight	for	population	control.	The	American	people,	she	contended,	had	to	
be	shown	how	their	lives	and	the	lives	of	their	children	would	improve	if	there	were	fewer	
people	in	the	world.	In	that	regard,	she	argued	that	“stopping	the	disastrous	growth	in	
population	will	give	our	children	a	better	chance	to	find	decent	jobs	in	an	increasingly	tough	
employment	market.	It	will	increase	the	chances	that	they	will	have	enough	room	to	live,	
enough	park	space,	wilderness	to	enjoy	and	a	decent	distance	between	them	and	their	
neighbors.	If	population	growth	is	stopped,	we	can	be	certain	that	our	children	will	not	be	
forced	to	lower	their	standard	of	living.	In	short,	we	can	show	that	the	quality	of	life	can	be	
maintained	and	improved,	provided	the	quantity	of	life	is	controlled.”	Mrs.	William	G.	Milliken,	
Michigan	Confederation	of	Zero	Population	Growth,	October	17,	1971,	box	2,	folder:	Publicity	
and	press	releases	[36],	MARC	Papers.	This	position	was	debunked	when	it	became	clear	that	
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abortions	because	they	were	raped	or	abused	by	family	members,	or	feared	that	
they	would	give	birth	to	a	child	with	birth	defects.	 Instead,	abortion	proponents	
concluded	that	“the	overwhelming	number	of	women	seek	abortions	because	they	
do	not	want	to	give	birth	to	an	unwelcome	or	unexpected	child.”34	As	the	primary	
caregivers	 of	 children,	 women,	 they	 believed,	 should	 be	 empowered	 to	 decide	
whether	they	wanted	to	take	on	that	responsibility.	“We	want	to	determine	the	
number	of	children	we	have	on	the	basis	of	our	ability	to	care	for	them.”35	Abortion	
restrictions	 “have	 the	effect	 of	 legally	 sanctioning	 compulsory	pregnancy”36	and	
made	pregnant	women	helpless	victims.37		
Beebe	distinguished	between	the	right	to	have	an	abortion	and	the	decision	
about	 whether	 to	 have	 an	 abortion.	 The	 government	 was	 properly	 involved	 in	
granting	the	right	to	have	an	abortion	because	it	was	a	political	issue	involving	the	
																																																						
these	efforts	at	population	control	had	been	selectively	applied	against	poor	and	minority	
women.	Ziegler,	After	Roe,	231.	
	
34	“What	You	Always	Wanted	to	Know	About	Abortion	but	Couldn’t	Find!”	Michigan	
Coordinating	Council	for	Abortion	Law	Reform,	n.d.,	2,	box	2,	folder:	Publicity	and	press	
releases	[36],	MARC	Papers.	
	
35	Flier,	“Abortion-A	Woman’s	Right	to	Choose.”	
		
36	“Statement:	For	the	Urban	Coalition,	From:	The	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	
Committee,”	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	Committee	Position	
Statements,	1970-1972	of	Various	Organizations	on	Abortion	Reform,	MARC	Papers.	
	
37	Speech,	Beebe,	April	11,	1970.		
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health	and	welfare	of	women	and	children.	On	 the	other	hand,	 she	argued,	 the	
questions	of	when	life	begins	and	whether	to	have	an	abortion	were	both	moral	or	
religious	decisions	best	left	to	the	discretion	of	the	individuals	who	faced	unwanted	
pregnancies.	By	prohibiting	abortion,	the	government	deprived	women	of	the	right	
to	make	this	personal	decision	and	imposed	the	religious	or	moral	beliefs	of	some	
of	its	citizens	on	others.38	The	law,	she	argued,	needed	to	grant	all	women	access	
to	 abortion	 and	 to	 provide	 them	 with	 the	 information	 necessary	 to	 make	 this	
important	decision.	Proponents	of	abortion	law	reform	argued	that	they	were	not	
pro-abortion,	but	rather	pro-choice.	The	law	would	not	force	anyone	to	have	an	
abortion.39		
Activists	 like	 Beebe	who	 favored	 abortion	 reform	 found	 that	 they	 had	 to	
avoid	the	thorny	issue	of	when	life	begins	because,	at	that	point,	the	protections	
afforded	to	a	pregnant	woman	had	to	be	balanced	against	those	of	the	unborn	child.	
Beebe	dealt	with	this	problem	by	declaring	it	a	personal	decision	that	was	irrelevant	
to	the	public	debate.	Perhaps	trying	to	head	off	the	problems	that	they	would	face	
if	 forced	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 when	 life	 began,	 they	 also	 argued	 that	 if	
																																																						
38	Ibid.;	Holliday,	“The	Lady	Said	‘Abortion,’”	August	3,	1969.	
	
39	Ibid.	
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abortions	 were	 legal,	 pregnant	 women	 would	 seek	 abortions	 earlier	 in	 the	
pregnancy,	and	justified	the	twenty-week	window	because	 it	allowed	for	testing	
that	would	reveal	birth	defects.	Late-term	abortions	were	not	the	norm,	nor	the	
desired	outcome.	Even	doctors	who	supported	abortion	reform	were	opposed	to	
these	types	of	abortions,	abortion	proponents	claimed.40		
Beebe	and	Kefauver	stressed	the	dangers	of	illegal	abortion,	and	argued	that	
if	Michigan	did	not	 liberalize	 its	abortion	 laws,	 those	who	could	afford	 to	do	 so	
would	travel	to	New	York,	where	abortion	was	legal.	Young	and/or	poor	women	
would	seek	dangerous	illegal	abortions	in	Michigan.	Legalizing	abortion	in	Michigan	
would	 save	 these	 women	 from	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 botched	 abortions	
performed	 under	 less	 than	 sterile	 conditions	 by	 unqualified	 abortion	 providers.	
One	doctor	suggested	that	“‘a	girl	would	be	safer	to	walk	blindfolded	across	the	
Ford	 Freeway	 than	 to	 have	 an	 abortion	 with	 contaminated,	 unsterilized	
instruments.’” 41 	This	 pipeline	 of	 illegal	 abortions	 could	 only	 be	 stopped,	 they	
argued,	by	legalizing	abortion	in	the	state.	
																																																						
40	DeView,	“Abortion	Pro,”	Detroit	News.	
	
41	Very	Important	Material,	Report,	Number	21,	Dr.	Thomas	N.	Evans,	chairman,	
Department	of	Gynecology,	Wayne	State	University	Medical	School,	March	20,	1969,	issued	by	
William	F.	McLaughlin,	Republican	state	chairman,	box	2,	folder:	Publicity	and	Press	Releases	
[36],	MARC	Papers.		
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Republican	feminists	also	asserted	that	abortion	protected	unborn	children	
from	 the	neglect,	 abuse,	 and	poverty	 that	 they	would	experience	 if	 born	 into	a	
situation	 where	 they	 were	 not	 wanted,	 and	 saved	 the	 government	 from	 the	
economic	 and	 intangible	 costs	 associated	with	 caring	 for	 them.	 They	 cited	 one	
study	that	concluded	that	children	who	were	not	wanted	were	“more	likely	than	
others	born	at	the	same	time	to	suffer	from	insecurity	and	instability	in	childhood.	
The	incidence	of	learning	problems,	psychiatric	disorders,	delinquency	and	crime	
was	 about	 twice	 as	 high;	 and	 they	 were	 six	 times	 more	 likely	 to	 need	 public	
assistance	between	the	ages	of	16	and	21.”42	These	children	struggled,	and	then	
they	 became	 unproductive	 adults	 who	 burdened	 society.	 Moreover,	 they	
replicated	 this	 pattern	with	 their	 own	 children.43	Every	 child	 should	 be	wanted,	
Beebe	believed.44	She	 lamented,	“It’s	not	the	cries	of	the	unborn	 I	hear,	but	the	
cries	of	the	unborn	unwanted.”45	
																																																						
42	DeView,	“Abortion	Pro,”	Detroit	News.	
	
43	“What	You	Always	Wanted	to	Know	About	Abortion	But	Couldn’t	Find!,”	Michigan	
Coordinating	Council	for	Abortion	Law	Reform,	n.d.,	2,	box	2,	folder:	Publicity	and	Press	
Releases	[36],	MARC	Papers.	
	
44	Speech,	Beebe,	April	11,	1970.		
	
45	Dobyms,	“Newcomer	Defeats	Mrs.	Beebe,”	Detroit	News.		
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Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 were	 surprised	 to	 find	 that	 they	 faced	
opposition	on	abortion	reform	from	an	unlikely	source,	a	feminist	from	their	own	
party.	 In	 1974,	 Binsfeld	 began	 the	 first	 of	 four	 terms	 in	 the	Michigan	House	 of	
Representatives.	 She	 identified	 herself	 as	 a	 feminist,	 but	 “not	 an	 extreme	
feminist.” 46 	The	 ERA	 had	 to	 be	 ratified,	 Binsfeld	 believed,	 because	 as	 a	
constitutional	amendment	 it	would	prevent	a	popularly	elected	 legislature	 from	
expunging	laws	that	provided	or	protected	equal	rights	for	women.47		
While	Binsfeld	identified	as	a	feminist	and	supported	the	ERA,	some	of	her	
ideas	were	more	 consistent	with	 her	 conservative	 colleagues	 in	 the	 Republican	
Party.	For	example,	she	was	committed	to	the	primacy	of	the	traditional	family	as	
the	 basic	 unit	 of	 American	 society,	 and	 worried	 that	 government	 interference	
																																																						
46	Binsfeld	to	Maureen	Reagan,	September	13,	1983,	box	7,	folder	11:	Connie	Binsfeld,	
Republican	Women,	1983-88,	1991,	accession	no.	MS	99-19,	Connie	Binsfeld	Papers,	Archives	
of	Michigan,	Lansing,	Michigan	(hereafter	cited	as	Binsfeld	Papers).	A	draft	version	of	this	letter	
provided,	“I	am	not	a	feminist.	I	am	not	a	member	of	the	Eagles	Forum.”	Handwritten	edits	to	
the	letter	made	by	someone,	presumably	Binsfeld,	changed	the	original	sentence,	“I	am	not	a	
feminist,”	to	“I	am	not	an	extreme	feminist.”	Binsfeld	to	Maureen	Reagan,	n.d.,	box	7,	folder	
11:	Connie	Binsfeld,	Republican	Women,	1983-89,	1991,	accession	no.	MS	99-19,	Binsfeld	
Papers.	The	letter	that	was	actually	sent	to	Maureen	Reagan	provided,	“I	am	not	an	extreme	
feminist.”	
	
47	Callow	to	Candidates,	August	1982,	box	3,	folder	13:	Connie	Binsfeld,	Campaign-
Questionnaires,	1982,	accession	no.	MS	99-17,	Binsfeld	Papers;	Michigan	Council	of	Christian	
Laymen,	Questions	for	(Legislative)	Candidates,	box	3,	folder	13:	Connie	Binsfeld,	Campaign-
Questionnaires,	1982,	accession	no.	MS	99-17,	Binsfeld	Papers;	Binsfeld	to	Mary	Mousseau,	
March	7,	1983,	box	4,	folder	6:	Connie	Binsfeld,	Equal	Rights	Amendment	1983-84,	accession	
no.	MS	99-19,	Binsfeld	Papers.	
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undermined	the	fundamental	relationship	between	parents	and	their	children.	She	
believed	 that	 parents	 were	 obligated	 to	 protect	 and	 preserve	 their	 families	 by	
instilling	in	their	children	“the	old	fashioned	principles	and	values	of	honesty,	loving,	
caring,	sharing,	hard	work,	trust	and	service.”48	In	addition	to	the	family,	however,	
parents	 needed	 to	 reinvigorate	 “the	 neighborhoods,	 the	 neighborhood	 schools,	
small	businesses,	the	P.T.A.,	church	parishes	and	volunteer	associations	of	every	
sort	.	.	.	[because	these	organizations]	“nourished	strong	individuals	and	protected	
them	 from	 the	 state.” 49 		 According	 to	 Binsfeld,	 certain	 government	 policies	
threatened	 the	 family.	 For	 example,	welfare	programs,	which	were	 intended	 to	
assist	 families	 in	 times	 of	 economic	 need,	 made	 Americans	 dependent	 on	 the	
government	 and	 perpetuated	 this	 dependence	 across	 generational	 lines.	 The	
traditional	American	way	of	life,	she	insisted,	had	to	be	preserved	because	“society	
will	crumble	if	we	fail.”50		
Women	 played	 a	 critical	 role	 as	mothers,	 but	 Binsfeld	 believed	 that	 they	
could	also	make	important	contributions	to	society	in	other	ways.	Calling	herself	“a	
																																																						
48	Michigan	Mothers	Award	Luncheon,	April	4,	1979,	5-6,	box	8,	folder	6:	Connie	
Binsfeld,	Speeches,	1976-79,	accession	no.	MS	99-17,	Binsfeld	Papers.		
	
49	Ibid.,	6.	
	
50	Ibid.,	2.	
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recycled	human	resource,”	she	argued	that	women	needed	to	regularly	reinvent	
themselves	as	their	familial	responsibilities	and	priorities	changed.51	She	noted,	“I	
believe	that	people	of	talent	and	ability	can	be	recycled	just	as	effectively	as	pop	
bottles	or	metals,	by	going	into	something	else	once	they	have	achieved	a	certain	
goal	 in	other	 fields.”52	Once	 their	 children	were	grown,	Binsfeld	argued,	women	
needed	to	become	involved	in	new	projects	outside	of	the	home	where	they	could	
use	their	experiences	to	promote	the	family.53	They	had	a	responsibility	to	use	their	
talents	and	skills	to	help	others.	
Binsfeld	chose	to	recycle	herself	through	government	service.	As	one	of	the	
few	women	in	the	Michigan	House	or	Senate,	Binsfeld,	like	Beebe,	“felt	a	special	
interest	and	obligation	to	promote	the	concerns	of	children	and	of	women.”54	As	a	
legislator,	 she	 noted	 that	 “what	 more	 important	 province	 could	 a	 mother	 be	
involved	in	than	those	vital	government	decisions	that	shape	the	very	destiny	of	
																																																						
51	Vogt,	“Mother	of	the	Year:	‘I	Consider	Myself	a	Recycled	Human	Resource,’”	Michigan	
Farmer,	August	6,	1977,	box	3,	folder	5:	Connie	Binsfeld,	Biographical	Info.,	1974-82,	accession	
no.	MS	99-17,	Binsfeld	Papers.		
	
52	Ibid.	
	
53	Ibid.	
	
54	Statement	by	Connie	Binsfeld,	SB	228	of	1988	(Surrogate	Parenting),	1,	box	1,	folder	
3:	Connie	Binsfeld	SB	228	of	1988	(Surrogate	Parenting)	1987-88,	accession	no.	99-19,	Binsfeld	
Papers.		
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our	children	and	our	children’s	children?”55	She	felt	that	a	part	of	her	charge	was	
to	empower	women	by	convincing	them	that	they	had	the	responsibility,	as	well	as	
the	unique	ability,	to	rectify	society’s	problems.	She	called	on	women	to	assume	
their	 responsibilities	by	becoming	political.	This	 involved	study	and	 reflection	 to	
determine	the	best	candidates	for	public	office	because	“those	you	elect	to	political	
office	do	effect	your	families	by	their	daily	decision	making.	Elect	those	who	have	
a	sense	of	moral	values	in	their	personalities	that	can	be	applied	to	public	life.	Don’t	
get	 hung	 up	 on	 one	 issue	 candidates.	 The	 family	 perspective	 is	 the	 most	
encompassing	cause.”56	She	emphasized	that	“we	must	believe	that	by	improving	
the	 family,	 we	 can	 improve	 the	 world.” 57 	Her	 belief	 in	 the	 overwhelming	
importance	 of	 the	 family,	 her	 sense	 of	mission	 in	 preserving	 it,	 and	 her	 almost	
apocalyptic	belief	that	society	would	otherwise	collapse,	were	very	representative	
of	one	of	the	basic	tenets	of	the	pro-family	faction	of	the	conservative	movement.		
Binsfeld	also	differed	 from	her	 fellow	Republican	 feminists	 in	her	 strident	
opposition	 to	 abortion.	 A	 practicing	 Catholic,	 Binsfeld	 never	waivered	 from	 her	
conviction	that	life	began	at	conception.	She	was	adamant	that	“the	worth	of	a	life	
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cannot	be	measured	by	its	mother’s	desire	for	it.	The	child	has	its	right	to	life.”58	In	
her	opinion,	regardless	of	its	gestational	development,	an	unborn	child’s	right	to	
life	took	precedence	over	a	pregnant	woman’s	right	to	decide	whether	to	give	birth	
to	 that	 child.	 Binsfeld	 believed	 that	 abortion	 was	 wrong	 and	 should	 only	 be	
available	 to	women	whose	 lives	were	 threatened	by	 carrying	or	delivering	 their	
babies.59	Binsfeld	did	not	agree	with	her	fellow	Republican	feminists	that	women	
would	 have	 full	 equality	 only	 if	 they	 had	 full	 control	 of	 their	 bodies	 under	 all	
circumstances,	including	pregnancy.	Equating	abortion	to	gender	equality	was,	she	
asserted,	 a	 rhetorical	 tool	 used	 to	market	 legalized	abortion	and	 to	protect	 the	
profits	of	those	involved	in	the	abortion	industry,	under	the	guise	of	support	for	
the	freedom	of	and	concern	for	others.	Abortion	rights	never	made	women	equal	
to	men.60	
Binsfeld	worried	about	the	virtue	of	a	society	that	condoned	abortion.	She	
asked	 whether	 “our	 resentment	 of	 the	 financial	 and	 emotional	 burden	 these	
children	can	create	[had]	reached	the	point	where	we	would	rather	kill	a	child	than	
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take	any	responsibility	for	 it?	Who	are	we	that	we	feel	qualified	to	make	such	a	
decision?”61	Any	society	that	endorsed	abortion	rights	for	women	suffered	from	a	
fundamental	and	ultimately	disabling	defect	because	“Abortion	is	much	more	than	
a	 question	 of	 a	woman’s	 right	 to	 control	 her	 own	 reproductive	 capacity.	 It	 is	 a	
question	of	the	value	our	society	places	on	human	life,	and	it	is	one	of	the	worst	
symptoms	of	this	diminishing	value.”62		
Lieutenant	Governor	James	Brickley,	who	disagreed	with	Governor	Milliken,	
but	agreed	with	Binsfeld,	about	abortion,	argued	that	society	had	a	responsibility	
to	the	women	considering	abortion	and	the	children	that	they	wanted	to	abort.	“I	
think	this	state	should	maintain	a	policy	which	advocates	that	every	child	is	wanted	
and	that	each	new	 life	presents	a	challenge	for	us	to	assure	that	each	person	 is	
properly	 cared	 for.”63	He	placed	 the	onus	on	 the	 government	 to	 alleviate	 those	
challenges	which	made	it	difficult	to	bear	and	raise	children	and,	more	broadly,	to	
imbue	its	citizens	with	respect	for	the	importance	of	human	life.64	Brickley’s	views	
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were	echoed	by	the	Catholic	Church,	which	argued	that	“‘the	abortion	issue	isn’t	a	
Catholic	issue–it’s	a	human	and	social	issue	which	the	Church	is	involved	in	as	part	
of	a	wider	view	that	all	life	should	be	cared	for	and	protected.’”65	Abortion	was	not	
an	economic	question	or	an	issue	of	equality,	but	a	reflection	of	society’s	respect	
for	humanity.	
As	 many	 scholars	 have	 concluded,	 the	 fundamental	 differences	 between	
pro-choice	and	pro-life	activists	could	never	be	settled	through	compromise.	The	
Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	Roe	was	the	first	step	in	resolving	the	matter,	but	it	
also	 created	 new	 issues.	Michigan’s	 pro-choice	 Republican	 feminists	 recognized	
that	the	Roe	Court	did	not	establish	an	absolute	right	to	an	abortion.	Therefore,	
they	 tried	 to	 stop	 any	 attempts	 by	 the	 Michigan	 legislature,	 encouraged	 by	
conservative	activists,	to	limit	access	to	what	they	characterized	as	a	legal	medical	
procedure.	Abortion	remained	an	ongoing	political	issue	in	Michigan	even	after	Roe.		
Kefauver,	 for	 example,	 engaged	 in	 nonpartisan	 lobbying	 and	 educational	
efforts	to	persuade	voters	not	to	vote	for	the	mostly	white	male	legislators	who	
opposed	women’s	rights.	To	further	her	goal,	she	was	willing	to	publicly	humiliate	
Michigan	House	and	Senate	members	who	did	not	support	feminist	causes.	In	1975,	
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she	 founded	 the	 “Feminist	 Bureau	 of	 Investigation,”	 an	 organization	 that	
categorized	Michigan’s	 legislators	based	on	 their	 legislative	 records	on	abortion	
and	other	 issues	that	 impacted	women.	Her	 findings	were	publicized	on	posters	
that	included	a	“feminist	honor	role”	to	identify	legislators	who	promoted	women’s	
rights	and	a	“Warning–These	Men	Hate	Women”	advertisement	that	made	it	clear	
that	women	 should	 not	 vote	 for	 legislators	 on	 the	 list.66	One	 particular	 poster,	
which	looked	like	an	old	fashioned	wanted	poster	for	criminals,	publicized	a	“Keep-
Em-Barefoot-&-Pregnant”	 Award	 for	 a	 Democratic	 legislator	 from	 Detroit,	
Thaddeus	Stopczynski.	In	these	posters,	Stopczynski’s	head	was	perched	on	a	very	
pregnant	 body.	 He	 was	 singled	 out	 for	 trying	 to	 ban	 fetal	 research	 and	 to	
legislatively	limit	a	woman’s	access	to	abortion	in	Michigan.67		
The	efforts	of	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	to	protect	a	woman’s	right	to	
have	an	abortion	became	more	difficult	when	they	began	to	face	opposition	from	
within	 their	party.	At	 the	1976	Republican	national	convention,	pressured	by	 its	
growing	 conservative	 wing,	 Republican	 leaders	 changed	 the	 party	 platform	 to	
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declare	that	“the	Republican	Party	favors	a	continuance	of	the	public	dialogue	on	
abortion	and	supports	the	efforts	of	those	who	seek	enactment	of	a	constitutional	
amendment	 to	 restore	protection	of	 the	 right	 to	 life	 for	unborn	children.”68	The	
national	 party	 undercut	 the	 argument	 of	 pro-choice	 Republicans	 that	 the	
determination	of	when	life	began	was	a	personal	choice	that	was	not	relevant	to	
the	 legality	 of	 abortion	when	 it	 endorsed	 a	 new	human	 life	 amendment	 to	 the	
constitution	that	recognized	that	life	begins	at	conception.	The	NRWTF,	which	led	
the	efforts	of	Republican	feminists	to	protect	feminist	interests	in	the	Republican	
Party	platform,	made	a	strategic	decision	to	forego	the	abortion	fight	in	order	to	
maintain	support	for	ratification	of	the	ERA.69	
This	 platform	 position	 placed	many	 Republican	 feminists	 in	 an	 untenable	
position.	They	wanted	to	remain	Republicans,	but	felt	betrayed	by	a	party	that	did	
not	 support	 their	 interests	 as	 women.	 Unlike	 the	more	 ambiguous	 ERA,	 which	
provided	 Republican	 feminists	 with	 the	 space	 to	 moderate	 some	 of	 the	 more	
extreme	 interpretations	 offered	 by	 their	 conservative	 opponents,	 pro-choice	
Republican	feminists	were	not	able	to	reconcile	the	feminist	and	party	positions	on	
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abortion.	They	could	not	change	what	it	meant	to	have	an	abortion	and	could	not	
convince	 themselves	 that	 the	human	rights	amendment	 supported	by	 the	more	
conservative	members	of	their	party	was	in	any	way	consistent	with	their	feminist	
goal	of	equality	through	control	over	their	reproductive	decisions.		
After	 their	 victory	 in	 Roe,	 pro-choice	 Republican	 feminists	 turned	 their	
attention	to	the	next	phase	in	their	fight	for	abortion	rights.	Their	opponents	tried	
to	 limit	access	 to	abortion	by	denying	poor	women	government	 funding	 for	 the	
procedure.	In	1977,	Congress	adopted	the	Hyde	Amendment,	which	provided	that	
federal	funds	could	not	be	used	to	pay	for	abortions	except	in	cases	of	rape,	incest,	
or	to	save	the	 life	of	the	mother.70	The	Michigan	 legislature	considered	a	similar	
law	 to	 prohibit	 the	 state	 from	 using	 its	 funds	 to	 pay	 for	 abortions	 for	 indigent	
women,	but	the	legislators	did	not	have	much	of	a	political	appetite	for	the	issue.	
One	Democrat	member	of	the	Michigan	House	noted,	“‘I	hate	to	vote	on	it.	.	.	.	We	
try	 to	help	 the	poor	whenever	we	 can,	 and	 to	have	 to	 continue	 this	 distinction	
(between	rich	and	poor)	makes	it	tough.	.	.	 .	 If	I	have	to	vote,	I	will	vote	for	(the	
cutoff).	There’s	only	one	question:	When	does	life	begin?	I	think	it	begins	at	the	
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point	 of	 conception.	 So	 after	 you	 say	 that,	 there	 isn’t	much	 else	 to	 say.’”71	No	
matter	how	they	voted,	they	were	certain	to	offend	some	constituency.		
Governor	Milliken	was	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 ambivalence	 of	 the	
state	legislature	on	this	question	to	preserve	equal	access	to	abortion	for	all	of	the	
women	in	Michigan.	When	the	federal	government	notified	Michigan	that	it	would	
no	 longer	 reimburse	 the	 state	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 abortions	 for	 poor	 women	 on	
Medicaid	(except	for	certain	enumerated	exclusions),	the	governor	picked	up	the	
shortfall	with	state	funds.	In	doing	so,	he	emphasized,	“I	cannot	support	a	policy,	
the	result	of	which	is	to	discriminate	against	the	poor	by	establishing	a	separate	
standard	 of	 medical	 care.” 72 	Thus,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Hyde	 Amendment,	
Michigan	remained	one	of	the	few	states	to	continue	to	fund	abortions	for	indigent	
women.		
However,	the	question	of	government	funding	for	abortions	for	poor	women	
reemerged	in	1978.	Not	coincidentally,	Democratic	state	Senator	William	Fitzgerald,	
who	 opposed	 abortion,	 was	 running	 against	Milliken	 in	 the	 1978	 gubernatorial	
																																																						
71	Dolores	Katz,	“Legislators	Duck	Vote	on	Abortion	Aid	Halt,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	
October	16,	1977;	The	Michigan	Medicaid	Abortion	Story:	June,	1978	to	November,	1978,	
Prepared	for:	The	ACLU/NARAL	Seminar	Milwaukee,	November	11	and	12,	1978,	box	2,	Beebe	
Papers.		
	
72	Louis	Heldman,	“Milliken	Facing	Abortion	Dilemma:	Bill	Forbids	State	Payment	for	the	
Poor,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	July	17,	1978.	
	
		
203	
election.	 Thus,	 when	 the	 Michigan	 legislature,	 both	 houses	 of	 which	 were	
controlled	by	the	Democrats,	adopted	a	budget	for	the	state’s	Department	of	Social	
Services,	 it	 allocated	 a	 total	Medicaid	 reimbursement	 of	 only	 one	 dollar	 for	 all	
nontherapeutic	abortions.	In	contrast,	Michigan	had	paid	$2.5	million	for	Medicaid	
abortions	during	the	prior	year,	and	the	overall	budget	for	the	Department	of	Social	
Services	was	$2.4	billion.	Legislators	who	opposed	Medicaid	funding	for	abortion	
believed	 that	 they	 had	 leverage	 because	 they	 tied	 the	 abortion	 limitation	 to	
Medicaid	funding	in	general.	To	veto	the	line	item	on	abortion,	Milliken	would	have	
had	to	veto	the	entire	Medicaid	budget,	leaving	Michigan’s	poor	without	access	to	
medical	care.	Support	for	and	opposition	to	this	legislation	was	bipartisan.73	
The	arguments	to	continue	Medicaid	funding	for	abortion	tended	to	focus	
on	economics	and	class.	Those	who	favored	it	were	supported	by	a	state	analyst	
who	 concluded	 that	 approximately	 twelve	 thousand	 abortions	 for	 poor	women	
cost	Medicaid	an	estimated	$2.5	million	each	year,	whereas	the	cost	of	welfare	for	
mothers	who	gave	birth	to	those	unwanted	children	would	reach	approximately	
$6.23	 million. 74 	They	 removed	 all	 humanity	 from	 the	 argument	 and	 instead	
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reduced	 abortion	 to	 a	 simple	 cost-benefit	 analysis.	 They	 also	 invoked	 a	 class	
struggle,	pitting	 rich	against	poor.	One	Republican	 senator	who	wanted	 to	 fund	
abortions	for	poor	women	argued	that	“there’s	an	old	saying:	‘The	rich	get	richer	
and	the	poor	get	children.’	I	think	that’s	what	it	boils	down	to	here.”75	Poor	women	
were	 effectively,	 but	 unfairly,	 denied	 the	 right	 to	 an	 abortion	 if	 they	 could	 not	
afford	it.	
Proponents	 of	 Medicaid	 abortions	 in	 Michigan	 disagreed	 on	 whether	
Milliken	should	veto	the	bill	to	get	to	the	objectionable	line	item,	which	would	have	
essentially	 eliminated	 all	 Medicaid	 funding	 for	 Michigan’s	 poor,	 or	 use	 the	
ambiguity	of	the	term	“therapeutic”	to	work	around	the	prohibition.	Some	abortion	
advocates,	including	the	American	Civil	Liberties	Union	and	the	Women’s	Lawyer’s	
Association,	argued	that	Milliken	should	order	the	Department	of	Social	Services	to	
adopt	a	very	 liberal	 view	of	 “therapeutic”	 to	 cover	all	 abortions	necessary	 for	a	
woman’s	 physical	 or	 emotional	 health. 76 	This	 interpretation	 placed	 the	 doctor	
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squarely	in	the	middle	of	the	determination	because	he	or	she	would	have	to	agree	
that	the	abortion	was	necessary	because	of	health	concerns.	Abortion	opponents	
argued	that	this	interpretation	was	contrary	to	legislative	intent.77	
Feminist	groups,	such	as	NOW	and	WEAL,	represented	by	Kefauver,	favored	
a	 veto.	 The	 head	 of	 NOW	 believed	 that	 the	 veto	 provided	 an	 educational	
opportunity	for	advocates	to	argue	“that	it	is	less	expensive	for	the	state	to	pay	for	
terminating	 a	 pregnancy	 than	 for	 bringing	 a	 child	 up	 on	 welfare.” 78 	Kefauver	
contended	that	any	substitute	bill	could	hardly	be	more	burdensome	for	indigent	
pregnant	women	and	that	a	veto	would	not	change	votes.	Moreover,	she	argued	
that	the	alternative,	limiting	the	impact	of	the	budgetary	legislation	by	adopting	a	
definition	 of	 “therapeutic”	 that	 was	 a	 mere	 regulatory	 slight	 of	 hand,	 would	
undermine	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 legally	 recognized	 abortion	 rights.	 Lawmakers,	
Kefauver	 argued,	 could	 no	 longer	 participate	 in	 “the	 despicable	 strategy	 of	
attaching	anti-abortion	riders	to	otherwise	good	and	necessary	legislation,	in	order	
to	 trap	 the	 pro-choice	 advocates	 into	 accepting	 this	 erosion	 of	 abortion	 rights.	
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Liberals	 as	 well	 as	 conservatives	 in	 Lansing	 have	 looked	 upon	 these	 riders	 as	
inconsequential,	thus	showing	their	contempt	for	the	lives	of	the	women	directly	
affected.”	79	She	saw	this	proposed	regulatory	fix	as	a	concession	to	the	religious	
right,	who	sought	to	incrementally	eliminate	the	right	to	abortion	in	Michigan.		
The	women	who	 favored	 an	 interpretive	 fix	 to	 the	 legislation	 referred	 to	
those	who	wanted	a	veto,	including	Kefauver,	as	“radical	feminist	groups.”	While	
both	sides	shared	the	goal	of	protecting	Medicaid	abortions,	and	the	interpretive	
group	 tried	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 two	 positions	 were	 compatible,	 not	 everyone	
agreed. 80 	Ultimately,	 Milliken	 conferred	 with	 his	 Republican	 feminist	 wife	 and	
decided	to	reject	the	call	to	interpret	“therapeutic”	broadly	because	it	would	result	
in	 a	 legal	 challenge	 that	 would	 cause	 uncertainty	 during	 an	 inevitable	 court	
challenge.	Instead,	he	decided	to	veto	the	entire	Medicaid	budget	in	order	to	get	
to	the	line	item	restricting	funding	for	abortion	for	poor	women.	He	noted	that	“I	
cannot	 say	 to	 a	woman	who	 is	 pregnant,	 and	who	has	 after	 considering	 all	 the	
alternatives	with	her	physician	reached	the	very	difficult	and	personal	decision	she	
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should	seek	an	abortion,	that	she	cannot	have	one	solely	because	she	is	poor.”	81	
WEAL	supported	his	decision,	noting	that,	“By	his	action	he	has	joined	that	select	
group	of	governors	.	.	.	who	refuse	to	be	intimidated	by	a	group	of	legislators	who	
have	no	idea	what	it	is	like	to	be	a	woman	and	poor.”82		
Milliken	then	urged	the	legislature	to	split	Medicaid	funding	in	general	from	
Medicaid	 funding	 for	abortion	so	 that	 the	poor	could	get	other	needed	medical	
treatment.	His	position	would	have	permitted	the	abortion	funding	question	to	be	
debated	separately.83	Since	they	could	not	gather	enough	votes	to	override	his	veto,	
the	legislature	threatened	to	pass	the	same	bill	and	put	it	before	him	again.	This	
second	bill	would	 come	 so	 close	 to	 the	 end	of	 the	 fiscal	 year	 that	 it	would	put	
Medicaid	funding	for	the	poor	at	risk	when	the	budget	expired.	Milliken	objected	
to	this	tactic,	indicating	that	if	the	legislature	did	not	have	enough	votes	to	override	
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his	veto,	they	needed	to	draft	different	legislation.	He	told	the	legislature	that	he	
would	veto	an	identical	bill	for	the	second	time.84		
In	September,	a	newly	created	Michigan	chapter	of	 the	National	Abortion	
Rights	 Action	 League	 (NARAL)	 elected	 Lorraine	 Beebe	 as	 chairperson.	 The	
organization	was	“‘dedicated	to	the	elimination	of	all	laws	and	practices	that	would	
compel	any	woman	to	bear	a	child	against	her	will.’”85	Beebe	said	that	“the	NARAL	
purpose	 .	 .	 .	 is	 to	 recognize	 the	basic	human	right	of	a	woman	to	 limit	her	own	
reproduction.” 86 She	 characterized	 the	 legislature’s	 work	 as	 “an	 attempt	 by	
religious	groups	to	impose	their	belief	that	life	begins	at	conception.	.	.	.	But	all	they	
care	about	is	the	fertilized	egg.	They	don’t	care	what	happens	to	the	women.	They	
don’t	 care	 what	 happens	 to	 the	 child.” 87 	Familiar	 arguments	 about	 abortion	
resurfaced	in	this	debate	as	proponents	of	government	funded	abortions	tried	to	
avoid	 the	 assertion	 of	 many	 of	 their	 opponents	 that	 life	 begins	 at	 conception.	
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However,	whereas	advocates	like	Beebe	had	argued	in	the	past	that	the	state	did	
not	 care	about	 the	unwanted	child,	 they	now	offered	a	 contradictory	economic	
argument	about	how	much	more	it	cost	the	state	to	raise	the	child	(that	it	did	not	
care	about)	than	to	pay	for	the	mother	to	abort	it.		
The	 House	 Appropriations	 Committee	 struggled	 with	 how	 to	 respond	 to	
Milliken’s	veto.	The	legislature	still	did	not	divide	along	strictly	party	lines	on	the	
question	 of	 abortion	 or	 government	 funding	 for	 abortion.	 However,	 when	
legislators	made	 the	Medicaid	 budget	 contingent	 on	 accepting	 a	 prohibition	 on	
Medicaid	funding	for	abortion,	votes	became	unpredictable,	especially	because	the	
governor	risked	being	blamed	for	cutting	off	all	Medicaid	funding	six	weeks	before	
the	gubernatorial	election.	Politics	influenced	the	votes	of	some	members	of	the	
legislature,	to	the	consternation	of	others.	In	the	House	Appropriations	Committee,	
where	the	second	bill	had	to	originate,	Republican	Mel	Larson,	who	was	running	
for	 Michigan	 Secretary	 of	 State	 on	 Governor	 Milliken’s	 ticket,	 voted	 against	
reissuing	 the	 same	 bill	 with	 the	 prohibition	 on	 abortion	 funding	 despite	 his	
opposition	 to	 abortion.	 He	 stated	 “I	 am	 going	 to	 vote	 ‘no’	 on	 this	 because	 the	
Democrats	are	using	this	to	embarrass	the	Governor.	.	.	.	I	have	a	commitment	to	
the	right-to-life,	but	when	you	use	the	right-to-life	to	defeat	political	candidates,	
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you	are	misusing	 the	 right-to-life.”88	Republican	Representative	Melvin	DeStiger,	
who	opposed	Medicaid	abortions,	argued	that	“when	you	cut	away	all	the	rhetoric,	
you	get	down	to	one	thing:	The	use	of	the	unborn	child	for	political	advantage.”89	
As	 a	 result	 he,	 like	 Larson,	 voted	 against	 reissuing	 the	 bill	 with	 an	 abortion	
prohibition.	By	cobbling	together	a	strange	coalition,	the	committee	was	able	to	
get	the	Medicaid	funding	bill,	without	any	restrictions	on	abortion	funding,	back	to	
the	full	House.	At	that	point,	those	who	did	not	want	the	government	to	pay	for	
abortions	hoped	to	insert	their	language	back	into	the	bill.	Thus,	the	dispute	was	
moved	back	to	the	full	House	for	debate.90		
WEAL	made	an	appeal	to	Michigan’s	legislators	to	protect	medical	care	for	
the	poor	by	refusing	to	hold	it	hostage	to	politics.	Kefauver	wrote	to	members	of	
the	Michigan	House	of	Representatives	to	indicate	her	disdain	about	how	abortion	
rights	 for	 the	 poor	 were	 being	 used	 by	 Democrats	 to	 garner	 support	 for	 their	
Democratic	candidate	in	the	race	for	governor.	She	invoked	the	traditional	support	
of	“the	Democratic	Party	.	.	.	[for]	the	disadvantaged	sectors	of	our	society.	What	
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this	legislature	does	in	the	next	two	weeks	either	will	prove	that	the	sensitivity	still	
exists,	 or	 that	 the	 Michigan	 Democratic	 Party	 has	 begun	 to	 wage	 war	 on	 the	
poor.”91	The	next	week	she	wrote	to	members	of	the	state	Senate	rebuking	them	
for	 their	 political	manipulation	 of	 the	 issue.	 This	 time,	 she	made	 a	 nonpartisan	
appeal	to	their	consciences	by	arguing	that	“neither	the	Republican	nor	Democratic	
parties	has	a	history	of	ruthless	insensitivity	towards	the	disadvantaged	members	
of	our	society.	What	you	do	today	and	in	the	next	two	days	will	prove	that	the	79th	
Legislature	is	either	ready	to	put	aside	political	expediency	and	see	that	Michigan’s	
poor	have	needed	services,	or	that	this	body	has	begun	to	wage	war	on	the	poor.”92		
The	House	ultimately	rejected	the	bill	that	came	out	of	committee	without	a	
restriction	on	abortion	funding	and,	 in	a	bipartisan	vote,	adopted	a	bill	 that	was	
identical	to	that	the	governor	had	vetoed	two	months	earlier.	In	the	process,	things	
got	nasty	as	both	sides	jabbed	at	each	other.	Democratic	Representative	Dominic	
Jacobetti,	who	chaired	the	House	Appropriations	Committee	and	was	opposed	to	
state	funding	for	abortion,	took	the	position	that	he	was	“not	going	to	sit	here	after	
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taking	my	oath	of	office	and	be	dictated	to	by	the	governor.	If	he	wants	to	veto	it	
again,	let	him	do	so.”93	Jacobetti	noted,	“we	should	not	take	state	money	to	snuff	
out	lives	in	this	state.”94	According	to	Republican	Larson,	“We	have	moved	to	the	
elective	abortion	as	a	method	we	are	encouraging	for	birth	control.”95	He	noted	
that	“‘all	these	people	are	crying	that	its	discrimination	against	the	poor	.	.	.	.	I	think	
the	unborn	child	is	one	of	the	poor	too.’”96	Similarly,	support	for	Medicaid	funded	
abortions	 came	 from	 both	 political	 parties.	 Democrat	 Perry	 Bullard	 supported	
Republican	Governor	Milliken	when	he	 asserted	 that	 “it	 is	 simply	 a	 question	 of	
equal	protection.	We	would	be	very	selfish	if	we	are	to	take	the	power	we	have	to	
take	equal	rights	away	from	persons	with	lower	incomes.”97		
When	the	bill	moved	to	the	Senate,	Senator	Fitzgerald	said	he	would	vote	for	
it	so	long	as	it	included	a	prohibition	against	Medicaid-funded	abortions,	even	if	it	
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meant	the	governor	would	veto	it	and	cut	off	all	Medicaid	funding.	98	The	editorial	
staffs	 of	 newspapers	 in	 the	 state	 could	 not	 help	 but	 note	 the	 strange	 political	
alignments	 that	 had	 developed	 over	 this	 issue,	 starting	with	 the	 candidates	 for	
governor.	 The	Grand	 Rapids	 Press	 noted,	 “The	 situation	 is	 not	without	 irony:	 a	
Republican	governor,	whose	party	increasingly	is	using	the	abortion	issue	in	its	bid	
for	votes,	opposes	state-imposed	restrictions	affecting	only	 the	poor,	while	Sen.	
Fitzgerald,	who	has	represented	himself	as	a	liberal	and	working	man’s	friend,	now	
says	that	insofar	as	Michigan	is	concerned,	only	those	women	who	are	fortunate	
enough	not	to	be	on	welfare	can	get	abortions	without	increasing	their	financial	
woes.”99	The	positions	of	Michigan’s	politicians	ultimately	rested	on	whether	they	
privileged	the	rights	of	the	mother	or	the	unborn	child	and	this	emphasis	was	not	
necessarily	dictated	by	partisanship.	
Recognizing	 that	 they	 faced	a	political	 stalemate,	members	of	 the	 Senate	
(despite	Fitzgerald’s	opposition)	and	House	finally	agreed	to	a	temporary	fix	for	the	
problem	that	extended	all	Medicaid	funding,	including	that	for	abortions,	for	four	
months.	This	compromise	bill	delinked	Medicaid	funding	in	general	from	funding	
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for	abortion	by	giving	Milliken	the	option	to	veto	only	the	one	dollar	appropriated	
for	 Medicaid	 funded	 abortions.	 As	 expected,	 he	 vetoed	 the	 abortion	 line	 item	
restriction.	 Thus,	Medicaid	 funding	was	 temporarily	 restored,	 including	 that	 for	
poor	women	who	sought	abortions.	Beebe,	speaking	on	behalf	of	Michigan	NARAL,	
noted	that	“it’s	ironic	that	the	legislators	and	gubernatorial	candidates	supporting	
this	bill	call	themselves	‘pro-life,’	when	they	were	willing	to	cut	off	all	funding	for	
health	services	to	senior	citizens,	infant	and	child	nutrition	programs,	and	services	
to	the	blind	and	disabled	in	order	to	gain	a	political	‘win.’”100		
Fitzgerald’s	 stand	 on	 abortion	 caused	 an	 interesting	 political	 realignment	
among	women	in	Michigan.	By	1978,	politically	active	feminists	on	both	sides	of	
the	aisle	questioned	their	party’s	position	on	abortion.	Many	feminist	Democrats	
publicly	supported	Milliken	for	governor	and,	in	fact,	created	an	organization	called	
“Democratic	Women	for	Milliken.”	These	women	were	not	swayed	when	Fitzgerald	
chose	a	pro-choice	woman,	Olivia	Maynard,	for	his	running	mate.	101	Kefauver,	on	
the	other	hand,	who	had	already	supported	Democrat	Jimmy	Carter	for	president	
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in	1976,	indicated	that	she	wanted	to	vote	for	a	Democrat	for	governor	in	1978,	
but	 could	 not	 bring	 herself	 to	 do	 so	 in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Democratic	
candidate	 was	 opposed	 to	 abortion.	 She	 told	 reporters	 “I’ve	 been	 a	 lifelong	
Republican.	I	was	dying	to	vote	for	the	Democratic	ticket.	I	know	that	even	if	he	
(Fitzgerald)	had	Jesus	Christ	as	his	running	mate	now,	responsible	Michigan	women	
won’t	vote	for	the	ticket.”102	Fitzgerald	lost	the	election.		
When	Medicaid	funding	ran	out	at	the	end	of	1978,	both	the	House	and	the	
Senate	voted	to	provide	Milliken	with	two	separate	bills,	one	for	Medicaid	funding	
in	general	and	one	to	oppose	Medicaid	funding	for	abortion.	He	signed	the	former	
and	vetoed	the	latter.103	By	the	time	he	retired	from	office	on	December	31,	1982,	
he	had	successfully	vetoed	bills	prohibiting	Medicaid	funding	for	abortion	eleven	
times.104	
Michigan’s	legislators	were	also	grappling	with	other	reproductive	issues	and	
Binsfeld,	as	a	pro-life	feminist,	found	herself	in	a	difficult,	but	potentially	important,	
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position.	While	she	oftentimes	sounded	like	a	conservative,	her	feminism	caused	
her	 to	moderate	and	even	 reject	 some	of	 the	 conservative	beliefs	 that	 typically	
emanated	from	her	commitment	to	the	traditional	family.	Because	of	her	stance	as	
a	 pro-life	 feminist,	 she	 was	 able	 to	 offer	 compromise	 positions	 on	 issues	 of	
importance	to	Republican	women	on	both	ends	of	the	ideological	spectrum.	Thus,	
she	 tried	 to	 bring	 together	 in	 this	 middle	 ground	 moderate	 feminists	 and	
conservative	women	on	issues	where	their	positions	seemed	irreconcilable.		
For	example,	she	tried	to	bridge	this	gap	on	the	controversial	 issue	of	sex	
education.	 Despite	 her	 opposition	 to	 abortion	 and	 all	 government	 funding	 for	
abortion,	Binsfeld	was	a	proponent	of	legislation,	HB	4425,	that	provided	for	sex	
education	in	Michigan’s	public	schools.105	She	noted	that	from	1962	to	1977,	the	
number	of	teenagers	in	the	United	States	who	had	babies	rose	about	34	percent,	
and	almost	half	 of	 all	 babies	born	 to	 teenagers	were	born	 to	 single	mothers.106	
These	young	parents	were	more	likely	to	live	in	poverty,	less	likely	to	graduate	from	
high	school	and,	therefore,	more	likely	to	live	in	poverty	as	adults.	It	was	a	problem	
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that	had	economic,	psychological,	and	health	implications	for	the	teenaged	father	
and	mother,	as	well	as	the	child.		
She	attributed	these	statistics,	at	least	in	part,	to	the	fact	that	high	schoolers	
were	not	inclined	to	use	birth	control	when	they	had	sex.	In	1977	Michigan	was	one	
of	only	two	states	that	did	not	permit	birth	control	education	in	the	public	schools.	
(Louisiana	 was	 the	 other	 state.) 107 	Therefore,	 teenagers	 often	 had	 to	 rely	 on	
inaccurate	information,	especially	when	parents	were	not	willing	or	able	to	provide	
the	 information	 they	 needed.	 She	 noted	 that	 in	 1968,	 the	Michigan	 legislature	
proposed	that	sex	education,	 including	birth	control	 information,	be	provided	 in	
Michigan’s	 schools.	 Romney,	 however,	 vetoed	 the	 portion	 dealing	 with	
contraceptive	information,	believing	that	the	people	of	Michigan	were	not	ready	
for	it.	She	found	it	ironic	that	Michigan	law	allowed	teachers	to	provide	information	
about	sex,	but	not	contraception.	“As	a	result,”	she	concluded,	“we	now	have	sex	
education	classes	in	our	public	schools	which	in	essence	tell	students	the	mechanics	
of	how	people	become	pregnant,	but	which	are	not	allowed	to	provide	the	answers	
to	the	logical	next	question:	How	do	you	not	become	pregnant?”108	
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All	of	Binsfeld’s	positions	on	reproductive	issues	emanated	from	her	belief	
that	life	began	at	conception,	and	her	position	on	sex	education	was	no	exception.	
She	believed	that	information	about	contraception	would	help	prevent	unwanted	
pregnancies	and,	therefore,	abortions,	among	teenage	girls.109	Thus,	she	supported	
legislation	 that	 permitted	 schools	 to	 teach	 about	 “family	 planning”	 and	
“reproductive	 health,”	 both	 of	 which	 included	 methods	 of	 contraception	 that	
would	prevent	pregnancy.	The	words	“birth	control”	were	not	used	because	she	
did	not	want	students	to	be	taught	about	abortion,	which	she	distinguished	from	
contraception	because	it	involved	terminating	a	pregnancy,	rather	than	preventing	
it.110	Schools	were	prohibited	from	providing	information	on	abortion,	required	to	
offer	opt	out	provisions	at	the	request	of	the	parents	or	the	student,	and	prohibited	
from	distributing	contraceptive	devices,	as	parents	needed	to	be	involved	in	that	
decision.		
Binsfeld’s	position	on	sex	education	was	contrary	to	that	of	conservatives,	
who	 agreed	 that	 schools	 should	 not	 provide	 any	 information	 to	 their	 students	
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about	sex.	Schlafly	wrote	that	“the	major	goal	of	nearly	all	sex	education	curricula	
being	taught	in	the	schools	is	to	teach	teenagers	(and	sometimes	children)	how	to	
enjoy	 fornication	 without	 having	 a	 baby	 and	 without	 feeling	 guilty.	 This	 goal	
explains	why	the	courses	promote	an	acceptance	of	sexual	behavior	that	does	not	
produce	a	baby,	such	as	homosexuality	and	masturbation.	This	goal	explains	why	
they	encourage	abortions	and	all	 varieties	of	 contraception.”111	Binsfeld	did	not	
even	engage	with	 conservatives	on	 that	objection,	but	 she	dismissed	 two	other	
arguments	against	the	legislation,	both	favorites	of	conservatives.	Once	teenagers	
learned	 about	 contraception,	 they	 argued,	 they	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	
sexual	activity.	Also,	it	was	best	that	parents	teach	their	children	about	sex.	Binsfeld	
admitted	that	the	former	was	not	true	and	the	latter	was	not	happening.	Teenagers	
were	sexually	active	whether	or	not	they	knew	anything	about	contraception	and	
parents	were	 not	 providing	 their	 children	with	 the	 information	 they	 needed	 to	
make	 good	 decisions. 112 	The	 best	 alternative	 was	 to	 teach	 minors	 about	
contraception	in	the	schools.	
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On	the	question	of	sex	education,	Binsfeld	operated	within	Ziegler’s	middle	
ground,	from	which	she	helped	to	facilitate	a	compromise	between	feminists	and	
conservatives.	 The	 sex	 education	 legislation	 she	 supported	 was	 limited	 to	
accommodate	some	conservative	opposition	to	abortion.	At	the	same	time,	it	was	
pragmatically	designed	to	appeal	 to	 feminists	who	wanted	to	help	minors	make	
sound	reproductive	decisions.	Moreover,	she	personally	compromised	her	belief	in	
the	sanctity	of	the	family	by	allowing	the	government	into	the	privacy	of	the	home	
through	the	schools.		
As	 the	 1970s	 drew	 to	 a	 close,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists,	 with	 the	
assistance	of	a	sympathetic	governor,	had	managed	to	stop	pro-life	activists	from	
imposing	 restrictions	 which,	 while	 constitutionally	 acceptable,	 would	 have	
effectively	limited	a	woman’s	right	to	an	abortion.	Binsfeld	made	minimal	progress	
in	her	efforts	to	bridge	the	gap	between	moderate	and	conservative	Republican	
women	on	issues	related	to	reproductive	rights.	However,	her	struggles	were	not	
surprising.	As	Luker	and	others	have	concluded,	the	abortion	debate	centered	on	
opposing	world	views	that	did	not	facilitate	compromise.	All	that	Binsfeld	could	do	
was	 tinker	around	the	edges	 to	 try	 to	 find	common	ground	on	 issues	 that	were	
tangentially	connected	to	abortion	and	women’s	rights	more	generally.		
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Conservative	 opposition	 to	 abortion	 within	 the	 Republican	 Party	 made	
reproductive	rights	a	fundamental	point	of	contention	for	Michigan’s	Republican	
feminists	as	they	tried	to	reconcile	their	partisanship	with	their	feminism.	In	fact,	
abortion	advocate	Kefauver	was	slowly	separating	from	the	Republican	Party	over	
this	and	other	issues.	As	early	as	1976,	she	chose	to	vote	for	Democratic	candidates	
who	supported	her	position	on	abortion.	Her	partisan	struggle	was	compounded	
by	the	fact	that	she	did	not	like	Governor	Milliken,	despite	his	support	for	the	ERA	
and	his	continuation	of	government	funding	for	abortions	for	indigent	women	in	
Michigan.	 Kefauver	 argued	 that	 “I	 am	 an	 advocate	 for	 women’s	 rights.	 The	
Governor	has	no	one	in	his	office	who	knows	anything	about	women’s	rights,	so	
they	mess	up	any	issue	that	has	any	‘delicate	connotations’	to	it.	This	makes	the	
many	 organizations	 espousing	 women’s	 rights	 very	 angry	 with	 the	 Governor.	
Where	 do	 they	 turn?	 To	 the	 Democratic	 Party	 for	 advocacy.” 113 	In	 fact,	 she	
eventually	 did	 just	 that,	 first	 through	 her	 vote	 and	 eventually	 with	 her	 party	
affiliation.	 The	 sensible	 center	 no	 longer	 worked	 for	 her.	 Her	 struggles	 were	 a	
preview	of	the	challenges	to	come	for	Michigan’s	other	Republican	feminists.	
																																																						
113	Lee	Kefauver	Delegate	Questionnaire,	box	1,	folder:	Lee	Kefauver,	Organizations,	
Republican	State	Committee,	State	Conventions	1974-1977,	Kefauver	Papers.	
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CHAPTER	6	IWY	CONFERENCE	AND	REPUBLICAN	FEMINISTS:	1977	
In	numbers	and	most	of	all,	in	unity,	is	strength!	
–Elly	M.	Peterson,	“Report	on	Houston”	
	
By	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 1970s,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 actively	
participated	 in	 both	 feminist	 organizations	 and	 the	Michigan	 Republican	 Party.	
They	focused	on	increasing	female	political	power,	ratifying	the	ERA	and	protecting	
abortion	 rights	 for	 all	 women.	 At	 the	 IWY	 Conference	 in	 Houston,	 Texas,	 in	
November	 1977,	 they	 consolidated,	 validated,	 and	 celebrated	 their	 work	 as	
feminists.	Many	of	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	represented	the	state	at	this	
nonpartisan	meeting.	 They	were	 challenged,	 however,	 by	 a	 large	 contingent	 of	
women,	including	some	conservative	Republicans	from	Michigan,	who	argued	that	
the	 conference	 did	 not	 represent	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 women.	 Conservatives	
characterized	it	as	a	well	planned	and	executed	subterfuge	intended	to	promote	
feminist	causes.		
At	the	end	of	the	conference,	feminists	and	conservatives	each	claimed	that	
the	 conference	 was	 a	 success. 1 	Peterson	 wrote	 that	 “it	 was	 in	 Houston	 the	
women’s	movement	came	of	age-201	years	after	the	founding	of	the	country.	51%	
																																																						
1	Marjorie	J.	Spruill,	“Gender	and	America’s	Right	Turn,”	in	Schulman	and	Zelizer,	
Rightward	Bound,	71-72.	
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of	the	population	will	no	longer	accept	the	back	of	the	bus.”2	Schlafly,	on	the	other	
hand,	asserted	that	feminists	finally	lost	the	fight	for	the	ERA	at	the	convention.3	
Regardless	of	their	similarly	upbeat	assessments,	the	fundamental	disagreements	
between	 feminists	and	 their	 conservative	opponents	were	not	 resolved.	 In	 fact,	
historian	Marjorie	 Spruill	 argued	 that	 “the	 IWY	conflict	ushered	 in	 a	new	era	 in	
American	politics,	the	beginning	rather	than	the	end	of	a	protracted	struggle	over	
women’s	 rights.”4	In	 one	way,	 however,	 the	 IWY	 Conference	 gave	 conservative	
Republican	women	a	new	advantage	over	Republican	feminists	 in	their	battle	to	
take	 control	 of	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 The	 conference	 provided	 them	 with	 the	
evidence	to	argue	that	Republican	feminists	had	abandoned	the	sensible	center.	
After	 the	 United	 Nations	 declared	 1975	 “International	 Women’s	 Year,”	
President	Ford	issued	a	presidential	order	creating	a	National	Commission	on	the	
Observance	of	International	Women’s	Year.	The	Commission,	led	by	Ruckleshaus,	
“was	 to	 adopt	 recommendations	 aimed	 at	 eliminating	 barriers	 to	 equality	 for	
																																																						
2	Elly	Peterson,	“Report	on	Houston,”	November	25,	1977,	8,	box	20,	folder:	
International	Women’s	Year	Miscellaneous,	1977-1978,	Peterson	Papers.	
	
3	Spruill,	“Gender	and	America’s	Right	Turn,”	71-72.	
	
4	Ibid.,	72.	
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women.”5	When	the	UN	extended	the	year	to	a	decade,	Congress	passed	P.L.	94-
167,	 which	 mandated	 that	 all	 states	 and	 territories	 of	 the	 United	 States	 hold	
meetings	to	adopt	resolutions	and	elect	delegates	to	a	national	conference.	The	
fifty-six	 state	 and	 territorial	meetings	 and	 the	 follow-up	 national	meeting	were	
intended	“to	assess	the	status	of	women	in	our	country,	to	measure	the	progress	
we	have	made,	to	identify	the	barriers	that	prevent	us	from	participating	fully	and	
equally	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	 national	 life,	 and	 to	 make	 recommendations	 to	 the	
President	and	to	the	Congress	for	means	by	which	such	barriers	can	be	removed.”6	
The	Commission	was	designated	as	the	sponsor	of	these	meetings	and	given	five	
million	dollars	to	offset	conference	costs.	The	report	of	the	Commission,	“.	.	.	To	
Form	 a	 More	 Perfect	 Union	 .	 .	 .	 Justice	 for	 American	 Women,”	 served	 as	 the	
instruction	manual	for	conference	leaders.7	Newly-elected	President	Jimmy	Carter	
replaced	 Chairperson	 Ruckleshaus	 with	 Abzug	 and,	 as	 one	 member	 of	 the	
Commission	noted,	it	became	decidedly	more	Democratic	in	both	its	outlook	and	
																																																						
5	“Background	on	the	National	Women’s	Conference	and	the	IWY	Commission,”	
National	Commission	on	the	Observance	of	International	Women’s	Year,	
http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=594788.		
	
6	“Declaration	of	American	Women,”	National	Plan	of	Action	adopted	at	National	
Women’s	Conference,	November	18-21,	1977,	Houston,	Texas,	2.		
	
7	“Background	on	the	National	Women’s	Conference	and	the	IWY	Commission,”	
National	Commission	on	the	Observance	of	International	Women’s	Year.	
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its	membership.8	The	law	required	that	these	conferences	be	broadly	inclusive	and	
diverse	to	adequately	represent	all	American	women,	including	those	who	opposed	
the	women’s	movement.	After	the	national	conference,	leaders	were	expected	to	
produce	a	report	for	the	president	that	contained	recommendations	for	changes	
by	the	federal	government.9		
Michigan’s	conference,	called	Focus:	Michigan	Women,	was	held	in	Lansing	
from	June	10	to	11,	1977.	The	meeting,	organized	by	an	advisory	committee	that	
included	Helen	Milliken	 and	 Burnett,	was	 designed	 to	 accomplish	 two	 goals,	 as	
required	 by	 Congress.10	The	 almost	 fourteen	 hundred	 attendees	were	 asked	 to	
nominate	a	slate	of	delegates	to	represent	them	at	the	national	convention	and	to	
adopt	a	series	of	resolutions,	including	fifteen	resolutions	suggested	by	the	national	
conference	committee,	and	additional	resolutions	approved	at	the	state	meeting,	
for	 the	 delegates	 to	 take	with	 them	 to	Houston.	 Attendees	 endorsed	 all	 of	 the	
national	 resolutions,	 formalizing	 their	 support	 for	 ratification	 of	 the	 ERA	 and	
																																																						
8	Alice	S.	Rossi,	Feminists	in	Politics:	A	Panel	Analysis	of	the	First	National	Women’s	
Conference	(New	York:	Academic	Press,	1982).		
	
9	An	Act	to	Direct	the	National	Commission	on	the	Observance	of	International	
Women’s	Year,	1975,	to	Organize	and	Convene	a	National	Women’s	Conference,	and	for	Other	
Purposes,	P.L.	94-167,	(December	23,	1975).	
	
10	State	Coordinating	Committee	for	International	Women’s	Year	Meeting,	minutes,	
February	18,	1977,	box	2,	folder:	International	Women’s	Year	(IWY)-Michigan,	Burnett	Papers.	
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abortion	 rights	 for	all	women,	 including	 funding	 for	 those	who	could	not	afford	
them.	They	also	adopted	fourteen	additional	state	resolutions.	Delegates	selected	
many	 of	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists,	 including	 Peterson,	Milliken,	 Burnett,	
McNamee,	 Beebe,	 and	 Kefauver’s	 seventeen-year-old	 daughter,	 Kari	 Lee	 Lavalli	
(who,	unlike	her	mother	at	that	time,	was	a	member	of	the	Democratic	Women’s	
Caucus),	 to	 attend	 the	 national	 convention.	 Neither	 Kefauver	 nor	 Binsfeld	
represented	the	state	at	the	national	meeting	and	there	is	no	indication	that	either	
one	of	them	attended	this	state	meeting.11		
As	in	most	states,	the	Michigan	meeting	generated	controversy.	Organizers	
estimated	that	about	three	hundred	attendees	objected	to	the	meeting,12	including	
conservatives	 Donnelly,	 Barbour,	 and	 Bernice	 Zilly.	 Donnelly	 called	 it	 a	 “phony	
festival	for	frustrated	feminists,	who	have	made	no	secret	of	their	intention	to	use	
these	tax-funded	Conferences	to	promote	their	own	pet	political	ends,	especially	
the	 Equal	 Rights	 Amendment.” 13 	Zilly	 had	 a	 long	 history	 as	 a	 conservative	
																																																						
11	“Focus:	Michigan	Women”	Final	Report,	n.d.,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	Files,	1969-1982:	
International	Women’s	Year:	Mich.	State	Conf.	Coord.	Committee:	Focus:	Mich.	Women,	June	
10-11,	1977:	Final	Report,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.	
		
12	Betty	J.	Blair,	“Klan’s	‘Spies’	Plan	to	Disrupt	Feminist	Parley,”	Detroit	News,	September	
1,	1977.	
	
13	Point	of	View	Transcript,	Elaine	Donnelly,	June	7,	1977,	WJR	Radio,	box	2,	folder:	
ERAmerica	Point	of	View	Broadcasts	Transcripts	(&	Corres.)	1977-1979,	Callow	Papers.	
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participant	 in	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party.	 As	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Women’s	
Republican	 Club	 of	 Grosse	 Pointe,	 Zilly	 was	 an	 activist	 in	 one	 of	 Michigan’s	
conservative	 strongholds.	 She	 led	 the	 1965	 slate	 of	 conservative	 women	
nominated	to	run	the	RWFM	that	was	defeated	when	Peterson	decided	that	she	
wanted	a	moderate	RWFM	board.14	As	the	only	conservative	member	of	the	state	
advisory	 committee,	 Zilly	 claimed	 that	 committee	 leaders	 did	 not	 allow	 her	 to	
meaningfully	participate	in	planning	the	conference.15		
The	 Final	 Report	 of	 the	 Focus:	 Michigan	 Women	 conference	 included	
minority	reports	authored	by	women,	including	Zilly,	who	sought	to	formalize	their	
conclusions	that	the	meeting	was	fundamentally	unfair.	They	made	a	case	that	the	
organizing	committee	had	adopted	processes	and	procedures	intended	to	preclude	
them	from	fully	participating	in	the	state	meeting,	contrary	to	the	federal	enabling	
legislation.	Moreover,	 they	objected	to	the	 fixed,	preselected,	proposed	slate	of	
delegates	 to	 the	 national	 convention.	 While	 delegates	 chose	 Barbour	 and	 Zilly	
																																																						
14	Mrs.	G.	Sam	Zilly	to	Delegate	to	the	Convention	of	the	Republican	Women’s	
Federation	of	Michigan,	September	8,	1965,	box	14,	folder:	Republican	Women’s	Federation	
1965-1967,	Peterson	Papers;	“Romney-Oriented	Faction	in	Women’s	Federation	Control,”	Port	
Huron	Times	Herald,	September	23,	1965,	box	14,	folder:	Republican	Women’s	Federation	
1965-1967,	Peterson	Papers.	
	
15	Patt	Barbour,	International	Women’s	Year	Conference,	Houston,	Texas,	November	19-
21,	1977,	2,	single	folder,	International	Women’s	Year	Conference	Collection,	1977-78,	IWYC	
Papers.	
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along	with	two	other	conservatives,	as	alternate	delegates,	the	roster	of	regular	
delegates	contained	no	conservative	women.	An	alternate	delegate	was	essentially	
an	observer	who	was	allowed	to	participate	only	if	needed	to	replace	an	original	
delegate.	 Thus,	 conservatives	 believed,	 the	 slate	 of	 alternate	 delegates	 was	
designed	 to	 satisfy	 the	 diversity	 requirements	 of	 the	 conference’s	 enabling	
legislation,	 but	 to	 isolate	 those	 representatives	 from	 participating	 in	 the	
conference.	16	
Finally,	 conservative	 women	 asserted	 that	 the	 resolutions	 the	 Michigan	
delegates	carried	to	Houston	did	not	reflect	their	substantive	positions,	including	
opposition	 to	 the	 ERA	 and	 abortion,	 and	 support	 for	 traditional	 families. 17	
According	to	Zilly,	“many	women	were	opposed	to	the	Equal	Rights	Amendment	
and	to	the	Resolution	on	Abortion.	They	wished	to	have	their	views	known.	They	
also	opposed	 the	 Lesbian	Resolution	and	 the	Child	Care	 and	many	other	of	 the	
National	Committee’s	Resolutions.	So	when	the	Majority	Report	reports	that	these	
Resolutions	 were	 approved,	 please	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 they	 were	 vehemently	
																																																						
16	Bernice	Zilly,	Minority	Report	of	Houston’s	I.W.Y.	Conference,	Michigan	Alternate	
Delegate,	1,	single	folder,	International	Women’s	Year	Conference	Collection,	1977-78,	IWYC	
Papers.	
	
17	“Patt	Barbour	Speaks	Out	for	Happiness	of	Womanhood,	Inc.	August,	77,”	box	1,	
folder:	Wohlfield	Happiness	of	Womanhood	Inc.	1973-1983,	Wohlfield	Papers.	
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opposed	by	a	great	number	of	Delegates.”18	One	attendee	commented	that	“their	
(women’s)	progress	is	all	in	the	wrong	direction.	They	refuse	to	have	children–take	
the	 pill–feel	 no	 special	 commitment	 to	 marriage	 and	 family.	 Without	 home,	
marriage	 and	 family,	 nothing	 else	 counts.” 19 	They	 feared	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
Michigan	women	who	thought	like	them	would	not	be	adequately	represented	at	
the	national	conference.20		
Despite	the	issues	raised	about	the	state	conference,	most	of	the	attendees	
were	pleased	with	the	conduct	and	outcomes	of	the	meeting.	The	newly	elected	
delegates	 believed	 that	 they	 would	 become	 a	 part	 of	 history	 at	 the	 national	
conference.	Milliken	 noted	 that	 “this	will	 be	 only	 the	 second	national	women’s	
conference	in	our	nation’s	history.	The	first,	of	course,	was	held	in	Seneca	Falls,	N.Y.	
in	 1848	 and	marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 the	 right	 to	 vote.”21	The	
																																																						
18	Minority	Report	#1,	A	Minority	Report,	Michigan’s	International	Women’s	Year	
Meeting,	Focus:	Michigan	Women,	June	10-11,	1977,	n.d.,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	Files	1969-
1982:	International	Women’s	Year:	Mich.	State	Conf.	Coord.	Committee:	Focus:	Mich.	Women,	
June	10-11,	1977:	Final	Report,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.	
	
19	“Focus:	Michigan	Women,”	Final	Report,	13.	
	
20	Minority	Report	#2,	Views	Solicited,	Rosemary	Hamilton,	June	22,	1977,	Michigan’s	
International	Women’s	Year	Meeting,	Focus:	Michigan	Women,	June	10-11,	1977,	n.d.,	box	5,	
folder:	Topical	Files	1969-1982:	International	Women’s	Year:	Mich.	State	Conf.	Coord.	
Committee:	Focus:	Mich.	Women,	June	10-11,	1977:	Final	Report,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.		
	
21	Press	Release,	Executive	Office,	November	16,	1977,	box	6,	folder:	Topical	Files,	1969-
1982:	International	Women’s	Year	Nat’l	Women’s	Conf.,	Nov.	18-21,	1977:	Miscellaneous,	
Helen	Milliken	Papers.		
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delegates	 to	 the	national	conference,	 including	Michigan’s	Republican	 feminists,	
looked	forward	to	their	trip	to	Houston,	but	Michigan’s	conservative	Republicans,	
angry	and	frustrated,	did	not	share	their	anticipation.		
Michigan’s	conservative	women	were	not	the	only	women	who	felt	that	they	
had	been	marginalized	by	the	IWY	Commission.	Women	from	around	the	country	
believed	that	the	IWY	Commission	advocated	a	feminist	agenda	that	it	intended	to	
promote	through	the	state	meetings	and	the	national	conference.	Critchlow	noted	
that	Schlafly	called	 it	“a	federally	funded	effort	to	rally	support	for	ERA,	publicly	
proclaiming	 it	 ‘a	 front	 for	 radicals	 and	 lesbians.’” 22 	Thus,	 conservative	 women	
decided	to	fight	back	through	the	the	National	Citizens’	Review	Committee	(NCRC).	
Established	as	“an	educational	coalition,”	it	sought	to	encourage	and	assist	women	
who	 opposed	 the	 feminist	 agenda	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 state	 and	 national	
conferences.23	The	NCRC	reached	out	in	particular	to	those	who	might	have	been	
discouraged	 from	 participating	 because	 they	 were	 intimidated	 by	 the	 size	 and	
scope	of	the	series	of	events.	It	also	tried	to	monitor	the	state	meetings	to	make	
																																																						
22	Critchlow,	Phyllis	Schlafly,	244-45.	
	
23	Citizens/Review	Committee	for	I.W.Y.,	News	Memo	#1,	Information	Backgrounder,	
Houston	International	Women’s	Year	Conference,	memorandum,	October	28,	1977,	box	1,	
folder:	Donnelly	Elaine	IWY	Convention-1977-1978,	Donnelly	Papers.	
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sure	that	they	complied	with	the	law.24	In	fact,	the	concerns	of	these	women	were	
justified.	The	Commission	originally	identified	the	passage	of	the	ERA	as	one	of	its	
goals.	 Moreover,	 it	 only	 included	 minimal,	 token	 representation	 from	 the	
conservative	movement.	25		
Before	the	national	conference,	the	NCRC	accelerated	its	efforts	to	protect	
the	 interests	 of	 conservative	 women.	 Donnelly,	 who	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	
organization’s	relationships	with	the	media,	issued	a	memorandum	that	updated	
the	 press	 on	 the	 state	 conferences	 and	 previewed	 their	 concerns	 about	 the	
national	conference.	She	asserted	that	“in	spite	of	promises	made	to	Congress	that	
women	 of	 all	 viewpoints	 on	 the	 issues	 could	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 planning	 of	
Conference	 activities,	 including	workshops	 and	 the	 election	 of	 delegates	 to	 the	
Houston	Conference,	women	opposed	to	the	Equal	Rights	Amendment	and	other	
I.W.Y.	goals	have	been	treated	with	outrageous	unfairness	and	discrimination	at	
every	step	of	the	way.”26	The	pro-feminist	bias	of	the	delegates	selected,	which	was	
reflected	 in	 the	 resolutions	 adopted	 by	 the	 state	 conferences,	 meant	 that	 the	
																																																						
24	Ibid.	
	
25	“The	‘Abzugate’	Scandal–Important	Facts,”	n.d.,	box	1,	folder:	Donnelly,	Elaine	IWY	
Convention-1977-1978,	Donnelly	Papers.	
	
26	News,	Citizens’	Review	Committee	for	I.W.Y.,	October	28,	1977,	box	1,	folder:	
Donnelly,	Elaine	IWY	Convention-1977-1978,	Donnelly	Papers.	
		
232	
findings	and	recommendations	of	the	delegates	at	the	national	conference	would	
reflect	a	similar	lack	of	ideological	diversity.	The	NCRC	attacked	the	Commission’s	
argument	that	their	membership	was	diversified.	“In	typically	disingenuous	fashion,	
I.W.Y.	 Officials	 have	 pointed	 to	 ‘homemakers’	 among	 their	 ranks,	 such	 as	 Ellie	
Smeal,	President	of	the	National	Organization	for	Women,	who	is	hardly	a	woman	
that	most	homemakers	would	identify	with,	or	choose	as	a	representative.	It	is	an	
insult	to	women	to	imply	that	one’s	views	on	the	issues	can	be	assumed	by	one’s	
religion,	income,	occupation,	race,	or	similar	characteristics.”27	
Donnelly	 and	 other	 leaders	 of	 the	 NCRC	 alleged	 that	 some	 of	 the	 state	
conferences	 adopted	 a	 plan,	 called	 the	 “Monitoring	 and	 Mobile	 Operation	
Partnership	Program,”	(MMOPP),	with	the	assistance	of	the	NWPC.	They	believed	
that	there	was	a	connection	between	the	IWY	Commission	and	the	NWPC	because	
twelve	 leaders	 of	 the	 NWPC	 were	 at	 one	 time	 on	 the	 IWY	 Commission.	 This	
program,	 “a	 systematic	 campaign	 of	 artifice	 and	 trickery,”	 was	 developed,	
according	to	conservative	women,	“to	rig	the	voting	in	workshops	at	the	state	and	
national	I.W.Y.	Conferences.”28	The	plan	was	relatively	straightforward.	A	monitor	
																																																						
27	“The	‘Abzugate’	Scandal–Important	Facts.”	
	
28	Operation	M.M.O.P.P.-A	Blueprint	for	Fraud,”	International	Women’s	Year	Citizens’	
Review	Committee,	September	14,	1977,	box	1,	folder:	Donnelly,	Elaine	IWY	Convention-1977-
1978,	Donnelly	Papers.	
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attended	every	break-out	workshop	or	meeting	to	read	the	room	and	identify	the	
positions	of	attendees.	If	the	majority	of	attendees	were	opposed	to	the	feminist	
position	on	that	topic,	the	monitor	brought	in	additional	women,	called	“floaters,”	
to	 outvote	 those	 who	 opposed	 the	 feminists.29 	The	 Michigan	 Citizens’	 Review	
Committee,	 the	Michigan	affiliate	of	 the	NCRC,	must	have	anticipated	problems	
like	this	when	it	recommended	that	Michigan’s	conservative	women	tape	record	
their	 sessions	 and	 avoid	 congregating	 in	 large	 groups	 at	 their	 state	 meeting.30	
Conservative	women	believed	that	the	feminists	did	not	speak	for	most	women,	
were	engaged	in	a	coordinated	effort	to	silence	them,	and	had	a	similar	plan	for	
the	national	conference.		
Feminists	 who	 supported	 the	 MMOPP	 believed	 that	 they	 were	 the	 true	
representatives	of	American	women.	 They,	 like	 conservative	women,	 saw	 these	
meetings	 as	 individual	 battlegrounds	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	 feminist	 movement,	
which,	 in	their	opinion,	 justified	the	tactics	they	adopted.	Peterson	worried	that	
Schlafly	would	disrupt	the	IWY	meetings.	She	lamented	that	“somehow	it	has	got	
																																																						
29	Ibid.	
	
30	“Instructions	for	IWY	Conference	in	Michigan,”	International	Women’s	Year	Citizens’	
Review	Committee,	box	20,	folder:	National	Women’s	Conference,	Memoranda	&	
Correspondence	1977-78,	Peterson	Papers.		
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to	be	put	across	that	Phyllis	has	trained	her	members	 in	sabotage	of	a	meeting,	
disruption,	etc.–and,	instead	of	coming	to	these	meetings	and	taking	part,	they	are	
coming	for	this	purpose	along	[sic].”31	The	MMOPP	was	intended	to	stop	Schlafly	
by	“prevent[ing]	a	minority	faction	from	taking	over	a	committee	or	workshop	and	
passing	out	a	resolution	which	did	not	represent	the	majority	opinion	of	conference	
women.”32	Feminists	used	the	MMOPP	successfully	in	Arizona	against	Schlafly	who	
tried	to	influence	the	outcome	of	the	abortion	and	ERA	workshops.	As	one	leader	
from	Arizona	wrote	to	the	NWPC,	“if	the	conservatives	packed	any	workshop	that	
woman	 [the	monitor]	 quietly	 left,	 went	 to	 a	 central	 location–word	was	 quickly	
passed	 and	 quietly	 people	 moved	 into	 the	 packed	 workshop–thus	 when	 a	
resolution	came	to	a	vote,	we	had	the	majority.”33	While	some	feminists	objected	
to	the	MMOPP	because	“our	tactics	were	too	blunt	and	maybe	even	unfair,”	others	
argued	“I’m	tired	of	being	a	‘good	sport’	and	losing.	NEVER	GIVE	YOUR	ENEMY	AN	
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EVEN	BREAK.	This	philosophy	still	has	difficulties	for	many	good-hearted	women.”34	
Feminists	rationalized	their	tactics	because	the	ends	justified	the	means.	The	future	
of	feminism	depended	on	it.	
The	NCRC	also	used	the	courts	and	legislative	hearings	to	argue	that	the	IWY	
Commission	improperly	allocated	its	appropriated	budget	to	lobbying,	contrary	to	
legislative	 intent.	 Conservative	 women	 filed	 a	 number	 of	 unsuccessful	 lawsuits	
challenging	the	use	of	 this	 federal	money.	The	NCRC	noted	that	“these	complex	
legal	 actions	 were	 filed	 for	 the	 plaintiffs	 by	 Attorney	 J.	 Fred	 Schlafly	 [Phyllis	
Schlafly’s	husband]	on	a	volunteer	basis.	However,	the	I.W.Y.	Commission	has	had	
the	benefit	of	extensive	legal	services	from	the	U.S.	Department	of	Justice.	This	is	
just	another	example	of	how	private	citizens	have	been	forced	to	compete	with	
huge	amounts	of	government	money	being	used	to	promote	the	interests	of	pro-
ERA	forces.”35	Senator	Jesse	Helms	presided	over	legislative	hearings	convened	in	
response	to	complaints	from	many	women	who	argued	that	their	state	meetings	
																																																						
34	Elly	Anderson,	“Monitoring	and	Mobile	Operation	Partnership	Program	(MMOPP),”	
June	10,	1977.	
	
35	“The	‘Abzugate’	Scandal–Important	Facts.”	
	
		
236	
did	 not	 comply	 with	 federal	 legislative	 requirements,	 but	 IWY	 Commission	
members	did	not	attend	or	respond	to	these	allegations.36		
To	 protect	 women,	 the	 imperial	 wizard	 of	 the	 KKK	 claimed	 that	 his	
organization	sent	representatives	from	its	female	auxiliary,	covertly	if	necessary,	to	
participate	 in	 state	 IWY	meetings,	 and	 planned	 to	 do	 the	 same	 at	 the	 national	
meeting.	He	attacked	“the	women’s	movement	as	a	haven	for	 ‘all	 the	misfits	of	
society,	 including	self-admitted	 lesbians,’”	and	made	 it	clear	that	the	KKK	would	
send	male	members	to	the	national	IWY	Conference	to	protect	“decent”	women	
from	these	sexual	predators.37	Anti-feminists	who	objected	to	the	IWY	conference,	
including	STOP	ERA,	HOW	and	the	NCRC,	denied	that	they	had	any	ties	to	the	KKK.	
But	their	hatred	of	the	lesbians	who	they	claimed	appropriated	the	IWY	program	
mirrored	that	of	the	KKK.	Schlafly	explained	that	the	anti-feminist	activists	were	not	
very	successful	in	putting	more	of	their	representatives	on	the	Illinois	delegation	to	
the	conference	in	Houston	because	“our	women	didn’t	want	to	leave	their	families	
for	an	entire	weekend	and	spend	 it	with	a	groups	 [sic]	of	 lesbians.	They’re	very	
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offensive	 to	 us.” 38 	The	 efforts	 by	 the	 various	 groups	 opposed	 to	 the	 IWY	
Conference	did	nothing	to	bridge	the	gaping	divide	between	the	feminists	and	anti-
feminists	and	did	not	stop	the	national	convention.		
Almost	 fifteen	 hundred	 delegates	 and	 nineteen	 thousand	 nonparticipant	
observers	 attended	 the	 IWY	 Conference	 in	 Houston	 from	 November	 18	 to	 21,	
1977.39	On	Friday	night,	 a	party	atmosphere	prevailed	as	 four	 thousand	people,	
including	Roslyn	Carter	and	Betty	Ford,	the	wives	of	President	Jimmy	Carter	and	
former	President	Gerald	Ford,	and	Coretta	Scott	King,	the	widow	of	slain	civil	rights	
leader	 Martin	 Luther	 King,	 Jr.,	 attended	 a	 cocktail	 party	 at	 which	 they	 raised	
$100,000	 to	 support	 efforts	 to	 ratify	 the	 ERA.	 The	 historic	 significance	 of	 the	
meeting	was	apparent	the	next	morning	when	three	young	girls	delivered	a	torch	
that	had	been	carried	from	Seneca	Falls,	New	York,	to	the	conference	in	Houston.	
Accompanied	by	an	all	girl	drum	and	bugle	corps,	they	passed	the	torch	to	Carter	
and	Ford,	as	well	as	Ladybird	Johnson,	wife	of	former	president	Lyndon	Johnson,	
and	the	head	of	the	commission	that	organized	the	conference,	Democrat	Barbara	
Jordon.	Jean	Stapleton	was	also	present.	An	actress	who	played	Edith	Bunker,	the	
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wife	and	oftentimes	target	of	the	sexist	and	racist	rants	of	her	television	husband,	
Archie	 Bunker,	 on	 the	 hit	 sitcom	All	 in	 the	 Family,	 Stapleton	was	 an	 active	 and	
visible	proponent	of	equal	rights	for	women.40	As	an	icon	of	American	pop	culture	
at	 the	 time,	 she	 represented	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 feminist	 movement	 and	
symbolized	its	cultural	immersion	into	the	lives	of	average	Americans.		
On	Saturday	afternoon	and	Sunday,	the	real	substance	of	the	meeting	began	
as	 delegates	 debated	 and	 approved	 the	 twenty-five	 resolutions	 that	 were	
ultimately	 combined	 into	 a	 National	 Plan	 of	 Action	 for	 America’s	 women.	 The	
conference	 endorsed	 ratification	 of	 the	 ERA,	 affirmed	 support	 for	 reproductive	
rights	for	all	women,	and	recommended	sex	education	for	all	students,	even	those	
in	elementary	school.	Conference	attendees	also	approved	government	assistance	
for	battered	women	and	abused	children,	asserting	that	“elimination	of	violence	in	
the	home	[should]	be	a	national	goal.”41	Peterson	noted	that	with	one	exception,	
some	delegates	opposed	every	resolution,42	which	seemed	to	indicate	to	her	that	
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attendees	considered	the	positions	of	all	women	and	adopted	a	fair	and	balanced	
decision-making	process.		
Perhaps	the	most	controversial	resolution	called	on	women	to	support	gay	
rights.	 The	 conferees,	 moved	 by	 the	 activism	 of	 the	 lesbians	 in	 attendance,	
endorsed	the	elimination	of	all	discrimination	based	on	sexual	preference.43	At	the	
conference,	it	became	apparent	that	some	feminists	had	shifted	their	positions	on	
this	issue.	Betty	Friedan,	for	example,	had	always	argued	that	the	ERA	had	to	be	
passed	before	feminists	could	focus	on	other,	more	potentially	controversial	issues,	
such	as	sexual	preference,	that	might	be	used	to	generate	opposition	to	the	ERA.	
During	the	conference,	however,	she	announced	her	support	for	lesbian	rights.44	
Burnett	 was	 pleased	 with	 the	 resolution	 and	 indicated	 that	 “those	 divisions	
[between	feminists	based	on	sexual	preference]	ended	forever	in	Houston,	where	
the	 entire	 body	made	 it	 clear	 that	 lesbians	 are	 our	 sisters	 and	 should	 join	 us–
something	 that	was	a	buoyant,	uplifting,	 truly	beautiful	experience.”45	Alternate	
delegate	Zilly	noted	that	while	all	of	the	representatives	from	Michigan	voted	for	
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the	other	 resolutions,	“six	or	eight	Michigan	delegates	did	not	approve	 this	one	
resolution	[on	sexual	preference].”46	Barbour	was	surprised	that	both	Milliken	and	
Burnett	voted	for	the	resolution	supporting	gay	rights.47	
The	feminist	delegates	believed	that,	as	required	by	law,	the	attendees	and	
the	plan	that	they	adopted	reflected	and	represented	the	interests	of	all	American	
women.	Most	 accounts	 of	 the	meeting	 indicated	 that	 about	 20	 percent	 of	 the	
attendees	were	conservatives	who	opposed	feminist	control	of	the	meeting.48	The	
majority	 of	 the	 delegates,	 including	 Peterson,	 viewed	 these	 women	 as	
obstructionists,	“led	by	State	Sen.	(Indiana)	Joan	Gubbins,	who	changed	her	outfits	
so	often	she	must	have	brought	a	dozen	suitcases–and	she	was	identified	by	her	
hat:	huge,	with	a	bright	orange	 long	plume.	She	held	at	her	 seat	 two	 flags–one	
yellow,	one	black,	which	she	used	to	signal	the	delegates	across	the	hall	such	as	
Mississippi,	how	to	vote,	when	to	sit,	etc.”49	Later	Peterson	joked	that	“in	a	suit	of	
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armor	 with	 that	 hat	 she	 could	 have	 ridden	 to	 war	 behind	 King	 Richard!”50 	By	
focusing	 on	 her	 appearance,	 Peterson	 used	 the	 ploy	 of	 many	 of	 Michigan’s	
journalists	 to	 delegitimize	 Gubbins	 and	 her	 message.	 How	 could	 she	 be	 taken	
seriously	 if	 she	was	 so	 flamboyant?	Moreover,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 she	directed	
conservative	women	with	two	flags	impugned	their	intelligence	and	independence	
by	implying	that	they	were	not	able	to	think	on	their	own.	
A	second,	simultaneous	conference,	organized	by	conservative	women	and	
endorsed	by	the	Eagle	Forum,	was	held	at	the	Houston	Astrodome	on	Saturday,	
November	 19.	 According	 to	 some	 attendees,	 there	were	 approximately	 twenty	
thousand	women	at	this	meeting.51	Many	of	them	were	also	delegates	or	alternate	
delegates	to	the	IWY	Conference	who	disagreed	with	most	of	the	assessments	of	
their	feminist	counterparts	about	the	national	conference.	Peterson	indicated	that	
these	conservative	women	met	“to	pray	and	to	castigate	those	at	the	Conference.	
Most	had	arrived	by	church	busses	 from	Texas	and	surrounding	states.	 In	direct	
contrast	 to	 the	 Coliseum	where	 there	was	 no	 name	 calling	 or	 outward	 signs	 of	
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disrespect,	this	group	concentrated	on	calling	the	delegates	and	observers,	‘sick’	
‘lesbians’	‘unpatriotic’	‘antiChrist.’”52		
Michigan’s	 alternate	 delegates,	 with	 Schlafly	 at	 least	 in	 spirit	 at	 her	
alternative	 meeting,	 remained	 convinced	 that	 conservative	 women	 had	 been	
marginalized	 by	 those	 who	 were	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 conference.	 As	 alternate	
delegates	 they	 witnessed,	 but	 could	 not	 speak	 against,	 the	 feminist	 agenda	
adopted	 at	 the	 conference.53	As	 a	 result,	 both	 Zilly	 and	Barbour	wrote	 scathing	
minority	 reports	 about	 the	 national	 conference.	 Zilly	 called	 the	 meeting	 “an	
agonizing	experience	for	me	.	.	.	the	most	highly	‘orchestrated’	gathering	which	I	
had	ever	attended.”54	It	was	an	event,	she	believed,	constructed	as	a	propaganda	
tool	for	the	feminists	because	“the	primary	effort	of	the	whole	Conference	seemed	
to	be	to	impress	upon	the	press,	all	media	and	the	State	Legislatures	who	have	not	
already	approved	the	E.R.A.	that	ALL	WOMEN	OF	THE	UNITED	STATES	INSIST	THAT	
E.R.A.	MUST	BE	PASSED.	Anyone	who	disagreed	with	that	thought	was	considered	
‘The	Enemy’	 and	was	 treated	as	 such.”55	She	disputed	Peterson’s	 assertion	 that	
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delegates	were	diverse	and	from	all	segments	of	society.56	According	to	Zilly,	“only	
about	 5%	 of	 all	 delegates	 on	 the	 floor	 were	 the	 ‘Enemy’”	 who	 opposed	 the	
conference’s	 feminist	 agenda.57	She	 believed	 that	 the	 national	 conference	 was	
operated	much	like	the	Michigan	meeting.	Those	who	opposed	the	Commission’s	
agenda	 were	 effectively	 precluded	 from	 participating	 by	 the	 processes	 and	
procedures	adopted	to	control	the	sessions.	Her	conclusion	to	her	Minority	Report	
reflected	her	frustration	and	anger.	She	wrote,	“it	was	an	orchestrated	Conference	
very	effectively.	I	OBJECTED	but	I	had	no	way	to	express	my	feelings	except	to	tell	
it	to	you.”58		
Barbour	believed	 that	 the	national	 conference	was	as	pro-feminist,	which	
meant	 pro-ERA,	 pro-abortion	 and	 anti-family,	 as	 the	 state	 meeting.	 She,	 in	
particular,	 cast	 aspersions	 on	 the	 feminist	 participants	 as	 she	 stressed	 the	
radicalism	 of	 the	 attendees,	 detailed	 their	 aggressive	 behavior,	 and	 generally	
mocked	the	proceedings.	The	radical	publications	available	at	the	conference	that	
not	only	endorsed	radical	feminism	and	abortion	rights,	but	also	lesbianism	and	the	
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legalization	of	prostitution,	offended	Barbour.	Pamphlets	also	promoted	socialism,	
communism,	and	union	activism.	In	a	particularly	negative	attack,	Barbour	noted	
that	 the	 conservative	delegates	 from	Michigan	 chose	a	 separate	hotel	 from	 the	
feminists	because	“the	strong	sexual	preference	(Gay	Rights)	resolution	which	the	
feminists	support	caused	us	to	feel	hesitant	about	leaving	to	chance	the	picking	out	
of	our	roommates	by	the	IWY	Planning	Commission.”59		
According	 to	 Barbour,	 the	 pro-feminist	 majority	 began	 their	 efforts	 to	
obstruct	 conservative	women	at	 the	 airport.	 She	 related	 that	 “under	 the	bright	
television	lights	the	feminists	began	chanting,	‘ERA	Now’	in	loud	raucous	voices	and	
held	clenched	fists	high.	Members	of	HOW,	Inc.	then	brought	out	a	huge	pink	cloth	
banner	that	read,	‘Stop	ERA’.	When	the	cameras	seemed	to	focus	on	this	banner,	
the	feminists	tried	to	stand	in	front	of	it	to	hide	it,	but	because	of	its	size	this	was	
impossible.	Their	disapproving	faces	showed	their	dismay.”60	Their	obstructionism	
became	violent	“when	the	torch	was	carried	the	last	few	yards	to	the	Conference	
Center	 [and]	a	 lone	man	there	 [who]	protested	the	 IWY	with	a	sign	which	read,	
‘IWY	 Means	 Immoral	 Women’s	 Year’	 was	 roughed	 up,	 his	 clothes	 torn	 by	 the	
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feminists,	 and	 when	 we	 saw	 him	 he	 had	 an	 ugly	 red	 scratch	 on	 his	 cheek.”61	
According	 to	 Barbour,	 the	 feminists	 intended	 to	 block	 the	 message	 of	 their	
opponents,	using	violence	if	necessary.	
Barbour	had	a	strongly	negative	reaction	to	the	overall	meeting,	noting	that	
“when	the	80%	feminist	delegation	and	the	feminist	guests	began	chanting	‘ERA	
Now’	and	as	they	began	to	get	louder	and	louder,	I	could	not	help	but	be	reminded	
of	film	clips	of	vast	crowds	gathered	in	Nazi	Germany	when	Hitler	spoke	and	their	
shout,	‘Seig	Heil,	Seig	Heil’	with	arms	raised	in	the	Nazi	salute.	I	wonder	how	many	
other	 spectators	got	 the	 same	 flashback.”62	Ironically,	while	 the	 feminists	at	 the	
conference	 connected	 the	 protesters	 to	 the	 Nazis,	 the	 protesters	 accused	 the	
feminists	of	using	Nazi	techniques	during	the	conference.	Barbour	also	disagreed	
with	 Peterson	 that	 the	 meeting	 was	 orderly.	 She	 wrote	 that	 “after	 the	 ERA	
resolution	 passed,	 I	 was	 overwhelmed	 by	 the	 loud	 stamping,	 applauding	 and	
shouting	that	was	heard.	A	snake	dance	wound	in	a	disorderly	fashion	around	the	
floor	of	the	coliseum.	Since	80%	of	the	delegates	were	of	 like	mind,	 I	wondered	
why	they	acted	as	if	they	had	just	won	a	tremendous	victory.	After	all,	they	were	
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holding	 all	 the	 aces,	 so	 who	 could	 stop	 them?” 63 	She	 was	 disturbed	 that	
“thunderous	 applause	 and	 shouting	 and	 cheering	 broke	 out”	 after	 conference	
attendees	endorsed	expansive	abortion	rights	for	all	women.64	She	wrote	that	“it	
was	unreal	to	see	this	carnival	atmosphere	after	the	abortion	rights	issue	passed.	I	
felt	kind	of	sick	about	then.”65	After	the	vote	on	sexual	preference,	she	noted	that	
“the	Lesbians	took	over	the	IWY	Conference.”66	
The	feminist	attendees	left	Houston	feeling	unified	and	optimistic	about	the	
future	of	the	women’s	movement,	and	they	deemed	it	a	success.67	Journalist	Lucy	
Komisar,	who	reported	on	the	IWY	Conference,	wrote	that	“the	significance	of	the	
Houston	Conference	is	that,	under	the	neutral	sponsorship	of	the	government,	and	
through	 the	 elected	 delegates	 and	 delegates	 at	 large,	 it	 gathered	 the	 major	
women’s	organizations	and	made	it	possible	for	them	to	approve	a	comprehensive	
national	political	program	that	belongs	equally	to	all	of	them,	because	it	was	not	
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proposed	by	any	one	of	them.”68	Milliken	called	it	a	life-changing	event.	She	wrote	
that	personally	she	felt	“a	unity	among	women	has	been	forged	and	that	it	will	be	
an	 indestructible	one.	What	an	experience	to	be	 in	the	midst	of	women	coming	
together	from	all	races	and	stations	in	life	to	‘consider	the	barriers’	and	set	goals	
to	remove	them.	And	the	remarkable	spirit	in	which	this	was	done,	the	sharing	and	
the	 caring.	 It	was	one	of	 the	 great	 experiences	of	my	 life.”69	The	attendees	 felt	
empowered	by	the	fact	that	they	were	not	alone,	but	had	grievances	and	concerns	
in	common	with	women	from	around	the	country.	Anything	was	possible	when	all	
of	these	women	chose	to	work	together.	
The	 meeting	 not	 only	 unified,	 but	 also	 politicized	 the	 feminists	 who	
participated	 in	 the	multiday	 event.	 They	 believed	 that	 they	were	 a	 part	 of	 the	
process	 and	 returned	 home	 excited	 to	 implement	 the	 National	 Plan	 of	 Action.	
Peterson	 commented	 on	 the	 order	 and	 propriety	 with	 which	 the	 attendees	
conducted	themselves	as	“hundreds	of	the	women	for	the	first	time	were	involved	
in	 political	 decisions–and	 they	 took	 to	 the	 action	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 observers	
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realized	no	more	would	they	be	content	to	make	the	coffee,	stamp	the	envelopes	
and	clean	 the	office”	and,	according	 to	Peterson,	 it	was	all	witnessed	by	over	a	
thousand	 journalists. 70 	Milliken	 believed	 that	 it	 would	 change	 the	 women’s	
movement	because	 “women’s	 issues	have	not	only	been	 solidified	and	defined,	
but	 .	 .	 .	 the	political	 process	 at	 every	 level	will	 begin	 to	 feel	 their	 impact,	 from	
Congress	down	to	the	state	and	local	level.”71	The	meeting	introduced	women	to	
the	 political	 process	 in	 the	ways	 that	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 had	 long	
advocated.72		
The	feminists	who	participated	in	the	IWY	conference	eagerly	embraced	the	
National	 Plan	 of	 Action.	 Ironically,	 however,	 the	 meeting	 also	 energized	
conservative	women.	As	Spruill	observed,	“the	success	of	the	feminist	 leaders	 in	
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gaining	this	mandate	from	two	presidents	and	from	Congress	to	hold	these	 IWY	
conferences	served	to	galvanize	the	opposition,	to	politicize	social	conservatives,	
and	 to	 aid	 Phyllis	 Schlafly	 and	 her	 associates	 in	 expanding	 the	 single-issue	
movement	against	the	ERA	into	a	more	enduring,	profoundly	antifeminist,	and–in	
her	 words—‘Pro-Family	 movement.’”73	These	 women	 left	 the	 conference	more	
committed	and	united	than	ever	 in	their	opposition	to	 feminism,	and	they	were	
able	to	use	the	National	Plan	of	Action	to	persuade	others	to	join	their	cause.74	
While	 the	 IWY	 conference	 helped	 conservative	 women	 organize	 against	
feminism,	 it	 also	 provided	 them	with	 support	 in	 their	 battle	 for	 control	 of	 the	
Republican	 Party.	 Conference	 proceedings	 gave	 them	 the	 evidence	 that	 they	
needed	to	characterize	Republican	feminists	as	radical.	Attendees	at	the	meeting,	
including	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists,	adopted	a	feminist	agenda	that	included	
more	than	their	traditional	support	for	the	ERA	and	abortion.	They	had	expanded	
their	understanding	of	feminism	to	include	a	woman’s	right	to	freely	choose	her	
sexual	 partners.	 By	 endorsing	 homosexuality,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	
provided	their	conservative	opposition	with	ammunition	to	argue	that	they	were	
no	longer	at	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	movement.	Once	they	abandoned	
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this	middle	ground,	it	became	more	difficult	for	them	to	argue	to	their	moderate	
partisan	colleagues	that	they	were	the	reasonable	representatives	of	women	in	the	
party	 and	 the	 logical	 mediators	 between	 moderate	 Republicans	 and	 radical	
feminists.	They	lost	some	of	their	legitimacy	in	the	battle	between	conservative	and	
moderate	Republicans.		
One	of	those	who	used	the	IWY	Conference	against	the	feminists,	including	
Republican	 feminists,	 was	 long-time	 moderate	 Republican	 George	 Romney.	
Feminists	had	always	feared	that	ERA’s	opponents	would	connect	the	ERA	to	other,	
more	controversial	issues	to	bolster	their	arguments	against	the	ERA.	In	December	
1979	Romney,	a	leader	in	the	Mormon	church,	validated	their	concerns	by	invoking	
the	proceedings	at	the	IWY	Conference	to	connect	homosexuality	to	the	ERA.75	He	
objected	to	homosexuality	because	he	believed	that	homosexuals	were	“morally	
perverted.”76	He	reiterated,	“I	said	that	and	I	meant	it.	The	Bible	makes	perfectly	
clear	 that	 adultery,	 fornication,	 homosexuality	 and	 lesbianism	 are	 immoral.” 77	
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These	 relationships	 destroyed	 the	 traditional	 family. 78 	Romney	 believed	 that	
lesbians	supported	the	ERA	because	“they	hope[d]	its	adoption	would	legitimate	
their	immoral	relationships	and	behavior.”79	As	a	result,	the	ERA	had	to	be	defeated.	
He	 told	 Laura	 Callow	 that	 “Gloria	 Stienem	 [sic],	 Betty	 Friedan	 have	 made	 it	
abundantly	clear	that	their	objective	is	to	destroy	marriage,	family,	parent	raising	
of	 children,	 conjugal	 love	 etc.	 O,	 now	 they	 are	moderating	 these	 objectives	 to	
secure	 the	 home-maker’s	 support.” 80 	Thus,	 he	 argued,	 radical	 feminists	 were	
engaged	 in	a	deliberate	effort	 to	 ratify	 the	ERA	 in	order	 to	use	 it	 to	as	cover	 to	
accomplish	their	more	radical	causes.		
Lenore	 Romney	 sided	 with	 her	 husband	 on	 the	 ERA.	 Adamant	 that	 the	
Mormon	Church	believed	in	equality	for	women,	she	argued,	nevertheless,	that	it	
could	 not	 support	 the	 ERA.	 While	 she	 shared	 George	 Romney’s	 opposition	 to	
homosexuality,	she	also	tied	the	ERA	to	legalized	abortion.	In	a	letter	to	Peterson,	
she	wrote	that	“most	 feminists	ERA	supports	approve	abortion	on	demand,	and	
while	I	do	not	quarrel	with	the	idea	that	a	woman	should	be	able	to	determine	what	
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she	should	do	under	certain	conditions,	still	I	abhor	the	attitude	I	find	on	the	college	
campuses	I	visit	where	abortion	is	used	as	a	birth	control	method.	I	do	know	that	
life	is	present	in	pregnancy	and	that	destroying	that	life–which	is	against	the	very	
ultimate	 function	 of	 nature	 [sic].” 81 	Anticipating	 that	 Peterson	 would	 try	 to	
delegitimize	the	Romneys	by	arguing	that	they	were	relying	on	the	assertions	and	
positions	 of	 radical	 feminists	 to	 support	 their	 position,	 Lenore	 cited	 statements	
recently	made	by	Helen	Milliken	“that	the	Mormon	church,	the	communist	and	the	
Klu	[sic]	Klux	Klan	were	obstructing	ERA.	Classifying	our	church	with	communists	
and	KKK	had	many	inflamed.”82	The	Romneys	believed	that	the	ERA	was	so	broadly	
drafted	that	 it	could	ultimately	be	used	to	 justify	what	they	considered	 immoral	
behavior	 and	 to	 outlaw	 legitimate	 distinctions	 in	 treatment	 between	 men	 and	
women.83		
The	 arguments	 made	 by	 the	 Romneys	 were	 consistent	 with	 all	 of	 the	
longstanding	arguments	made	by	conservative	Republicans,	especially	Schlafly	and	
Donnelly,	against	the	ERA.	They	were	particularly	impactful,	however,	because	of	
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George	Romney’s	 legitimacy	as	 an	elder	 statesman	of	moderate	Republicanism.	
Now,	after	the	IWY	Conference,	he	had	what	he	believed	was	a	tangible	basis	for	
linking	homosexuality	to	the	ERA.		
Despite	the	fact	that	this	position	aligned	them	with	the	conservatives	in	the	
Republican	Party	and	put	them	at	odds	with	many	of	their	 longtime	friends,	the	
Romneys	refused	to	change	their	views.	George	Romney	made	it	clear	that	he	did	
not	mean	 to	 imply	 that	all	 supporters	of	 the	ERA	were	“moral	perverts.”84	They	
were	particularly	bothered	that	their	opposition	to	the	ERA	hurt	Peterson.	Lenore	
Romney	wrote	to	her	that	“I	do	not	apologize	for	what	I	am–for	that	it	is	my	identity	
as	a	child	of	God–but	I	do	apologize	for	offending	you–The	scriptures	tell	us	that	
offences	will	 come,	but	woe	 to	 them	by	who	 they	 come.	Woe	 is	me.”85	George	
Romney	also	tried	to	justify	his	position	to	Peterson.	He	wrote	to	her	that	“we	did	
not	take	our	position	lightly	or	just	because	of	the	church.	I	was	burned	once	before	
(Vietnam)	by	taking	a	position	I	had	to	change	because	I	hadn’t	studied	the	problem	
thoroughly	 first.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 E.R.A.	 I	 carefully	 researched	 the	 issue	 first,	 and	
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weighted	all	the	points	you	make.	I	could	respond	to	them	but	there	is	no	point	in	
doing	so	because	I’m	sure	your	position	is	one	you	believe	is	right.”86	He	also	made	
it	clear	that	while	some	of	the	advocates	of	the	ERA	had	good	intentions,	“I	have	
learned	 from	 sad	 experience	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 following	 statement	 ‘honorable	
intentions	often	deteriorate	into	shameful	circumstances;	the	singular	good	often	
evolves	into	plural	abominations.’”87	
Because	 of	 her	 longstanding	 friendship	 with	 the	 Romneys.	 Peterson	 felt	
particularly	betrayed,	although	she	should	not	have	been	surprised.	Earlier,	Lenore	
Romney	wrote	to	Peterson	that	“the	homos	and	lesbians	are	the	main	reason	for	
opposition	[by	the	Mormon	Church	to	ERA]	for	they	believe	the	next	step	after	ERA	
will	 be	 acceptance	 of	 family	 unions	 of	 homos–with	 further	 deterioration	 of	 the	
sacred	 relationship	 of	 marriage	 as	 an	 institution.”88 	Peterson’s	 feminist	 friends	
tried	to	help	her	deal	with	the	Romneys’	statements.	Callow	offered	Peterson	both	
sympathy	and	humor.	“I’m	glad	I	was	able	to	make	you	laugh	by	sending	you	a	copy	
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of	Gloria	Steinem’s	remarks	about	‘Ayotolla	Romney.’	My	heart	has	ached	for	you.	
I	had	always	admired	the	Romneys	from	a	distance.	I	still	felt	a	personal	sense	of	
betrayal.	For	you,	a	close	friend	for	years,	it	must	be	devastating.”89	Helen	Milliken	
tried	to	provide	some	advice	on	how	to	deal	with	her	anger	without	completely	
destroying	the	long-standing	relationship	she	had	with	the	Romneys.	“I	do	have	a	
fairly	 good	 idea	 how	 traumatic	 this	 experience	 has	 been	 for	 you,	 because	 the	
element	of	past	friendship	enters	in.	My	relationship	with	them	has	been	far	less	
personal.	However,	it	does	occur	to	me	that	even	your	silence	would	be	a	strong	
message.	But	perhaps	one	good	blast	(BLAST)	would	be	more	cleansing,	and	even	
less	destructive	of	a	friendship.”90	
Peterson	was	bothered	not	only	by	what	she	saw	as	a	personal	rejection;	she	
was	also	concerned	that	the	Romneys’	position	reflected	a	growing	movement	in	
opposition	 to	 the	 ERA. 91 	She	 wrote	 to	 Helen	 Milliken,	 “but	 oh	 Lord,	 am	 I	
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scared?!!” 92 	By	 1979,	 she	 was	 convinced	 that	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 women’s	
movement	 was	 organized,	 well	 funded,	 and	 a	 politically	 connected,	 growing	
component	 of	 the	 Republican	 Party. 93 	Moreover,	 she	 was	 disgusted	 that	 ERA	
supporters	 seemed	unwilling	 to	 take	any	action	 to	promote	 their	positions.	 She	
wrote,	“I	tell	you	frankly	Helen	I	get	a	little	tired	of	everyone	being	FOR	ERA	but	
unable	to	sit	down	and	do	something	about	it--such	as	in	this	instance,	write	a	letter.	
So	be	it.”94	Helen	Milliken,	however,	was	an	eternal	optimist.	She	disagreed	with	
Peterson,	writing	to	her,	“Elly,	I	do	believe	you	are	wrong	when	you	say	that	people	
no	longer	have	any	passion	for	this	issue.	I	see	new	fires	being	kindled	all	along	the	
way,	and	the	sparks	set	off	by	this	Romney	ruckus	will	help	the	cause–if	we	can	
avoid	being	overcome	by	some	of	the	smoke	along	the	way.	The	cause	is	right,	the	
principle	 is	 just,	and	I	do	trust	 in	God–She	will	provide.”95	Michigan’s	Republican	
feminists	found	it	difficult	to	respond	to	the	Romneys’	arguments	because	they	saw	
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them	as	personal	attacks,	but	also	because	they	believed	 that	 their	attempts	 to	
radicalize	the	ERA	were	both	irrelevant	and	inaccurate.96		
Despite	 the	 elation	 with	 which	 feminists	 left	 the	 IWY	 Conference,	 the	
National	Plan	of	Action	adopted	at	the	meeting,	especially	its	support	for	lesbians,	
had	unintended	consequences	 for	Michigan’s	Republican	 feminists.	At	 the	 time,	
Peterson	 was	 convinced	 that	 feminists	 had	 sent	 a	 powerful	 message	 to	
conservative	 women.	 The	 unity	 of	 the	 women	 who	 attended	 the	 Houston	
conference,	she	wrote,	“could	not	be	 lost	on	the	frightened	right	wing	who	had	
spent	vast	sums	of	money–first,	to	take	over	the	state	meetings	and	then,	 in	an	
attempt	to	destroy	the	value	of	the	Houston	Conference.”97	But	McNamee	seemed	
to	sense	this	shift	and	the	danger	it	posed	to	the	politics	of	the	Republican	feminists.	
She	wrote	that	“for	me,	this	one	[sexual	preference]	represented	an	idea	whose	
time	has	not	come,	but	I’m	in	the	political	arena	and	I’m	not	looking	for	any	more	
issues	than	we	already	have	in	1978.”98	While	there	is	no	record	of	how	she	voted	
on	this	resolution,	presumably	she	was	one	of	the	few	who	opposed	it.	It	appeared	
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to	push	her	beyond	what	 she	had	 traditionally	been	willing	 to	endorse,	but	 she	
blamed	her	reluctance	on	the	pragmatics	of	politics.		
Eventually,	 even	 Peterson	 came	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 IWY	 Conference	
contributed	to	the	defeat	of	the	ERA.		
I	 believe,	 in	 retrospect,	 our	 problems	 began	 to	mount	 in	 Houston.	
Most	of	us	thought	that	it	would	be	a	plus	for	the	women’s	movement	
and,	of	course,	in	many	ways	it	was.	But	in	terms	of	the	ERA,	it	gave	
new	impetus	to	the	anti	group.	On	the	plus	side	we	came	out	of	the	
convention	with	many	new	groups	pro-ERA	and	many	new	faces.	.	.	.	
But	out	of	it	came	trouble,	too.	The	convention	had	been	ordained	and	
funded	 by	 Congress;	 and	was	 an	 official	 act.	 The	 agenda	 had	 been	
worked	over	 in	50	state	meetings	and	many	seminars	 .	 .	 .	and	what	
happened?	The	press	gave	equal	coverage	to	a	jack	leg	religious	rally	
which	wouldn’t	have	been	covered	with	one	inch	of	press	any	other	
time.	.	.	.	We	must	remember,	too,	that	up	to	this	point	Phyllis	Schlafly	
had	been	a	born	loser.	.	.	.	But	Houston	and	the	Opposition	to	ERA	gave	
her	her	heart’s	desire–publicity.99		
	
These	 newly	 energized	 conservative	 women,	 who	 Peterson	 described	 as	 the	
“frightened	right	wing,”	used	the	IWY	Conference	proceedings	to	recruit	others	to	
their	cause	by	characterizing	feminists	as	“radicals	and	lesbians.”100	Barbour,	with	
her	emphasis	on	the	radicalism,	violence,	and	“raised	clenched	fists”	at	the	meeting,	
and	her	analogy	to	Nazi	rallies,	captured	the	characterization	that	the	conservative	
women	 sought.	 Romney,	who	 relied	 on	 the	 IWY	 Conference	 to	 conflate	 radical	
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feminism	 and	 the	 ERA,	 further	 undermined	 the	 cause	 of	 Republican	 feminists	
within	 the	Republican	Party.	The	 IWY	Conference	pushed	Michigan’s	Republican	
feminists	 off	 of	 the	 sensible	 center	 of	 the	 women’s	movement,	 and	 once	 they	
shifted	 leftward,	 conservative	women	were	able	 to	characterize	 them	as	 radical	
crazies	who	were	unfit	to	represent	women,	especially	within	the	Republican	Party.	
The	IWY	Conference	had	placed	Republican	feminists	in	a	precarious	position.	The	
pressures	that	were	building	on	them	as	they	tried	to	reconcile	their	feminism	with	
their	Republicanism	were	ready	to	explode.		
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CHAPTER	7	THE	SENSIBLE	CENTER	BECOMES	IRRELEVANT:	1980	TO	1983	
Our	party,	the	party	of	Lincoln,	the	party	of	human	rights,	has	been	the	party	
that	has	turned	its	back	on	women.	
–Helen	Milliken	
	
We	must	each	march	to	his	own	tune	.	.	.	and	mine	is	certainly	that	I	must	be	a	
loyal	citizen	AND	woman	before	I	become	partisan.	
–Elly	Peterson	
	
In	July	1980,	Detroit	served	as	the	site	for	the	Republican	national	convention.	
Commentators	 predicted	 that	 this	 quadrennial	 meeting	 would	 be	 significant	
because	“Republican	leaders	meeting	in	Detroit	believe	they	are	on	the	verge	of	
forming	a	new	majority	party	with	a	New	Deal-type	coalition	built	on	a	conservative	
base.”1	This	 conservative	 challenge	did	not	bode	well	 for	Michigan’s	Republican	
feminists,	whose	survival	depended	on	the	ability	of	the	party’s	moderate	faction	
to	stop	the	conservative	tsunami.	What	otherwise	might	have	been	a	chance	for	
these	 activists	 to	 show	 off	 their	 state	 and	 celebrate	 their	 partisanship	 became	
instead	a	fight	for	survival	between	the	moderate	and	conservative	wings	of	the	
party.	 While	 Michigan’s	 ratification	 of	 the	 ERA	 had	 not	 been	 rescinded,	 the	
proposed	constitutional	amendment	was	still	three	states	short	of	ratification	and	
faced	 a	 deadline	 of	 September	 30,	 1982.	 In	 Michigan,	 abortion	 was	 legal	 and	
available	 to	poor	women	 through	Medicaid,	but	 that	was	only	due	 to	Governor	
																																																						
1	Saul	Friedman	and	Remer	Tyson,	“A	Newer	Deal,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	July	8,	1980.		
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Milliken’s	successive	vetoes	of	repeated	legislative	attempts	to	end	such	funding.	
Conservatives,	who	opposed	both	the	ERA	and	abortion	rights	for	women,	were	
about	to	take	over	the	national	and	state	Republican	parties.	
As	predicted,	conservative	Republicans	nominated	Ronald	Reagan	as	 their	
presidential	candidate,	which	they	celebrated	as	the	culmination	of	many	years	of	
hard	work	designed	to	take	control	of	the	Republican	Party.	Moderate	Republicans,	
on	the	other	hand,	including	Republican	feminists,	were	fearful	about	their	future	
in	a	party	run	by	conservatives.	Not	surprisingly,	moderates	also	lost	control	of	the	
Michigan	Republican	Party	when	conservative	Richard	Headlee	replaced	Milliken	
at	the	top	of	the	ticket	in	1982.		
With	 the	 conservative	 takeover	 of	 the	 Republican	 Party	 complete,	
Republican	feminists	faced	new	partisan	challenges.	They	expected	opposition	to	
the	 ERA,	 abortion	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 their	 feminist	 agenda	 from	 the	 party	 and	 its	
leaders.	Thus,	they	anticipated	a	struggle	“to	maintain	a	feminist	presence	in	the	
Republican	 Party.”	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 conservative	 control	 over	 the	 Republican	
Party	 undermined	 the	 multipartisanship	 of	 the	 NWPC,	 making	 it	 increasingly	
difficult	“to	maintain	a	Republican	presence	 in	the	feminist	movement.”	Despite	
the	 pressures	 placed	 on	 them	 by	 the	 changing	 Republican	 Party,	 Michigan’s	
Republican	feminists	tried	to	hold	themselves	and	their	causes	together.	Each	was	
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forced,	however,	to	 individually	reassess	her	attempts	to	reconcile	her	feminism	
and	 partisanship	 in	 light	 of	 the	 presidential	 election	 of	 1980	 and	 the	Michigan	
gubernatorial	 election	 of	 1982.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 outcome	was	 different	 for	
each	of	them.		
The	disagreements	between	Republican	women	that	were	apparent	at	the	
IWY	Conference	came	to	the	forefront	in	Detroit	at	the	1980	Republican	National	
Convention.	While	Republican	feminists	had	managed	to	maintain	some	modicum	
of	support	for	the	ERA	in	the	1976	Republican	Party	platform,	all	partisan	support	
for	 abortion	 rights	 had	 been	 abandoned.	 Going	 into	 the	 1980	 convention,	
presumptive	 candidate	 Reagan	 had	 already	 stated	 that	 he	 supported	 gender	
equality,	especially	with	respect	to	wages,	and	indicated	that	he	was	willing	to	sign	
legislation	on	a	piecemeal	basis	that	promoted	income	equality	for	women.	But	he	
believed	 that	 the	 ERA	 was	 unnecessary	 and,	 in	 fact,	 jeopardized	 many	 of	 the	
legislative	 protections	 offered	 specifically	 to	 women. 2 	He	 claimed	 that	 he	
supported	 equal	 rights,	 but	 opposed	 the	 constitutional	 amendment	 that	would	
guarantee	those	equal	rights.		
																																																						
2	“Citizens	for	Reagan”	Flier,	April	27,	1976,	box	19,	folder:	ERAmerica	Reagan	(Ronald)	
Position	on	ERA	(1976),	Peterson	Papers.		
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ERA	activists	objected	to	his	position.	While	they	conceded	that	the	cause	of	
gender	equality	had	progressed,	they	knew	they	had	more	to	do	and	would	never	
stop	until	the	constitution	protected	their	rights.	Callow	ironically	noted	“Ronald	
Reagan’s	promise	 to	urge	all	 states	and	Congress	 to	amend	 their	discriminatory	
laws	is	also	a	sign	of	progress.	It	is,	in	effect,	an	admission	there	are	hundreds	of	
laws	 that	 need	 change.	 State	 legislatures	 and	 Congress	 have	 had	 the	 power	 to	
change	 these	 laws	all	 along,	but	have	not.	 ERA	 supporters	do	not	expect	either	
Reagan	or	themselves	to	live	that	long.”3	
While	Reagan	set	the	stage	for	the	convention	debate	that	would	inevitably	
occur	over	the	ERA,	the	leaders	of	the	debate	on	the	convention	floor	were	familiar	
adversaries.	 Schlafly	 was	 an	 advisor	 to	 Reagan	 and	 a	 convention	 delegate.	 A	
majority	of	convention	delegates	supported	her	STOP	ERA	movement.	Moderate	
Republicans	within	the	party,	including	the	NRWTF	and	convention	hosts	William	
and	 Helen	 Milliken,	 the	 latter	 representing	 ERAmerica,	 fought	 to	 continue	 the	
party’s	 endorsement	 of	 the	 ERA.	 In	 a	 familiar	 argument,	 Governor	 Milliken	
contended	that	a	broad-based	party	was	essential	to	win	the	presidential	election	
																																																						
3	“Republican	National	Platform,”	Point	of	View	Transcript,	Laura	Callow,	July	26,	1980,	
WJR	Radio,	box	2,	ERAmerica	Point	of	View	Broadcasts	Transcripts	(&	Corr.)	1980-1986,	Callow	
Papers.	
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and	 that	 if	 the	 party	 repudiated	 its	 support	 for	 the	 ERA,	 it	 would	 lose	 women	
voters.4	
The	NRWTF	arrived	at	the	preconvention	meetings,	however,	handicapped	
by	the	bridges	that	it	had	burned	at	the	1976	Republican	presidential	convention.	
Freeman	concluded	that	Republicans	became	powerful	within	their	party	through	
their	connections	to	the	party’s	power	brokers.	Thus,	the	NRWTF,	which	derived	its	
earlier	influence	from	its	connections	to	the	then	ascendant	moderate	wing	of	the	
party,	 was	 relatively	 powerless	 by	 1980	 as	 its	 fortunes	 sank	 with	 those	 of	 its	
moderate	mentors.	To	make	matters	worse,	the	NRWTF	had	been	able	to	retain	a	
pro-ERA	plank	 in	 the	1976	platform	only	 through	 its	 ties	 to	Reagan’s	opponent,	
Gerald	 Ford.	 Even	 in	 1976,	 Republican	 feminists	 operated	 from	 a	 position	 of	
weakness,	dropping	efforts	to	retain	a	pro-choice	plank	because	they	believed	that	
any	linkage	of	abortion	with	the	ERA	would	jeopardize	their	chances	of	retaining	
support	for	the	ERA	in	the	platform.	By	1980	they	had	no	real	power	or	influence	
within	the	party,	having	lost	it	all	to	Schlafly	and	her	supporters.5		
																																																						
4	Paul	Magnusson,	“GOP	Deal	Shapes	Up	to	Head	Off	ERA	Fight,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	July	
6,	1980.		
	
5	Jo	Freeman,	“Republicans:	Feminists	Avoid	a	Direct	Show	Down	(at	the	1980	
Republican	Convention),”	In	These	Times,	4,	no.	32,	(July	30,	1980),	
http://www.jofreeman.com/conventions/RepubPol1980.htm.		
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The	party’s	platform	writing	subcommittee,	which	arrived	in	Detroit	a	week	
early,	 drafted	 a	 compromise	 between	 moderate	 and	 conservative	 Republicans	
concerning	the	ERA.	It	provided	that	that	the	party	“reaffirm[s]	our	party’s	historic	
commitment	 to	 equal	 rights	 and	 equal	 opportunity	 for	 women,	 a	 commitment	
which	made	us	the	first	national	party	to	endorse	the	Equal	Rights	Amendment.”6	
At	the	same	time,	the	compromise	did	not	include	a	specific	endorsement	of	any	
version	of	the	ERA.	Instead,	it	 included	the	more	ambiguous	statement	that	“we	
are	proud	of	our	pioneering	role	and	do	not	renounce	our	stand.”7		
The	compromise	language,	however,	pleased	no	one.	ERA	supporters,	led	by	
the	NRWTF,	wanted	more	than	a	passive	statement	 in	which	 the	party	 failed	 to	
denounce	 the	ERA.	Helen	Milliken	 joined	with	other	members	of	 the	NRWTF	 to	
lobby	the	platform	committee	to	change	the	language	promising	not	to	renounce	
the	ERA	to	a	statement	of	support	for	it.	Conservatives	wanted	it	made	clear	that	
the	party	did	not	 support	 the	ERA	at	all.8	Schlafly	warned	 that	 if	 the	moderates	
pushed	too	hard	for	a	plank	endorsing	the	ERA,	she	had	the	votes	to	adopt	a	plank	
																																																						
6	Magnusson,	“GOP	Deal	Shapes	Up	to	Head	Off	ERA	Fight,”	July	6,	1980.		
	
7	Ibid.	
	
8	Ibid.	
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renouncing	it	outright.9	She	told	the	feminists	that	“we	think	leaving	the	ERA	out	
altogether	is	a	generous	compromise.	.	.	.	We’re	willing	to	go	along	with	it	in	the	
interests	of	party	unity.	But	we’ve	got	a	majority	of	votes	on	this	subcommittee	and	
a	big	majority	on	the	whole	committee.	If	they	push	us,	we’ll	give	them	a	plan	which	
repudiates	the	ERA	entirely.”10	Conservative	Senator	Jesse	Helms	was	more	blunt.	
He	asserted	that	“conservatives	have	the	votes	 to	pass	 ‘a	 tough,	mean	anti-ERA	
plank’	if	proponents	of	the	measure	persist	in	their	efforts	to	push	the	issue	to	a	
test.”11	
With	 respect	 to	 women’s	 issues,	 the	 final	 Republican	 platform	 included	
conservative	priorities,	including	support	for	exempting	women	from	the	military	
draft,	and	an	assertion	that	the	government	should	not	interfere	with	the	integrity	
of	the	family.12	It	reflected	Reagan’s	preference	to	fight	discrimination	with	specific	
																																																						
9	David	S.	Broder,	“Republicans’	Plank	on	ERA	Pleases	Neither	Side,”	Washington	Post,	
July	7,	1980,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	Files,	1969-1982	International	Women’s	Year:	National	
Women’s	Conf.,	November	18-21,	1977:	Leaflets	and	Position	Papers,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.	
	
10	“GOP	Platform	Drafters	Reject	Pro-ERA	Plank,”	n.p.,	July	8,	1980,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	
Files,	1969-1982	International	Women’s	Year:	National	Women’s	Conf.,	November	18-21,	1977:	
Leaflets	and	Position	Papers,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.	
	
11	David	S.	Broder,	“Republicans’	Plank	on	ERA	Pleases	Neither	Side,”	July	7,	1980.	
	
12	“Women’s	Rights,”	“Strong	Family,”	“Family	Protection,”	Republican	Party	Platform	of	
1980,	July	15,	1980,	http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844.	
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laws,	rather	than	a	constitutional	amendment,	and	to	permit	the	states	to	make	
their	own	decisions	about	the	ERA.	The	Carter	administration		was	reprimanded	for	
trying	to	pressure	states	into	ratifying	the	proposed	constitutional	amendment.13	
In	a	concession	to	moderates,	the	plank	“acknowledge[d]	the	legitimate	efforts	of	
those	who	 support	 or	 oppose	 ratification	 of	 the	 Equal	 Rights	Amendment”	 and	
“reaffirm[ed]	 the	 Party’s	 historical	 commitment	 to	 equal	 rights	 and	 equality	 for	
women,”	but	never	specifically	mentioned	the	ERA.14	Republican	feminists	agreed	
not	 to	 pursue	 this	 fight	 on	 the	 floor	 of	 the	 convention.	 In	 exchange,	 Reagan	
promised	 to	 meet	 with	 them	 when	 he	 came	 to	 Detroit	 to	 accept	 the	 party’s	
nomination.15	
Donnelly	was	pleased	with	 the	platform.	 She	noted	 that	 it	 “combine[d]	 a	
neutral	position	on	the	Equal	Rights	Amendment	with	the	strongest	women’s	rights	
																																																						
13	“Women’s	Rights,”	Republican	Party	Platform	of	1980,	July	15,	1980.	
	
14	Ibid.	
	
15	“Angry	ERA	Backers	Vow	Convention	Fight,”	n.p.,	July	9,	1980,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	
Files,	1969-1982	International	Women’s	Year:	National	Women’s	Conf.,	November	18-21,	1977:	
Leaflets	and	Position	Papers,	Helen	Milliken	Papers;	“Platform	Committee	Dooms	Pro-ERA	
Plank,”	n.p.,	July	9,	1980,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	Files,	1969-1982	International	Women’s	Year:	
National	Women’s	Conf.,	November	18-21,	1977:	Leaflets	and	Position	Papers,	Helen	Milliken	
Papers.	
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platform	that	the	Party	has	ever	had.”16	Conservatives	embraced	what	they	called	
a	“compromise	plank”	in	the	1980	Republican	Party	platform	because	it	repudiated	
the	 ERA	 and	 the	 threat	 it	 posed	 to	 the	 traditional	 family,	 supported	measures	
intended	 to	 provide	 economic	 equality	 for	 women	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
recognized	 that	women	were	 different	 from	men	 and,	 therefore,	 needed	 some	
protections.17	Donnelly	noted	 that	“the	Republican	Party	has	 taken	a	 far-sighted	
step	which	recognizes	the	differences	between	the	Women’s	Movement	of	the	70’s,	
and	 what	 could	 be	 identified	 as	 the	 Women’s	 Movement	 of	 the	 80’s.” 18	
Conservative	women	believed	that	they	would	finally	realize	their	goal	of	becoming	
the	legitimate	representatives	of	women’s	interests	in	the	Republican	Party.		
Women’s	groups	sponsored	protest	rallies	to	indicate	their	opposition	to	the	
party’s	official	position	on	the	ERA.	On	Sunday,	July	13,	1980,	the	day	before	the	
convention	opened,	a	rally	called	“The	Family	of	Americans	for	ERA”	convened	in	
downtown	Detroit.	Organized	by	Women	in	Communications,	participants	tried	to	
refute	the	notion	that	the	ERA	was	unnecessary	and	the	fight	was	over.	It	was	a	
																																																						
16	Point	of	View	Transcript,	Elaine	Donnelly,	August	8,	1980,	WJR	Radio,	box	2,	folder:	
ERAmerica	Point	of	View	Broadcasts	Transcripts	(&	Corr.)	1980-1986,	Callow	Papers.	
	
17	Ibid.	
	
18	Ibid.	
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complicated	 rally	 that	 focused	 on	 the	 “construction	 of	 a	 simple	 home–a	 house	
raising–on	a	flat	bed	truck	in	a	park	near	the	convention	site.	The	house	will	be	only	
partially	completed	to	symbolize	women’s	limited	buying	power	and	the	unfinished	
task	of	passing	ERA.	Planks	in	the	house	will	be	painted	with	the	states	which	have	
ratified	ERA	and	the	names	of	individuals	and	organizations	contributing	$1000.”19	
The	family	the	organizers	referred	to	“include[d]	representatives	of	all	states,	ages,	
ethnic	and	income	levels,	the	‘Doctor,	Lawyer,	Indian	Chiefs’	of	society,	as	well	as	
housewives	 and	 football	 players,	 well-known	 VIP’s,	 including	 celebrities	
intermingled	with	average	citizens.”20	NOW	organized	a	protest	march	on	the	first	
day	 of	 the	 convention,	 which	 was	 attended,	 according	 to	 one	 report,	 by	
approximately	twelve	thousand	marchers,	including	Helen	Milliken,	who	wore	her	
Republican	elephant	pin	upside	down	“in	distress.”	Drawing	on	the	history	of	the	
																																																						
19	“The	Family	of	Americans	for	ERA,”	memorandum,	Women	in	Communications,	Inc.,	
box	15,	folder:	July	7-17,	1980	Republican	National	Convention/Detroit	File	2,	Helen	Milliken	
Papers.	
	
20	“Far	West	Region,	Proposed	Media	Events	in	Detroit	and	New	York,”	ERA	Committee,	
box	15,	folder:	July	7-17,	1980	Republican	National	Convention/Detroit	File	2,	Helen	Milliken	
Papers.	
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party	as	the	original	proponent	of	equal	rights	for	African	Americans,	some	people	
carried	signs	picturing	Abraham	Lincoln	with	a	tear	streaming	down	his	face.21		
Republican	feminists	fared	no	better	on	abortion,	but	on	this	issue	they	did	
not	even	have	a	 favorable	plank	 from	the	1976	convention	 to	use	as	a	possible	
point	of	reference.	While	the	final	platform	acknowledged	that	some	Republicans	
favored	a	woman’s	right	to	choose	an	abortion,	it	then	dismissed	their	concerns	by	
specifically	 endorsing	 “a	 constitutional	 amendment	 to	 restore	 protection	 of	 the	
right	 to	 life	 for	 unborn	 children.	 We	 also	 support	 the	 Congressional	 efforts	 to	
restrict	 the	 use	 of	 taxpayers’	 dollars	 for	 abortion.”22	This	 so-called	 “human	 life	
amendment”	would	render	Roe	 invalid.	While	they	did	not	favor	a	constitutional	
amendment	to	guarantee	equality	for	women,	Republicans	endorsed	one	to	outlaw	
abortion	by	recognizing	that	a	fetus	became	a	person,	entitled	to	all	of	the	legal	
rights	conveyed	by	such	status,	at	conception.	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	quickly	became	aware	of	their	place	in	the	
Reagan	Republican	Party.	The	majority	of	Michigan’s	delegates,	who	reflected	the	
																																																						
21	“12,000	March	for	ERA,”	n.p.,	July	12,	1980,	box	5,	folder:	Topical	Files,	1969-1982	
International	Women’s	Year:	National	Women’s	Conf.,	November	18-21,	1977:	Leaflets	and	
Position	Papers,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.	
	
22	“Abortion,”	Republican	Party	Platform	of	1980,	July	15,	1980,	
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844.		
	
		
271	
moderation	of	the	state	party	in	their	commitment	to	George	H.	W.	Bush,	found	
that	they	were	decisively	outnumbered.	While	at	the	1976	convention	“the	Reagan	
forces	 were	 considered	 the	 ‘lunatic	 fringe,’”	 in	 Detroit	 they	 became	 the	
mainstream	who	ostracized	moderates.23	This	marginalization	was	apparent	in	the	
way	that	the	party	treated	Republican	feminists,	not	only	in	drafting	the	platform,	
but	also	at	the	convention.		
Binsfeld,	a	Bush	delegate	to	the	Republican	National	Convention,	anticipated	
the	 opportunities	 for	 change	 presented	 by	 this	 national	meeting	 of	 Republican	
Party	leadership.	She	believed	in	the	importance	of	political	involvement	through	
political	parties	and	the	influence	that	participants	could	have	on	the	country.	In	a	
press	release,	she	stated	“‘people	have	abandoned	political	parties	and	turned	the	
elections	and	government	over	to	the	control	of	special	interest	groups.	The	result	
is	government	inaction	because	there	is	no	unifying	force	to	produce	action–a	role	
historically	 carried	 out	 by	 political	 parties.’” 24 	She	 believed	 that	 “‘if	 they	 [the	
American	people]	join	the	political	process,	revitalize	the	political	parties	and	vote	
																																																						
23	Loraine	Anderson,	“‘Fast	Gavel’	Thwarts	Binsfeld	ERA	Hopes,”	Traverse	City	Record-
Eagle,	July	16,	1980,	box	7,	folder:	Topical	Files,	1969-1982,	Michigan	Women’s	Task	Force,	
Helen	Milliken	Papers.	
	
24	News	Release,	June	11,	1980,	1,	box	3,	folder	6:	Connie	Binsfeld	Campaign,	1980,	
accession	no.	MS	99-17,	Binsfeld	Papers.		
	
		
272	
in	the	next	election,	they	can	reject	stagnant	politics	and	policies	and	chart	a	new	
course	 of	 events	 for	 our	 country.’” 25 	She	 was	 especially	 excited	 about	 the	
opportunities	she	saw	in	the	creation	of	the	Republican	Party	Platform.	“‘This	is	the	
area	where	I	hope	to	make	a	strong	contribution.	.	.	.	I	don’t	want	the	party	platform	
to	be	a	platitude	that’s	forgotten	the	day	after	the	election.	Platforms	should	be	
philosophical	 commitments	 against	 which	 we	 can	 test	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
party	and	the	people	we	elect.’”26	Binsfeld	must	have	been	quite	disillusioned	by	
her	experiences	in	trying	to	influence	the	platform	and	the	process	by	which	it	was	
adopted.	She	was	disturbed	that	they	could	not	even	agree	to	a	roll	call	vote	on	the	
platform	 that	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 publicly	 record	 their	 opposition	 the	 party’s	
stance	on	the	ERA.27		
Republican	feminists	tried	to	make	the	best	of	a	bad	situation,	but	they	were	
clearly	demoralized.	To	save	face,	they	argued	that	the	outcome	would	have	been	
much	worse	 if	 they	 had	 not	 actively	 participated	 in	 the	 convention.	 As	 agreed,	
Reagan	met	with	the	NRWTF	on	July	15,	1980.	Attendees,	including	Helen	Milliken	
																																																						
25	Ibid.	
	
26	Ibid.		
	
27	Ibid.	
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and	other	ERA	supporters,	cited	the	fact	that	the	meeting	took	place,	and	offered	
vague	representations	and	broad	generalizations	about	what	transpired	when	they	
met,	as	evidence	that	it	was	a	success.	They	noted	that	“the	Reagan	meeting	was	a	
clear	victory	for	pro-ERA	forces	and	a	tacit	acknowledgement	by	the	Reagan	camp	
that	it	had	underestimated	the	significance	of	the	issue	and	the	ability	of	pro-ERA	
supporters	to	rally	support	and	public	attention	to	the	issue.”28	Nevertheless,	their	
influence	 over	 Reagan	 was	 minimal	 and	 they	 were	 only	 able	 to	 extract	 minor	
concessions	from	him.	He	did,	however,	agree	to	consider	appointing	a	woman	to	
a	 future	 Supreme	 Court	 vacancy,	 and	 ultimately	 did	 so	with	 the	 nomination	 of	
Sandra	Day	O’Connor	in	1981.29		
Reagan	chose	moderate	George	H.	W.	Bush	as	his	vice-presidential	running	
mate,	a	selection	that	the	members	of	the	NRWTF	believed	they	had	influenced.30	
In	 their	 opinion,	 Bush	was	 their	 best	 chance	 to	moderate	Reagan’s	 strong	 anti-
women	positions.	Immediately	after	the	convention	ended,	the	MRWTF	wrote	to	
																																																						
28	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force	Newsletter,	August-September,	1980,	5,	box	7,	
folder:	Topical	Files	1969-1982,	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus:	Republican	Women’s	Task	
Force	ca.	1974-1980,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.		
	
29	David	Hoffman	and	Paul	Taylor,	“Reagan	Seeks	to	Mend	Fences,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	
July	16,	1980.	
	
30	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force	Newsletter,	August-September,	1980,	2.	
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Bush,	who	they	had	supported	for	president	because	he	favored	the	ERA,	to	hold	
him	 accountable	 for	 his	 subsequent	 endorsement	 of	 the	 Republican	 platform,	
including	its	lukewarm	position	on	women’s	rights.	Victoria	Toensing,	a	Republican	
feminist	from	Michigan	who	cochaired	the	Task	Force,	wrote	that	“we	feel	strongly	
that	ratification	of	the	ERA	is	both	a	human	issue	and	an	economic	issue.	We	cannot	
view	the	present	platform	language	as	anything	but	a	repudiation	of	the	Republican	
Party’s	forty	year	support	for	ratification.”31	Their	efforts	to	hold	him	accountable	
were	 largely	 unsuccessful,	 however,	 as	 Republican	 feminists	 continued	 to	 be	
marginalized	after	the	election.		
The	NRWTF	also	convinced	Reagan	to	create	a	Women’s	Policy	Board	under	
the	leadership	of	NRWTF	members	Mary	Louise	Smith	and	Kilberg,	through	which	
they	hoped	“to	continue	to	sensitize	the	candidate	and	campaign	operatives	to	the	
need	to	address	women’s	issues	and	include	women	in	the	campaign	process	at	all	
levels.” 32 	When	 they	 tried	 to	 populate	 the	 new	 group,	 however,	 Republican	
feminist	 leaders	 saw	 just	 how	 damaged	 relations	 were	 between	 Republican	
feminists	because	of	the	party’s	position	on	ERA.	Anne	Armstrong,	Pam	Curtis	and	
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Mary	 Louise	 Smith	 approached	 Peterson	 to	 try	 to	 convince	 her	 to	 become	 a	
member	of	the	board.	She	turned	them	all	down,	indicating	that	she	preferred	to	
continue	her	work	in	support	of	the	ERA,	which	had	become	more	difficult	because	
of	 the	 opposition	 of	 Reagan	 and	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 She	 also	 shot	 down	 any	
expectations	 that	 Helen	 Milliken	 should	 do	 more	 to	 support	 Reagan.	 Peterson	
subsequently	told	Milliken	that	she	wrote	to	Smith,	“the	Governor	[Milliken]	has	
come	out	for	the	ticket–you	are	striving	to	keep	the	moderate	Republican	women	
in	the	party	and	happy	and	working.	.	.	.	I	closed	that	little	discussion	by	saying	that	
you	were	committed	to	ERAmerica	and	if	you	were	to	drop	out	of	that	and	say	you	
were	working	for	RR	[Ronald	Reagan]	it	would	really	create	problems.”33	Peterson	
and	Milliken	were	never	able	to	enthusiastically	support	Reagan	and	chose,	for	the	
most	part,	to	continue	their	work	on	the	ERA.34	Donnelly,	on	the	other	hand,	was	a	
Reagan-Bush	volunteer	in	Michigan	and	became	a	member	of	the	Women’s	Policy	
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Advisory	Board,	not	at	all	what	the	NRWTF	intended	when	it	advocated	that	the	
organization	be	created.35		
NRWTF	 member	 Pam	 Curtis	 indicated	 that	 Republican	 feminists	 would	
respond	in	one	of	three	ways	to	the	nomination	of	Reagan.	Some	would	support	
him	 because	 they	 were	 Republicans	 and	 they	 prioritized	 partisanship	 over	
feminism.	Burnett,	for	example,	indicated	that	she	“happily	voted	for	Reagan	and	
cheered	when	he	crushed	Jimmy	Carter	in	1980,”	despite	her	pro-choice	stance	on	
abortion,	because	she	was	“not	a	one-issue	voter.”36	She	called	herself	a	“feminist	
Republican”	and,	by	indicating	that	she	did	not	vote	on	the	basis	of	a	single	issue,	
tried	to	reconcile	her	partisanship	and	feminism	by	working	within	the	Republican	
Party	 to	make	 it	more	 receptive	 to	 feminist	 issues.37	Others	would	 support	 him	
because	they	wanted	to	advance	within	the	party	bureaucracy	or	to	participate	in	
a	 Republican	 administration. 38 	Peterson	 characterized	 Kilberg	 as	 a	 member	 of	
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Curtis’	 latter	 group–seeking	 a	 “big	 appointment”	 in	 the	 new	 Reagan	
administration.39	
In	 order	 to	 continue	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 campaign	 and	 support	 the	
Republican	 Party,	 Republican	 feminists	 were	 encouraged	 to	 redefine	 women’s	
issues.	 Instead	 of	 rejecting	 Reagan	 because	 of	 his	 opposition	 to	 the	 ERA	 and	
abortion,	women,	according	 to	Kilberg,	needed	 to	 reconfirm	 their	 loyalty	 to	 the	
Republican	Party	and	redirect	their	efforts	to	those	issues	where	they	might	be	able	
to	 make	 a	 difference.	 She	 stated,	 “I	 think	 it	 is	 useless	 and	 unrealistic	 for	 a	
Republican	 feminist	 to	expect	 to	 find	a	change	 in	Reagan’s	position	on	ERA	and	
abortion.	 It’s	obvious	 that’s	not	going	 to	happen.”	40	Reagan	argued	 that	gender	
equality	 was	 dependent	 on	 economic	 security	 and	 global	 stability	 for	 all	
Americans. 41 	Kilberg	 shifted	 her	 position	 accordingly.	 She	 advised	 women	 “to	
concentrate	on	a	lot	of	other	issues	that	impact	on	women–displaced	homemakers,	
pension	 reform,	 day	 care,	 the	marriage	 tax.	 .	 .	 .	 I’m	 a	 feminist.	 But	 I’m	 also	 a	
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consumer	and	wage	earner	.	.	.	and	to	me	the	decision	as	to	whom	to	support	for	
the	presidency	is	going	to	be	broader	than	equal	rights	and	abortion.”42	Republican	
feminists	who	shifted	or	abandoned	their	priorities	to	accept	this	argument	were	
able	 to	 convince	 themselves	 that	 a	 Reagan	 presidency	 would	 address	 their	
concerns.		
Curtis	 identified	 a	 final	 alternative	 for	 disillusioned	 Republican	 feminists.	
These	women,	 she	believed,	would	 choose	 to	 elevate	 their	 feminism	over	 their	
partisanship	 and	 support	 the	 candidate	 who	 best	 met	 their	 feminist	 goals–
independent	 John	 Anderson.	 Anderson	 was	 a	 Republican	 who,	 in	 April	 1980,	
decided	to	run	as	an	independent,	third-party	candidate	when	it	became	clear	that	
he	would	not	be	able	to	defeat	Reagan	for	the	Republican	presidential	nomination.	
A	supporter	of	the	ERA	and	reproductive	choice	for	women,	he	was	widely	seen	as	
the	 Republican	 candidate	who	was	most	 supportive	 of	women’s	 rights.43	Helen	
Milliken	 even	 chose	 to	 endorse	 him	while	 he	 ran	 as	 a	 Republican,	 but	 did	 not	
believe	that	she	could	publicly	support	him	after	he	left	the	party.44	In	a	letter	she	
																																																						
42	Mann,	“GOP	Feminists	Seek	Way	to	Support	Reagan”	Washington	Post,	May	30,	1980.	
	
43	“John	Anderson	for	President,”	Campaign	Brochure,	
http://www.4president.org/brochures/andersonlucey1980brochure.htm.	
	
44	Helen	Milliken	to	Dottie	Lamm,	June	19,	1980,	box	15,	folder:	1980	National	
Governors	Conference,	August	3,	4,	5-Denver	Colo.,	Helen	Milliken	Papers.		
	
		
279	
wrote	to	Peterson	early	in	the	1980	election	year,	she	noted	that	she	thought	that	
he	 was	 best	 on	 women’s	 issues	 and	 had	 widespread	 grassroots	 support,	 but	
nobody	to	organize	for	him.	She	further	indicated	that	the	governor	was	not	sure	
how	to	proceed	with	the	1980	presidential	campaign.	“Bill	is	agonizing	over	what	
to	do	____	what	would	be	the	step	(and	endorsement)	that	would	deflect	Ronald	
R.	I	think	John	A.	is	really	his	choice	too,	but	he	can’t	afford	a	miss	on	this	one.”45	
At	 least	 one	 of	Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 became	 an	 advocate	 and	
campaign	 leader	 for	 Anderson.	 Beebe	 became	 coordinator	 of	 his	 presidential	
campaign	 in	 Michigan	 because	 she	 believed	 that	 a	 third	 party	 candidate	 was	
necessary.	46	She	felt	that	Reagan	was	“ultraconservative	and	hyper-nationalistic,”	
and	Carter	“wasn’t	trained	to	be	president”	and	“doesn’t	have	the	skills	to	lead	a	
nation.”47	Under	her	leadership,	Anderson	was	able	to	garner	enough	signatures	to	
get	his	name	on	the	primary	ballot	and	won	enough	votes	in	the	primary	to	get	his	
name	 on	 Michigan’s	 final	 ballot	 in	 November.	 Beebe	 was	 even	 temporarily	
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nominated	 as	 his	 vice	 presidential	 candidate	 as	 a	 placeholder	 on	 the	Michigan	
ticket	 until	 he	 actually	 selected	 his	 running	 mate,	 Patrick	 Lucey.	 Ultimately,	
Anderson	got	about	7	percent	of	the	vote	in	Michigan.	Reagan	won	the	state	with	
49	percent	and	Carter	trailed	him,	winning	43	percent	of	the	vote	in	Michigan.48		
Once	 Reagan	 became	 president,	 things	 went	 downhill	 for	 Republican	
feminists.	The	NWPC	effectively	purged	the	NRWTF	from	its	network	of	feminist	
organizations	and	replaced	it	with	a	new,	accountable	Republican	affiliate.	In	1979,	
the	NWPC	sought	to	gain	some	control	over	the	NRWTF	by	requiring	that	all	task	
force	members	join	the	NWPC.	When	the	NRWTF	objected	to	this	rule	change,	the	
NWPC	pushed	the	NRWTF	out	of	the	organization.	The	leader	of	the	NRWTF	told	
members	that	“Iris	[Mitgang,	chairperson	of	the	NWPC]	indicated	that	the	time	had	
probably	come	when	the	Task	Force	and	the	National	Women’s	Political	Caucus	
should	 sever	 their	 relationship	 in	 a	 friendly	manner	with	 no	 hard	 feelings.”49	A	
second	group	was	formed,	called	the	NWPC	Republicans,	to	serve	as	the	partisan	
task	 force	 of	 the	 NWPC.	 As	 the	 leaders	 of	 this	 new	 organization	 told	 potential	
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members,	“the	NWPC	is	a	multipartisan	organization	as	set	forth	in	its	purpose	and	
by-laws	and	[NWPC	Republicans	is]	intend	[sic]	to	be	the	feminist	Republican	voice	
and	 action	 arm	 of	 the	 mother	 organization,	 NWPC.” 50 	Leaders	 of	 the	 now	
independent	NRWTF	were	discouraged.	Chairperson	Nancy	Thompson	 indicated	
that	“it	appears	to	me,	and	I	think	I	can	speak	for	the	other	officers	as	well,	that	we	
should	still	work	to	fulfill	our	original	objectives:	(1)	to	promote	a	feminist	presence	
in	the	Republican	Party	and;	(2)	to	promote	a	Republican	presence	in	the	feminist	
movement.”51	However,	she	was	not	optimistic	about	the	organization’s	chances	
to	do	so.	“On	the	feminist	front,	I	have	just	reported	our	exclusion.	Earlier	in	my	
letter,	I	referred	to	the	appointment	‘progress’	of	the	Reagan	administration;	it	is	
equally	 clear	 that	 women,	 not	 just	 feminist	 women,	 are	 being	 excluded	 [from	
positions	in	the	Reagan	administration].”52	
Inherent	 in	 this	 reorganization	was	a	 critique	of	 the	old	guard	Republican	
feminists	who	made	up	the	NRWTF.	As	the	leader	of	the	new	NWPC	Republicans	
told	 potential	 members,	 “we	 as	 Republican	 women	 cannot	 help	 but	 view	with	
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mixed	emotions	the	tremendous	gains	Republicans	made	in	November.	The	long	
standing	commitment	of	the	Republican	Party	to	ratification	of	the	ERA	is	gone.	The	
lip	 service	 paid	 to	 equal	 representation	 of	women	 in	 convention	 delegates	 and	
committee	memberships	from	the	local	level	on	up	is	laughable.	We	are	all	aware	
of	 the	 dearth	 of	 women	 appointed	 by	 Reagan	 to	 high	 level	 government	
positions.”53	The	suggestion	appears	to	be	that	the	women	of	the	NRWTF	were	too	
closely	 tied	 to	 Reagan	 and,	 therefore,	were	 either	 not	 interested	 in	 or	 not	 in	 a	
position	 to	 accomplish	 much	 for	 Republican	 feminists,	 with	 the	 emphasis	 on	
feminists.	She	continued	that	“the	RWTF	has	done	a	tremendous	job	in	trying	to	
look	after	our	interests	with	limited	resources,	particularly	at	National	Convention	
time,	and	I	urge	you	to	give	them	your	support.	However,	I	feel	that	the	NWPC	with	
its	grassroots	organizational	structure	can	provide	the	kind	of	umbrella	we	need	to	
build	an	effective	network	for	impacting	our	party	and	our	government	in	general.	
As	 Caucus	members	we	 are	 not	 only	 a	 voice	 for	 Republican	women	 but	 for	 all	
women	who	share	our	concerns	about	equality	 in	our	democracy.”54	If	 forced	to	
choose,	this	new	group	was	likely	to	prioritize	its	feminism	over	its	Republicanism.	
As	 the	 NWPC	 became	 increasingly	 Democratic	 and	 the	 Republican	 Party	
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increasingly	conservative,	NWPC	leadership	sought	to	separate	its	Republican	arm	
from	Reagan	Republicans.	It	did	so	by	creating	a	substitute	for	the	NRWTF	and	then	
populating	 it	with	members	who	were	more	 loyal	 to	 the	 feminists	of	 the	NWPC	
than	to	Reagan’s	Republican	Party.	
Changes	in	the	Republican	Party	also	threatened	the	multipartisanship	of	the	
NWPC.	Caucus	 leaders	believed	that	women	gained	political	 strength	 from	their	
large	numbers	and	thus	had	to	prioritize	their	common	feminist	goals	over	their	
partisan	differences.	However,	when	Republican	candidates	who	received	support	
from	the	NWPC	began	to	vote	in	accordance	with	the	directives	of	their	party	and	
contrary	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 feminists,	 members	 of	 the	 NWPC	 suggested	 that	
perhaps	its	policy	of	supporting	Republican	candidates	should	be	reviewed.	Others	
countered	that	reversing	this	policy	would	undermine	the	multipartisan	foundation	
on	which	the	organization	was	based.	Kathy	Wilson	was	the	Republican	president	
of	the	NWPC	from	1981	to	1983.	In	her	obituary,	a	Democratic	strategist	noted	that	
she	was	“‘so	tough	that	when	she	burned	her	bra	she	kept	it	on.’”55	While	she	led	
the	NWPC,	she	stressed	that	“only	with	the	support	of	both	parties	will	equality	be	
won.	I	want	my	party	back,	and	I’m	going	to	work	very	hard	to	get	it	back,	especially	
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by	supporting	progressive	Republican	women	for	office.”56	Thus,	she	argued,	the	
NWPC	could	be	instrumental	in	bringing	the	Republican	Party	back	to	its	moderate	
roots.	Ironically,	however,	she	was	one	of	many	Caucus	members	who	ultimately	
prioritized	their	feminism	over	their	partisanship	and	left	the	Republican	Party.57		
The	ERA	was	finally	defeated	with	a	whimper	when	the	ratification	period	
expired	on	June	30,	1982.	As	head	of	ERAmerica,	Milliken	spoke	eloquently	about	
the	defeat,	and	sought	to	inspire	the	women	who	unsuccessfully	fought	for	the	ERA	
by	comparing	and	connecting	them	to	the	suffragists	who	fought	for	the	vote.	She	
asserted	that	these	activists	“share[d]	more	than	history	with	our	foremothers.	We	
share	 a	 vision.”58	She	 stressed	 that	women	would	 continue	 to	 pass	 the	 goal	 of	
equality	from	generation	to	generation	until	it	became	a	reality.59	Their	efforts,	she	
said,	while	not	successful,	provided	“us	the	know-how	and	the	tools	to	continue	
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the	fight	for	equality.	Women	have	become	a	political	force.	It	will	not	go	away.”60	
In	fact,	women	in	Michigan	began	to	organize	immediately	to	reintroduce	the	ERA	
in	 Congress,	 to	 establish	 statewide	 programs	 in	 support	 of	 ratification	 and	 to	
nominate	and	elect	candidates	in	the	November	1982	elections	who	would	support	
the	ERA	and	other	issues	of	concern	to	women.	ERAmerica	reconstituted	itself	in	
Michigan	and	committed	itself	to	become	an	integrated	element	of	the	national	
ERA	movement	to	adopt	the	ERA	and	ratify	it	again	in	Michigan.61		
Reactions	to	the	defeat	of	the	ERA	varied.	Burnett	and	Callow	both	believed	
that	 the	 ERA	 failed	 because	 men	 realized	 that	 forced	 equality	 would	 be	 too	
expensive.	Thus,	they	blamed	patriarchs	who	profited	from	the	status	quo	and	had	
no	incentive	to	change	discriminatory	labor	and	wage	structures.62	Donnelly,	who	
felt	vindicated	and	apparently	magnanimous,	called	for	a	new	sense	of	cooperation	
between	women.	She	indicated,	“It’s	time	to	get	over	the	bitterness.	.	.	.	I	don’t	feel	
bitter.	It’s	time	to	break	the	ice	and	find	a	way	for	those	of	us	who	agree	on	basic	
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issues	 and	 positive	 things	 to	 stand	 together.	 The	 defeat	 of	 ERA	 doesn’t	 mean	
women’s	rights	are	lost	or	anything	taken	away.	It	means	the	debate	will	continue	
in	 a	 more	 reasonable	 fashion.”63 	Her	 words,	 however,	 could	 not	 eliminate	 the	
lingering	 animosity	 between	 those	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 ERA	battle	 and	 did	 not	
change	the	minds	of	Republican	feminists.	
Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 received	 another	 blow	 when	 Governor	
Milliken	announced,	in	December	1981,	that	after	thirteen	years	as	governor,	he	
would	not	run	for	reelection	and,	in	fact,	would	retire	from	politics	at	the	end	of	his	
term	 in	 1982.	 A	 four-person	 Republican	 primary	 ensued	 between	 three	
conservative	 candidates,	 L.	 Brooks	 Patterson,	 an	 Oakland	 County	 prosecuting	
attorney,	 state	 representative	 Jack	 Welborn,	 and	 insurance	 executive	 and	
businessman	Richard	Headlee,	and	moderate	 lieutenant	governor	and	Milliken’s	
chosen	successor,	James	Brickley.	The	Republican	voters	nominated	Headlee,	and	
a	former	Chief	Justice	of	the	Michigan	Supreme	Court,	Thomas	Brennan,	to	run	for	
governor	and	lieutenant	governor,	respectively.	The	three	conservative	candidates	
collectively	received	almost	70	percent,	or	450,000	of	the	644,429	votes	cast	in	the	
Republican	 primary	 election,	which	was	 indicative	 of	 the	 direction	 in	which	 the	
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party	 was	 moving. 64 	A	 Detroit	 Free	 Press	 obituary	 for	 Headlee	 in	 2004	 noted,	
“Headlee	was	‘a	transformational	figure	in	Michigan	politics,	involved	in	re-shaping	
the	Republican	Party	from	the	moderate	era	of	former	Gov.	William	Milliken	to	the	
more	conservative,	tax	averse	generation	that	came	to	power	in	the	1990s.’”65	The	
Democrats	nominated	state	representative	James	Blanchard	to	run	for	governor,	
and	 former	 member	 of	 the	 United	 States	 House	 of	 Representatives,	 Martha	
Griffiths,	who	had	originally	 introduced	the	ERA	to	the	US	Congress	when	it	was	
adopted	in	1971,	to	run	for	lieutenant	governor.66		
Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 found	 that	 Headlee	 was	 not	 Milliken,	
especially	with	respect	to	women’s	issues.	The	contrast	between	Headlee	and	his	
opponent	 on	 these	 issues	 could	 not	 have	 been	 clearer.	 The	 1982	 Republican	
gubernatorial	 ticket	opposed	the	ERA	and	abortion	rights	 for	women.	Blanchard	
favored	both,	including	the	rights	of	poor	women	to	have	abortions	at	government	
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expense,	if	necessary.67	Much	like	Reagan,	Headlee	opposed	the	ERA	and	any	laws	
that	 tried	 to	 eliminate	 distinctions	 between	 men	 and	 women,	 but	 claimed	 to	
support	equal	rights	for	women.	Differences	between	the	genders,	he	argued,	were	
biologically	 fixed	and,	 therefore,	could	not	be	eliminated	through	 legislation.	He	
believed	 that	 the	 argument	 over	 the	 ERA	 was	 mere	 “rhetoric,”	 and	 that	 the	
Republican	 Party	 had	 a	 much	 better	 record	 than	 Democrats	 in	 supporting	 the	
women	 who	 held	 high	 level	 government	 positions	 in	Michigan,	 including	Mary	
Coleman,	the	only	female	supreme	court	justice	in	Michigan.68	
Many	 of	 Headlee’s	 comments	 to	 and	 about	 women	 were	 incendiary	 to	
feminists	 within	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 Party.	 He	 objectified	 women	 as	 he	
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dismissed	their	concerns.	Recognizing	that	he	had	a	problem	with	half	of	the	voters	
in	the	state,	he	met	with	a	small	group	of	women	in	September	to	try	to	convince	
them	to	support	his	candidacy.	The	women,	however,	were	not	impressed	with	his	
commitment	to	equality	when	he	announced	that	“‘women	are	superior	beings.	
They	 have	 more	 money	 .	 .	 .	 because	 they	 live	 longer’–and	 they	 inherit	 their	
husbands’	money–‘and	 they’re	 pretty.’”69	He	 tried	 to	minimize	 the	 number	 and	
attack	the	legitimacy	of	the	women	who	opposed	him,	arguing	that	there	were	only	
nine	members	of	the	MRWTF	who	opposed	him	because	of	their	rabid	commitment	
to	the	ERA	and	abortion.	He	called	them	“‘irrational.	.	.	.	so	obsessed	with	this	that	
they’ve	 become	 hardened.	 They	 don’t	 even	 smile.	 They’re	 unhappy.’” 70 	He	
compared	supporters	of	the	ERA	to	members	of	“‘the	[John]	Birch	Society’	in	their	
unwillingness	 to	 come	 up	 with	 a	 compromise	 ERA	 that	 would	 allow	 for	 sexual	
differences.”71		
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Headlee	proved	that	he	was	tone-deaf	to	women’s	 issues	when	he	crassly	
equated	his	 support	 for	women	 to	his	 reproductive	prowess.	He	argued	 that	 in	
comparison	to	Blanchard	he	could	not	be	considered	anti-women	since	he	had	nine	
children	 and	 Blanchard	 only	 had	 one. 72 	He	 often	 came	 across	 as	 flip	 and	
condescending,	 like	when	he	 sarcastically	 attributed	his	belief	 that	 “women	are	
pretty”	 to	 “a	 hormonal	 imbalance.”73	Instead	 of	 reassuring	women	 that	 he	was	
committed	 to	 addressing	 their	 concerns,	 his	 comments	 proved	 that	 he	 did	 not	
understand	or	care	about	women’s	issues.	In	fact,	he	repeatedly	asserted	that	the	
ERA	and	abortion	rights	were	secondary	issues	that	were	not	as	important	as	fixing	
Michigan’s	 weak	 economy	 and	 high	 unemployment	 rate	 (while	 arguing	 that	 by	
rectifying	these	problems,	he	was	helping	women	as	well	as	men).		
Problems	between	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	and	Headlee	culminated	
on	 October	 5,	 1982,	 when	 Peterson	 and	 about	 twenty-five	 other	 Republican	
feminists	attended	a	Blanchard	fundraiser	to	publicly	announce	their	support	for	
him.	Some	felt	that	this	 luncheon	was	a	staged	event,	 intended	to	maximize	the	
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political	mileage	that	Blanchard	could	achieve	by	publicizing	his	endorsement	by	
“the	mother”	of	Michigan’s	moderate	Republican	Party.74	In	fact,	the	optics	of	the	
luncheon	supported	that	 interpretation.	Republican	women	met	with	Blanchard,	
Griffiths	and	Mrs.	Blanchard	before	the	event	and	entered	the	meeting	room	as	a	
group	 after	 all	 of	 the	 other	 attendees	 were	 seated.	Detroit	 Free	 Press	 political	
editor	Hugh	McDiarmid	concluded	that	“in	fact,	the	luncheon	was	strictly	a	set	up,	
orchestrated	 down	 to	 the	 last	 teacup	 by	 Democrats	 from	 the	 Blanchard	 for	
Governor	 Committee.	 .	 .	 .	 [T]he	 Republicans	 were	 paraded	 in	 like	 show-biz	
celebrities	on	opening	night.”75		
When	asked	about	her	endorsement	of	Democrat	Blanchard,	Peterson	cited,	
in	 addition	 to	 Headlee’s	 stand	 on	 the	 ERA	 and	 abortion	 rights,	 his	 efforts	 to	
undermine	her	long-term	work	to	diversify	the	base	of	the	Republican	Party.	She	
had	long	worked	to	bring	women	and	people	who	lived	in	the	cities,	especially	the	
African	American	 residents	of	Detroit,	 into	 the	 traditionally	white,	male,	middle	
class	Republican	Party.	She	said,	“‘I	gave	my	[sic]	15	years	of	my	life	.	.	.	24	hours	a	
day	to	build	a	broad	based	Republican	Party.	When	I	left	in	1970,	I	felt	completely	
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convinced	that	Bill	Milliken	would	carry	on	and	build	an	even	greater	Republican	
Party.	.	.	.	And	to	find	out	now	that	we	are	reversing	all	that.	.	.	.	I	guess	you	have	to	
say	I’m	a	Michigander	and	a	woman	before	I’m	a	Republican.’”76	After	the	luncheon,	
she	indicated	that	“none	of	these	women	[who	joined	her	that	day]	are	leaving	the	
Republican	Party.	.	.	.	They	just	do	not	feel	Richard	Headlee	represents	the	Party.”77	
She	indicated	that	they	orchestrated	this	public	repudiation	to	try	and	convince	the	
men	in	the	Republican	Party	to	recognize	and	respect	women,	their	interests,	and	
their	potential	political	power.78		
In	1982,	Peterson’s	feminist	activism	seemed	to	mirror	her	partisan	work	of	
1970	when	she	was	still	trying	to	convince	a	male-dominated	Republican	Party	to	
empower	women.	However,	her	 reaction	 to	 their	 leadership	decisions	was	 very	
different	in	1982,	to	a	large	extent	because	she	now	had	twelve	years	of	experience	
with	 the	 women’s	 movement.	 While	 in	 1970	 she	 indicated	 that	 she	 was	 a	
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Republican	first	and	a	woman	second,	faced	with	Headlee’s	candidacy,	Peterson	
was	forced	to	reprioritize	her	interests	and	her	partisanship	became	less	important	
than	her	gender.	She	noted,	“We	must	each	march	to	his	own	tune	.	.	.	and	mine	is	
certainly	that	 I	must	be	a	 loyal	citizen	AND	woman	before	 I	become	partisan.”79	
While	she	still	wanted	to	believe	that	the	Republican	Party	reflected	her	interests,	
she	argued	that	Headlee	was	an	illegitimate,	albeit	temporary,	representative	of	
the	party	and,	therefore,	she	could	not	support	him.		
Helen	Milliken,	who	had	just	undergone	surgery	for	breast	cancer,	was	more	
politically	handcuffed	than	Peterson	and	did	not	publicly	support	either	Headlee	or	
Blanchard	for	governor.80	Michigan	political	 journalist	Tim	Skubick	 indicated	that	
he	 repeatedly	 tried	 to	 get	 both	Governor	 and	Mrs.	Milliken	 to	 reveal	who	 they	
voted	 for	 in	 the	1982	gubernatorial	 election,	but	 they	would	never	 give	him	an	
answer.	 However,	McDiarmid,	 writing	 about	 Skubick’s	 interview,	 indicated	 that	
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while	they	would	not	respond	to	the	question,	based	on	their	disdain	for	Headlee,	
the	answer	was	apparent.81	
Some	of	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	reacted	to	Headlee	in	the	same	way	
that	Republican	feminists	responded	to	Reagan	in	1980	when	they	met	with	him	
during	 the	 national	 convention.	 Instead	 of	 prioritizing	 their	 feminism	over	 their	
partisanship,	 they	 tried	 to	 reconcile	 their	 interests	with	Headlee’s	priorities	and	
policies.	McNamee	and	Binsfeld,	for	example,	seemed	inclined	to	soften	Peterson’s	
criticism	of	Headlee.	After	they	met	with	him,	they	were	convinced	that	they	had	
been	able	to	sensitize	him	to	the	issues	that	women	deemed	important.	Moreover,	
they	believed	that	policies	and	programs	that	he	had	implemented	in	his	successful	
insurance	company	and	campaign	indicated	that	he	did	understand	their	concerns.	
They	contended	that	Headlee	“has	shown	his	commitment	to	women	by	having	a	
woman	campaign	manager,	a	day	care	center	for	his	campaign	staff,	two	women	
vice-presidents	 (actually	 they	 are	 assistant	 vice-presidents)	 as	 well	 as	 women	
managers	at	his	company	and	‘flex	time’–a	program	in	which	employes	generally	
set	 their	 own	 schedules	 to	 meet	 family	 and	 work	 obligations–for	 company	
employes.” 82 	Thus,	 they	 sought	 to	 downplay	 the	 controversial	 and	 insensitive	
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public	 comments	 that	he	made	on	 the	campaign	 trail	by	emphasizing	his	actual	
accomplishments	on	women’s	issues.	At	the	same	time,	they	tried	to	diminish	the	
importance	 of	 his	 opposition	 to	 both	 the	 ERA	 and	 abortion	 by	 emphasizing	 his	
economic	positions.	Binsfeld	noted	 that	 the	meeting	“was	a	candid	exchange	of	
ideas	and	positions,	I	learned	that	he	already	embraces	a	number	of	the	concepts	
that	we	believe	in,	and	I	believe	he	has	a	feel	for	the	economic	and	job	problems	
women	 face	 today.” 83 	They	 recharacterized	 women’s	 issues	 as	 nongendered	
“economic	 and	 job”	 issues	 so	 that	 they	 could	 continue	 to	 prioritize,	 or	 at	 least	
reconcile,	their	partisanship	with	their	feminism.	
In	 an	 interview	 with	 a	 student	 journalist	 at	 Central	 Michigan	 University	
towards	the	end	of	the	campaign,	Headlee	criticized	those	who	supported	the	ERA	
in	a	comment	that	the	Harvard	Crimson	called,	“the	gaffe	of	the	year.”84	He	stated	
that	“those	people	that	sponsor	the	ERA–and	it	doesn’t	mention	women	anywhere	
in	the	ERA,	it	doesn’t	mention	women’s	rights	anywhere	in	it,	it	talks	about	sex–
they	are	the	proponents	of	lesbian	marriage,	homosexual	marriage,	things	of	that	
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nature,	which	I	categorically	resist,	categorically	reject	as	part	of	a	basis	of	a	sound	
society.”85	This	 comment	was	 very	 similar	 to	 the	public	 statement	 that	Romney	
made	about	the	ERA	in	1979.	The	similarity	was	most	likely	more	than	coincidental,	
however,	 as	Romney	 and	Headlee	were	both	Mormons	 and	Romney	 supported	
Headlee’s	candidacy	for	governor.		
Like	Romney,	Headlee	was	criticized	for	this	statement	and	soon	tried	to	walk	
it	back.	He	indicated	that	he	was	not	referring	to	supporters	of	the	ERA,	but	to	the	
Michigan	Women’s	Assembly	III,	which	had	just	come	out	with	a	candidate	ranking	
that	placed	him	far	below	his	opponent,	 largely	due	to	his	positions	on	abortion	
and	the	ERA.	The	Michigan	Women’s	Assembly	III	was	a	bipartisan,	collaborative	
meeting	 of	 almost	 thirty	 feminist	 women’s	 groups	 from	 around	 the	 state.	 The	
group	met	in	June	1982	to	find	ways	to	use	the	political	power	of	women	to	further	
their	feminist	interests	in	Michigan.	It	endorsed	a	new	ERA,	access	to	abortion	and	
lesbian	and	homosexual	rights.	These	women	organized	to	support	candidates	in	
the	November	1982	election	who	backed	their	goals	and	objectives.86	
Headlee	issued	the	following	statement	to	explain	his	earlier	comment:		
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My	 comments	 were	made	 in	 reference	 to	 some	 of	 the	 resolutions	
contained	 in	 the	Women’s	Assembly	 III	platform	such	as	 support	of	
lesbian	 and	 homosexual	 marriage,	 lesbian	 and	 homosexual	 child	
custody	 and	 adoption	 rights	 and	 permitting	minors	 to	 obtain	 birth	
control	pills	and	abortions	without	parental	knowledge	and	consent.	
Obviously	 every	 supporter	 of	 the	 ERA	 or	 every	 member	 of	 the	
Women’s	Assembly	III	does	not	support	these	provisions.	However,	as	
a	 group	 of	 28	 self-described	 feminist	 organizations	 the	 Women’s	
Assembly	 III	 has	 endorsed	 them	 knowing	 that	 this	 hidden	 agenda	
might	 well	 be	 enacted	 by	 courts	 interpreting	 the	 equal	 rights	
amendment.	It	is	that	very	real	possibility	that	caused	me	and	many	
others	 to	 oppose	 the	 Equal	 Rights	 Amendment	 as	 proposed	 even	
though	I	fully	support	equal	rights	for	women.87	
	
His	running	mate	was	equally	critical	of	the	Assembly.	He	called	it	“‘a	very	radical	
organization’	 that	 wants	 ‘power	 for	 women’	 and	 ‘sets	 women	 against	men.’”88	
Brennan	stated	that	many	of	Headlee’s	other	statements	were	just	jokes	that	were	
misinterpreted	 because	 of	 the	 preconceived	 notions	 that	 women	 had	 about	
Headlee.	 He	 also	 suggested	 that	 critics	 of	 the	 Headlee-Brennan	 ticket	 were	
engaged	 in	 religious	 discrimination	 because	 the	 two	 men	 were	 Mormon	 and	
Catholic,	respectively.	“The	Democrats	are	‘trying	to	make	us	look	like	the	guys	who	
are	trying	to	keep	the	women	barefoot	and	pregnant	in	the	kitchen.’”89	These	men	
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seemed	 unable	 to	 craft	 a	 narrative	 that	 responded	 to	 the	 concerns	 of	 women	
voters.		
In	 fact,	 none	of	 the	explanations	offered	by	 the	Republican	 candidate	 for	
governor	or	his	running	mate	helped	him	win	the	governorship.	He	lost	the	election	
by	51	to	45	percent,	despite	the	fact	that	more	men	voted	for	Headlee.	Headlee	
lost	 largely	because	six	out	of	every	ten	women	voted	for	Blanchard.90	Thus,	the	
gender	gap	proved	to	be	significant	in	this	election.	Milliken	biographer	Dempsey	
noted	 that	 Headlee	 “spoke	 candidly	 and	 sometimes	 with	 devastating	 invective	
about	his	conservative	political	views.	While	that	appealed	to	conservative	voters,	
the	trait	likely	cost	him	the	governor’s	job–and	all	because	one	of	the	targets	he	
chose	to	attack	was	the	pro-Equal	Rights	Amendment	position	of	Helen	Milliken,	
the	 first	 lady	of	Michigan.”91	Ironically,	Republican	 feminists	Peterson	and	Helen	
Milliken	helped	 to	 turn	women	voters	away	 from	the	Republican	candidate	and	
contributed	 to	 the	 electoral	 victory	 of	 Democrat	 Blanchard.	 Their	 feminism	
trumped	their	partisanship.	
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Republican	feminists	did	not	fare	well	in	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	after	
the	 1982	 election.	Despite	Headlee’s	 loss,	 conservatives	 retained	 control	 of	 the	
party	and	Republican	women	disagreed	over	who	should	represent	them.	In	1983	
conservative	women	prevailed.	Angered	by	 the	 fact	 that	many	members	 of	 the	
MRWTF,	 including	 its	 newly	 elected	 leader,	 publicly	 supported	Blanchard	 in	 the	
1982	election,	conservatives	were	able	to	convince	Republican	Party	leadership	to	
declare	“that	the	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force	‘has	no	official	connection	with	
this	party	and	no	franchise	to	speak	for	Republican	women.’”92		Since	their	liberal	
views	 were	 no	 longer	 consistent	 with	 those	 of	 the	 party,	 conservative	 women	
purged	 the	 MRWTF	 as	 the	 face	 of	 women	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 Although	
Republican	 feminists	and	conservative	women	had	battled	 for	at	 least	 ten	years	
over	 which	 group	 best	 represented	 women	 in	 the	 party,	 the	 latter	 had	 finally	
prevailed	 and,	 in	 doing	 so,	 made	 moderate	 feminists	 feel	 ostracized	 and	
unwelcome.93		
																																																						
92	Fireman,	“Angry	GOP	Women	Disown	Task	Force,”	June	26,	1983;	Maxine	Swanson	to	
Spencer	Abraham,	July	6,	1983,	box	17,	folder:	Elly	Peterson	correspondence	1980-1985,	
Peterson	Papers.	
	
93	Fireman,	“Angry	GOP	Women	Disown	Task	Force,”	June	26,	1983.	
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Some	members	of	the	party	were	incensed	by	the	way	it	treated	the	women	
who	chose	Blanchard	over	Headlee.	Lou	Cramton,	who	had	served	as	a	Republican	
member	 of	 the	Michigan	 legislature,	 asked	 Spencer	 Abraham,	 chairman	 of	 the	
Michigan	Republican	Party,	“How	do	I	transfer	out	of	this	chicken	outfit?	I’ve	been	
a	working,	voting	and	contributing	Republican	for	more	years	than	I	like	to	admit	
but	reading	of	the	purging	of	the	party	of	people--such	outstanding	Republicans	as	
Maxine	 Swanson,	 Elly	 Peterson,	 Helen	 Milliken	 and	 others	 in	 the	 Women’s	
Republican	 Task	 Force--who	 are	 branded	 as	 disloyal	 sinners	 by	 the	 more	
conservative	 element	 of	 our	 part--leaves	 me	 looking	 for	 the	 exit.” 94 	Cramton	
accurately	 identified	the	problem	that	the	party	 faced.95	It	needed	to	expand	 its	
membership,	not	exile	members	who	did	not	agree	with	its	turn	to	the	right.	He	
queried,	“Is	a	purge	going	to	bring	those	women--and	their	votes,	and	their	efforts	
and	their	contributions	back	into	the	fold?”96	The	big	tent	approach	advocated	by	
Peterson,	Milliken	and	other	moderate	Republicans	was	abandoned	on	ideological	
																																																						
94	Lou	Cramton	to	Spencer	Abraham,	June	27,	1983,	box	17,	folder:	Elly	Peterson	
Correspondence	1980-1985,	Peterson	Papers.		
	
95	Cramton	praised	these	women	for	prioritizing	their	feminism	over	their	Republicanism	
when	they	publicly	endorsed	Blanchard.	Noting	that	“these	women	didn’t	desert	their	party;	
someone	has	stolen	it,”	Cramton	indicated	that	was	also	going	to	vote	for	Blanchard	in	1982.	
Letters	to	the	Editor,	Detroit	Free	Press,	October	27,	1982.	
	
96	Cramton	to	Abraham,	June	27,	1983.	
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grounds	and	it	left	many	Republican	men	and	women	worried	about	the	future	of	
the	party.	
The	 presidential	 election	 of	 1980	 and	 the	 gubernatorial	 election	 of	 1982	
made	it	clear	that	conservatives	had	taken	control	of	both	the	national	and	state	
Republican	 parties.	 While	 Republican	 feminists	 tried	 their	 best	 “to	 maintain	 a	
feminist	 presence	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party,”	 their	 efforts	 had	 largely	 failed.	
Conservatives	rejected	that	presence	when	they	purged	the	feminist	MRWTF	from	
the	Michigan	Republican	Party.	At	the	same	time,	they	did	not	fare	much	better	in	
“maintain[ing]	 a	 Republican	 presence	 in	 the	 feminist	 movement.”	 The	 NWPC	
seemed	unwilling	or	unable	to	work	with	a	conservative	Republican	Party	because	
the	 Republican	 candidates	 it	 supported,	 once	 elected,	 could	 not	 reconcile	 and	
oftentimes	prioritized	the	party	over	their	feminism.	As	a	result,	the	NWPC	seemed	
willing	to	jeopardize	the	strength	that	it	derived	from	its	multipartisan	constituency	
by	 cutting	 ties	 with	 a	 conservative	 Republican	 Party.	 Michigan’s	 Republican	
feminists	had	tried	to	maintain	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	movement	in	
order	 to	 reconcile	 their	 core	 identities–feminism	 and	 Republicanism–but	 that	
strategy	ultimately	failed.	They	were	each	left	to	process	these	contradictions	on	
their	own.
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CHAPTER	8	CONCLUSION	
Not	only	is	it	our	right	as	women	to	actively	participate	in	government,	but	it’s	
time	for	the	female	half	of	our	population	to	accept	its	full	share	of	responsibility	
for	governing.	
–Connie	Binsfeld	
	
Peterson	turned	seventy	in	1984,	and	her	friends	and	colleagues	planned	a	
large	 party	 to	 celebrate	 the	 occasion.	 Organizers	 designated	 the	 proceeds,	
naturally,	 to	the	MRWTF.	Since	women	 in	the	Michigan	Republican	Party,	which	
was	 no	 longer	 affiliated	 with	 the	 MRWTF,	 were	 at	 odds,	 at	 least	 one	 political	
commentator	wondered	if	the	event	would	become	a	political	free	for	all.	Instead,	
it	 was	 a	 bipartisan	 lovefest.	 Many	 of	 the	 state’s	 Democratic	 leaders,	 including	
Senator	Donald	Riegle	and	Lieutenant	Governor	Martha	Griffiths,	came	to	honor	
Peterson.	George	Romney	and	Mr.	and	Mrs.	Milliken	attended.	Even	conservative	
Republicans,	 such	as	Headlee’s	1982	running	mate	Thomas	Brennan,	and	 future	
governor	John	Engler,	who	would	select	Binsfeld	as	his	running	mate	in	1990,	came	
to	honor	Peterson.	Martha	Griffiths	offered	the	following	tribute:	“‘In	my	judgment,	
Elly	Peterson	is	the	brightest	politician	this	state	has	had	in	this	century,	Democrat	
or	Republican,	man	or	woman,	black	or	white.’”1	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists,	
including	 Peterson,	 had	 tried	 to	 work	 within	 the	 Republican	 Party	 to	 make	 it	
																																																						
1	Hugh	McDiarmid,	“Bipartisan	Tribute	to	a	Ticket	Splitter,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	June	12,	
1984.		
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inclusive	 and	 responsive	 to	 the	 concerns	 of	 all,	 including	 women	 who	 sought	
gender	 equality.	 How	 ironic	 that	 the	 proceeds	 of	 this	 tribute	 to	 her	 long	 and	
successful	 career,	 which	 she	 had	 dedicated	 to	 both	 the	 Republican	 Party	 and	
women’s	equality,	went	to	a	feminist	women’s	organization	tied	to	the	Republican	
Party	in	name	only.		
By	1984	the	terms	“Republican”	and	“feminist”	were	widely	considered	to	
be	 antithetical,	 forcing	 each	of	 the	 seven	women	 studied	 in	 this	 dissertation	 to	
individually	decide	how	to	reconcile	her	feminism	with	her	Republicanism.	Three	
of	 them	either	officially	 or	 effectively	 left	 the	party	by	 retiring	 from	Republican	
Party	 politics.	 Lee	 Kefauver	 moved	 back	 to	 Massachusetts	 in	 1982,	 where	 she	
registered	as	a	Democrat.	In	light	of	her	frequent	criticisms	of	William	Milliken	and	
the	Michigan	Republican	Party,	and	her	passionate	commitment	to	abortion	rights	
for	all	women,	her	political	shift	was	not	surprising.	As	a	Democrat,	she	continued	
to	 fight	 for	 equal	 access	 to	 abortion	 and	wrote	 frequently	 about	 the	misogyny	
inherent	in	the	pro-life	movement.	For	example,	in	2009	she	asserted	that	people	
who	argue	that	life	begins	at	conception	are	“fetus	fetishists”	who	cannot	claim	to	
be	concerned	about	life	because	they	do	not	care	about	the	lives	of	the	pregnant	
women.	She	concluded	that	“in	my	years	of	experience	dealing	with	these	fetus	
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fetishists,	 I	 would	 add	 that	 they	 are	 the	 ultimate	 misogynists.” 2 	Kefauver	 is	
apparently	still	living	in	Massachusetts.		
After	 campaigning	 for	 independent	 candidate	 Anderson	 in	 1980,	 Beebe	
remained	disillusioned	about	the	Michigan	Republican	Party.	She	was	convinced	
that,	going	back	to	1966,	the	party	had	not	supported	her	candidacies.	In	1983	she	
announced	that	“there’s	no	way	I	want	to	be	identified	with	the	Republican	Party	
as	 it	 is	now.”3	While	 she	continued	her	 longstanding	 support	 for	abortion	 rights	
through	her	participation	 in	Planned	Parenthood,	there	 is	no	 indication	that	she	
remained	involved	in	politics	after	1980.4	She	died	in	2005	at	the	age	of	ninety-five.		
In	1984,	McNamee	retired	from	the	Michigan	House	of	Representatives	at	
the	age	of	sixty.	She	decided	that	it	was	time	for	her	to	resign	because	she	was	out	
of	place	as	 a	moderate	 in	 an	 increasingly	 conservative	Republican	Party.5	When	
																																																						
2	Lee	Kefauver,	Letter	to	the	Editor,	“Life	Begins	at	Some	Point,”	Progressive	Populist,	
September	1,	2009,	http://www.populist.com/09.15.letters.html.	
	
3	Ken	Fireman,	“Feminists	to	Fight	for	Voice	in	GOP,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	June	28,	1983.	
	
4	Jacquelynn	Boyle,	“A	Revelation	that	Stunned	Colleagues,”	Detroit	Free	Press,	June	29,	
1989.	
	
5	Sandra	Combs	Birdiett,	“McNamee’s	Seen	Politics	Come	a	Long	Way:	But	Birmingham	
State	Legislator	Thinks	the	Best	is	Yet	to	Come,”	Oakland	Press,	September	9,	1984,	box	1,	
folder:	Ruth	Braden	McNamee	Biographical,	Newspaper	Articles	1964-1984,	McNamee	Papers;	
Charlie	Cain,	“Her	Deciding	Vote	Defies	White	House	Plea,”	Detroit	News,	September	14,	1984.		
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asked	if	she	had	ever	considered	becoming	a	Democrat,	she	responded,	“No.	.	.	.	
I’m	needed	in	my	own	party	as	a	liberal–well,	a	moderate	Republican.	And	I	am	a	
Republican.	I	believe	in	private	enterprise,	private	initiatives	to	solve	problems.	I	
just	want	some	women’s	voices	to	be	heard	in	decision-making.”6	After	she	retired	
from	public	office,	it	does	not	appear	that	she	ever	reengaged	in	politics.	She	chose	
to	reconcile	her	interests	by	largely	withdrawing	from	the	public	sphere.	She	died	
in	2006	at	the	age	of	eighty-five.	
Peterson	 prioritized	 her	 feminism	 over	 her	 partisanship	 in	 the	 1982	
gubernatorial	 election.	 Perhaps	 hoping	 that	 conservative	 control	 over	 the	 party	
was	temporary,	she	clarified	that	her	support	for	Blanchard	did	not	mean	that	she	
had	left	the	party.	Instead,	she	argued	that	Headlee’s	Republican	Party	was	not	the	
party	for	which	she	had	worked	for	so	many	years.	The	party	had	changed,	not	her.	
She	noted,	“MY	Republican	Party	is	open	to	all,	and	it	is	not	necessary	that	we	think	
precisely	alike,	as	we	goose	step	along.”7	Years	later,	however,	she	announced	that	
																																																						
6	Ruth	McNamee,	interview	by	Lois	Leonard,	“Religion	and	Politics	Don’t	Mix,”	The	
Record,	September	1984,	box	1,	folder:	Ruth	Braden	McNamee	Biographical	Vita	and	Overview	
Articles,	McNamee	Papers.		
	
7	James	N.	Crutchfield,	“Peterson	Won’t	‘Goose	Step’	with	the	State	GOP,”	Detroit	Free	
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306	
she	had	become	an	independent.8	In	2008	shortly	before	she	died,	she	endorsed	
Democrat	Hillary	Clinton	for	president.		
Although	 Helen	 Milliken,	 understandably,	 was	 always	 somewhat	 reticent	
about	 publicly	 opposing	 the	 Republican	 Party,	 it	 appears	 that	 she	 voted	 for	
Blanchard	 in	 1982.	 Thereafter,	 she	 seemed	 increasingly	 likely	 to	 back	 the	
candidates	who	 agreed	with	 her	 on	 the	 issues	 that	were	 important	 to	 her	 as	 a	
feminist.	Thus,	she	repudiated	conservative	Republican	John	Engler	and	endorsed	
Democrat	 Blanchard	 for	 governor	 in	 1990	 and	 Democrat	 Howard	 Wolpe	 for	
governor	in	1994,	largely	because	they	were	pro-choice.9	Wolpe	asked	her	to	run	
as	 his	 lieutenant	 governor,	 but	 she	 decided	 not	 to	 enter	 the	 race.	 While	 she	
remained	 active	 fighting	 for	 ERA	 and	 abortion	 rights,	 she	 came	 to	 believe	 that	
abortion	was	of	vital	importance	because	“‘all	other	rights’	of	a	woman	[were]	of	
‘limited	value’	without	the	right	to	choose	when	to	bear	children.”10	She	remained	
largely	uninvolved	with	a	Republican	Party	that	did	not	reflect	her	 interests	as	a	
woman.	But	when	she	died	in	2012	at	the	age	of	eighty-nine,	George	Weeks,	one	
																																																						
8	Peterson,	interview	by	William	Ballenger,	Michigan	Political	History	Society,	part	6.	
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of	Governor	Milliken’s	 long-time	 assistants,	 noted	 that	 he	did	 not	 believe	 “that	
Helen	Milliken	left	the	Republican	Party.	‘I	think	she	was	an	advocate	of	the	party	
returning	 to	 what	 she	 thought	 of	 as	 its	 roots.	 .	 .	 .	 She	 was	 clearly	 a	 flaming	
moderate.’”11	She	 had	 evolved	 from	a	 childhood	 steeped	 in	 conservatism	 to	 an	
adult	life	devoted	to	moderate	and	liberal	causes.	
Even	after	the	Republican	Party’s	rightward	turn,	a	small	feminist	presence	
remained	in	the	party.	Burnett	continued	to	try	to	integrate	her	politics	with	her	
gender	 as	 an	 active	 feminist	 and	 vocal	 Republican,	 but	 she	 never	 became	 a	
candidate	 for	 public	 office.	 She	 supported	 freedom	 of	 reproductive	 choice,	
including	government	 funded	abortions	 for	poor	women,	and	tried	to	moderate	
the	Republican	Party’s	opposition	to	abortion	from	within.	In	1988,	Burnett	spoke	
before	 the	 Michigan	 Republican	 State	 Convention	 in	 favor	 of	 abortion	 rights,	
including	 Medicaid-funded	 abortions	 for	 poor	 women.	 She	 indicated	 that	 she	
“completely	respect[ed]	and	honor[ed]	other	people’s	right	to	object	to	abortion,	
based	on	their	own	personal	religious	or	moral	beliefs.	All	I	ask	is	that	those	who	
are	pro-life	will	let	us	who	are	pro-choice	decide	for	ourselves,	just	as	they	decide	
for	 themselves.” 12 	She	 cloaked	 her	 argument	 in	 familiar,	 fiscally	 conservative	
																																																						
11	Ibid.	
	
12	Burnett,	True	Colors,	33.	
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rhetoric,	noting	that	abortions	were	less	expensive	than	raising	unwanted	children.	
Most	of	them,	she	believed,	became	a	part	of	the	state	welfare	system.	Even	as	
adults,	they	were	less	likely	to	become	successful,	productive	members	of	society.	
She	believed	that	opposition	 to	abortion	“was	sexism	 in	an	unholy	alliance	with	
religion.	There	are	a	lot	of	men	who	are	not	comfortable	with	the	idea	of	women	
having	control	over	their	own	bodies.	(Next	thing	you	know,	I	imagine	they	must	
be	 thinking,	 they’ll	 want	 control	 over	 their	 own	 money.)	 Denying	 them	 this	
fundamental	right	is	a	lot	easier	when	you’ve	convinced	yourself	that’s	what	God	
wants,	too.”13	After	her	speech,	the	Republican	audience	booed.14		
Burnett	was	also	critical	of	the	feminist	movement	which,	she	believed,	had	
been	taken	over	by	radicals	who	discouraged	participation	by	women	who	were	
not	like	them.	She	was	one	of	those	women.	Based	on	her	experiences,	she	was	
convinced	 that	 radical	 feminists	 believed	 that	 her	 wealth	 in	 some	 way	
compromised	her	commitment	to	feminism.	Moreover,	she	argued	that	NOW	was	
intolerant	of	feminists	who	were	Republicans	because	of	the	party’s	stance	on	the	
ERA	and	abortion.	Despite	the	differences	between	feminism	and	Republicanism,	
																																																						
13	Ibid.,	33-34.	
	
14	Ibid.,	32.	
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she	continued	to	believe	that	they	could	be	reconciled.	She	described	herself	as	“a	
fiscal	conservative	.	.	.	[and]	a	radical	feminist	to	the	core.	My	mission	.	.	.	is	to	be	a	
thorn	in	the	side	of	my	party	pricking	its	conscience.”	15	Shortly	before	she	died,	she	
gave	an	interview	in	which	she	exhorted	women	to	become	Republicans	and	to	get	
involved	in	the	political	process.16	Burnett	remained	a	Republican	feminist	until	her	
death	 in	 2014	 at	 the	 age	 of	 ninety-four.	 Throughout	 her	 long	 life,	 she	 was	
“committed	 to	 maintaining	 a	 feminist	 presence	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party	 and	 a	
Republican	presence	in	the	feminist	movement.”17	
Binsfeld	also	 remained	 in	 the	party,	but	adopted	a	different	 strategy.	She	
worked	from	within	to	promote	equality	for	women,	but	tried	to	do	so	in	a	way	
that	 did	 not	 alienate	 her	 conservative	 colleagues.	 Because	 she	 was	 a	 pro-life	
Republican	feminist,	she	started	from	a	position	that	was	perhaps	more	acceptable	
to	party	 leaders.	Thus,	she	served	 in	the	Michigan	Senate	from	1982	until	1990,	
when	 she	was	 elected	 lieutenant	 governor	 under	 conservative	 Republican	 John	
Engler.	 She	 held	 that	 position	 for	 the	 next	 eight	 years.	 Binsfeld	 referenced	 the	
																																																						
15	Ibid.,	100-101.	
	
16	Patricia	Hill	Burnett,	Interview	by	Cherie	Wyatt	Rolfe,	Oakland	County	NOW,	video,	
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17	Position	Statement,	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Task	Force,	n.d.	
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confusing	fluidity	of	 the	 ideological	 labels	attached	to	feminists	when	she	noted	
that	she	“came	down	here	[to	the	1980	Republican	National	Convention]	thinking	
I	was	a	moderate.	.	.	.	‘In	the	Michigan	House,	I’m	considered	a	conservative,’	she	
added.	‘But	on	this	committee,	I	was	probably	considered	a	flaming	liberal.’”18	
In	 addition	 to	 her	 work	 promoting	 sex	 education	 in	 Michigan’s	 schools,	
Binsfeld	put	forth	other	compromise	strategies	which	reflected	and	integrated	her	
moderate	 feminism	 with	 the	 conservatism	 of	 her	 Republican	 colleagues.	 For	
example,	in	1983	she	cofounded	the	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Caucus	as	“a	
voluntary,	nonprofit,	unincorporated	committee	of	Republican	women	who	are	or	
were	elected	or	appointed	public	officials,	or	who	are	working	or	have	worked	in	
positions	affecting	public	policy.	It	is	not	affiliated	with	any	other	organization.”19	
This	 organization	 incorporated	 Reagan’s	 goals,	 noting	 that	 “the	 purpose	 of	 the	
MRWC	is	to	promote	a	policy	of	equal	opportunity	for	women,	and	to	recognize	
the	 important	contributions	women	make	to	the	economy	and	the	government.	
The	 MRWC	 will	 focus	 on	 issues	 of	 economic	 equality,	 and	 will	 expand	 upon	
																																																						
18	Anderson,	“‘Fast	Gavel’	Thwarts	Binsfeld	ERA	Hopes,”	Traverse	City	Record-Eagle,	July	
16,	1980.	
	
19	Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Caucus	,n.d.,	box	7,	folder	11:	Connie	Binsfeld	
Republican	Women	1981-88,	1991,	accession	no.	MS	99-19,	Binsfeld	Papers.		
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President	Reagan’s.	and	the	Republican	Party’s,	efforts	and	achievements	for	the	
benefit	of	all	American	women.”20		
Binsfeld	remained	an	advocate	for	the	ERA	because	she	believed	that	it	was	
essential	 for	 women	 to	 have	 constitutional	 protection	 against	 legislators	 who	
answered	 to	 the	political	whims	of	 their	 constituents.	After	 the	ERA	 ratification	
period	 expired	 in	 1982,	 she	 proposed	 that	 the	 Republican	 Party	 endorse	 a	 less	
controversial	version	of	the	ERA	that	could	not	be	interpreted	to	protect	abortion	
rights.	 She	 sought	 a	 statement	 in	 the	 1984	 party	 platform	 that	 endorsed	 the	
following	proposed	constitutional	amendment:	“Equality	of	 rights	under	 the	 law	
shall	not	be	denied	or	abridged	by	the	United	States	or	any	state	on	the	basis	of	
whether	 a	 person	 is	 male	 or	 female.”21	President	 Reagan,	 she	 argued,	 “should	
support	a	modified	equal	rights	amendment	because:	a.	It	is	right;	b.	The	majority	
of	the	people	want	it;	c.	It	will	help	his	re-election	by	making	the	Democrats	focus	
on	 something	 else;	 d.	 The	 Republican	 Party	 has	 always	 been	 the	 champion	 of	
equality	before	the	law	as	the	cornerstone	on	which	all	that	we	value	rests.”22	She	
																																																						
20	Ibid.	
	
21	Senator	Connie	Binsfeld,	“Equal	Rights	Under	the	Law,”	Statement	to	Platform	
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recognized	that	women	had	needs	that	were	different	from	their	male	colleagues	
in	 the	 Republican	 Party.	 They	 shared	 a	 common	 identity	 and	 an	 interest	 in	
protecting	 themselves,	 not	 just	 as	 economic	 actors,	 but	 also	 as	 women.	 She	
continued	 to	dedicate	her	political	 career	 to	helping	women	and	 children	while	
remaining	true	to	her	Republicanism	and	her	feminism.	After	serving	for	for	eight	
years	 as	 a	 Michigan	 state	 senator	 and	 two	 terms	 as	 lieutenant	 governor	 for	
conservative	Republican	John	Engler,	she	retired	in	1998,	and	died	in	2014	at	the	
age	of	eighty-nine.		
This	 dissertation	 illustrates	 that	 throughout	 the	 1970s,	 Michigan’s	
Republican	feminists	appropriated	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	movement	
to	maintain	a	feminist	presence	in	the	Republican	Party	and	a	Republican	presence	
in	the	feminist	movement.	In	this	way,	they	were	able	to	reconcile	and	promote	
two	of	their	core	identities–Republicanism	and	feminism.	For	a	while	this	strategy	
worked.	However,	as	the	Republican	Party	became	more	conservative,	they	found	
themselves	unable	to	simultaneously	promote	both	interests.	The	NWPC	did	not	
want	to	work	with	a	conservative	Republican	Party	that	challenged	its	raison	d’etre.	
Even	 the	NWPC	 leaders	who	vowed	 to	 try	 to	change	 the	Republican	Party	 from	
within	eventually	gave	up	and	joined	the	Democratic	Party.	In	trying	to	represent	
feminists	 in	 the	 Republican	 Party,	 Michigan’s	 Republican	 feminists	 became	 an	
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integral	part	of	the	struggle	between	moderates	and	conservatives	for	control	of	
the	party.	They	had	no	choice	but	to	partner	with	party	moderates	to	neutralize	
the	 conservatism	 that	 threatened	 their	 existence.	 In	 1980	 and	 1982,	 the	
nominations	 of	 conservatives	 to	 the	 highest	 national	 and	 state	 elective	 offices	
signaled	 that	 conservatives	 had	 won	 control	 of	 the	 party.	 As	 historians	 have	
concluded,	 the	 feminist	 movement	 was	 one	 of	 the	 losers	 in	 the	 conservative	
ascendency.	Beebe,	Kefauver,	 Peterson,	Milliken	and	McNamee	prioritized	 their	
feminism	over	their	partisanship	and	reluctantly	retired	from	politics	and/or	fled	
the	party.		
However,	Burnett	and	Binsfeld	remained	active	in	Republican	Party	politics.	
Burnett	continued	the	strategy	she	used	in	the	1970s,	trying	to	moderate	both	the	
feminist	political	organizations	to	which	she	belonged	and	the	Republican	Party.	
She	died	fighting	and	frustrated	that	that	NOW	and	the	NWPC	were	increasingly	
liberal	and	the	Republican	Party	remained	largely	conservative.	Binsfeld,	who	was	
always	closer	to	the	conservative	movement	because	of	her	position	on	abortion,	
tried	a	different	strategy.	She	used	her	elective	office	to	work	with	Republican	Party	
leadership	on	women’s	rights,	which	sometimes	required	her	to	compromise.	As	a	
result,	 her	 strategies	 and	 goals	 became	 less	 robust	 than	 those	 that	Michigan’s	
Republican	feminists	had	pursued	in	the	1970s.	If	not	a	strong	feminist	presence,	
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for	 almost	 twenty-five	 years	 Binsfeld	 reminded	Republicans,	 through	her	words	
and	deeds,	that	women	needed	to	be	involved	in	politics	as	equal	participants.	Her	
activism	suggests	that	both	feminist	and	political	historians	need	to	further	explore	
the	role	that	Ziegler’s	pro-life	feminists	played	in	the	Republican	Party.	
While	the	conservative	ascendency	largely	strangled	the	feminist	presence	
in	the	Republican	Party,	 the	activism	of	Republican	feminists	nevertheless	had	a	
long-term,	political	impact.	In	2011,	revisiting	her	earlier	work,	Rymph	suggested	
that	the	Republican	Party	had	changed.	She	noted	that	in	the	1970s,	there	were	
“political	feminists,”	including	Republican	feminists,	who	sought	to	make	sure	“that	
more	women	be	elected	to	public	office	and	serve	as	leaders	in	the	political	parties,	
and	that	feminist	issues	be	advanced	through	the	political	system.”23	While	she	was	
not	willing	to	identify	a	rebirth	of	Republican	feminism	in	the	twenty-first	century	
Republican	Party,	she	did	indicate	that	“Americans,	including	Republicans,	seem	to	
have	 accepted–and	 in	 some	 cases	 even	 grown	 to	 appreciate–transformations	
propelled	by	the	women’s	movement,	while	remaining	wary	of	or	hostile	to	liberal	
feminism	itself.”24	This	dissertation	describes,	on	a	grass	roots	level,	the	genesis	of	
this	change.	
																																																						
23	Rymph,	“Political	Feminism,”	137.	
	
24	Ibid.,	145.	
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In	 fact,	 recent	 polls	 support	 Rymph’s	 conclusion.	 They	 suggest	 that	
Republicans	have	embraced	some	of	the	basic	principles	of	Michigan’s	Republican	
feminists.	 For	 example,	 in	 October	 2015,	 90	 percent	 of	 Republicans	 surveyed	
agreed	that	they	“would	support	an	amendment	to	the	United	States	Constitution	
that	 guarantees	 equal	 rights	 for	 both	men	 and	women.”25	According	 to	 a	 2013	
Huffington	Post	poll,	76	percent	of	Republicans	said	“that	men	and	women	should	
be	social,	political	and	economic	equals,”	yet	only	5	percent	of	the	people	surveyed	
called	 themselves	 feminists.26 	Thus,	 these	 polls	 indicate	 that	 most	 Republicans	
believe	in	gender	equality	and	are	willing	to	support	a	constitutional	amendment	
that	guarantees	that	equality.	If	these	surveys	are	to	be	believed,	many	of	the	ideas	
about	gender	equality	espoused	by	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	have	survived,	
but	are	no	longer	linked	to	feminism.	Instead,	they	are	now	mainstream	beliefs	that	
have	been	adopted	at	the	grassroots	level	not	just	by	the	5	percent	of	Republicans	
who	identify	as	feminists,	but	by	three	quarters	of	the	party’s	members.	This	is	the	
legacy	of	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists.	
	 	
																																																						
25	ERA	Coalition/Fund	for	Women’s	Equality,	June	17,	2016,	eracoalition.org.	
	
26	Emily	Swanson,	“Poll:	Few	Identify	as	Feminists,	But	Most	Believe	in	Equality	of	
Sexes,”	Huffington	Post,	April	16,	2013,	huffingtonpost.com.	By	way	of	contrast,	87	percent	of	
Democrats	indicated	that	they	believed	in	gender	equality,	but	only	32	percent	called	
themselves	feminists.	
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APPENDIX-TIMELINE	
1910	–	Lorraine	Beebe	born	
	
1914	–	Elly	Peterson	born	
	
1920	–	19th	Amendment	ratified	
	 		Patricia	Hill	Burnett	born	
	
1921	–	Ruth	McNamee	born	
	
1922	–	Helen	Milliken	born	
	
1923	–	ERA	first	introduced	in	Congress	
	
1924	–	Connie	Binsfeld	born	
	 		Phyllis	Schlafly	born	
	
1934	–	Lee	Kefauver	born	
	
1950s	–	Conservative	movement	begins	to	coalesce		
	
1962	–	George	Romney	elected	governor	of	Michigan	(two-year	term)	
	
1964	–	Romney	re-elected	as	governor	of	Michigan	(two-year	term)	
	 		Milliken	elected	lieutenant	governor	of	Michigan	
	 		Barry	Goldwater	loses	bid	for	US	president	
		Peterson	unsuccessfully	runs	for	US	Senate	from	Michigan	
	
1965	–	Peterson	becomes	first	female	chairman	of	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	
	 		Peterson	orchestrates	moderate	takeover	of	RWFM	leadership	
	 		Ruth	McNamee	elected	to	Birmingham	City	Commission	
	
1966	–	Romney	reelected	as	governor	of	Michigan	(four-year	term)	
	 		Beebe	elected	to	Michigan	Senate	(four-year	term)	
	 		NOW	Founded	
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1967	–	Legislative	efforts	begin	in	Michigan	to	legalize	abortion	
	
1960s	–	Beginnings	of	Second	Wave	Feminism	
	
1969	–	Milliken	becomes	governor	of	Michigan		
	 		Beebe	reveals	her	abortion	before	Michigan	Senate	
	 		Peterson	becomes	assistant	chairman	of	the	RNC	
	 		Burnett	establishes	first	Michigan	chapter	of	NOW	
	
1970	–	Peterson	resigns	as	assistant	chairman	of	the	RNC	
	 		Beebe	loses	her	bid	for	reelection	to	Michigan	Senate	
	 		Michigan	Democratic	Women’s	Caucus	established	
	 		McNamee	elected	Mayor	of	Birmingham	
	 		Michigan	Republican	Party	endorses	abortion	reform	
	 		Milliken	elected	governor	of	Michigan	(four-year	term)	
	
1971	–	NWPC	founded	
	 		MWPC	founded	
	 		HOW	founded	
	 		Michigan	Women’s	Abortion	Suit	filed	
	
1972	–	ERA	passed	by	US	Congress	
	 		ERA	ratified	by	Michigan	legislature	
	 		STOP	ERA	founded	by	Phyllis	Schlafly	
	 		Plaintiffs	win	Michigan’s	Women’s	Abortion	Suit	in	trial	court		
	 		Michigan	Abortion	Referendum	placed	on	November	ballot,	but	defeated	
	 		Republican	Convention	held	in	Miami	Beach	
	 							Platform	contains	pro-ERA	plank	and	supports	abortion	
	
1973	–	Roe	v.	Wade	decided	by	US	Supreme	Court	
	 		First	NWPC	conference	held	
	 		Mary	Coleman	elected	first	female	Michigan	Supreme	Court	Justice	
	
1974	–	McNamee	elected	to	Michigan	House	of	Representatives	
	 		Binsfeld	elected	to	Michigan	House	of	Representatives		
	 		Unsuccessful	effort	to	rescind	Michigan’s	ratification	of	ERA	
	 		Milliken	re-elected	governor	of	Michigan	(four-year	term)		
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1975	–	NRWTF	Created	
		Michigan	Republican	Women’s	Caucus	established	
	 		Kefauver	founded	“Feminist	Bureau	of	Investigation”	
	 		United	Nations	declared	1975	International	Women’s	Year	
	 		Eagle	Forum	founded	
	
1976	–	Republican	National	Convention	held	in	Kansas	City	
	 							Platform	contains	pro-ERA	plank,	but	no	support	for	abortion	
	 		ERAmerica	founded	–	chaired	by	Carpenter	and	Peterson	
	 		Michigan	ERAmerica	founded	–	honorary	chairs:	Milliken	and	Griffiths	
	 		Unsuccessful	effort	to	rescind	Michigan’s	ratification	of	ERA	
	
1977	–	International	Women’s	Year	Conference	held	in	Houston,	Texas	
	 		Hyde	Amendment	prohibits	use	of	federal	funds	for	abortion	
	 		Governor	Milliken	overrides	prohibition	on	using	state	funds	for	abortion	
	
1978	–	Milliken	reelected	governor	of	Michigan	(four-year	term)	
	 		Congress	extends	ERA	ratification	period	until	June	30,	1982	
	
1979	–	MRWTF	Created	
	 		ERA	America	chaired	by	Helen	Milliken	and	Sharon	Percy	Rockefeller	
	 		George	Romney	announces	his	opposition	to	ERA	
	 		Initial	ratification	period	for	ERA	expires	
	 			
1980	–	Republican	National	Convention	held	in	Detroit	
	 							Platform	contains	no	planks	in	support	of	ERA	or	abortion	
	 		John	Anderson	becomes	independent	candidate	for	President	
		Ronald	Reagan	elected	President	(four-year	term)	
		Hyde	Amendment	determined	to	be	constitutional:	Harris	v.	McRae	
	
1981	–	NRWTF	purged	from	NWPC		
	
1982	–	Headlee	loses	gubernatorial	election	to	Blanchard	
	 		Extended	ERA	ratification	period	expires	
	
1983	–	MRWTF	purged	from	Michigan	Republican	Party	
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1984	–	McNamee	retires	from	Michigan	House	of	Representatives	
	 		Peterson	celebrates	her	70th	birthday		
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	 	 This	dissertation	explores	feminism	in	the	Michigan	Republican	Party	from	
the	late	1960s	until	the	early	1980s	through	the	activism	of	seven	women.	These	
women,	Republicans	before	they	were	feminists,	believed	in	the	efficacy	of	party	
politics	to	bring	about	change.	Therefore,	it	was	only	natural	that	once	they	became	
feminists	they	turned	to	the	political	system	to	effectuate	gender	equality.	They	
sought	to	bring	feminism	into	the	Republican	Party	and	Republican	Party	politics	
into	the	feminist	movement.	The	best	way	to	do	this,	they	assumed,	was	to	operate	
from	the	sensible	center	of	the	women’s	movement.	From	this	middle	ground,	they	
rejected	radical	feminism	and	disparaged	the	apathy	of	women	who	were	satisfied	
with	 the	 status	 quo.	 As	 the	 conservative	 movement	 became	 increasingly	 anti-
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feminist	 and	 the	 Republican	 Party	 became	 increasingly	 conservative,	 however,	
Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	were	forced	to	align	with	moderates	to	maintain	
their	presence	in	the	party.	In	doing	so,	they	became	an	integral	part	of	the	struggle	
between	moderates	and	conservatives	for	control	of	the	party.		
As	conservatives	gained	greater	control	over	the	party	in	the	latter	part	of	
the	1970s,	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	found	that	it	was	becoming	difficult	for	
them	 to	 reconcile	 their	 partisanship	 and	 their	 feminism.	 Conservatives	 were	
squeezing	them	out	of	the	party	and	feminist	political	organizations	were	reluctant	
to	embrace	members	of	a	political	party	that	challenged	their	raison	d’etre.	When	
conservative	leaders	won	the	Republican	Party’s	nominations	for	the	presidency	in	
1980	and	the	governorship	of	Michigan	in	1982,	Michigan’s	Republican	feminists	
had	 to	 individually	 determine	 how	 to	 reconcile	 and	 prioritize	 two	 of	 their	 core	
identities.	Many	of	them	voted	for	candidates	from	other	parties,	left	the	party	or	
retired	 from	politics.	 Two	of	 them,	however,	 remained	active	 in	 the	Republican	
Party,	hoping	to	promote	moderation	from	within.	Republican	feminists	lost	when	
conservatives	gained	control	of	the	party,	but	their	activism	yielded	some	benefit.	
Forty	 years	 later,	 some	 of	 their	 goals	 have	 been	 embraced	 as	 mainstream	 by	
members	of	the	Republican	Party.	
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